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 Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations (SE) investigates the five devices which sophists 
employ to appear wise in dialogue. The sophist’s primary device is the sophistical 
refutation which is a particular kind of fallacy. A sophistical refutation is a merely 
apparent refutation. Thus, the fallacy has two causes: the “causa apparentiae” and the 
“causa non existentiae." A genuine refutation is a syllogism based on an interlocutor’s 
opinions that leads necessarily to a conclusion which contradicts some other established 
position of the interlocutor. The sophist desires especially the apparent refutation of his 
opponent because the greatest glory follows upon seeming to expose the ultimate defect 
in opponent’s understanding, a contradiction. The SE neither accounts for every cause 
of error nor every type of false reasoning; “ad” arguments like ad baculum or ad hominem 
are not in investigated in the SE because they are not apparent refutations. 
 After a description of the SE’s subject matter, the dissertation’s introduction 
locates the role of the SE in Aristotle’s Organon and explains why a dialectician would 
investigate and untie sophisms. Sophistic is the sham portion of the dialectic which is a 
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universal art (τέχνη) of syllogizing from endoxes to the contradiction of an interlocutor. 
Unlike principles of demonstrations, endoxes are premises that are in accord “with the 
expectation (ἔνδοξος) of all or most or the wise, and of all the latter or most or of the 
most knowing.” They do not need to be certain or true; instead, they must be acceptable 
to a dialectical opponent. Dialecticians derive endoxes from dialectical places (τόποι), 
i.e., extrinsic and most universal principles which usually affirm relations between 
logical intentions and may be employed in any given subject matter. Sophists use 
sophistical places which may be expressed as universal propositions and provide the 
foundation for the apparent reasonability of the sophistical refutations. That said, unlike 
dialectical places, Aristotle does not present sophistical places as universal conditional 
statements of logical intentions; they are presented as common distinctions—such as the 
distinction between the different senses of a word—that a sophist may exploit to 
produce a sophistical refutation. A dialectician will study sophistic for the same reasons 
he will learn dialectic; it is useful for exercise, conversation, and in the philosophical 
sciences. Moreover, investigating sophisms facilitates appreciation of distinctions that 
are fundamental to Aristotelian philosophy, protects the philosopher from error, and 
preserves his reputation.  
Although translation of Aristotelian logical works is difficult—especially one 
which contains many examples of linguistic fallacies—the dissertation provides a 
faithful and consistent translation of the treatise. The line by line commentary contains 
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explanation of the order, purpose, and meaning of the text, clarification of Aristotle’s 
difficult examples, discussion of scholarly treatment of controversial passages, and 
references to other relevant passages in the Organon.  
The dissertation ends with two appendices to provide a thorough treatment of 
Aristotle’s two most deceptive fallacies: the fallacy of equivocation and the fallacy of the 
accident. The first appendix locates equivocation as a kind of proper naming (as 
opposed to figurative) and offers an original interpretation of Aristotle’s argument for 
the necessity of equivocation based on his understanding of how we name. Afterward, 
the appendix unfolds the nature and solution to the fallacy, explains Aristotle’s places 
(τόποι) for detecting equivocation, and categorizes the kinds of equivocation. 
 The second appendix unfolds a unique and overlooked explanation of the 
fallacy of the accident that allows Aristotle to be read consistently, distinguishes the 
fallacy from the other fallacies, and accounts for Aristotle’s examples. The fallacy of the 
accident occurs when a middle term’s connection to one extreme term is accidental to its 
connection to the other. The appendix locates the fallacy through a reduction of all 
fallacies outside of speech to ignorance of refutation, offers four distinct meanings of 
‘accident’ in Aristotle, shows which meaning Aristotle attributes to the fallacy, divides 
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Introduction I: Literature Review and Subject Matter 
 
I.I Literature Review 
 
When one of the company said to him, "Convince me that logic is necessary," 
"Would you have me demonstrate it to you?" he said. 
"Yes." 
"Then I must use a demonstrative form of argument." 
"Granted." 
"And how will you know, then whether my arguments mislead you?" On this, the man being 
silent, Epictetus said, "You see that even by your own confession, logic is necessary; since 
without it, you cannot even learn whether it is necessary or not." 
-Epictetus, Discourses 
 
Aristotle’s list of thirteen sophistical refutations is still a prevalent account—with 
a few additions or omissions—of logical fallacies.1 If one peruses most logic textbooks, 
he will find contained in the list of fallacies, Aristotle’s thirteen—or in some twelve2—
sophistical refutations.3 His taxonomy of fallacies was orignally compiled in Aristotle’s 
Sophistical Refutations over three hundred years before Christ.  Despite the work’s 
longevity, we know little about its immediate influence.  It is clear that Andronicus of 
Rhodes republished the Sophistical Refutations in the first century4 and that Galen wrote 
a small commentary on fallacies inside of speech, known as his De Captionibus.5 Still, 
                                                     
1 Cf. Hamblin, 1970, pp. 9-13. 
2 Scholars debate whether there are thirteen or twelve fallacies in Aristotle’s list. The fallacy of 
composition and the fallacy of division are often considered to be one fallacy. Again, sometimes the 
fallacy of ignorance of refutation is not considered to be part of the list but is rather treated as a super 
category. 
3 Cf. for instance, Oesterle, 1963, pp. 253-259, Kreeft, 2008, pp. 69-70, McInerny, 2004, pp. 104-129. 
4 Cf. Hamblin, 1970, p. 89. 
5 For those interested in the evidence for the chronology of this work relative to other of Galen’s works cf.  
Ebbesen I, 1981, p. 236. 
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outside of what is otherwise a small number of fragments and references, we are mostly 
ignorant of the response to and commentary on the Sophistical Refutations during the 
first fourteen hundred years of its existence.6   
Modern commentary is almost as limited. Although there has been some revival 
of interest in the philosopher’s thoughts about true argument, scholars have generally 
devoted little attention to the Sophistical Refutations. Scott Schreiber argues that the 
dearth of scholarship on the treatise is a result of the modern English analytic logical 
tradition’s tendency to classify all fallacies as dependent on speech—something that 
Aristotle repeatedly denies. Perhaps, in the revival of the study of Aristotelian logic, it 
was most natural for scholarship to begin with the Analytics and related works before 
moving to the Topics. The Sophistical Refutations may have been merely last in line. 
Indeed, it seems reasonable to study what makes an argument correct before 
considering ways it may go wrong. Whatever the reason for the lack of attention given 
to the treatise, recent scholarship on the Sophistical Refutations is relatively small. 
I have undertaken to treat the Sophistical Refutations as a whole through a 
translation, introduction, commentary, and appendices.  Such a holistic endeavor both 
narrows and broadens relevant secondary literature. On the one hand, since a holistic 
treatment of the Sophistical Refutations involves an articulation of the work’s function in 
Aristotle’s Organon, the amount of broadly relevant contemporary scholarship almost 
                                                     
6 Cf. Ebbesen I, 1981, pp. 18-51.  
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exceeds readability. On the other hand, there may be little to almost nothing written on 
the specific content of any given chapter of the treatise. For this reason, I have taken into 
account literature from ancient, medieval, and modern periods. What follows is a 
review of the more holistic treatments of the Sophistical Refutations that have informed 
my endeavor, beginning with the ancient literature, then the Medieval, and finally 
modern or contemporary scholarship.  
Ancient Literature 
 
The oldest preserved work on the Sophistical Refutations is Galen’s treatment of 
the fallacies from speech in De Captionibus. The work is a lengthy justification of 
Aristotle’s claim for a complete division of all fallacies from speech (SE 165b24-30) as 
well as an argument for the superiority of Aristotle’s classification over Stoic versions of 
the fallacies from speech. The treatise has informed my understanding of Aristotle’s 
division of the fallacies from speech. However, I do not address Aristotle’s classification 
of fallacies in relation to that of the Stoics. 
While there is little available from Aristotle’s immediate successors on the 
Sophistical Refutations, I have considered one of his predecessors to help shed light on 
the treatise—Plato. The Platonic dialogues often foreshadow doctrine in the Sophistical 
Refutations. In fact, Aristotle uses examples of sophisms taken almost word for word out 
of various dialogues. Moreover, both philosophers considered likeness to be a cause of 
error, and both emphasized the importance of a good beginning in philosophical 
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inquiry. I have not, however, undertaken to compare their notions of sophism or 
refutation. Louis Andre Dorion has already undertaken such a treatment in the 
introduction to his commentary on the Sophistical Refutations.7  
I have also consulted ancient commentators on Aristotle in specific areas related 
to the Sophistical Refutations. For instance, Alexander of Aphrodisias’ commentary on 
Aristotle’s Topics has influenced my understanding of Aristotle’s dialectical place, 
which is necessary for my articulation of sophistical place. Again, the Grammarian, 
John Philoponus, helped spur my treatement of Aristotle’s fallacy of the accident in 
relation to Aristotle’s “said of all” principle—though I do not side with Philoponus’ 
solution to the fallacy based on ambiguous quantifiers.8  
Medieval Literature 
 
I have sought guidance from medieval scholars in interpreting the treatise for a 
number of reasons. Principally, I found that the medieval commentators of the 
Sophistical Refutations are illuminating—often where modern scholarship is not.9 Since 
scholarship on the treatise is so limited, sometimes essential issues have not been 
addressed by modern scholarship. The notion of place in the treatise and how it relates 
                                                     
7 Cf. Dorion, 1995, pp. 37-58. Cf. also Ebbesen, 2011, pp. 88-94. 
8 Cf. Philoponus, 1905, pp. 11-16. Cf. Bäck, 1987, pp. 131-146. 
9 As, for instance, Albert the Great’s account of how fallacies outside of speech may involve ambiguous 
language or the medievals’ explanation of Aristotle’s division of the fallacies outside of speech or (ps) 
Thomas Aquinas’ three species of the fallacy of accident. Other scholars have also used primarily 
medieval interpretations of the Sophistical Refutations as guides in understanding the Sophistical 
Refutations: cf. Gelber, 1987, pp. 110-145 or Ebbesen, 2011, pp. 75-94. 
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to the notion of place in the Topics has been entirely untouched by modern scholarship. 
The medievals, however, did not hesitate to bring to light sophistical places.10 One 
might add that many prevelant interpretations of the Sophistical Refutations originated in 
Medieval scholarship. For instance, the analysis of sophisms into the cause of 
nonexistence and the cause of appearance—although found in modern scholarship—
has its most detailed account in Albert the Great’s commentary. 
Many Latin authors refer to a text of “Alexander.” There are a couple of versions 
of Greek texts at various stages of development. It was assumed that these texts are a 
commentary on the Sophistical Refutations by Alexander of Aphrodisias. However, 
positive evidence showing Alexander to be the original author is limited.11 The extant 
Greek work, previously attributed to Alexander, has been reasonably attributed to the 
Byzantine Michael of Ephesus in the thirteenth century by Wallies.12 The chronological 
order and development of the various (ps) Alexander texts is obscure. Sten Ebbesen 
argues for a priority between them in his published doctoral dissertation.13 I will cite the 
most complete version of the work—as has become the standard—as that of Michael of 
Ephesus. The work is a complete commentary on the Sophistical Refutations. Ephesus 
helpfully points out apparent difficulties and their resolution within the text. For 
                                                     
10 Cf. (ps) Aquinas, 1976, c. 4.  
11 Cf. Ebbesen III, 1981, pp. 242-244. 
12 Cf. A.C. Lloyd, 1986, pp. 231-233 
13 Cf. Ebbesen III, 1981, pp. 70-77. 
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instance, he notes that nothing prevents an argument from committing many fallacies, 
an observation which explains why two similar examples are given for different 
fallacies.   
Albert the Great’s commentary on the Sophistical Refutations is one of the most 
extensive available. It is analytical insofar as it resolves the various sophistical 
refutations into their causes. Although the commentary at times suffers from a lack of 
clarity, it is characteristic of Albert to explain both why each sophistical refutation fails 
to be a genuine refutation, and why each sophistical refutation appears to be a 
refutation. As a result, his analysis of each of Aristotle’s examples is singularly 
illuminating.  
It is a disputed question whether or not Thomas Aquinas wrote the De Fallaciis.14 
I do not consider the work to be authentic to Aquinas based merely on certain eye tests. 
The work does not have the structure or the rigor of a standard commentary by 
Aquinas on Aristotle. Moreover, the author sometimes makes claims that I find hard to 
believe Saint Thomas—during any period of his life—would say. The work has the 
virtue of discussing topics that are not discussed, or at least not discussed in as much 
detail, in other commentaries. The work considers, for instance, the fallacy of what is 
simply and what is in a certain respect as based on what is perfect and imperfect in 
                                                     
14 On the attribution of this text to Thomas Aquinas and other questions, cf. H. F. Dondaine’s criticism 
within: (ps) Aquinas, 1976, pp. 385-400.  
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things. Moreover, the author characteristically divides the thirteen fallacies into 
subspecies.  
In any case, I have otherwise used Thomas Aquinas, particularly his logical 
commentaries on the Posterior Analytics and De Interpretatione. Aquinas offers a unique 
account of Aristotle’s logic from a synoptic perspective, which helps locate the 
Sophistical Refutations among the other works of the Organon, although I do not 
ultimately agree with Aquinas’ strict articulation of the function of the Sophistical 
Refutations in comparison to other works. 
 On a more limited basis, I have consulted additional Latin authors. Both the 
Italian jurist, Julius Pacius, and the Italian Jesuit, Sylvester Maurus, provide full-length 
glosses of the treatise. I have used Pacius merely as a foil to my interpretation of the 
text. Sylvester Maurus has a gift for clarity. Sylvester has the clearest and most 
thorough account of Aristotle’s claim that his division of fallacies from speech can be 
justified both through induction and syllogism. Moreover, he provides the best account 
of why the fallacy of amphiboly must be distinct from the fallacy of equivocation. 
Moreover, I have consulted William of Ockham’s analysis of the fallacy of the accident 
and his treatment of the dictum de omni controversy which touches on Aristotle’s 
primary division of fallacies inside and outside of speech. 
Modern and Contemporary Literature 
 
 8 
The last English translation and commentary done on the Sophistical Refutations is 
that of Edward Poste in 1866. I have found Poste’s commentary useful in pointing out 
texts from Aristotle’s corpus, which shed light on the Sophistical Refutations. Moreover, 
he often gives useful analysis on the translation of specific words or phrases. Still, Poste 
unfortunately does not seem to have taken Aristotle seriously; he is all too ready to 
draw attention to superficial contradictions in the text, and then to let them stand as a 
mere result of Aristotle’s lack of “accuracy.”15 
Sten Ebbesen’s doctoral dissertation is a systematic study on who the author of 
(ps) Alexander’s commentary was and anything and everything else related to the 
Sophistic Refutations. Although Ebbesen rightly worries that readers of his work may 
repeatedly state: μέγα βιβλίον μέγα κακόν, the work nevertheless provides a stunning 
breadth of interpretations of the Sophistical Refutations. The work sometimes lacks a 
clear order and unity. More recently, Ebbesen has published more accessible and 
unified articles on the middle chapters of the Sophistical Refutations  
The most thorough treatment of Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations written in the 
last hundred years is Louis Andre Dorion’s French translation and commentary. In his 
introduction, Dorion argues that the Sophistical Refutations is directed against the 
Megarians and not the men we usually think of as sophists—such as Protagoras, 
                                                     
15 Cf. Poste, 1866, n. 2, p. 145 and SE 176b36-40 with note ad loc. Cf. also Poste, 1866, n. 14, p. 158; n. 9, p 
157. Cf. also, Appendix II: Fallacy of the Accident. 
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Hippias, and Gorgias— because these well-known “sophists” did not practice eristic 
refutation. Rachel Barney has argued that Dorion overstates this central thesis in his 
introduction.16 I have not considered the question in my commentary because, while 
interesting, this historical question is not central to the subject matter of the Sophistical 
Refutations. As Dorion himself notes, the treatise is not a polemic against a particular 
group of men’s methods of debating; it is far more universal in scope. The Sophistical 
Refutations is about the tools of the sophist simply—such a treatise has merit outside the 
time and place of any particular sophists.  That said, Dorion’s translation and line by 
line commentary on the text itself is an indispensable resource. He has also published 
two articles related to the Sophistical Refutations: one on the relationship between 
Socratic and Aristotelian refutation, and another on the relationship between dialectic 
and eristic in the Sophistical Refutations.   
The only contemporary English monograph devoted solely to the Sophistical 
Refutations is Schreiber’s Aristotle on False Reasoning. Schreiber’s goal is to show the 
philosophical justification for Aristotle’s taxonomy of fallacies; he argues that just as the 
fallacies outside of speech are based on mistakes about language, so too the fallacies 
from speech are based on errors about the world—hence his subtitle: Language and the 
World in the Sophistical Refutations.  He completes his goal through a close treatment of 
Aristotle’s examples. I disagree with some of Schreiber’s central positions taken on the 
                                                     
16 Cf. Barney, 1998, pp. 111-120. 
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text.17 Nonetheless, his analyses of particular portions of the treatise are often the most 
persuasive accounts of Aristotle available.18 
Hamblin’s extensive book, Fallacies, is not devoted principally to the Sophistical 
Refutations, but instead is a treatment of fallacies in general. Hamblin, nevertheless, 
devotes a significant portion of his work to the Sophistical Refutations because of its 
dominant influence on the understanding of fallacies. Hamblin’s work is useful, in part, 
by manifesting particular ways in which the Sophistical Refutations takes from Platonic 
dialogues. Hamblin also has a clear account of the development of the notion of fallacy 
from the time of Aristotle. This account is essential to understanding the subject matter 
of the Sophistical Refutations.  
In my introduction’s discussion of dialectic and the notion of dialectical place, I 
have relied heavily on Robin Smith’s translation and commentary on Books I and VIII 
of the Topics. I have also used P. Slomkowski’s monograph Aristotle’s Topics, although I 
ultimately move away from Slomkowski’s position and side with Alexander of 
Aphrodisias understanding that dialectical places are not premises but principles of 
premises. I have also consulted the sections concerning dialectic and art in C.D.C. 
Reeve’s recent edition of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Yvan Pelletier’s French monograph La 
                                                     
17 For instance, I disagree with Schreiber’s position that Aristotle held one can avoid all error by changing 
twelve false beliefs. Cf. Schreiber, 2003, p. xiii. I will say more on this point in my introduction below.  
18 For instance, Schreiber has the most reasonable account of why Aristotle excludes the use of 
synonymous names in contradiction. Cf. Schreiber, 2003, pp. 88-90. Moreover, we are more or less in 
agreement concerning how Aristotle divides the fallacies inside of speech. Cf. Schreiber, 2003, pp. 57-58.  
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Dialectique Aristotelicienne, and Anthony Andres’ dissertation A Thomistic Definition of the 
Dialectical Topica for the notion of second or logical intentions.  
This review of literature does not exhaust the texts I have consulted nor the 
works that I will reference. It does, however, give some introduction to the influential 
literature in my own work on the Sophistical Refutations, and on the Sophistical 
Refutations in general. Many other scholars have treated some portion of the Sophistical 
Refutations. For instance, on any given fallacy, there are often numerous authors—
medieval and contemporary—who have analyzed Aristotle’s treatment. I have 
consulted many, if not all, of their analyses. Other authors that I have used in these 
more particular regards I have indicated in my notes and bibliography. 
English translations of the work include the old Oxford translation by Sir Arthur 
Wallace Pickard-Cambridge, which remains one of the best translations available of the 
Sophistical Refutations. Peiter Hapser’s recent translation of the treatise is the best. I have 
also consulted E. S. Forster’s translation from the Loeb Classical Library. Poste’s 
translation of the Sophistical Refutations has been more accurately described as a 
“paraphrase,”19 and I have rarely used his edition to inform my own translation of the 
work. 
I have based my translation of the text on Ross’s critical edition of the Topics and 
the Sophistical Refutations. At times, I have sided with other editors or translators against 
                                                     
19 Cf. Forster, 1995, p. 8. 
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Ross’s Greek text. Such cases, I have indicated in the commentary. I have used the 
pagination from Ross’s critical apparatus to indicate the manuscripts that form a basis 
for my deviations from Ross. As is necessary in translation, The Bekker reference 
numbers are approximate and do not always perfectly mirror the Greek. In my 
translation, I have tried to strike a balance between translating into fluent English and 
providing a literal translation that leaves interpretation to the reader. In instances where 
any variation from the Greek’s syntax and vocabulary tilts the translation toward one 
interpretation over another, I stayed as close as possible to the original Greek. In 
instances where it seemed to me that some variation of the original Greek syntax could 
still render Aristotle’s intended meaning, I have not hesitated to put the phrase into 
more readable English.  
One can find the commentary on each chapter at the after the translation. The 
commentary is intended to provide both interpretation of the text itself and to provide 
references to other relevant passages of Aristotle. I have included more thorough 
discussion of the fallacy of the accident and the fallacy of equivocation as appendices. 
The notes and appendices are not intended to explain Aristotle by using the “language” 
of the prevalent symbolic logic. Instead, they are intended to explain Aristotle as I think 
he would explain himself. Naturally, this dissertation only touches upon many topics 
that could be treated more fully. Finally, I have included a glossary to indicate how I 
have translated certain central terms.  
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I.II Subject Matter 
 
Yet at the same time, they should have said something about error. For 
this is more proper to animals, and the soul continues in this for more 
time.  
-Aristotle De Anima 
 
The Meaning of Fallacy 
 
Aristotle, while arguing against his predecessors’ accounts of soul, criticizes their 
failure to account for error (DeAn 427a16-b2). The universal experience of “getting it 
wrong” must have a place in any complete epistemology. Sophistical Refutations may be 
considered as Aristotle’s account of error insofar as it aims to explain some logical 
causes of error. Accordingly, one way to understand the subject matter of this treatise is 
to approach it through its relation to the meaning of error. 
Aristotle defines error as stating “what is as what is not, and what is not as what is” 
(DeIn 17a26). The word “error” is derived from the Latin word errorem, which means a 
wandering.20 In fact, the English word “error” originally meant “wander.”21 
Interestingly, Christ even uses “wander” as a figure of error while reproving the 
Sadducees: “You wander (πλανᾶσθε), not knowing the Scriptures, nor the power of 
God.”22 What can this etymology teach us about error? The etymology suggests that just 
as wandering is a certain disordered physical movement, so also is error a certain 
                                                     
20 We have the same etymology in the Greek word πλάνη. The planets were considered by the ancients to 
be nothing other than the stars that wandered around the twelve constellations of the Zodiac.  
21 Cf. Onions I, 1973, p. 678. 
22 Matthew 22:29. Cf. also Mark 12:24. 
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disordered discourse in our reason or the result of a disordered discourse in our reason. 
In other words, only by proceeding in an orderly way, can we proceed without error. 
For this reason, Aristotle places heavy emphasis on making good beginnings and 
proceeding in an orderly fashion. For, as he says, the beginning is more than half of the 
whole.23 
In contrast, the word “mistake” has an etymology that suggests that error results 
from missing some distinction. The word “mistake” is derived from the English “miss 
take.” Whenever things closely resemble one another, it is easy to take one for the other 
or to make a “mistake.” The mind naturally aims at the truth (Meta 980a20 and Rhet 
1355a20ff), although it sometimes misses the mark for something that resembles it 
closely. Thus, Aristotle establishes that likeness is a general cause of error (SE 164a26-
b24). If we see the likeness between two things without seeing their distinction, we may 
mistakenly take one for the other. A failure to make distinctions is the root of Aristotle’s 
explanation of error (SE 169a21-b18).  
                                                     
23 Cf. NE 1098b. Cf. also SE 164a25 and note ad loc for a full discussion of Aristotle’s understanding of the 
necessity of order in philosophy. St Thomas Aquinas also notes this connection between error and 
making a good beginning in the Proemium to his commentary on the Posterior Analytics: “But the third 
process of reason is that in which reason fails to reach a truth because some principle which should have 
been observed in reasoning was defective,” Cf. Berquist, 2007, p. 2. This also manifests the reason why 
Thomas gives his order of the fruit of logic: to proceed orderly, easily, and without error. Cf. Berquist, 
2007, p. 1. One can proceed without error only insofar as he proceeds in an orderly fashion.  Cf. Maurer, 
1949, pp. 25-26. 
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The word fallacy is not just another name for error.24 The word fallacy is related to 
the words error and mistake, but a fallacy is not strictly speaking either. Aristotle 
describes fallacies in the treatise as the ways of deceiving one's interlocutor into 
thinking that he has been refuted.25 This description is to describe fallacy in the specific 
context of the Sophistical Refutations. More generally, a fallacy is a way of making a 
mistake or error. The fallacy of equivocation, for instance, does not name any particular 
mistake in thinking but a way of making a mistake in thinking. Aristotle’s subject 
matter, however, is not the fallacy as such but a particular kind of fallacy: the 
sophistical refutation.  
What is a Sophistical Refutation? 
 
The Sophistical Refutations does not treat every kind of fallacy.26 Its principal 
subject matter is the thirteen ways of making sophistical refutations, and not every 
fallacy, as we shall see, is a way of making a sophistical refutation. A sophistical 
refutation is a more limited notion. Nevertheless, it is not the only subject of the 
                                                     
24 Bradley H. Dowden, for instance, claims, “Errors in reasoning are called fallacies.” Cf. Dowden, 1993, p. 
186. 
25 Cf., for example, SE 165b24. 
26 Some commentators seem to have missed the narrow scope of the treatise. Schreiber claims: “He says 
that there are twelve ways and only twelve ways by which false arguments can appear to be persuasive,” 
and “Aristotle believes that he has uncovered the 12 false beliefs about language and the world whose 
correction will protect one from being taken in by false arguments.” Cf. Schreiber, 2003, p. xiii, emphasis 
my own.  (Schreiber holds that there are really twelve and not thirteen fallacies in the Sophistical 
Refutations by claiming that the fallacy of composition is the same fallacy as that of division.) On the other 
end of the spectrum, Davies holds that Aristotle’s fallacies are mere historical accident: “The study of 
fallacies is an exercise in folklore.” For “the list of 13 sophistical refutations we find in the fourth and fifth 
chapters are just examples of some tricks that (fourth century Athenian) sophists got up to.” Cf. Davies, 
2012, pp. 12-15. 
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Sophistical Refutations. The treatise has five subjects corresponding to various tools that 
sophists use to appear wise (SE 165b12-23). The principal tool is the sophistical 
refutation, and therefore it is the chief subject of Aristotle’s treatise.  Aristotle says that 
sophistical refutations are what “appear to be refutations, but are fallacies and not 
refutations.”27 One can understand sophistical refutation through its positive 
counterpart, the sound refutation. A refutation is defined as a “syllogism with a 
contradiction of the conclusion.”28  To understand the Sophistical Refutations one ought 
to consider Aristotle’s notions of syllogism, contradiction, and sophism. 
Refutation as a Syllogism  
Aristotle categorizes syllogism as one of four kinds of arguments (λόγοι): 
induction, syllogism, example, and enthymeme.29 Although the concept of argument is 
fundamental to any logical work, it is seldom examined. According to its genus, 
argument is a form of speech. This speech is a tool formed by the mind to reason, by 
which we come to know or suppose that a statement is true or false or probable or 
improbable because of other statements that we know or suppose are true or false or 
probable or improbable. Through argument the mind is led from what is known, or 
                                                     
27 τῶν φαινομένων μὲν ἐλέγχων, ὄντων δὲ παραλογισμῶν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐλέγχων (SE 164a20-21). 
28 ἔλεγχος δὲ συλλογισμὸς μετ' ἀντιφάσεως τοῦ συμπεράσματος (SE 165a2-3). 
29 Cf. APo 71a5-11, There is some question as to whether or not the example and enthymeme are just 
syllogism and induction used in rhetoric as Aristotle appears to be saying in this passage or that they are 
in fact distinct kinds of arguments as appears to be the case elsewhere. Cf. Rhet 1457b26-30, 1356a36-
1357a22 and 1357b25-1358a2; APr 68b37-60a13 and 70a3-38. Whatever the status of enthymeme and 
example is, it is clear that the syllogism is not the only kind of argument. For a more complete discussion 
of the argument from example, see SE 164a25-26 note ad loc. 
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known to be probable, to other things which were previously unknown, or unknown to 
be probable.  
 In the Prior Analytics, Aristotle defines a syllogism as “an argument (λόγος)30 in 
which, when certain [premises] have been laid down, something else, other than what 
was laid down, follows by necessity by those [premises] being so.” Aristotle then adds, 
“by, ‘by those [premises] being so,’ I mean that they happen through them, and by ‘it 
happens through them,’ that no extrinsic term is needed for the necessity to arise.”31 In 
other words, the definition does not imply that the conclusion is true but that the 
conclusion must be true if the premises are true and this necessity must be seen simply 
by what is laid down in the premises. The syllogism expresses a necessary intelligible 
connection between the premises and the conclusion.32 Aristotle gives a similar 
definition in the Sophistical Refutations (165a1), and a virtually identical definition in the 
Topics (100a25-27). 
 Two other elements in the definition are worth noting. First, there has to be a 
number of things—meaning premises—laid down. In all Aristotle’s definitions of 
                                                     
30 Alexander of Aphrodisias understood λόγος here to mean speech or utterance. Cf. Van Ophuijsen 7.15-
25, 2001, p. 9. I take it that both speech and argument are genera of the syllogism with argument being the 
more proximate genus.  
31 συλλογισμὸς δέ ἐστι λόγος ἐν ᾧ τεθέντων τινῶν ἕτερόν τι τῶν κειμένων ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνει τῷ 
ταῦτα εἶναι. λέγω δὲ τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι τὸ διὰ ταῦτα συμβαίνειν, τὸ δὲ διὰ ταῦτα συμβαίνειν τὸ μηδενὸς 
ἔξωθεν ὅρου προσδεῖν πρὸς τὸ γενέσθαι τὸ ἀναγκαῖον (APr 24b18-22).  
32 Cf. Byrne, 1997, pp. 31-32. Byrne’s account of Aristotle’s definition falls within a thorough account of 
Aristotle’s understanding of syllogism including an account of its figures and modes. Cf. Byrne 1997, pp. 
29-55.  
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syllogism, he uses the plural: τεθέντων. Alexander of Aphrodisias points out that the 
use of the plural implies that a syllogism must consist of at least two premises.33 
According to Aristotle, nothing new results from necessity from a single premise. This 
requirement excludes the possibility that such reasonings as the following are 
syllogisms: “Since no man is green, then no green thing is a man” or “Since you are 
breathing, you are therefore alive.”  The former “reasoning” is not a syllogism, but a 
conversion—it simply switches the position of the subject and the predicate—and the 
quasi-conclusion does not say anything more than its premise. The latter “reasoning” 
needs to have a missing premise supplied to be a syllogism, but as it stands is not a 
complete argument (cf. APr 40b35-36 and 53b16-20).  A second essential requirement of 
the syllogism is that the “something else” that “follows by necessity”—meaning the 
conclusion—must be different from the premises that constitute the syllogism. This 
requirement implies that not every valid deduction is a syllogism because a deduction 
can assume the conclusion in its premises whereas a syllogism cannot.   
 The definition of refutation given, “syllogism with a contradiction of the 
conclusion” (SE 165a2-3), at first glance may be confusing because it appears to say that 
a refutation is an argument whose conclusion is immediately contradicted and is 
therefore shown to be false. What Aristotle means, however, is that the conclusion 
contradicts some other statement such that the conclusion makes manifest the falsity of 
                                                     
33 Cf. Van Ophuijsen 8.15, 2001, p. 9. 
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the other statement, or at least that it is not in harmony with the syllogism’s premises. 
In the context of the Sophistical Refutations, the other statement in contradiction to the 
conclusion is held by one’s interlocutor. A syllogism is a refutation then insofar as its 
conclusion is an affirmation of what the interlocutor denies or vice versa.  
In the Sophistical Refutations and Topics, Aristotle speaks of refutation as coming 
about in the context of a particular form of dialectical disputation. Both works are 
concerned with methods used in one-on-one debates between interlocutors aiming at 
defeating one another through refutation or at least its appearance. In the disputation, 
the two key competitors are the questioner and the answerer. The interlocutors 
establish a specific problem for disputation, taking opposing sides. The questioner then 
seeks to build a syllogism using as premises only the responses of the answerer that 
concludes in a contradiction of the answerer’s original expressed opinion on the 
established problem. The premises of this form of dialectical argument are originally 
put forward as questions that one can answer with a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no.’ After failing to 
achieve outright refutation of the answerer's original position, the questioner may try to 
achieve lesser forms of victory. The answerer seeks to answer each question while 
avoiding yielding answers that the questioner may use as premises that will lead to his 
contradiction. Book VIII of the Topics presupposes various rules of this disputation that 
allow either of the interlocutors to call foul. The whole of the Topics and the Sophistical 
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Refutations presupposes this organized form of competitive intellectual exercise as the 
context of discussing refutation and sophistical refutation.34  
Refutation as Involving Contradiction 
Contradiction is part of the meaning of refutation. As the treatise makes clear, the 
notion of contradiction can be slippery. Contradiction is one of the four kinds of 
opposition (Cat 11ab15-13b37). In any two contradictory statements, “one opposite 
must always be true, while the other must always be false.”35 Unlike the opposition of 
contraries or sub-contraries, if two statements are in contradiction to one another there 
is no middle ground, both cannot be true, and both cannot be false.  
For this kind of opposition to come about there must be a specific relation 
between two “parts.” In one part of the contradiction, the affirmation joins a predicate 
with a subject; in the other part, the negation disjoins these same terms (DeIn 72a11-12). 
Aristotle clarifies in On Interpretation: 
Let this be a contradiction: an affirmation and a denial which are opposite; I call 
[statements] opposite when they affirm and deny the same thing of the same 
thing, not equivocally, together with all other [qualifications] we specify in 
addition regarding sophistical difficulties.36  
 
                                                     
34 This is not to say that the contents of the Topics and the Sophistical Refutations cannot be used outside 
this context. Most of the contents will be useful in any form of dialogue. The context does mean that 
Aristotle will take certain things for granted in his treatment of dialectic and sophistic, such as an 
audience of the disputation. For a more complete articulation of this practice of Aristotelian dialectical 
disputation, see Smith, 1997, pp. xiii-xxi and Slomkowski, 1997, pp. 9-42 
35 ἀναγκαῖον ἀεὶ τὸ μὲν [ἐναντίον] ἀληθὲς τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος αὐτῶν εἶναι (Cat 13b2-3). 
36 καὶ ἔστω ἀντίφασις τοῦτο, κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις αἱ ἀντικείμεναι· λέγω δὲ ἀντικεῖσθαι τὴν τοῦ 
αὐτοῦ κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μὴ ὁμωνύμως δέ, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τῶν τοιούτων προσδιοριζόμεθα πρὸς τὰς 
σοφιστικὰς ἐνοχλήσεις (DeIn 17a33-37). 
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The affirmation and denial are opposed as contradictories only when the very same 
thing is affirmed or denied of the very same thing. That is, the statement’s subject and 
predicate must be the same as well as their quantity. For example, “No man is mortal” 
is not the contradiction of “Every man is mortal.” The contradiction of “Every man is 
mortal” is “Not every man is mortal” or in other words “Some man is not mortal.” 
Contradiction is the unequivocal opposition of an affirmation and a denial of the same 
thing of one and the same thing.  
What does Aristotle mean by “concerning the sophistical difficulties?” Grappling 
with the various forms of sophistical refutation leads Aristotle to specify the nature of a 
true refutation and therefore contradiction more fully: 
Refutation is [a syllogism to] the contradiction of one and the same thing [held 
by an interlocutor], not of the name but of the thing, and not of the synonymous 
name,37 but of the same name, [in which the conclusion follows] from the 
premises that are granted by necessity (and does not assume [among the 
premises] the original problem), [where the contradiction is] according to the 
same thing,38 in relation to the same thing, in the same manner, at the same 
time.39  
 
In the passage quoted above, Aristotle lists some requirements for a true syllogism and 
others for a true contradiction. Concerning contradiction, not only must the predicate 
                                                     
37 The Greek word which I translate as synonymous here is συνωνύμος. The same word is defined as 
univocal in Cat 1a5.  However, the word can also be seen to have its transliteral meaning as evidenced by 
Rhet 1405a1. 
38 For Aristotle’s meaning of according to the same (κατὰ ταὐτὸ), cf. Appendix II: The Fallacy of the 
Accident. 
39 ἔλεγχος μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἀντίφασις τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἑνός, μὴ ὀνόματος ἀλλὰ πράγματος, καὶ ὁνόματος 
μὴ συνωνύμου ἀλλὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἐκ τῶν δοθέντων ἐξ ἀνάγκης μὴ συναριθμουμένου τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ, 
κατὰ ταὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς ταὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ (SE 167a22-26). 
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and the subject of the two contradictory statements be the same, but the predicate must 
be affirmed or denied of the same subject, in relation to the same thing, at the same 
time, in the same manner, and with the same terms.  There is no contradiction, for 
instance, in saying that four is both half and is not half as long as one makes these 
affirmations in relation to different numbers. In its full sense, contradiction is the 
univocal and synonymous opposition between an affirmation and denial of the same 
thing with the same name, according to the same thing, in relation to the same thing, at 
the same time, and in the same manner. 
In sum, a sound refutation is an argument in which certain premises based on 
the opinions of one’s interlocutor are laid down from which a conclusion follows 
necessarily which is in genuine contradiction with some other established position of 
the interlocutor.  By genuine contradiction, Aristotle means that contradiction affirms 
the same predicate of the same subject that the answerer denies or vice versa. They 
must apply at the same time, they must be said in the same respect, and if the subject or 
the predicate is in the category of relation, they must be said relative to the same thing. 
If the questioner forces the answerer into making statements that meet all of these 
requirements, then the answerer is genuinely refuted; two of his conceded positions are 
not in harmony with one another. Either one of the premises that he has accepted is 
false or his original position on the established problem is false. One way or another he 
is mistaken.  
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Refutation as Sophistical 
Aristotle’s characterization of sophistical refutations as “what appear to be 
refutations, but are fallacies and not refutations” (SE 164a20-23), makes clear that what 
makes a refutation sophistical is twofold. First, the argument must fail to be an actual 
refutation. Second, the argument must in some way appear to be a real refutation.40 
Aristotle identifies the cause of the deception as the likeness that the sophism has to 
genuine refutation (SE 164a25-26). Thus, appearance is essentially connected with the 
instrument of the sophist, the sophistical refutation. The notion of appearance not only 
enables Aristotle to define the sophistical refutation, but it also becomes a principle of 
distinction among sophisms: there will be as many different sophistical refutations as 
there are appearances of actual refutations. The number of sophisms, in short, is 
determined by the number of ways in which a speech which is not a syllogism may 
appear to be a syllogism. 
Albert the Great will help us bring these two requirements to light. Each 
sophistical refutation has two causes: its “causa apparentiae” and “causa non existentiae."41 
                                                     
40 One might doubt whether or not it is possible for an argument to appear to bring about a refutation of 
one’s interlocutor while in fact not bringing about this refutation. Accordingly, Aristotle does not assume 
that this kind of argument exists. Unlike Aristotle’s method in other disciplines, in the discipline of 
sophistic, Aristotle sets out to establish that the subject matter exists. Such arguments exist through 
likeness which is a universal cause of error. For, as we noted earlier, the etymology of mistake suggests 
that failure to make a distinction is at the root of error, but we can fail to make a distinction between two 
things when they have a certain likeness to one another. No one would ever mistake the salt for the 
pepper, but one may mistake the salt for the sugar. Cf. SE 164a24-165a20 and notes ad loc. 
41 Cf. Albertus Magnus I, 1890, tr. 2, c. 2, p. 542a. 
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Untying any sophism requires that one point out the effect of each of these two causes: 
why does it seem to be a refutation and why is it not a true refutation? Answering these 
questions is the heart of Aristotle’s “loosening up” of the knots tied by a sophistical 
refutation.  
An example may help us come to terms with Albert’s understanding of the 
causes of a sophistical refutation. In the case of the fallacy of equivocation, the "causa 
apparentiae" is a "unitatem vocis." For “the unity of the word (vox) is the cause of 
appearance.”42 Take the following argument: happiness is life’s end, but life’s end is 
death, and therefore happiness is death. Both premises are true and the conclusion 
appears to follow. Why? Likeness of the word ‘end’ is the reason for the appearance of a 
syllogism. Just as fool’s gold resembles and has the appearance of real gold because of 
its shiny yellow color, so also an argument may assume the appearance of a rigorously 
concluding syllogism because the word ‘end’ is the same. Obviously, the conclusion is 
not true. Albert says, “However the causa non existentiae is the diversity of 
signification.”43 The "causa non existentiae" or the cause of the defect of the syllogism is 
that it has four terms because ‘end’ signifies both the purpose of life and the termination 
of its duration. In other words, the argument has no middle term because life’s end does 
not signify the same thing in both premises, and hence the syllogism is defective. 
                                                     
42 [C]ausam apparentiae habet unitatem vocis (Albertus Magnus I, 1890, tr. 2, c. 2, p. 542a).  
43 Causam autem non existentiae habet diversitatem significatorum (Albert Magnus I, 1890, tr. 2, c. 2, p. 542a). 
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These causes of the sophistical refutation are sufficient for the appearance of 
refutation insofar as the interlocutor lacks experience. “For inexperienced people 
perceive just as if they were looking from far away.”44 Just as those who are 
inexperienced with the subtle difference between genuine and counterfeit gold are 
fooled by their likeness, so also are those inexperienced with the subtle difference 
between the genuine and sophistical refutation fooled by their likeness. In some way, 
then, inexperience with and ignorance of genuine refutation are causes of the 
appearance of sophistical refutations (SE 168a17-169a20). 
The Sophist’s Purposes 
Aristotle also unfolds the other causes of sophistical refutations. The agent cause 
of the sophistical refutation is the sophist. In harmony with Plato’s Sophist (268c), 
Aristotle characterizes the sophist as a person for whom “seeming to be wise is more 
profitable than being [wise] and not seeming to be.”45 That is, for the sophist it is better 
to appear to be wise than to be wise. He uses the tool of apparent refutation for the sake 
of an apparent wisdom. Aristotle also characterizes the sophist by his more proximate 
end as a lover of victory (SE 165b13, 171b22-b34). This characterization places the 
sophist in stark contrast to the philosopher—the lover of wisdom. Philosophy differs 
from dialectic in the manner of its capacity, but it differs from sophistry in the kind of 
                                                     
44 οἱ γὰρ ἄπειροι ὥσπερ ἂν ἀπέχοντες πόρρωθεν θεωροῦσιν (SE 164b26-27). 
45 μᾶλλον πρὸ ἔργου τὸ δοκεῖν εἶναι σοφοῖς ἢ τὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ δοκεῖν (SE 165a19-21). Cf. also Dorion, 
1995, pp. 52-53, 111-112, and 120-121. 
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life chosen (Meta 1004b16-25). It is not ability or even habit that principally 
distinguishes a philosopher from a sophist; it is their loves that divide them. For the 
sophist, winning is more important than the truth and therefore he chooses a life 
ordered to apparent wisdom. The philosopher would rather know the truth and appear 
ignorant and therefore chooses a life ordered to wisdom. A sophist chooses to place the 
good of appearing wise and the evil of appearing foolish over the good of truth and the 
fear of being mistaken. 
In the practical order, the first principle is the ultimate end, and the means are 
determined insofar as the practical intellect can bring about that end. Thus, the various 
tools or methods of the sophist are the different ways (τρόποι) that he may bring about 
the appearance of his wisdom.  Before Aristotle unfolds the different means of the 
sophist, he lays out the more proximate ends or aims of the sophist.  There are five 
aims: to refute the interlocutor, to manifest that he has stated a falsehood, to lead him 
into a paradox, to get him to commit a solecism, and fifth to make him babble (SE 
165b12-23). By overcoming his opponent in these five ways or the appearance of these, 
the sophist—the lover of victory—appears wise. They are his five forms of victory. 
The sophist prefers the end of refutation above all (SE 165b19-20). Albert the 
Great points out that the sophist orders his actions principally to refutation because he 
thinks that this will bring him the most glory.46 It is proper to the wise man to state the 
                                                     
46 Cf. Albertus Magnus I, 1890, tr. 1, c. 5, p. 533b: hoc enim maximam reputant gloriam.  
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truth but also to expose error (SE 165a25-27). Exposing error, however, is more glorious 
insofar as it involves upheaval, which captures the attention of an audience. Moreover, 
since the principle of non-contradiction is the ultimate principle of reason, its violation 
is the ultimate defect of reason. Revealing this defect through refutation is “the greatest 
of all purifications” (Sophist 230d6-10). The interlocutor is shown to have violated the 
fundamental principle of the mind. There is nothing more humiliating or disastrous to 
the mind than for it to be led to contradict itself. The refuter above all appears to be the 
benefactor of those in error. Not only does the refuter seem to know but he also sets 
others aright. The sophist’s chief aim is to refute because refuting brings about the 
greatest appearance of wisdom. 
Aristotle’s original definition of a sophistical refutation may then be revised to 
account for all of its various causes. A sophistical refutation is a speech that appears to 
be a refutation due to its likeness to a real refutation, but is not a refutation; it is sought 
as a means by the sophist to appear wise and deceives because of the interlocutor’s 
inexperience in distinguishing the genuine from the apparent refutation. 
What the Subject Matter is not. 
The Sophistical Refutations is about the causes of error, but it does not treat the 
causes of error from every angle. The treatise treats of error insofar as it may be caused 
by deceptive argument. Pride, the passions, and human nature are causes of error. 
Thomas Aquinas, for instance, holds that “the root of mistakes is twofold, to wit, the 
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affection of pride and the defect of the understanding.”47 Further, Aristotle holds that 
the stirring of the passions leads men to error (Rhet 154b8-12). Moreover, Aristotle 
implies that the lowness of our nature is in some sense the cause of error.48 While such 
causes are worthy of consideration, they are beyond the consideration of the treatise 
because they are not deceptions used in argument.  
Further, since the sophist's primary tool is sophistical refutation, and refutation is 
a syllogism, the work does not deal with every kind of sophistical argument. Aristotle’s 
treatise does not treat of an argument that appears to be an induction on account of 
some likeness, but that is not an induction as a result of some defect. Certainly, what 
Aristotle says in the Sophistical Refutations will lead one to suspect how he would 
account for this kind of fallacy and how one would untie such arguments, but they are 
never directly addressed. This subject matter, then, leaves out certain common 
“fallacies” such as the fallacy of the hasty generalization. The hasty generalization is a 
defective induction,49 and as such, it is not discussed in this work. 
Again, the treatise does not treat of arguments that are germane to a specific 
subject matter, but only concerns fallacies that one may use in any philosophical 
discipline. Although Aristotle claims that his list of sophistical refutations is complete, 
                                                     
47 Radix autem erroris est duplex, scilicet superbiae affectus, et defectus intellectus (Aquinas, 1953, VI, l.1, n. 238). 
48 Cf. DeAn 427b1-5. Cf. also Meta 1005b23-24 where Aristotle claims false imagination can cause one to 
verbally contradict first principles. 
49 Cf. Kreeft, 2008, p. 100. 
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the Sophistical Refutations does not treat every kind of sophistical refutation since some 
kinds of sophistical refutations are proper to a specific discipline. It is more efficient for 
a sophist to use tools that he can use in any discussion. On the one hand, the sophist 
cannot use the naturalistic fallacy—“the illicit inference from facts to norms”50—in 
mathematics or metaphysics. On the other hand, he can use the fallacy of equivocation 
in any discipline. It is because of the universal application of the fallacy of equivocation 
that it and similar fallacies are treated in the Sophistical Refutations while others are not.  
Finally, today we use the English word fallacy to refer to the “Ad” arguments 
such as ad baculum or ad hominem. Such “arguments” would not fall under Aristotle’s 
category of fallacy (παραλογισμός) because they are not apparent arguments at all.51 
They are available means of persuasion which do not primarily use λόγος but affect the 
πάθος or the judgement of ἔθος. Hamblin argues that Francis Bacon’s four idols mark a 
shift in the western world of treating these “appeals to psychological factors” as 
fallacies.52 Whatever the origin of calling such means of persuasion fallacies, it is clear 
that Aristotle does not consider these methods in the Sophistical Refutations because they 
do not appear to be refutations, syllogisms, or even arguments in the strict sense.53  
  
                                                     
50 Finnis, 1980, p. 33. 
51 Cf. Walton, 1992, p. 97: “Such arguments may help lead one to think a certain thing or think it with 
more conviction or intensity, but they do not do so through a form of apparent syllogism.”  
52 Cf. Hamblin, 1970, pp. 144-148. Cf. also Evans, 1975, p. 44.  
53 To say one can learn nothing about this kind of persuasion from Aristotle is too strong. Aristotle 
certainly touches this form of persuasion in the Rhetoric. Cf. for instance, Rhet 1354a16-31; 1356b28-1357a7 
1377b15-1378a31. Cf. also NE 1095a2-11. 
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Introduction II: Role of Sophistical Refutations in Aristotle’s 
Organon 
 
[T]his then is the first thing we should guard against, he [Socrates] said. We should not 
allow into our minds the conviction that argumentation (λόγοι) has nothing sound 
about it; much rather we should believe that it is we who are not yet sound and that we 
must take courage and be eager to attain soundness. 
-Plato, Phaedo 
 
II. I Socrates’ Call for An Art of Arguments “τέκνη περὶ λόγος” 
In Plato’s dialogue the Phaedo, the character, Phaedo, recounts Socrates’ final 
discussion with his friends in the hours leading up to his death. Socrates initially poses 
three arguments for the soul’s immortality—arguments that are convincing to most 
members of the discussion. Simmias and Cebes, however, remain unconvinced. Seeing 
their reticence, Socrates invites them to engage publicly in the conversation, to which 
they respond with strong rebuttals. They reply that the soul may be nothing more than 
a kind of harmony or composition in the body or perhaps a hardy material substance 
that, like a cloak, may outlast many owners, but will eventually perish like all other 
bodies. These rebuttals darken the mood: 
When we heard what they [Simmias and Cebes] said we were all depressed, as 
we told each other afterward. We had been quite convinced by the previous 
argument [Socrates’ argument], and they seemed to confuse us again, and to 
drive us to doubt not only what had already been said but also what was going 
to be said, lest we be worthless as critics or the subject itself [the fate of the soul] 
admitted of no certainty (Phaedo 88c, trans. Grube). 
 
However convincing Socrates’ original arguments had been to his interlocutors, those 
arguments were later subject to unforeseen objections that led Phaedo and his 
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companions not only to doubt their validity but even to question the validity of any 
argument whatsoever. Socrates’ interlocutors not only begin to doubt Socrates’ 
arguments; they begin to doubt argument itself. 
 Socrates responds to this skepticism with an exhortation to avoid the greatest of 
all suffering, that of becoming misologues—haters of argument: 
[W]e must not become misologues, as people become misanthropes. There is no 
greater evil one can suffer than to hate reasonable discourse. Misology and 
misanthropy arise in the same way. Misanthropy comes when a man without 
knowledge or skill (τέχνη) has placed great trust in someone and believes him to 
be altogether truthful (ἀληθῆ), sound (ὑγιῆ) and trustworthy (πιστὸν); then, a 
short time afterwards he finds him to be wicked and unreliable, and then this 
happens in another case; when one has frequently had that experience, especially 
with those whom one believed to be one's closest friends, then, in the end, after 
many blows, one comes to hate all men and to believe that no one is sound in any 
way at all. … This is a shameful state of affairs. … and obviously due to an 
attempt to have human relations without any skill in human affairs (Phaedo 89d-
e, trans. Grube). 54 
 
Socrates likens misology to misanthropy. One is hatred of other men, and the other is 
hatred of arguments. Just as misanthropy arises from trusting people that one should 
not trust, so too does misology stem from placing confidence in arguments that one 
should not trust. Certain arguments may seem (δοκεῖν) to be true at one time and at 
another time seem false. This inconsistency leads some men to spend their time hating 
                                                     
54 It is important to note that Grube translates τέχνη as skill. I translate the same Greek word as art when 
it is used in the Sophistical Refutations and St. Thomas Aquinas translates τέχνη as ars which I also 
translate as art. 
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all argument, shifting the blame away from their own want of skill onto the arguments 
(Phaedo 90c8-d7).  
 Socrates concludes that if one is fooled by an argument, the proper response is 
not to hate argument or to think that no argument can be true, sound, and trustworthy, 
but to recognize that we are not yet sound ourselves. Socrates claims that the cause of 
misanthropy is “an attempt to have human relations without any skill in human 
affairs.” Likewise, the cause of misology is an attempt to engage in argument without 
skill or art by which one may categorize sound arguments as sound arguments and bad 
arguments as bad arguments. To avoid mistaking one kind of argument for another 
requires studying what distinguishes different kinds of arguments, which includes 
studying how different arguments are made. In short, avoiding misology requires an art 
of arguments. 
II.II What is an Art (τέχνη) of Arguments? 
Aristotle’s Meaning of Art 
 
Whether or not Socrates’ call for an art of arguments was the direct cause of Aristotle’s 
composition of the Organon, Plato’s overall emphasis on dialectic clearly influenced the 
method and doctrine of Aristotle’s logical works.55 Aristotle understood dialectic and 
                                                     
55 The relationship of Aristotle’s and Plato’s conception of dialectic is a weighty subject. It will not be 
treated here. For lengthy discussions on the relationship see Evans, 1975, pp. 7-52 and Dorion, 2011, pp. 
563-582.  
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sophistic as arts of arguments,56 and so to understand Aristotle’s conception of the art of 
sophistic, let us first turn to Aristotle’s notion of art itself. 
To begin, let us consider art’s purpose. It is proper to man to direct his acts 
through reason and not only through instinct (Meta 980b28). Actions resulting from 
instinct are more determined than those resulting from reason. While a spider always 
builds the same sort of web and in the same way, a carpenter can build a house in many 
different styles and in many different ways.57 Human action is vastly indeterminate, 
and as a result, it is not always directed towards a good. Man requires reason, therefore, 
to help determine his acts in an orderly and efficient manner towards his ends.  
Utilizing his reason, man may determine his reason according to habit (ἕξις). A 
habit, which Aristotle places in the genus of quality (Cat 8b27), is a firm disposition by 
which a person is disposed in a good or bad condition.58 Habit is distinguished from the 
stricter sense of disposition insofar as habits are more stable and longer lasting than 
dispositions (Cat 8b28-9a4).59 Aristotle offers scientific knowledge and moral virtue as 
examples of habits to manifest that they cannot be lost without great upheaval. In 
                                                     
56 Cf., for example, SE 165a32-39. 
57 Thomas Aquinas uses this and other similar examples to explain what Aristotle sees as the difference 
between art and instinct in his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics. Cf. Blackwell, 1995, I, l. 13, n. 259, p. 
130. 
58 Meta 1022b11. Cf. also NE 1104b19. Cf. also, for example, the two τρόποι of habit, in the beginning of 
PA 639a 2-3. 
59 But a habit can also be called a disposition in the broad sense for by a habit we are disposed in some 
way. Thus, the word disposition could be used in general for this species or genus of quality and then be 
kept for the disposition in particular that is easily movable while the other species, adding something 
noteworthy (stability and long lastingness), gets the new name of habit. Cf. Cat 9a12-14. 
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contrast, health and sickness are dispositions because they come and go. Habit then is 
some sort of firm disposition in a person towards a determined end. 
When a habit determines human action to its proper end, it is a good habit or 
virtue.  Aristotle lists art as one of the five virtues of thought (τῆς διανοίας, NE 
1138b35-a2, 1139b16–17). All virtue “causes that of which it is a virtue to be in a good 
state (ἕξις), and to perform its characteristic activity (ἔργον) well” (NE 1106a15– 19; cf. 
also, Top 131b1– 4). Every virtue is a “good state” or habit (ἕξις) and directs human 
powers to perform their proper acts well.  For Aristotle, then, art is a virtue of thought 
that orders human action toward the art’s particular end.60  
Next, let us investigate what makes art a “virtue of thought.” Aristotle’s 
examples of habits in the Categories match the two kinds of virtues in the Ethics: 
character virtue and virtue of thought (NE 1103a10). While virtues of character are 
acquired by repeatedly doing the same kind of action (ἔθος), virtues of thought owe 
their “origin and development mainly to teaching, for which reason its attainment 
requires experience and time” (NE 1103a14-16, trans. Crisp). Aristotle claims that arts 
are acquired by learning rather than practice (Meta 1047b34). Clearly, what is acquired 
by learning instead of repeated action must be some sort of knowledge. Hence, art is a 
virtue of thought by being a kind of habit or fixed disposition of knowing.  
                                                     
60 Aristotle considers all arts as aimed at some good. Cf. NE 1094a1. 
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More specifically, art is a habit of knowing how to make something. In contrast, 
the virtue of scientific knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), which is also a habit of knowing, does 
not directly teach one to make anything. Aristotle claims that “all arts and productive 
sciences are abilities. For they are principles of change in some other thing inasmuch as 
it is other.”61 Art is distinguished from the speculative virtues of thought insofar as it is 
practical and distinguished from prudence insofar as it is ordered to the production of 
some product. Hence, Aristotle says, 
Every art is about coming into being, and employing an art means to consider 
how contingent things whose principle is in the one making but not in the thing 
made may come to be.62   
 
If it is to be art, there must be something made. Making is an action that passes into 
something else as building or cutting pass into something other, but doing an action 
may also abide in the agent as dancing or running do not pass into another.63 Making is 
ordered to the production of something other than the action itself.  Art perfects 
reason’s direction of activities which pass into exterior matter. Prudence perfects 
reason’s direction of activities which remain in the agent. In a word, art is a habitual 
                                                     
61 πᾶσαι αἱ τέχναι καὶ αἱ ποιητικαὶ ἐπιστῆμαι δυνάμεις εἰσίν: ἀρχαὶ γὰρ μεταβλητικαί εἰσιν ἐν ἄλλῳ 
ἢ ᾗ ἄλλο (Meta, 1046b2-3). Cf. also NE, 1098b33 where Aristotle opposes ἕξις to its actuality. 
62 ἔστι δὲ τέχνη πᾶσα περὶ γένεσιν καὶ τὸ τεχνάζειν καὶ θεωρεῖν ὅπως ἂν γένηταί τι τῶν 
ἐνδεχομένων καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ (NE 
1140a10-14).  
63 Cf. Summa Theologiae, Ia IIae, q. 57, a. 4.  
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knowledge of how to produce something “other” well, or as Aristotle puts it, art is "a 
productive habit (ἕξις) in cooperation with true reason.”64 
 It should also be clear at this point that insofar as Aristotle considers art (τέχνη) 
a habitual knowledge, it is more specific than our normal English meaning of the word. 
We might speak of “arts” as acquired by training as well as by learning—even as 
primarily acquired by training. It is hard to see how “art” could be considered a 
habitual knowledge that is acquired primarily by teaching. For Aristotle, however, what 
is acquired by training is called experience (ἐμπειρία). Aristotle contrasts art with 
experience in the first chapter of his Metaphysics. Art comes about through experience 
(διὰ τῆς ἐμπειρίας, Meta 191a3). Aristotle claims “art comes to be whenever one 
universal supposition concerning similar things comes about from many intelligible 
objects of experience.”65 It is a matter of experience to know that when Callias was sick 
this treatment helped him, but it is matter of art to know that anyone of a certain sort 
can be helped by this sort of treatment (Meta 981a7-12). No art as such considers the 
individual as such, although art’s use does (Rhet 1356b30-36). Aristotle’s art is 
exclusively a habitual knowledge.66 This is why C.D.C. Reeve translates τέχνη as “craft 
                                                     
64 ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική (NE 1140a10).  
65 γίγνεται δὲ τέχνη ὅταν ἐκ πολλῶν τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἐννοημάτων μία καθόλου γένηται περὶ τῶν 
ὁμοίων ὑπόληψις (Meta 981a5-7). 
66 Although using art in this way may seem counter-intuitive, this interpretation of Aristotle’s art is fairly 
standard. Joe Sach’s describes Aristotle’s art as the “know-how that permits any kind of skilled making.” 
Cf. Sachs, 1999, p. 243. Apostle states, “This [art] is knowledge and skill of how to produce something.” 
The emphasis is Apostle’s. Cf. Apostle, 1976, p. 451.  
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knowledge” rather than the more traditional renderings of art or craft.67 It should be 
clear then that Aristotle uses the word art (τέχνη) as a habit of the mind and not as 
acquired primarily by training. 
 It is worth noting that that a man could not be a good carpenter without 
experience in carpentry. Aristotle is simply saying that the art (τέχνη) is not the 
experience. As Aristotle says, “knowledge and comprehension belong to art rather than 
to experience” (Meta 981a24-25). In fact, Aristotle claims a man with experience is often 
more successful in producing his product than a man with an account (λὀγος) but 
without experience (Meta 981a12-15). Possessing the art of carpentry is not sufficient to 
make good desks and tables in every instance; experience is also necessary.  For 
experience is knowledge of the particular while art is knowledge of the universal. A 
carpenter does not build a universal desk but this or that desk (Meta 981a15-23). 
Certainly, experience in woodworking is necessary for a person to be a good carpenter. 
 Although the man of experience may bring about a product more efficiently than 
an artist, the artist is wiser than the man of experience. For the artist knows both what 
the product is and why such and such actions will bring about the product because he 
knows the cause (Meta 981a24-28). The man of experience may know that this action 
will bring about this product but he does not know why.  For this reason, the more 
architectonic artist is wiser than the handicraftsman—not because he is more practically 
                                                     
67 Cf. for instance, Reeve, 2016, 980b26ff, p. 2.  
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efficient but because he has a more complete account and knows more than merely the 
proximate causes (Meta 981a29-981b9).  
An Art of Arguments 
 
 Accordingly, the art of arguments, commonly called logic, is a habitual 
knowledge ordered chiefly to the production of arguments.68 The mind is properly able 
to know and direct its own acts, and thus it is able to dispose itself to make things well. 
The mind is ordered by nature to the truth (Meta 980a20). The mind comes to know 
what it does not know, at least in part, through arguments,69 and therefore it follows 
that the mind comes to its good through the production of arguments. Consequently, 
logic is chiefly an art of knowing how to make arguments.  
 Arguments are artifacts in an extended sense. They exist in the mind. Surely, 
they are not “other” in the usual sense, but they must be “other” in some way. We 
speak of “making” arguments and nothing can make itself. There is some distinction 
between the maker and the made even if the product exists in the maker. It is the fruit 
of his labor. Aristotle, for example, is willing to call health the product of the art of 
                                                     
68 The art of logic also considers how other second intentions such as definitions or endoxical statements 
might be made. Chiefly, however, logic is ordered to the production of arguments since argument is the 
mind’s primary means of coming to know what it does not know. Even knowledge of how to make 
definitions and endixical statements can in some way be seen as ordered to the production of arguments. 
One reason why the mind should know how to make definitions is because a definition is often the 
middle term in demonstration. We shall see below that endoxical statements are the premises of 
dialectical arguments.  
69 It is clear that Aristotle holds that one comes to know through arguments by his inductive manner of 
showing that all learning comes from preexistent knowledge. Cf. APo 71a1-11. 
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medicine (Meta 1032b1-14). Still, the doctor is not limited to bringing about health in 
others, but he can also bring about health in himself (Phys 192b25). In the same way, a 
logician makes arguments that exist in his and other minds, and nevertheless they are in 
some sense distinct from the logician. 
II.III A Neat Division of Arguments 
Where does the Sophistical Refutations fit into this art of argument? Socrates 
divides men into three classes: those who are always truthful (ἀληθῆ), sound (ὑγιῆ), 
and trustworthy (πιστὸν), those who never are, and those who are in between the other 
two kinds (Phaedo 89e-90b). By this division, Socrates’ analogy of misology to 
misanthropy anticipates Thomas Aquinas’ threefold division of the kinds of argument 
in his prooemium to the Posterior Analytics. Thomas, taking for his criterion the different 
degrees of certainty demanded by the conclusions of the arguments, divides the logic of 
reasoning into three parts.70 The first part is the study of syllogisms one can trust 
completely, namely demonstrations, which he says is the subject of Aristotle’s Analytics; 
second, the study of arguments one can trust up to a point, and this in different degrees, 
which he claims is the subject of Aristotle’s Topics, Rhetoric, and Poetics; and third, the 
                                                     
70 Cf. Berquist, 2007, pp. 2-3. It should be noted that Aquinas’ division of the logic of reasoning here is a 
division of only a part of logic. For logic is divided according to the three acts of the mind: 
comprehending the simple, composing and dividing, and reasoning. The first two acts of the mind are 
distinguished by Aristotle in Book 3 of the De Anima. Cf. DeAn 430a26-27. According to Aquinas, The 
Categories are part of the logic of the first act of the mind. On Interpretation is ordered to the second act of 
the mind. The logic of the third act of the mind is divided as given above.  
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study of arguments one cannot trust at all, which he claims is the subject of the 
Sophistical Refutations.71  
 In the eyes of Aquinas, the Sophistical Refutations treats arguments that are 
completely untrustworthy as a part of Aristotle’s larger body of work that treats 
arguments generally. The sham syllogism does not compel assent from the mind, the 
dialectical syllogism compels probable assent from the mind, and the demonstration 
compels complete assent from the mind. Thus, according to Aquinas, Aristotle’s logic is 
the answer to Socrates’ desire for an art by which one will become strong in arguments.  
Since the cause of misology is ultimately mistaking one type of argument for another, a 
person avoids misology through learning the characteristics of the three types of 
arguments. Aristotle’s Organon is ordered—among other things—to determining the 
characteristics of the various types of arguments and thereby to helping students avoid 
mistaking one for the other and becoming misologues.  The Sophistical Refutations treats 
arguments that cannot be trusted at all. 
                                                     
71 Socrates explicitly denies that there are three types of argument that correspond to the three types of 
men. In fact, it is as if he brings up the three types of men in order to deny this. Cf. Nieto, 2002, p. 7. I 
suspect that Socrates’ denial—as is his way—is ironic and he in fact does think that there are these three 
types of arguments that correspond to the three types of men to whom he alludes.  
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II.IV Aristotle’s Division of Syllogisms 
At the beginning of the Topics, Aristotle divides syllogism—a form of 
argument—into four kinds: two of which are genuine and two of which are deceptive. 
The basis for this division is the quality of premises: 
It is demonstration if the syllogism is from true and primary [premises], or if [the 
syllogism] takes as a principle of knowledge [premises] which are derived from 
first and true [premises]. A dialectical syllogism is one which syllogizes from 
endoxes (plausible opinions).72… The contentious syllogism is the one from 
apparent but not real endoxes or the apparent [syllogism] from endoxes or from 
apparent endoxes. … Moreover, besides all the syllogisms mentioned, there are 
fallacies which arise from things proper to some science.73 
 
There are two genuine forms of syllogism: the demonstrative and the dialectical, and 
there are two counterfeit forms of syllogism: the contentious—that is, the sophistical74—
                                                     
72 ἔνδοξον which I transliterate as endox (or endoxes in the plural) has the etymology of “in opinion.” As 
defined by Aristotle it is opinion that is held in some general way; the opinion is “in” at the moment. I 
choose this translation in imitation of Yvan Pelletier who prefers endox to the normal translation of 
probable opinion.  “For ἔνδοξον, I dislike the standard translation: probable, which doesn't target the 
dialectical matter from the same point of view as Aristotle. Instead of the suggested workaround 
paraphrases (received idea, current opinion), I prefer ‘the neologism endoxical’ attempted by Brunschwig 
(xxxv, note 1) and "built on the pattern of its exact antonym, paradoxical.’ I'll even say endox, when I'll 
need to consider dialectic's discrete matter; the endox is related to endoxical, as paradox to paradoxical.” 
Cf. Pelletier, 2014, p. 3. The reference Pelletier makes is to Brunschwig, 1967. 
73 ἀπόδειξις μὲν οὖν ἐστιν, ὅταν ἐξ ἀληθῶν καὶ πρώτων ὁ συλλογισμὸς ᾖ, ἢ ἐκ τοιούτων ἃ διά τινων 
πρώτων καὶ ἀληθῶν τῆς περὶ αὐτὰ γνώσεως τὴν ἀρχὴν εἴληφεν, διαλεκτικὸς δὲ συλλογισμὸς ὁ ἐξ 
ἐνδόξων συλλογιζόμενος. ... ἐριστικὸς δ' ἐστὶ συλλογισμὸς ὁ ἐκ φαινομένων ἐνδόξων μὴ ὄντων δέ, 
καὶ ὁ ἐξ ἐνδόξων ἢ φαινομένων ἐνδόξων φαινόμενος· ... Ἔτι δὲ παρὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους ἅπαντας 
συλλογισμοὺς οἱ ἐκ τῶν περί τινας ἐπιστήμας οἰκείων γινόμενοι παραλογισμοί (Top 100a27-101a7).  
74 Aristotle holds that the sophistical syllogism is the contentious syllogism used for a different purpose. 
They are in fact both apparent syllogisms. The apparent syllogism is sophistical insofar as it is used for 
the appearance of wisdom, but it is contentious insofar as it is used for the love of victory itself.  “[T]hose 
so disposed for the sake of victory itself are held to be contentious men and lovers of strife, but those so 
disposed for the sake of a reputation for the purpose of moneymaking are held to be sophistical” (SE 
171b25-30). 
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and the fallacy proper to particular sciences.75 The demonstration is from true and 
primary premises, that is, premises, “which have conviction not through other things 
but through themselves.” The dialectical syllogism is from endoxes. Aristotle defines 
endoxes as “premises which seem so to all or to most or to the wise, and to all the latter 
or most or to the most knowing and well-reputed (ἐνδόξοις, Top 100b21-24).”76 The 
sophistical syllogism is the corruption of the dialectical insofar as it syllogizes from 
what is not but appears to be an endox or appears to syllogize from endox. Finally, the 
fallacy proper to particular sciences—the false-diagrammatic—is the corruption of the 
demonstration insofar as it syllogizes from what seems, but is not, a first principle of 
demonstration.77 
The sophistical refutation is not the only kind of counterfeit argument, nor is it 
even the only kind of counterfeit syllogism. For this reason, the treatise should not be 
considered Aristotle’s complete account of untrustworthy arguments.  Thomas Aquinas, 
therefore, is not being entirely precise when he identifies the Sophistical Refutations as 
that the part of the Organon that deals with arguments that one cannot trust at all.78 
                                                     
75 Euclid’s Pseudria was a compilation of such arguments in geometry. Cf. Heath, 1956, vol. I, p. 7. 
76 The notion of the endox will be examined more fully below. 
77 For a more thorough discussion of this form of fallacy see Chapter 11 and commentary.  
78 Thomas Aquinas knowingly overgeneralizes the subject matter of the Sophistical Refutations as is 
evident from his comments on the paralogisms that proceed from principles proper to a discipline. Cf. 
Berquist, 2007, p. 122-123. 
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According to Aristotle, the treatise deals specifically with the kind of syllogism that is 
the corruption of the dialectical syllogism.79 
II.V The Sophistical Art as Part of the Dialectical Art 
This connection between the sophistical syllogism and the dialectical syllogism 
highlights the place of sophistic in the general art of logic. The Sophistical Refutations has 
been called an appendix to Aristotle’s work the Topics,80 as Edward Poste and E. S. 
Forster claim that Aristotle twice refers to the Sophistical Refutations as the Topics.81 
Whether or not Forster and Poste are correct in judging the references as referring to 
material in the Sophistical Refutations and in judging the references as authentic to 
Aristotle, it is clear that Aristotle intended both the Sophistical Refutations and Topics to 
treat parts of the same discipline. For one thing, the conclusion to the Sophistical 
Refutations serves additionally as a conclusion to Aristotle’s treatment of the art of 
dialectic in its entirety (SE 183a36-184b). Further, the Topics and the Sophistical 
Refutations assume the same context of a particular form of dialectical disputation. More 
significantly, Aristotle claims that the sophistical art is part of the dialectical art: 
“Accordingly, these are the ways of sophistical refutations. It is easy to see that it is the 
                                                     
79 Aristotle treats of fallacies that use false premises particular to a specific discipline in his Posterior 
Analytics, 79b23-81b9. 
80 Cf. Forster, 1955, p. 2. 
81 Cf. APr 65b16, and DeIn 25b26. The passage from APr does, in my opinion, refer to discussions in the 
Sophistical Refutations: SE 167b21ff. The passage from the DeIn could refer to the SE 167b38ff. Cooke, 
however, thinks the passage from the DeIn refers to Topics 160a18ff. Cf. Cooke, p. 150.  
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dialectician’s [task] to consider about them and to be able to make them.”82 Just as there 
is not one science of medicine that considers health and another that considers sickness, 
so too there is not one art that considers dialectical refutations and another that 
considers sophistical refutations (Rhet 1355b13-20).  
Aristotle considers the sophist as a corrupt or counterfeit dialectician. On the one 
hand, one might aptly rename the Topics true refutations to parallel the name of the 
Sophistical Refutations. On the other hand, one might aptly rename the Sophistical 
Refutations sophistical topics to match the title of the Topics. Knowledge of an opposite 
sheds light on its opposite, or to put it as Aristotle would, “knowledge of contraries is 
the same.”83 And so, to understand fully the place and nature of the Sophistical 
Refutations in Aristotle’s Organon, let us consider the place and nature of dialectic. This 
consideration will further allow us to understand the other name given to sophistical 
refutations: τόποι. 
II.VI What is Aristotelian Dialectic? 
Dialectic as an Art and Ability  
 
The human mind naturally endeavors to give reasons for the things man does and 
believes. Even so, sometimes one reasons better, sometimes worse—either at random or 
through habit.  This natural comparison of arguments as being more or less reasonable 
                                                     
82  Τρόποι μὲν οὖν εἰσιν οὗτοι τῶν σοφιστικῶν ἐλέγχων. ὅτι δ' ἐστὶ τοῦ διαλεκτικοῦ τὸ θεωρῆσαι περὶ 
τούτων καὶ δύνασθαι ταῦτα ποιεῖν, οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν (SE 172b5-7). 
83 Cf. for instance, SE 174b37-38 or Top 104a15-17. 
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or persuasive is a universal experience.  It results from intuiting the standards of 
reasoning that serve as the foundation for distinguishing better reasoning from worse.  
The knowledge of this standard belongs to the art of logic generally and to dialectic in a 
more limited sense. In the following text, Aristotle characterizes rhetoric and dialectic in 
this way: 
Rhetoric is counterpart to dialectic; for both concern such things that are in a way 
within the common ken of all men and belong to no determinate science. Hence 
all men in a way participate in both; for, to some extent, all men attempt to 
criticize or uphold an account, to defend themselves or to accuse. Now, ordinary 
people do this either at random or with a familiarity arising from habit. Both 
ways being possible, clearly the subject can be handled methodically because it is 
possible to inquire the reason why some people succeed through practice but 
others automatically; and everyone will at once agree that this sort of 
undertaking is the characteristic activity of art. 84 
 
Clearly, what is said here applies to both rhetoric and dialectic. As a branch of logic, 
dialectic is ordered in some way to knowledge of the standards of reasoning. All men 
have a natural ability to argue and give grounds for the things that they believe. All 
men interrogate and refute. Yet, it is possible to understand the “reason why” some are 
more successful than others, and with this understanding to develop a method of 
making arguments, and by such knowledge reason “artfully” (SE 172a29-37). 
                                                     
84 Ἡ ῥητορική ἐστιν ἀντίστροφος τῇ διαλεκτικῇ· ἀμφότεραι γὰρ περὶ τοιούτων τινῶν εἰσιν ἃ κοινὰ 
τρόπον τινὰ ἁπάντων ἐστὶ γνωρίζειν καὶ οὐδεμιᾶς ἐπιστήμης ἀφωρισμένης· διὸ καὶ πάντες τρόπον 
τινὰ μετέχουσιν ἀμφοῖν· πάντες γὰρ μέχρι τινὸς καὶ ἐξετάζειν καὶ ὑπέχειν λόγον καὶ ἀπολογεῖσθαι 
καὶ κατηγορεῖν ἐγχειροῦσιν. τῶν μὲν οὖν πολλῶν οἱ μὲν εἰκῇ ταῦτα δρῶσιν, οἱ δὲ διὰ συνήθειαν ἀπὸ 
ἕξεως· ἐπεὶ δ' ἀμφοτέρως ἐνδέχεται, δῆλον ὅτι εἴη ἂν αὐτὰ καὶ ὁδῷ ποιεῖν· δι' ὃ γὰρ ἐπιτυγχάνουσιν 
οἵ τε διὰ συνήθειαν καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου τὴν αἰτίαν θεωρεῖν ἐνδέχεται, τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον ἤδη 
πάντες ἂν ὁμολογήσαιεν τέχνης ἔργον εἶναι (Rhet 1354a1-12). Emphasis my own. 
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Dialectic is not only a reasoned understanding of how to make refutations; it is 
also an ability (δύναμις) to find the premises that one’s interlocuter will accept, and an 
ability to uphold one’s own position. Dialectical art is a teachable ability to reason 
correctly and methodically. Aristotle begins the Topics by delineating the two chief 
abilities contained in the dialectical method:  
The purpose of the treatise is to find a method from which we will be able 
(δυνησόμεθα) to syllogize about every proposed problem from endoxes, and, 
[from which], we ourselves will say nothing contrary when maintaining an 
argument.85 
 
The Topics and the Sophistical Refutations are practical treatises.86 The intention of the 
Topics is to describe systematically a method by which the dialectician has two abilities: 
to refute and to avoid being refuted. These two abilities mirror the above described 
goals of the questioner and the answerer in the dialectical disputation. The questioner 
attacks the answerer by using the answerer’s opinion in an effort to lead him into 
affirming something inconsistent. For this reason Aristotle defines dialectic as 
syllogizing from endoxes even to contradictory conclusions (SE 165b5).87 Syllogizing to 
contradiction is the mark of refutation. The dialectician can syllogize from endoxes on 
                                                     
85 Ἡ μὲν πρόθεσις τῆς πραγματείας μέθοδον εὑρεῖν ἀφ' ἧς δυνησόμεθα συλλογίζεσθαι περὶ παντὸς 
τοῦ προτεθέντος προβλήματος ἐξ ἐνδόξων, καὶ αὐτοὶ λόγον ὑπέχοντες μηθὲν ἐροῦμεν ὑπεναντίον 
(Top 100a18-21).  
86 Cf. Smith, 1997, xxii. 
87 The dialectician’s ability to reason to contradictory positions is exemplified in Plato’s Meno where 
Socrates argues both that virtue can be taught because—he argues—virtue is knowledge and knowledge 
can be taught and later he argues that virtue cannot be taught because then there would be teachers and 
students of virtue but there are none. Cf. Meno 86e-96c. 
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any topic to the refutation of any given opponent and can avoid saying anything 
inconsistent himself. Dialectic is first and foremost an ability of overcoming adversaries 
through refutation and an ability of avoiding such a defeat. 
 Aristotle claims that one has the method of dialectic perfectly when one is able to 
do what one chooses given the available means, just as it is in medicine, rhetoric, and 
other abilities. The rhetorician does not persuade by every tool that is available but he is 
aware of all of the possible tools that can bring about persuasion and chooses those that 
are most expedient. A person is a dialectician when he has the habitual knowledge of 
how to refute his opponent and avoid his own refutation using the most expedient 
means available and overlooking none (Top 101b5-11). 
Accordingly, the Topics’ purpose stands in sharp contrast to Aristotle’s 
Analytics.88 Demonstration is not directly ordered to an adversary’s refutation but to 
scientific knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). Aristotle defines demonstration by its end; a 
demonstration is a syllogism that makes one know scientifically.89 To know 
scientifically is to “know the cause and that it is the cause and that it cannot be 
otherwise.”90 Demonstration gives its possessor a stable knowledge of the truth—the 
                                                     
88 At the beginning of the Prior Analytics, Aristotle says that the subject of analytics is demonstration and 
that the inquiry is demonstrative science. Cf. APr 24a10-12. I consider the Prior Analytics and Posterior 
Analytics to be really one work with a sharp break. The texts as they have been handed down to us refer 
to the Analytics as if it is one work. Cf. DeIn 19b31, Top 162a11, SE 165b9, Meta 1037, and NE 1139b27-32. 
89 Cf. APo 71b17-18. Cf. also Bryne (1997), p. xiii and pp. 9-10. 
90 γινώσκειν δι' ἣν τὸ πρᾶγμά ἐστιν, ὅτι ἐκείνου αἰτία ἐστί, καὶ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι τοῦτ' ἄλλως ἔχειν (APo 
71b11-12). 
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conclusion “cannot be otherwise.” In this way, scientific knowledge is like moral virtue. 
If one has habitual knowledge of a demonstration, he will never think that the 
contradiction is true and therefore will never be wrong about a subject but always right, 
just as a man with moral virtue will always do the right thing given the circumstances.  
The art of dialectic will not make a person always right and never wrong 
concerning a certain subject. Nevertheless, it is an acquired ability that leads to the 
discovery of error, and as such, it is indirectly ordered to arriving at the truth. Socrates 
could confess his ignorance because he did not possess the habit of demonstration, and 
yet still manifests the ignorance of his many interlocutors because he possessed the art 
of dialectic (SE 183b5-10). By refuting the answerer, the questioner reveals that the 
answerer’s opinions are in disharmony with one another. In truth, all things harmonize 
(NE 1098b9-11). Interlocutors, therefore, learn that particular sets of opinions cannot go 
together and thus refutation helps to reveal error. 
The Premises of Dialectical Syllogisms 
As we have seen, Aristotle not only distinguishes dialectic from demonstration 
by its purpose, but also by its premises. Dialectic does not require premises that are true 
or primary because it is not principally ordered to the truth, but rather to refutation; it 
only requires premises that are acceptable to the interlocutor, which, Aristotle tells us, 
are endoxes. He describes these endoxes more fully in chapter ten of the first book of his 
Topics. 
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The dialectical proposition is an answer in accord with the expectation (ἔνδοξος) 
of all or most or the wise, and of all the latter or most or of the most knowing, 
and which is not a paradox; For someone would hold the expectation of the wise, 
if it is not contrary to the expectations of the many. The dialectical propositions 
are also things similar to endoxes, and also they are propositions made according 
to contradiction of things contrary to endoxes, and they are the many opinions 
(δόξαι) of the artists that have been discovered.91 
 
The base of the Greek word ἔνδοξος is δόξα which is derived from δοκεῖν meaning 
expect. Laurence Godin-Tremblay points out that Homer uses ἀπὸ δόξης to signify 
what surprises or hinders expectation.92 The word δοκεῖν itself derives from δέχεσθαι, 
which refers to the act of receiving or admitting. An endox is what most men, or what 
most men in certain classes, expect or admit. It is opposed here to paradox. 
Consequently, the dialectician reasons from endoxes because he needs premises that his 
interlocutor will accept. To progress efficiently towards refutation, he must know the 
kinds of premises his opponent will accept in advance. The dialectician will reason from 
endoxes because his interlocutor will mostly admit premises from this class of opinions. 
The endoxes that a dialectician actually employs in the course of a debate depend on 
who the interlocutor is and the position he takes on the established problem. 
Furthermore, one may consider the endox from another direction. Since no one 
can always proceed from principles that are true, primary, more known, and causes of 
                                                     
91 ἔστι δὲ πρότασις διαλεκτικὴ ἐρώτησις ἔνδοξος ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς σοφοῖς, καὶ τούτοις ἢ 
πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς μάλιστα γνωρίμοις, μὴ παράδοξος· θείη γὰρ ἄν τις τὸ δοκοῦν τοῖς 
σοφοῖς, ἐὰν μὴ ἐναντίον ταῖς τῶν πολλῶν δόξαις ᾖ. εἰσὶ δὲ προτάσεις διαλεκτικαὶ καὶ τὰ τοῖς 
ἐνδόξοις ὅμοια, καὶ τἀναντία τοῖς δοκοῦσιν ἐνδόξοις εἶναι, κατ' ἀντίφασιν προτεινόμενα, καὶ ὅσαι 
δόξαι κατὰ τέχνας εἰσὶ τὰς εὑρημένας (Top 104a8-15). 
92 Cf. Godin-Tremblay, 2014, p. 108. Cf. also LS entry for δόξα and Iliad, c. 10, l. 324; Odyssey, c. 11, l. 344. 
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the conclusion (APo 71b19-22), men often syllogize from principles that lack this 
perfection. If someone does not know the true and primary principles, “the 
spontaneous reaction of reason is to trust its own nature, made to know truth, and 
adapted to this knowledge.”93 Hence, given reason’s natural tendency toward the 
truth,94 it will admit premises and principles which it expects, while not having 
complete justification of their truth. These “probable” principles are the endoxes.95 As 
Yvan Pelletier puts it, “The endox is the idea that is admitted spontaneously, and 
therefore always or nearly always; although without perfect evidence.”96 
While true and primary principles cannot be otherwise, reason fears the 
contradiction of an endox. On the one hand, when one syllogizes from true and first 
principles, he syllogizes from: a) what is believed not on the strength of anything else 
but on itself, b) and what does not need a reason why for justification. Whatever is 
known in this way is known through itself (καθ’ αὑτό). On the other hand, when one 
syllogizes from endoxes a) one can ask why about them, b) and they do not command 
assent in themselves; they can be doubted but they are accepted for the time being 
while one lacks the explicit and distinct knowledge of first principles.  
                                                     
93 Cf. Pelletier, 2014, p. 4. 
94 "Men are fairly well endowed by nature for truth and they attain truth most often" (Rhet 1355a15-16, 
trans. Pelletier). Cf. also Rhet 1355a21-22; 1355a35- 38 and Meta 993a30-993b19 
95 Thomas Aquinas, for instance, calls the endoxes probable (probabile) propositions in his Proemium to 
the Posterior Analytics. Cf. Berquist, 2007, p. 2. 
96 Pelletier, 2014, p. 4. 
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A demonstration’s premises are limited to one side of a contradiction, but the 
premises of dialectic are not because the dialectician reasons from the answers of his 
opponent.  
A demonstrative premise is different from the dialectical [premise] because a 
demonstrative [premise] takes one part of a contradiction (for a demonstrator 
does not inquire but assumes), while the dialectical [premise] is [an answer to] an 
inquiry about a contradiction.97  
 
Only one side of a contradiction can be true, and therefore the demonstrator is bound to 
this side of the contradiction on account of demonstration’s direct order to truth. A 
demonstrator does not inquire of his pupil which side of the contradiction is true but 
assumes the true side of the contradiction. A dialectician takes either side of the 
contradiction “indifferently” (APo 72a9) because his premises need not be true nor even 
his opinion; all that is required for refutation is that the answerer accept the premises. 
Thus the dialectician inquires of his answerer which side of the contradiction the 
answerer will accept and uses whichever answer as a premise.  
As a result of this free nature of dialectic, it is possible for the dialectician to 
refute truth.  The answerer may take a true position regarding the established problem, 
and then the questioner may draw out a false opinion from his opponent, from which 
the questioner syllogizes to the contradiction of the true position. Although the 
                                                     
97 διαφέρει δὲ ἡ ἀποδεικτικὴ πρότασις τῆς διαλεκτικῆς, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἀποδεικτικὴ λῆψις θατέρου μορίου 
τῆς ἀντιφάσεώς ἐστιν (οὐ γὰρ ἐρωτᾷ ἀλλὰ λαμβάνει ὁ ἀποδεικνύων), ἡ δὲ διαλεκτικὴ ἐρώτησις 
ἀντιφάσεώς ἐστιν (APr 24a22-25). 
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premises are actually accepted and the reasoning is real reasoning, dialectic can arrive 
at a false or a true conclusion. It can use true or false premises. Here we see why the 
refutation of error is not one of the purposes Aristotle gives for the Topics. The 
dialectician refutes true and false opinions. In short, truth does not bind dialectical 
reasoning.  
Universality of Dialectic 
What dialectic loses in its ability to give certainty, it gains in its ability to be 
applied to any subject matter. Aristotle claims that “dialecticians dispute about all 
things” (Meta, 1004b19-20).98 Dialectic is completely universal insofar as its method can 
be used to reason about any problem. When one has a demonstration of something, it is 
always within and restricted to a given subject.  The demonstrator “cannot demonstrate 
while changing genera, for instance, a geometric [truth] in arithmetic.”99 A geometrician 
has the habit of geometrical demonstration, but his habit does not apply outside the 
science of geometry. Demonstration has a circumscribed subject because it uses 
premises that are proper to the subject matter.100 In contrast, one who has the dialectical 
ability has a method applicable to any problem in any subject matter.   
                                                     
98 It is on account of this quality that Aristotle draws a likeness between the dialectician and the first 
philosopher. It is the office of the dialectician to syllogize about all things but the subject matter of first 
philosophy is common to all things. Cf. Meta 1004a34-b27. 
99  οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν ἐξ ἄλλου γένους μεταβάντα δεῖξαι, οἷον τὸ γεωμετρικὸν ἀριθμητικῇ (APo 75a38-39). 
100 For Aristotle’s complete discussion of the limited nature of demonstration, cf. APo 75a38-78a21. 
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II.VII The Sophist and the Dialectician. 
The previous discussion of dialectic may appear to be outside the scope of an 
introduction to a work on fallacies. Yet, as was noted earlier, Aristotle does not consider 
the dialectician to be distinct from the sophist in ability, but rather in purpose (Rhet 
1355b20). They are two parts of the same art. The sophistic art is the dialectical art 
without regard for fair play. The sophist is good at being bad. He will, therefore, use 
tools towards apparent refutation that a dialectician would not use because a 
dialectician is only interested the genuine refutation of an opponent. Just as the chief 
product of the art of dialectic is genuine refutation, the chief product of the art of 
sophistic is sophistical refutation.  For this reason, our understanding of the dialectician 
underlies our understanding of the sophist. 
Sophistic, like dialectic, is a combative ability. Although the sophist’s first desire 
is to appear to be a first philosopher, he does so through the means of sham dialectic 
(SE 179b27-29, NE 1164a22-33, Meta 1004bl7-26). It is proper to the wise man to expose 
error so the sophist desires to appear to expose error through refutation no matter what 
position his interlocutor takes (SE 165a20-31). Like the dialectician, he must foresee the 
positions his interlocutor is willing to accept and determine the most efficient place to 
mount an attack. Sophistic is a heuristic ability to determine which endoxes (plausible 
opinions), or apparent endoxes, his interlocutor will accept in order to syllogize, or 
seem to syllogize, to the answerer’s apparent refutation. Like the dialectician, a skillful 
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sophist is one who—seeing all the available means—is able to achieve his goal by the 
best available means. 
Moreover, the premises of sophistical reasoning can be endoxes or they can be 
false imitations of endoxes. Sophistical and dialectical reasoning differ in that dialectical 
premises must be genuine endoxes and the syllogizing must be true syllogizing, while 
in sophistical reasoning either the premises are not genuine endoxes or the syllogizing 
is not genuine syllogizing or both. For Aristotle notes, “Not everything which appears 
to be an endox is an endox. For nothing in what is called endoxic has its likelihood on 
the surface, as principles of contentious argument do.”101 Take for instance the previous 
example: happiness is life’s end, but life’s end is death, and therefore happiness is 
death. Given the meaning of “end” required for the syllogism to follow, happiness is 
not life’s end, but it appears to be endox because the word “end” has another meaning. 
In some cases, what is claimed to be an endox, and may even seem to be, is not. 
The sophist gravitates toward the freedom and universality of dialectic. The 
unlimited nature of dialectic appeals to the sophist—who is indifferent to what position 
is refuted. Afterall, he has no regard for the truth. The sophist has no time for 
demonstration which is bound to one side of a contradiction. Instead, he seizes every 
opportunity to illustrate his ability by overcoming opponents through apparent 
                                                     
101 οὐ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ φαινόμενον ἔνδοξον καὶ ἔστιν ἔνδοξον. οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν λεγομένων ἐνδόξων 
ἐπιπόλαιον ἔχει παντελῶς τὴν φαντασίαν, καθάπερ περὶ τὰς τῶν ἐριστικῶν λόγων ἀρχὰς συμ- 
βέβηκεν ἔχειν (Top 100b26-29). 
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refutation. He must therefore be able to argue for the contradiction of whatever position 
his interlocutor may take. Again, the universal applicability of dialectic attracts the 
sophist who desires at all times to appear wise to overcome his opponent no matter 
what subject is being discussed. The abilities and properties of dialectic fit the wishes of 
a man wishing to appear wise rather than actually having the properties of wisdom 
itself. 
II.VIII Fallacies as Places 
The connection between the Sophistical Refutations and the Topics sheds light on a 
second—and telling—name by which Aristotle refers to the fallacies in the Sophistical 
Refutations. In addition to ways (τρόποι), Aristotle refers to fallacies as places (τόποι). 
The nature of place as Aristotle uses it in his Organon is a highly-disputed question. 
While he unfolds hundreds of dialectical places in Books II-VII of the Topics, he 
nevertheless says little explicitly about the nature of places in the Topics or in the 
Sophistical Refutations. Scholars have made many and varied attempts to define a 
dialectical place.102 Despite the question being a controversial and difficult one, it seems 
an inquiry is worthwhile if only to shed a little light on Aristotle’s notion of sophistical 
place. 
                                                     
102 For the many and various attempts to define places, cf. Drehe, 2016, pp. 132-133. Cf. also Slomkowski, 
1997, pp. 50-58. 
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Dialectical Places 
To begin, Aristotle clearly indicates many texts containing examples of places 
within them, but he does not clearly indicate what part of the text is the place and what 
is not. The texts include not just the place but also a strategy for its use and examples 
(Top 111a14-33, 115a15-25, 123b20-25, 109a-b, 120b, 130b, 140a). A further problem is 
that Aristotle does not always use place in the same sense, although all his senses are 
related.103 This difficulty is compounded when he extends the notion of genuine places 
to cover sophistical places too. Finally, Aristotle also calls places elements (στοιχεῖα), 
but does not tell us that he considers the two names to be synonyms except in the 
Rhetoric (Rhet 1396b22, 1403a18ff).104 
In its common usage, a place is an extrinsic and most universal principle which 
affirms relations between logical intentions. This principle is a source of more particular 
endoxes. Dialectical places are generally, but not exclusively, 105 conditional statements 
about logical or second intentions—concepts which signify the relations that first 
                                                     
103 Cf. for instance, Top, 155b5 vs. 155a37. Smith claims that one “dimension” of a place “is a point at 
which the answerer’s position may be probed of attack.” Another dimension is that each place is “a 
location at which many arguments may be found by appropriate substitutions in the relevant form.” In 
one case, place signifies the vulnerable position in the answerers defense. In the other case, it signifies a 
place to look for abundant means of attacking any position. Cf. Smith, 1997, xxvii.  
104 I take it that this sense of element (στοιχεῖα) is analogous to Shruck and White’s use of element in their 
Elements of Style or Euclid’s use of the word in his Elements. 
105 Dialectical places are generally composed of logical intentions. They are sometimes composed of 
highly universal real intentions such as the notion of contrary or the notions of more and less. What is 
absolutely necessary is that places be composed of terms that are most universal so that the place itself 
has universal applicability. Smith notes that this inconsistency is not surprising because the Topics is a 
practical treatise. Aristotle provides his readers with places insofar as they are useful, not insofar as they 
fit into a theoretical categorization. Cf. Smith, 1997, p. xxxiii.  
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intentions have insofar as they are known, such as genus, species, predicate, subject, etc. 
Sometimes places are also composed of most universal real intentions such as the 
concept of contrary or opposite, or more and less.106 Places provide the framework 
underlying endoxes. A few examples will help to clarify this understanding of place: 
Example #1 
Place: If the predicate belongs to a less likely subject, then it will belong to a more likely 
subject (Top 115a6-8, Rhet 1397b13-15). 
Endox: If the sense powers are immaterial, then the intellect is immaterial.  
Dialectical Syllogism:  
1) If the sense powers are immaterial, then the intellect is immaterial. 
2) The sense powers are immaterial. 
3) The intellect is immaterial. 
Alternative Endoxes: If the body survives death, then the soul survives death (Phaedo 
78b-80e). If theft is always wrong, then murder is always wrong. If locomotion is 
continuous, then a place is continuous.  
 
Example #2: 
Place: If the predicate is the genus of the subject, then the predicate’s opposite will be 
the genus of the subject’s opposite (Top 125a25-33). 
Endox: If knowledge is a kind of sense perception, then the object of knowledge will be 
a kind of sense object.107 
Dialectical Syllogism:  
1) If knowledge is a kind of sense perception, then the object of knowledge is a kind 
of sense object. 
2) The object of knowledge is not a kind of sense object. 
3) Knowledge is not a kind of sense perception. 
Alternative Endox: If pain is an evil, then pleasure is a good. 
 
                                                     
106 The notion of places as most universal propositions is present in (ps) Thomas Aquinas’ De fallaciis. The 
place “dicitur maxima” (1976, c. 4).  
107 While is might seem odd, knowledge and its object as well as sense and its object are kinds of 
opposites. For knowledge is always of the knowable and sense of the sensible. In some way, they are 
relative to one another respectively. Aristotle lists relatives as one of his four kinds of opposites.  
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 This characterization of the nature of place is in line with what the ancient’s 
description of it. Alexander of Aphrodisias claimed that “the place (τόπος), as 
Theophrastus says, is a principle (ἀρχή) from which we take the principles concerning 
each matter by focusing our thought upon it.”108 A place is principle insofar as we can 
use it as a source for a more particular premise—which also may be called principles— 
directly pertinent to a given subject matter. Theophrastus, Aristotle’s longtime 
associate, says that a place is determinate in outline but indeterminate as to the 
particulars.109 If a place is made up of logical intentions, then it will be indeterminate 
with regard to the particulars—the actual instances of logical intentions—but will 
determine their relation in outline. The dialectical place in our second example does not 
determine what particular genus or subject in the endox derived from the place will be. 
What this place does is articulate the exact relation between the particular subject and 
genus. A dialectical place is a proposition composed of most universal intentions—such 
as logical intentions—that may be replaced by more specific content to make endoxes 
appropriate to the question at hand. The dialectical place, then, is like a template for 
dialectical premises. A template provides an outline without determining matter or 
content. In the same way, a dialectical place provides the outline of an endox without 
fully determining its specific terms.  
                                                     
108 Van Ophuijsen, 2001, 5.21-23, p. 7 [modified translation]. 
109 Cf. Van Ophuijsen, 2001, 5.21-25, p. 7. 
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The way Aristotle describes place is in harmony with understanding it as a 
universal principle composed of logical intentions which provides an outline for more 
particular endoxes.  Aristotle refers to place both as a principle (ἀρχή) and as a common 
proposition (πρότασις κοινή).110 Clearly, the dialectical places given in our examples 
are principles111 and commons propositions from which one can derive more concrete 
endoxes. Aristotle emphasizes that places are common to all disciplines: 
Just as in the Topics, so also in this work, a distinction should be made between 
kinds and places from which they are to be taken. By “kinds” I mean the 
premises specific to each genus [of knowledge], and by the places those common 
to all.112  
 
Aristotle characterizes places as common to all. Logical intentions are most universal 
concepts insofar as they name relations between concepts that will apply regardless of 
                                                     
110 Cf. Slomkowski, 1997, p. 47 and Top 163b27ff. 
111 In logic, there are different senses in which a statement may be a principle of a syllogism. On the one 
hand, A statement may be a principle of a syllogism insofar as it is an unmediated premise of that 
syllogism. The places are far too abstract to be acceptable to the common interlocutor. Contrary to 
Slomkowski’s opinion, dialectical places are not endoxes, but they are the source of endoxes. Cf. 
Slomkowski, 1997, p. 49. On the other hand, a statement can also be called a principle of a syllogism as an 
axiom. For instance, the principle of non-contradiction underlies all premises but is not a premise in a 
syllogism. Thus, Aristotle calls the principle of non-contradiction of a principle, not just of 
demonstrations, but of other axioms (Meta 1005b33-34). A principle may be virtually present in a 
syllogism as the foundation of one of the premises. A place is ordered to a dialectical syllogism in this 
way. That is, a place is virtually present in the articulation of the endox and states the foundation of that 
endox just as the principle of non-contradiction gives the foundation of any statement. 
112 καθάπερ οὖν καὶ ἐν τοῖς Τοπικοῖς, καὶ ἐνταῦθα διαιρετέον τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων τά τε εἴδη καὶ τοὺς 
τόπους ἐξ ὧν ληπτέον. λέγω δ' εἴδη μὲν τὰς καθ' ἕκαστον γένος ἰδίας προτάσεις, τόπους δὲ τοὺς 
κοινοὺς ὁμοίως πάντων (Rhet 1358a29-33). Aristotle divides common places from proper principles 
(ἴδια) which can only be applied to a specific subject matter. He then names the proper places as kinds 
(εἴδη) and opposes them to common places which retain the name place. It is important to keep in mind 
that Aristotle is willing to use place with a number of senses. Paul Slomkowski, when commenting on 
this passage, notes that there are good reasons to call these special principles places but that Aristotle 
never does (1997, n. 24, p. 48). It appears, therefore, that Aristotle considered universal applicability to be 
essentially connected with the notion of place. 
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the subject matter, because every subject matter will contain genera, species, subjects, 
predicates, etc. Thus, if places are conditional statement involving logical intentions, 
they will have the property of universal applicability. 
This interpretation also fits with Aristotle’s description of the function of place. 
Aristotle characterizes places as providing abundant means of attacking (ἐπιχειρεῖν) 
any problem (Top 155a37). Following this characterization, one may say that a place is a 
source of the dialectician’s heuristic ability to find all possible endoxes acceptable to his 
interlocutor.  Accordingly, Aristotle recommends that these universal propositions be 
committed to memory rather than arguments themselves because it is sufficiently 
difficult to have at hand the places alone (Top 163b31-33).113 Any place contains many 
potential premises within itself. Memorizing one principle gives the dialectician the 
ability to bring forth many endoxes in concrete disputations. For example, the 
dialectical place, “the increase of the subject will include the increase of the predicate” 
(cf. Top 114b37-115a14), includes many premises in various disciplines: “if heat is the 
motion of molecules then the increase in the motion of a molecules will entail an 
increase in heat,” and “if pride is the cause of envy, then he who is more proud will be 
more envious,” and “if being is one as such, then a higher grade of being will have a 
higher grade of unity.”  
                                                     
113. Cf. Slomkowski for an excellent commentary on this passage, pp. 46-47. 
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The place must be both a principle of and distinct from the endox. Aristotle 
defines rhetorical places as follows: “I call the place and the element the same, that into 
which many enthymemes fall.”114 Enthymemes are arguments used most often in 
rhetoric. More generally then, a place is a universal statement under which many 
arguments fall—whether rhetorical, dialectical, or sophistical. How can many 
arguments fall under a place? A place is an extrinsic foundation of endoxes; it is 
virtually present in a dialectical syllogism as the foundation of one of the premises. The 
place is not a premise of a dialectical syllogism, but rather the source from which it is 
brought out. Still, the force of an endox is derived from its place. That is, a place is an 
articulation of the endox’s acceptability on a more universal level.  If an interlocutor will 
accept any particular endox, it is because he holds the more general position articulated 
in the endox’s place. In sum, dialectical place is extrincic to the endox but provides its 
structure and force.  
Finally, this interpretation of dialectical place shares compelling likeness to 
Aristotle’s account of physical place.115 Physical place is the “first immobile limit of the 
containing body” (Phys 212a21-22). For Aristotle, place is the inner limit of the 
containing body that coincides with the shape of the contained body. The physical place 
                                                     
114 τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ λέγω στοιχεῖον καὶ τόπον· ἔστιν γὰρ στοιχεῖον καὶ τόπος εἰς ὃ πολλὰ ἐνθυμήματα 
ἐμπίπτει (Rhet 1403a17-18). 
115 Yvan Pelletier highlights the close relationship between dialectical and natural place (1991, pp. 323-
326).  
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limits and is extrinsic to the placed; the physical place of the coffee is the inner surface 
of the mug. Likewise, a dialectical place is distinct from but limits—metaphorically of 
course—the endox it contains because the dialectical place outlines the endox’s 
structure while being extrinsic to the endox. For example, the dialectical place, “if the 
predicate is the genus of the subject, then the predicate’s opposite will be the genus of 
the subject’s opposite,” outlines different endoxes that may fall under it. If a dialectician 
cannot locate the premises of his syllogism in a more particular formulation of a place, 
then he should find another place to look for endoxes which will act as premises in his 
dialectical syllogism.  
Sophistical Places 
Aristotle carries the word place over to signify a principle of sophistical 
refutation. In the Sophistical Refutations, Aristotle lays out thirteen places where a 
sophist may look for premises and syllogisms that will appear to refute an interlocutor. 
Sophistical refutations are “from these places” (SE 166b20-21). Like dialectical places, 
sophistical places are distinct from the premises of the refutation, and yet remain 
sources of these premises. The human mind is prone to mix up the senses of words, and 
because a valid syllogism with four terms is impossible, equivocation is a good place to 
find syllogisms that will appear to refute one’s opponent. Like dialectical places 
fallacies in the Sophistical Refutations have universal applicability. A sophist can use the 
fallacy of equivocation in any argument because every discipline contains words that 
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one can use equivocally. Again, fallacies are similar to dialectical places in their use: 
rather than memorizing specific sophistical arguments, the sophist will memorize 
sophistical places—sources from which he may draw an unlimited number of 
sophistical arguments, and more importantly, the sophistical arguments with premises 
which his interlocutor will grant. 
(Ps) Aquinas observes, “just as the dialectical argument has its strength from a 
true place, so also the sophistical argument has its apparent strength from an apparent 
place.”116  A sophistical place may be expressed as a proposition that provides the 
foundation for the apparent reasonability of the sophism. For instance, the fallacy of 
equivocation may be expressed as a sophistical place in the following way: If the same 
name is used two times in an argument, the name bears the same meaning. If an 
interlocutor is taken in by the fallacy of equivocation, it is because he is assuming—at 
least in this particular instance—that proposition.  
That said, unlike dialectical places, sophistical places are not presented as 
universal conditional statements of logical intentions; they are presented as common 
distinctions—such as the distinction between the different senses of a word—that a 
sophist may exploit. Aristotle holds that false refutations are infinite. Consequently, he 
argues that one ought to grasp only the places that are “common to every art and 
                                                     
116 sicut argumentatio dialectica firmitatem habet ex loco vero, ita argumentatio sophistica apparentem firmitatem 
habet ex loco apparenti (1976, c. 4).  
 64 
ability” (cf. SE 170a30-170b2). The sophist has in hand thirteen distinctions that men 
commonly overlook in every discipline, and thus he carries the means to produce 
apparent endoxes and syllogisms for the purpose of bringing about an apparent 
refutation of his opponent. 
One should note that the Sophistical Refutations also considers places which are 
not sources of sophistical refutation, but rather of the sophist's secondary aims (cf. SE 
172b9-174a16). When a sophist despairs of refuting his interlocutor, his means of 
appearing wise are not exhausted; he knows places to look for arguments that will lead 
his interlocutor to say something manifestly false, or lead him to say a paradox, or lead 
him to babble, or lead him commit a solecism. 
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Introduction III: Uses and Division of Sophistical Refutations 
III.I Uses of Dialectic in General 
We have examined how a sophist seeks the sophistical art with the desire to 
appear wise. Aristotle, however, considers knowledge of the art of sophistic as a branch 
of the art of dialectic. Why would the dialectician seek after knowledge of the art of 
sophistic? It seems that the dialectician’s purposes for studying dialectic would in some 
way apply to his reasons for studying sophistic. Aristotle gives three uses (χρήσιμοι) 
for the study of dialectic: 
Let us say for how many and for what things the treatise is useful. Surely, it is 
useful for three things: for exercise, for conversation, and for the philosophical 
sciences. It is very clear from the following considerations that it is useful for 
exercise. For, when we have a method, we will be able to attack what is proposed 
more easily. [It is useful] for conversation, because after we have enumerated the 
opinions of the many, we will enter discussion with them not from alien 
teachings, but from their own, changing whatever they do not seem to say to us 
well. [It is useful] for the philosophical sciences, because, being able to puzzle on 
both sides, we will more easily spot the true and the false in each thing. 
Moreover, [it is useful] with regard to what are the first things concerning each 
science. For it is impossible to say something about these from what are the 
proper principles of each proposed science, since the first things are the 
principles of all; it is necessary to go through what concerns them through the 
endoxes about each thing. This is proper or most proper to dialectic. For being 
inquisitive, it is the road to the principles of all methods.117 
                                                     
117 [Ἑ]ἰπεῖν πρὸς πόσα τε καὶ τίνα χρήσιμος ἡ πραγματεία. ἔστι δὴ πρὸς τρία, πρὸς γυμνασίαν, πρὸς 
τὰς ἐντεύξεις, πρὸς τὰς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιστήμας. ὅτι μὲν οὖν πρὸς γυμνασίαν χρήσιμος, ἐξ 
αὐτῶν καταφανές ἐστι· μέθοδον γὰρ ἔχοντες ῥᾷον περὶ τοῦ προτεθέντος ἐπιχειρεῖν δυνησόμεθα· 
πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐντεύξεις, διότι τὰς τῶν πολλῶν κατηριθμημένοι δόξας οὐκ ἐκ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἀλλ' ἐκ 
τῶν οἰκείων δογμάτων ὁμιλήσομεν πρὸς αὐτούς, μεταβιβάζοντες ὅ τι ἂν μὴ καλῶς φαίνωνται λέγειν 
ἡμῖν· πρὸς δὲ τὰς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιστήμας, ὅτι δυνάμενοι πρὸς ἀμφότερα διαπορῆσαι ῥᾷον ἐν 
ἑκάστοις κατοψόμεθα τἀληθές τε καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος· ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα τῶν περὶ ἑκάστην ἐπιστήμην. 
ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τῶν οἰκείων τῶν κατὰ τὴν προτεθεῖσαν ἐπιστήμην ἀρχῶν ἀδύνατον εἰπεῖν τι περὶ αὐτῶν, 
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In this passage, Aristotle gives three uses for a treatise on dialectic: exercise, 
conversation, and philosophic inquiry. Under philosophic inquiry, he gives two sub-
uses: a) being able to puzzle on both sides of a question and b) knowing the road to the 
principles of all the individual sciences.  
Exercise: Aristotle claims that “the characteristic activities (ἐργασίας) of all 
abilities (δυνάμεις) or arts require prior education and prior training.”118 It is well 
known that the memory and imagination require exercise, yet we find that men are 
prone to err, especially when they first begin to philosophize. This is a sign that our 
mind can be weak too.119 Just as through a lack of exercise the body grows weak and 
inert, so too the mind grows weak from disuse.  
Dialectic is the form of reaoning particularly proportioned for exercise. An 
athlete begins with easier exercises before advancing to perform difficult feats. No one 
training to set the bench press world record begins exercising for the feat by attempting 
to bench press 1000 pounds. Similarly, one begins to train the mind with easier 
arguments, that is, dialectical syllogisms, before one can complete more difficult 
arguments like demonstrations. Endoxes are much easier to find than first principles. 
                                                     
ἐπειδὴ πρῶται αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἁπάντων εἰσί, διὰ δὲ τῶν περὶ ἕκαστα ἐνδόξων ἀνάγκη περὶ αὐτῶν διελθεῖν. 
τοῦτο δ' ἴδιον ἢ μάλιστα οἰκεῖον τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἐστιν· ἐξεταστικὴ γὰρ οὖσα πρὸς τὰς ἁπασῶν τῶν 
μεθόδων ἀρχὰς ὁδὸν ἔχει (Top 101a25-b5).  
118 ἔτι δὲ πρὸς πάσας δυνάμεις καὶ τέχνας ἔστιν ἃ δεῖ προπαιδεύεσθαι καὶ προεθίζεσθαι πρὸς τὰς 
ἑκάστων ἐργασίας (Pol 1337a19-20). 
119 Cf. D. Berquist, 1964, pp. 176-177. 
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For this reason, the benefit of the dialectical method—by which one may exercise his 
reason—extends beyond dialectical argument. Exercising the mind in the practice of 
dialectic will better enable one to engage in any form of syllogizing.  
In addition, dialectic is particularly useful for exercise insofar as it involves 
competition. Since the disputation involves an opponent, the dialectician must be able 
to reason to contradictory conclusions. As we have seen, Aristotle’s specific dialectical 
method sets up the discussion as a kind of debate between two interlocutors in 
competition. Competition encourages preparation, focus, and reflection on the 
arguments engaged in the dialogue. Each is striving to achieve victory, and the honor of 
publicly refuting his opponent. The glory involved in dialectic may serve as a stepping 
to demonstrative reasoning. Hence, the dialectical argument is the best form to use as 
exercise because it starts from endoxes and reasons to contradictory conclusions.   
Conversation: In the Rhetoric, Aristotle gives one of the purposes of rhetoric as 
persuading in moments when teaching is impossible. He says that “before some 
audiences, not even the possession of the most exact knowledge will make it easy for 
what we say to produce conviction” (Rhet 1355a24-26, trans. Corbett). Not every 
conversation can lead to scientific knowledge. For various reasons—some of them 
fallacious—people may not accept true and primary principles in conversation. 
Aristotle advises that in such situations one must use “notions possessed by 
everybody.” Dialectic is particularly useful in these conversations because it reasons 
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from endoxes, that is, common opinions or those of the wise or those of experts in a 
particular discipline. This property gives one the ability to enter into a dispute with 
anyone and to reason from opinions that are not “alien” from the opponent’s own. 
Most, if not all, of an opponent’s views will be common opinions or the judgments of 
experts whom he has heard because these are the views that seem naturally reasonable 
to the mind. No argument can be more convincing to an interlocutor than one from his 
own opinions, and thus dialectic is the best form of argument when teaching is 
impossible.  
Dialectic is even useful in conversation when refutation is impossible. If one’s 
interlocutor does not accept the dialectician’s premises, then there is no way to refute 
him. If persuasion is simply impossible, dialectic will enable one to come as near as 
possible to whatever “success the circumstances of each particular case allow” (Rhet 
1355b12). Convincing an interlocutor of a position admits of degrees: sometimes the 
best possible result is to make him open to the idea that his position is not sound as is 
the result in most Platonic dialogues. 
Uses for Philosophical Science: In United States law, whenever the state accuses a 
citizen of a crime, the defendant has a right to legal counsel and defense. This practice 
assures that the jury hears arguments on both sides of the case before determining a 
verdict and facilitates a fitting rigor and decisiveness. The human mind is better able to 
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see the truth when the reasons for both sides of the argument are known.120 In the same 
way, dialectic is useful for philosophical inquiry because only dialectic—and its 
counterpart rhetoric—give one the ability to argue for either side of a contradiction 
(Rhet 1355a35). Aristotle does not hold that the purpose of this ability is to make people 
believe something wrong (cf. Rhet 1355a32), but in fact to make clearer the reasons on 
both sides of the question. Possessing the ability to puzzle on both sides, “we will more 
easily spot the true and the false in each thing” (Top 101a35-36).121 A contrary 
arguments may help one realize where the fundamental difficulty is, and thus one 
knows where to devote his attention. When one sees all the reasons on both sides, his 
mind will incline toward the truth, for the “underlying facts do not lend themselves 
equally well to contrary views.”122 
Aristotle supplies a second reason why the study of dialectic is important to the 
philosopher. It is useful for the discovery of “the proper principles of each proposed 
science.” How the practice of dialectic aids the mind in this discovery is a notoriously 
                                                     
120 Aristotle makes this direct comparison between Greek court and jury practices and the practice of 
dialectic (Meta 995b3-5).  
121. Thus, Aristotle claims in the Nicomachean Ethics, “We must, as in all other cases, set the phenomena 
before us and, after first discussing the difficulties, go on to demonstrate, if possible, the truth of all 
endoxes about these affections or, failing this, of the greater number and most authoritative; for if we 
resolve the difficulties and leave the endoxes undisturbed, we shall have demonstrated the case 
sufficiently” (NE 1145b2-7, modified Barnes translation). Cf. also EE 1235b13-18, Phys 211a2-11. Aristotle 
believes that reasonable arguments can contain part of the truth. This is why he begins his major works 
by recounting the positions of previous philosophers on both sides of the question. For this reason, 
Aristotle’s final solution to philosophical problems will reveal why his predecessors held the positions 
that they did. 
122 Rhet 1355a38. 
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difficult question.123 I will not treat of the matter fully here, but I will make a few small 
points. First, this use of dialectic is not entirely distinct from the first philosophical use. 
One way in which dialectic helps one come to know first principles is that it allows one 
to see the reasons on both sides of a contradiction. Take, for example, definitions which 
are proper principles in a demonstrative science.124 In the Physics, Aristotle gives 
dialectical reasons for and against the existence of place (Phys 208b27-209a31) and later 
confirms his definition of place by manifesting how it resolves those difficulties 
(ἀπορίαι, Phys 212b23-213a11. Cf. also Phys 211a2-11). In the De Anima, Aristotle 
prepares his reader to understand that the soul is a substantial form by opposing the 
reasons for saying that the soul is a complete substance with those saying that the soul 
is an accidental form.125  
Second, since we cannot demonstrate the truth of first principles because they are 
themselves the ultimate principles of all demonstration, we must reason about them 
using some less rigorous method: the dialectical. Dialectical arguments cannot justify 
the truth of the first principles, but they help us come to a clearer grasp of them. 
Aristotle says in the Topics, that the third and fourth tools of dialectic,126 seeing 
difference and seeing likeness, are useful for definition (Top 108a38-b12). And the first 
                                                     
123 For an account of numerous but by no means all the views on this subject, cf. Sim, ix-xxv.  
124 Cf. for example, APo 76a37-41 where Aristotle distinguishes the proper and common principles of a 
science and gives definitions as examples of proper principles. Cf. also APo 72a14-24.  
125 Cf. for instance, DeAn 404b30–405b30 vs. 407b27-408a33. 
126 Aristotle lists his four tools of dialectic at Top 105a21-25.  
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tool, procuring premises, is useful for seeing definitions that others have discovered.127 
In fact, all the different kinds places Aristotle treats in Topics II-VII contribute the 
examination of definition. Books II and III consider places about whether something 
belongs or can be said of something or not. Obviously, all definitions must be said of 
what they define. Book IV considers places for determining whether something is said 
of something essentially; Obviously all definitions are said essentially. Then, in Book V, 
Aristotle unfolds places for seeing whether what is said of something is convertible and 
the definition is convertible (cf. Top 109a13-14). Books VI and VII consider places for 
determining whether predicates bring out fully the nature of the thing it is said of, i.e., 
determining whether or not that are definitions. So, all of Aristotle’s books considering 
places can be seen as ordered to coming to know definitions.  
Third, dialectic cannot be the whole road to knowledge of first principles. One 
must distinguish the common road of coming to know the first principles from the 
different roads that are proper to each science. For instance, in geometry the discovery 
of proper principles often depends on imagining the correct lines or supposing the 
thing one is trying to prove and then “analyzing” back to first principles or 
demonstrated propositions.128 Knowing the proper principles in ethics requires 
experience which is one reason why the young are not suitable students for this 
                                                     
127  Aristotle discusses the ways of compiling and ordering these propositions at Top 105a34-b36. 
128 Cf. Byrne, 2001, pp. 409-413 and 420-421. As Byrne points out, “not only rules of logic but also non-
deductive ingenuity is indispensable” to the process of geometrical analysis (1997, pp. 15-20 and 123-146). 
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discipline (NE 1095a2-4).  Only the first philosopher can have unqualified knowledge of 
the principle of non-contradiction.129 The use of dialectic may be essential to recognizing 
first principles, but it is not the some total of the path to first principles in any given 
science.  
III.II Uses of Sophistic in Correlation to Uses of Dialectic in General 
Can all of the uses of dialectic apply to the dialectical art’s subsection, the art of 
sophistic?  In its way, the study of sophistic lends a hand to all of the uses given for 
dialectic. Practicing a method of tying and untying sophistical arguments exercises the 
mind. In the first place, Aristotle exhorts us to be thankful not only for those who have 
spoken the truth but also for those who express superficial (ἐπιπόλαιος) opinions. For, 
wrestling with superficial opinions exercises (προασκεῖν) our habit.130 In other words, 
dealing with opinions resulting from superficial reasoning provides training necessary 
for developing healthy mental habits. In another way, the study of sophistic is useful for 
determining the type of intellectual exercise that will lead to good intellectual habits. It 
is important in intellectual exercise to reason correctly to avoid the development of bad 
habits. For by repeated exercise one may form a productive habit that is not in 
cooperation with true reason: an ἀτεχνία (cf. NE 1140a20-22). In this way, the study of 
                                                     
129 Cf. Wians 2006, 343-345.  
130 Cf. Meta 993b11-18. Unfortunately, Apostle’s translation of this passage is misleading. Jonathan 
Barnes’s translation is superior in this regard.  
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the art of sophistic teaches the dialectician which arguments to avoid and thereby limits 
exercise to training that will determine one’s reason to true syllogizing.  
Moreover, the study of sophistic can also be an aid on the road to knowledge of 
first principles. For Aristotle, it is proper to the wise man to defend first principles 
(Meta 1005a19ff). The wise man not only knows first principles, but he will not fall 
victim to sophisms about them. Everyone implicitly uses the principle of non-
contradiction, but the wise man states it explicitly and defends it from sophistical 
objections. Implicitly assuming a first principle is one thing; however, its exact, explicit, 
firm, and commensurately universal grasp is another.131 Accordingly, Plato’s dialogues 
often exemplify that it is possible for a person to think that he knows what he does not 
know.132 Aristotle makes the surprising and illuminating observation that if one can 
make this mistake in one direction, then he can make it in the other direction (Phys 
193a5-10). That is, a man can think that he does not know what he does know. It is 
possible to come upon sophistical objections to first principles and not know how to 
solve them and consequently believe that there is no way to solve them (Meta 1005b35-
1006a5). One could easily give a sophistical argument that in some cases the part is 
more than the whole: Animal is part of the definition of man, but there are more 
animals than men. Therefore the part is more than the whole. This equivocation on 
                                                     
131 Cf. Augros, 2016, p. 13.  
132 Cf. for instance, Meno 70a1-80a1. 
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intentional and extensional parts could lead a person to deny a self-evident first 
principle: the whole is more than its part. In this way, the study of sophistical 
refutations may remove impediments to the mind firmly assenting to first principles. 
Surely, this is useful on the road to the exact, explicit, stable, and commensurately 
universal knowledge of first principles.133 
Finally, the art of sophistical refutations is useful in conversation. The only way 
to defend against falling into sophistical traps is by understanding the way they work 
and how to untie them. The distinction between the sophist and the dialectician is not 
one of knowledge, but is one of wish; the sophist uses sophistical argument knowingly, 
and the dialectician does not—though he may do so unconsciously because of the 
deceptive nature of sophistical refutation. Sophistical refutations can be extraordinarily 
deceptive. Aristotle goes so far as to say that the fallacy of the accident fools even those 
with scientific knowledge (ἐπιστήμων, SE 168b6). A dialectician should study the 
fallacies, not to use them but to defend himself when others give them or when he 
unintentionally thinks them up himself.  
One can see the need for the dialectician—who cares for the intellect—to study 
fallacies in an analogy to the doctor who cares for the body. The doctor must not only 
                                                     
133 One might argue, that if “imparting a deeper grasp of principles” is the main task of a teacher, then 
dialectic (and even sophistic) will be irreplaceable pedagogical tools which, of course, explains why such 
large portions of Aristotle’s great philosophical treatises are dialectical. Cf. Wians 1989, pp. 245-253, 
especially 250-251.   
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know the causes of health but must also know the causes of sickness. Similarly, the 
philosopher must not only know genuine reasoning but also fallacious reasoning.  
Again, a good doctor is not content with restoring health, but also prescribes 
preventative medicines and diets. In a similar way, the philosopher is not content 
merely to untie sophisms when he happens upon them. He further desires to ensure the 
health of the mind by inoculating against certain diseases of reason by studying them in 
advance. 
III.III Two Uses Proper to Sophistic for Philosophy 
In addition to the uses that Aristotle gives for the study of dialectic in general, he 
gives uses for the study of sophistic proper. Aristotle says that the study of sophistic has 
two uses for philosophy: first, knowledge of the various senses in which things may be 
said, and second, avoiding error when inquiring alone (SE 175a5-9). The explanation of 
how knowledge of sophistic is useful in conversation applies to the second use. If 
someone can be fooled in conversation with another, then he can also be fooled while 
thinking alone. 
The first use, however, adds to the previous discussion. It seems that the first use 
Aristotle gives is a concrete example of something that is more universal in principle. 
While Aristotle says that one use of the study of sophistic is the appreciation of the 
distinct senses in which things may be said, the untying of sophistical arguments leads 
to an appreciation of other distinctions useful to the philosopher too. In the same way 
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that dialectical reasoning ties a knot the untying of which leads to the discovery of some 
truth,134 sophistical reasoning ties a knot the untying of which does not uncover some 
new truth but may bring to light an important and overlooked distinction. The 
philosopher’s primary use of the treatment of fallacies is bringing to light overlooked 
distinctions. 
As we saw previously, the cause of deception in fallacies is their likeness to real 
syllogisms whereby one fails to distinguish between the two. Thus, failure to make 
distinctions is the root of fallacious deception while the ability to make distinctions is 
the heart of the art of untying fallacies. Untying the fallacy of equivocation leads one to 
distinguish the different senses of a word. Untying the fallacy of the accident leads one 
to distinguish between what is so as such and what is so accidentally. Untying the 
fallacy of what is simply and what is in a certain respect trains one to distinguish 
between what is so simply and what is so insome respect, and so on Moreover, the 
distinctions involved in untying sophistical refutations help one distinctly grasp what a 
syllogism is and what a contradiction is. These distinctions and notions are 
indispensable for the philosopher.  
                                                     
134 “[F]or the answers successfully arrived at are solutions (λύσις) to difficulties (ἀπορία) previously 
discussed” (Meta 995a28-30, trans. Apostle). According to Apostle, difficulty is “an uncertainty as to 
whether or not something is or is not the case, in view of arguments favoring both sides” (1976, p. 457). 
Cf. also Phys 211a8-12. 
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Aristotle’s use of the distinctions that sophists exploit is prolific. Aristotle uses 
the distinction between what is so simply (ἁπλῶς) and what is so in some respect (πῃ) 
in many cases: to explain why his predecessors did not think that good was a cause 
(Meta 988b15), to explain that first philosophy does not treat accidental (κατὰ 
συμβεβηκὸς) being (Meta 1026a33-1027a28), to argue that first philosophy is chiefly 
about substance (Meta 1028a 10-1028b), to show how ‘what it was to be’ (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) 
and definition belong to the categories (Meta 1030a17-1031a5), to explain how there is 
and is not a demonstration of first principles (Meta 1062a30-31), to distinguish different 
senses of best regime (Pol 1288b20-40),  to explain the natural road of inquiry in the 
physical sciences (Phys 184a9-b16, cf. also NE 1095b3-5), to distinguish between 
substantial and accidental change (Phys 190a30-b10), and so on. Aristotle of course also 
uses the distinction to untie sophistical arguments of his predecessors (cf. for instance, 
APo 71a29-b9). This distinction between what is so simply and what is so in some 
respect is so prolific that without understanding it, one cannot understand Aristotelian 
philosophy. 
 The distinction between what is so as such or in itself (καθ’ αὑτό) and what is so 
according to accident (κατὰ συμβεβηκός) is equally prevalent in Aristotle’s work. 
Aristotle solves Heraclitus’ change paradox, “cold things become warm, and the warm 
becomes cold; the wet dries, and the dry becomes wet” (DK 126), by arguing that one 
contrary comes to be from the other only according to accident, but that it comes to be 
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from the underlying not according to accident (Phys 190b25-30). Again, this distinction 
is also necessary to understand the subject of the Physics because Aristotle defines 
nature as a certain principle and cause of moving and of resting in that which it is, 
primarily, in itself and not according to accident (Phys 192b20-23). In one of Aristotle’s 
corollaries to his four senses of cause, he states that many things are the cause of the 
same thing and not according to accident (Phys 194b16-195a5). Moreover, Aristotle 
bases his distinction between things that happen by chance and things that happen for 
the sake of something on the distinction made between what comes to be in itself and 
what comes to be according to accident (Phys 196b10-197a7). While these examples 
comprise a relatively small number of Aristotle’s uses of the distinction, they help to 
manifest its importance. 
 In sum, the treatment of sophistical refutations is useful because the distinctions 
necessary to untie sophistical refutations are fundamental to comprehending Aristotle’s 
philosophy as a whole. Since untying sophistical refutations requires making such 
distinctions, the experience and art of untying sophistical refutations necessarily 
involves familiarity with making these distinctions. The study of the art of sophistic, 
therefore, is an occasion for gaining knowledge and experience essential for 
understanding Aristotle’s corpus. 
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A Third Use Proper to Sophistic for the Philosopher 
While Aristotle initially claims that he will give two uses for the study of 
sophistic in philosophy, he adds a third use for the philosopher himself, namely, that 
the philosopher not appear to be refuted by fallacies to his audience (SE 175a12-30).  
Even if a fallacious reasoning used in dialogue does not fool the philosopher, there is 
always the danger that bystanders may be fooled. The philosopher will not be able to 
acquire the excellence of producing another like himself if he cannot teach. The student 
must trust that his teacher has knowledge worthy of understanding for the endeavor to 
be successful (SE 165b2-3). The philosopher must learn how to expose fallacious 
reasoning plainly and avoid even the appearance of refutation of the truth.  
The philosopher’s desire to prevent the appearance of refutation does not make 
him a sophist because he will not deceive others to gain this appearance. While 
Aristotle’s treatment of the fallacies in the Sophistical Refutations has a tone of 
indifference as to whether or not one will use knowledge of sophistic to trick and 
manipulate his neighbor, it is clear that Aristotle wrote the treatise to further the truth 
and not vice versa.  Although Aristotle considers the reputation of a philosopher to be 
important, it is secondary to the crown of virtue (cf. NE 1123a34-1125a34). He has a 
pious concern for the truth (NE 1096a11-17). For virtue as such is ordered to some good, 
and the good man’s highest faculty aims at is the truth. What is more, Aristotle does not 
go out of his way to defend the use of sophistic the way he does to defend the use of 
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Rhetoric. He does not counsel the apparent untying of sophistic through sophistical 
reasoning. Moreover, Aristotle counsels that any “art, or science, which makes the body 
or soul or mind of the free man less fit for the practice or exercise of virtue, is vulgar” 
(Pol 1337b7-8, trans. Jowett). The philosopher desires knowledge of the art of sophistic 
in order to maintain his reputation, but he does not do so at the expense of the truth. 
III.IV Division of the Sophistical Refutations 
 
The Sophistical Refutations is divided into two main parts. In fact, Albert the Great 
turns the work into two books with this division. Chapters I-XV are ordered to the 
discussion of sophistical refutations from the perspective of the sophistic questioner. 
The second part of the treatise, Chapters XVI-XXXIV, is ordered to the discussion of 
sophistical refutations from the point of view of the answerer seeking to untie the 
sophist’s knots. 
In more detail, after a prooemium to the whole work in Chapters I-III, Aristotle 
considers sophistical aims through the lense of the sophist’s practical intellect. The 
practical intellect begins with its knowledge of its chief end and works backward to its 
more proximate ends. The first half of the Sophistical Refutations is ordered in this 
regard. Therefore, Aristotle first treats of the how the chief aim of the sophist is 
achieved and then treats of the secondary ends. The second half of the treatise mirrors 
the structure of the first half from the perspective of the answerer. 
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Outline of the Sophistical Refutations135 
I. Proemium or Prologue: Chapters One & Two 
A. The nature and existence of the subject matter C. 1  
B. Distinction of four kinds of argument in dialogue C. 2   
II. The aims of the sophist and how they are achieved: CS. 3-15 
A. The chief and secondary aims of the sophist C.3  
B. How the chief aim is achieved CS. 4-11 
1. The distinction of ways into two C. 4 165b 23-24  
2. The ways or places from speech C. 4 16524-166b21 
3. The ways or places from things C. 4 166b21-C. 5  
4. The reduction of all ways to ignorance of refutation C. 6  
5. How men are tricked by sophistical refutation C. 7  
6. Sufficiency of the above places and their distinction from other kinds of 
refutation CS. 8-9 
7. Concerning a mistake in dividing refutations C. 10 
8. The differences between dialectical and testing, sophistical and eristic, 
demonstrative and false-diagrammatic, arguments C. 11 
C. How the secondary aims are achieved CS. 12-14  
D. Rules to help achieved the aims in conversation C. 15 
III. Untying sophistical arguments: CS. 16-33 
A. Usefulness of untying C.16 
B. Apparent untying C.17 
C. True untying 
1. Of the sophist’s arguments for the chief aim CS. 18-30 
a. True untying of sophistical arguments in general C. 18  
b. Untying arguments from words CS. 19-23 
i. Untying arguments from equivocation and amphiboly C. 19  
ii. Untying arguments from composition and division C. 20  
iii. Untying arguments from accent C. 21 
iv. Untying arguments from figure of diction C. 22 
v. Untying of arguments from words in general C. 23  
c. Untying of arguments from things C. 24 
i. Untying arguments from the accident C. 24  
ii. Untying arguments from simply and in some respect C. 25 
iii. Untying arguments from ignorance of refutation C. 26  
iv. Untying arguments from taking the conclusion in the beginning C. 27  
                                                     
135 For this outline and for innumerable other insights into the text, I owe a debt of gratitude to Dr. Duane 
H. Berquist.  
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v. Untying arguments from consequence C. 28 
vi. Untying arguments from non-cause as cause C. 29  
vii. Untying arguments from making many questions one C. 30 
2. Of the sophist’s attempt to achieve secondary aims CS. 31-32  
D. Difficult and easy untying C. 33 







































Beginning from first things according to nature, let us speak about 
sophistical refutations, that is, what appear to be refutations, but are fallacies 
and not refutations. 
Now, it is manifest that there are syllogisms and there are other 
[arguments] which appear to be [syllogisms], but are not. For just as this 
[misleading appearance] takes place in other things through some likeness, so 
too it happens in arguments in the same way. For even with condition: some 
people are vigorous, but others appear to be [vigorous] by puffing up and 
preparing themselves like tribesmen; and some people are beautiful through 
beauty, but others appear to be [beautiful] by embellishing themselves. It is 
likewise with inanimate things: for some of these are truly silver or gold 
while others are not [silver or gold], but they appear to be by sensation. For 
example, things made of litharge and tin [appear to be] silver, and yellow 
colored things [appear to be] gold.  In the same way, one [argument] is both a 
syllogism and a refutation while another [argument] only appears to be 
because of inexperience. For inexperienced people perceive as if they were 
looking from far away. 
For a syllogism is [an argument] from [premises] which are laid down, 
such that one asserts something else, by necessity, other than the [premises] 
laid down but because of the [premises] laid down. A refutation is a 
syllogism with a contradiction of the conclusion. 
Some [arguments] do not [refute], but they seem to through a number 
of causes, one of which is most naturally suited and frequently used, namely 
the place through names. For, just like those who count with counting stones, 
we believe that what happens to names, happens to things. For we cannot put 
forward things themselves in discussion, and so we use names as symbols 
instead of the things. Nevertheless, it is not the same, because names and the 
number of speeches are limited, while things are unlimited in number. One 
and the same speech or name must signify more [than one thing]. In fact, just 
like in counting where people who are unskillful at directing counting stones 
are misled by those who are skilled, so too people who are inexperienced 
with the power of names are misled in arguments similarly, both when they 
argue dialectically themselves and when they hear others. Accordingly, 
 84 
 
         
 
        20 
 
 
         







        30 
 
 
        35 
through this cause—and those which we will discuss later—[some 
arguments] appear to be both syllogisms and refutations, but are not. 
Since seeming to be wise is more profitable for some people than being 
[wise] without appearing to be [wise] (for the sophistical art is apparent, but 
not real wisdom; and a sophist is a profiteer from apparent, but not real, 
wisdom), clearly [sophists] must appear to practice the wise man’s proper 
activity rather than practice [this activity] without seeming to do so. To 
explain how one relates to the other: it is the proper activity of the one who 
knows about something not to speak falsely about what he knows, and to be 
able to manifest when something is said falsely; concerning these, the first is 
being able to give an argument, the other is [being able] to receive one. 
Accordingly, those who wish to be sophists must inquire into the genus of 
arguments that have been mentioned.  For it is profitable because such a 
ability will make them appear wise, which they accomplish when they have 
this intention.  Evidently, therefore, there is a genus of arguments of this 
kind, and those whom we call sophists aim at such an ability. 
Let us now discuss how many species of sophistical arguments there 
are, the number of [parts] from which the ability is composed, how many 
parts of the discipline (πραγμᾶτεία) there are, and about other things which 
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 Clearly, there are four kinds of arguments in dialogue: didactic, 
dialectical, testing, and contentious. Didactic [arguments] syllogize from each 
discipline’s proper principles and not from the answerer’s opinions. (For a 
student must have trust.) Dialectical [arguments] syllogize from endoxes to a 
contradiction. Testing [arguments] syllogize from opinions held by the 
answerer and from premises that anyone pretending to have knowledge 
(ἐπιστήμη) must know (in the way that was layed down in other [works]). 
Contentious arguments syllogize from apparent but not real endoxes, or they 
appear to syllogize. 
 What concerns demonstrations has been treated in the Analytics, while 
what concerns dialectical [arguments] and testing [arguments] has been 
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 We must first grasp how many things competitors and victory-lovers 
aim at in arguments. There are five of these [aims]: refutation, falsehood, 
paradox, solecism, and fifth, causing the interlocutor to babble, (that is, to 
force him to say the same thing many times), or [to force him to state] what 
merely appears to be each of these [aims]. For [sophists] prefer to appear to 
be refuting most of all, second to expose when something is said falsely, third 
to lead [the answerer] into a paradox, fourth to make him say a solecism (i.e., 
to make the answerer commit a barbarism in his speech on account of an 
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 There are two ways of refutation: some are from speech, and others 
are outside of speech. There are six ways of producing an appearance [of 
refutation] from speech: equivocation, amphiboly, composition, division, 
accent, and the figure of diction. Confidence in this [list] comes from 
induction, or syllogism (if we should take up another way), especially 
because we can fail to signify the same thing with the same names and 
speeches in so many ways. 
 The following arguments are from equivocation. For example, Those 
who have knowledge learn because literate people understand dictated lessons. Here 
“to learn” is equivocal; it [means] both understanding while using 
knowledge and acquiring knowledge. Again, Evils are good because what needs 
to be is good, but evil things need to be. For “what needs to be” is twofold: [it 
means] “the necessary” which often occurs even in the case of evils, (since 
evil is something necessary); and we also say good things are “what needs to 
be.” Further: To sit and to stand are the same, and to be sick and to be healthy, 
because he who was standing up has stood up, and he who was recovering is healthy, 
but the man who has been seated was standing up, and the man who is sick was 
recovering. For, “the sick man doing or suffering anything whatsoever” does 
not signify one thing, but sometimes [it signifies] he who is now sick (or 
sitting), and at other times he who was sick before. Albeit the man who is 
sick was recovering even while he was sick, but he is not healthy while he is 
sick, rather he is the man who was sick before, but not now. 
The following [arguments] are from amphiboly: Wishing me the enemies 
to capture, and Is there knowledge of what one knows? For by speaking this way a 
person can signify the one who knows as knowing and the one who is known 
[as knowing]. Also, Is there sight of what one sees? But he sees the pillar, so the 
pillar sees. Again, Is it the case that what you claim to be, this you claim to be? But 
you claim the stone to be, so you claim to be a stone. Moreover, Is it the case that 
speaking of the silent is possible? For even “speaking of the silent” is twofold: [it 
means] either that the speaker is silent or that the ones who are spoken of are 
silent.  
There are three ways of [apparent refutation] from equivocation and 
amphiboly. The first way occurs whenever the speech or the name properly 
signify more than one thing as ἀετὸς and κύων. The second way occurs 
whenever we have been accustomed to speak in this way. The third way 
occurs whenever something signifies more than one thing when it is 
composed, but [signifies] only one thing when it is divided, as knowing letters. 
For if they happen [to be separated], both “knowing” and “letters” signify 
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one thing, but together, [they signify] more than one thing: either that the 
letters themselves have knowledge or another [person has knowledge] of the 
letters. Hence, amphiboly and equivocation occur in these ways.  
 The following arguments are from composition. For example, being 
able to walk while sitting, and [being able] to write while not writing. For, if 
someone says that “walking while sitting” is possible, he does not signify the 
same thing when he divides [the phrase] as he does when he composes it. 
And it is likewise in the following phrase, if someone composes “writing 
while not writing;” for [the phrase] signifies that one has the ability of 
writing while not writing; whereas if one does not compose it, [he signifies] 
that he has the ability of writing, when he does not write. Again, He learns 
letters now if in fact he learns what he has knowledge of. Again, being able to carry 
many things while one is able to carry only one thing. 
The following arguments are from division: Five is two and three, both 
odd and even, and the greater is equal, because it is so much and still more. For the 
same speech may not always appear to signify the same thing when divided 
and when composed, as for instance, I established you a slave while being free 
and God-like Achilles left a hundred fifty men. 
In dialectic, it is not easy to make an argument from accent without 
writing, but it is easier in written works and poetry. For example, some 
people even revise Homer against the criticism that the expression The invalid 
ought to be put aside is strange. For they untie this by an accent, by 
pronouncing the first syllable more sharply. Again, concerning 
Agamemnon’s vision in sleep, they say that Zeus himself did not say We 
grant him to attain what he prays for but that he commanded the vision in sleep 
to grant it. Thus, such examples are from accent.  
Arguments from the figure of diction occur whenever what is not the 
same is expressed in the same way. For instance, it occurs when the 
masculine [is expressed] by the feminine or the feminine by the masculine, or 
the neuter by either of these; or again, quality by quantity or quantity by 
quality; or acting upon by undergoing or the intransitive by the acting upon, 
and so on as has been previously distinguished. For with speech a person can 
signify what is not [in the category] of acting upon as something [in the 
category] of acting upon. For example, “being healthy” is said by figure of 
diction in a similar manner to “cutting” and to “building.”  Yet it is clear 
somehow that the one is a certain quality and intransitive, and the other is a 
certain acting upon. It also happens the same way in other instances.  
 Thus, refutations from speech are from these places. There are seven 
species of fallacies outside of speech: first, that from accident; second, that 
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or at some time, or in relation to something; third, that from ignorance of 
refutation; fourth, that from the consequent; fifth, that from assuming the 
original [question]; sixth, that from laying down what is not a cause as a 
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 Now, fallacies from accident occur whenever anything is thought to 
belong to a thing (πρᾶγμα) and to its accident in a like manner.  For it is not 
necessary that the same things belong to all the predicates and to the subject 
of which they are predicated. For many things happen accidentally to the 
same thing. For instance, If Coriscus is different from man, then he is different 
from himself because he is a man. Moreover, If he is different from Socrates and 
Socrates is a man, they say that he has conceded he is different from man 
because of the accident that [Socrates]—whom the [respondent] said that 
[Coriscus] is different from—is a man. 
 Fallacies from being said simply or in some respect and not properly 
occur whenever what is said in part (ἐν μέρει) is taken as if it had been said 
simply. For instance, If non-being is a matter of opinion, then non-being is. For to 
be something and to be simply are not the same. Or again, [it is said] that 
Being is not being, if it is not a certain kind of the being, for instance, if it is not 
man. For “not being something” and “not being simply” are not the same. 
Yet “being something” appears to be little different from “being” through 
resemblance in speech and “not being something” from “not being.” And it 
is likewise with the argument from what is in some respect and what is 
simply. For instance, If the Indian is white in respect to his teeth while he is black 
all over, then he is white and he is not white. Or, [it is said] that If both are in some 
respect, then contraries belong together. 
 In some cases, it would be easy for anybody to recognize this sort [of 
fallacy]. For example, if the questioner should ask whether [the Ethiopian] is 
white in respect to his teeth after securing that the Ethiopian is black [with 
respect to his skin]; if, in fact, the Ethiopian is white in respect [to his teeth], 
then [the answerer]—concluding the interrogation syllogistically—might 
think that it has been argued that [the Ethiopian] is both black and not black. 
 In some cases, [the fallacy] often escapes detection, namely in all cases 
where, whenever something is said in some respect, what is simply might 
also seem to follow, and in all cases where it is not easy to perceive which of 
these is properly assigned. Such a situation occurs in cases where opposites 
belong in a like manner. For it seems that one must concede that either both 
or neither are simply. For example, If something is half white and half black, is it 
white or black? 
Those [fallacies] from not having defined what syllogism or what 
refutation is come about through a deficient account (λόγος). For refutation 
is [a syllogism of] the contradiction of one and the same [thing], not of the 
name but of the thing [held by the answerer], and not of the synonymous 
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name, but of the same name, [in which the conclusion follows] by necessity 
from the [premises] that are granted (and does not assume the original 
[question]), [and the contradiction is] according to the same thing, in relation 
to the same thing, in the same manner, at the same time. (Also, [I define] any 
false assertion in the same way.) Some people merely appear to refute by 
leaving out one of the stated [parts of the definition]. For instance, [they say] 
that The same thing is double and not double because two is double of one, but it is 
not double of three. Or [they say that The same thing is double and not double], if 
the same thing is double and not double of the same thing, but not according to the 
same. For it is double in length, but it is not double in width; Or [they say that 
The same thing is double and not double], if [the same thing is double and not 
double] of the same thing and according to the same and in the same manner, but not 
at the same time; hence there is an apparent refutation. Someone might even 
drag this [refutation] into the refutations from speech.  
[Fallacies] from assuming the original [question] occur in the same 
way and from all the ways a person can beg the original [question]. They 
appear to refute through [the interlocutor’s] inability to distinguish the same 
from the different. 
The refutation from the consequent occurs through assuming that an 
implication converts.  For whenever [B] follows by necessity from [A] being 
so, they also expect that [A] follows by necessity and from [B] being so. 
This is the source of mistaken opinions based on sense sensation also. 
For people often take the bile for honey because the yellow color follows 
upon honey. Again since it happens that the earth is soaked after it rains, we 
assume it rained if the earth is soaked, but this is not necessary. 
Again, in rhetorical [arguments], demonstrations by sign are from 
consequents. For when rhetoricians wish to show that someone is an 
adulterer, they take the consequent that he is a dandy or that he is seen 
wandering by night. Still, these [attributes] belong to many people, but the 
accusation [of adultery] does not. 
It happens likewise even in syllogistic arguments, as Melissus’ 
argument that the universe is unlimited. He thought that The universe is 
unoriginated (for nothing can come to be from non-being) and what becomes comes 
to be from a beginning. Therefore, If the universe has not come to be, it does not have 
a beginning; hence, it is unlimited. This, however, does not follow necessarily. 
For it does not follow that if everything which comes to be has a beginning, 
then if something has a beginning, it also has come to be, just as if a man 
who is feverish is hot, a hot man is not necessarily feverish. 
The [refutation] from what is not a cause as a cause occurs whenever 




































         
 
it. This kind [of argument] happens in syllogisms to the impossible. For in 
these [syllogisms] one must do away with one of the premises laid down. 
Now if [a statement] is counted among the questions necessary for the 
resulting impossibility, the refutation will often seem to depend on it. For 
example, The soul and life are not the same because if coming to be is contrary to 
ceasing to be, then also some kind of coming to be is contrary to some kind of ceasing 
to be. Death is some kind of ceasing to be and is contrary to life; accordingly, life is a 
coming-to-be and to live is to become. But this is impossible, hence the soul and life 
are not the same. Surely the [argument] does not syllogize. For the 
impossibility follows even if the answerer does not say that life is the same 
as the soul, but says only that life is contrary to death—which is a ceasing-to-
be—and that coming-to-be is [contrary to] ceasing-to-be. Arguments of this 
kind are not unsyllogistic simply, but unsyllogistic relative to the question 
under discussion. And often this kind [of argument] escapes the detection of 
the questioners themselves just as much [as it does of the answerers]. Hence, 
arguments of this kind are from the consequent and what is not a cause. 
Arguments from making two questions one occur whenever [the 
answerer] does not notice that there are a number [of questions], and he 
gives one answer as if there is only one [question]. Now in some cases, it is 
easy to see that there are many [questions] and that the [respondent] must 
not give an answer. For example, Is the earth the sea or the sky? In some cases, 
however, it is not as [clear], and either [the answerers] concede as if there is 
only one question by not answering, or they appear to be refuted. For 
example, Is he (A) and he (B) a man? Therefore, if someone strikes him (A) and him 
(B), then will he not strike men but a man. Or again, concerning things of which 
some are good and others are bad, Are all of them good or not good? For 
whichever of the two [answers] he says, he may seem to produce an 
apparent refutation or a false statement. For it is false to say that something 
is good which is not good or that something is not good which is good. 
Sometimes, securing additional premises may give rise to a true refutation. 
For instance, if someone grants that “white” and “naked” and “blind” are 
said similarly of one and many things. For If the blind is that which does not 
have sight but is naturally disposed to have it, then blind things will also be things 
which do not have sight but are naturally disposed to have it. Hence, whenever one 
thing has [sight] but another does not have [sight], they both will either be seeing or 




Chapter 6: Reduction of Apparent Refutations to Ignorance of Refutation 
 
 




































 Assuredly, one must either divide apparent syllogisms and refutations 
as above or one must refer all to ignorance of refutation—making this the 
beginning: for it is possible to reduce all the previously stated ways into the 
definition of refutation. First, [one can reduce them] if they are unsyllogistic. 
For the conclusion must follow from the premises laid down such that one 
asserts it by necessity, and does not merely appear to. Then [one can reduce 
them] according to the parts of the definition also. For concerning the 
[fallacies] inside speech, some are from what is twofold: namely, 
equivocation and speech and the common-form (for it is customary to signify 
everything as a ‘this something’), while composition and division and accent 
occur because the speech is not the same or the name is different. Even this 
[i.e., the speech or name] must be the same—just as the thing (πρᾶγμα) must 
also be the same—if there is to be a refutation or syllogism. For example, if 
the [name is] robe, one must not syllogize about “cloak,” but about “robe.” 
For the former [conclusion] would also be true, but it has not been syllogized. 
Instead, in response to the one seeking to know the “reason why,” one must 
ask the further question: whether it signifies the same thing. 
[Fallacies] from accident are exposed when syllogism has been 
defined. For there must also be the same definition of refutation except that 
contradiction is added. For a refutation is a syllogism of contradiction. 
Consequently, if there is no syllogism of the accident, there is no refutation. 
For if (C) must be when these (A) and (B) are, and (C) is white, then it is not 
necessary that it is white because of the syllogism. Moreover, if a triangle has 
angles equal to two right angles, but it happens accidentally to be a figure or 
an element or a principle, it is not necessary that a figure or an element or a 
principle [have angles equal to two right angles]. For the demonstration is 
not as figure or as principle but as triangle, and it is likewise even in other 
cases. If, therefore, a refutation is a syllogism, then there cannot be a 
refutation according to accident. Still, because of this [fallacy], both the 
artisans and in general people who know scientifically are refuted by people 
who do not. For [those who do not know scientifically] make syllogisms 
according to the accident against those who do. For those who are unable to 
distinguish either concede when they are questioned or suppose that they 
have conceded when they have not conceded. 
[Fallacies] from [being said] simply and in some respect [reduce to 
ignorance of refutation] because the affirmation and denial are not of the 
same thing. For the denial of “white in some respect” is “not white in some 
respect” and of “white simply,” “not white simply.” Accordingly, if [the 
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questioner] assumes that something is said to be white simply when [the 
answerer] grants it merely in some respect, then he does not cause a 
refutation. He appears to, however, because of ignorance of what a refutation 
is. 
 The clearest of all are [arguments] previously called [fallacies] from 
the definition of refutation. (This is why they have the name that they do.) 
For the appearance is the result of a deficient account [of refutation], and if 
they are distinguished in this way, we must establish that a deficient account 
is common to them all.   
 Both [fallacies] from assuming the original [question] and [fallacies] 
from laying down what is not a cause as a cause are clear through the 
definition. For the conclusion must follow “by these [premises] being so,” 
although this does not happen when the [premises] are not causes. And 
again, “not assuming the original [question]” [is part of the definition], but 
[fallacies] from begging the original [question] do just that. 
[Fallacies] from the consequent are part of the [fallacy] of the accident. 
For the consequent is an accident, but it is different from an accident because 
it is possible to take the accident in one [thing] alone. For example, the yellow 
and honey are the same, and the white and swan. On the other hand, the 
[fallacy] from the consequent is always in several things. For we think things 
that are the same by one and the same thing are also the same as one another. 
The refutation from the consequent comes to be on account of this. Yet it is 
not always true, as for instance, if it is [white] according to accident because 
both snow and a swan are the same by whiteness.  
 Or again, as in Mellisus’ argument, he assumes that “having come to 
be” and “having a beginning” are the same, or “becoming equal” and “to 
take the same magnitude” [are the same.] For he thinks that what has a 
beginning has come to be, since what has come to be also has a beginning as 
if both things—i.e., what has come to be and what is limited—are the same 
by having a beginning. And likewise, in things which become equal, if what 
takes one and the same magnitude becomes equal, then also what becomes 
equal takes one magnitude. Hence, he assumes the consequent. Accordingly, 
since the refutation from accident is in ignorance of refutation, it is apparent 
that the [argument] from the consequent is too. Yet we must also consider 
this in another way. 
 [Fallacies] from making many questions one depend on our not 
articulating the account of a premise. For a premise is one [term] said of one 
[term]. For the same definition applies to one thing alone and to the thing 
(πρᾶγμα) simply, as to man and to one man alone, and it is likewise in other 
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question will also be a premise simply. Since the syllogism is from premises 
and a refutation is a syllogism, then the refutation will also be from premises. 
Consequently, if the premise asserts one [term] of one [term,] clearly [the 
fallacy of making many questions one] is also in ignorance of refutation. For 
[in the fallacy] what is not a premise appears to be a premise. If, therefore, 
[the answerer] has given the answer as if to one question, there will be a 
refutation. On the other hand, if he has not given [an answer], but appears to, 
then there will be an apparent refutation. 
 Hence all places fall into ignorance of refutation: [fallacies] from 
speech because the contradiction is apparent—which was proper to 




Chapter 7: How People are Tricked by Fallacies 
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 The trick of [fallacies] from equivocation and speech occurs through 
being unable to distinguish what is said in many ways. For some [names and 
phrases] are not easy to distinguish, as “one,” and “being,” and “the same.” 
 [The trick of fallacies] from composition and division occurs through 
thinking that it makes no difference whether a phrase (λόγος) is composed or 
divided, just as [it makes no difference] in most cases. 
 In a like manner, [the trick occurs] in [fallacies] from accent because 
lowering and raising a phrase’s pitch does not seem to alter its meaning—
either in all or many cases. 
 [The trick of arguments] from figure [of diction] is through a likeness 
of speech. For it is difficult to distinguish what sort of things are said in the 
same way and what sort are said in a different way (for anyone able to do 
this is close to seeing the truth and knows best when to assent) because we 
assume everything that is predicated of something is a ‘this something,’ and 
we hear it as one thing. For ‘this something’ and ‘being’ especially seem to 
follow upon what is one and substance. Whence one must count this way 
among those from speech, first because the trick occurs more when inquiring 
with others than by ourselves. (For inquiry with another person happens 
through speech, while inquiry by oneself happens no less through the thing 
itself). Second, one is liable to be tricked even by himself whenever he makes 
the inquiry with speech. Besides, a trick is from a likeness, and the likeness is 
from speech.  
 [The trick of fallacies] from accident occurs through not being able to 
distinguish what is the same and what is different, and what is one and what 
is many, nor in what kinds of predicate all the same things happen 
accidentally to them and to their subject (πρᾶγμα). 
 It occurs likewise in those [fallacies] from the consequent. For the 
consequent is a part of the accident. Furthermore, in many cases the 
following [opinion] seems so and is thought to be so: if (A) cannot be 
separated from (B), then (B) cannot be separated from (A). 
 The trick of those [fallacies] from a deficient account [of refutation] 
and of those fallacies from what is in a certain respect and what is simply 
depends on a small difference. For we assent universally, acting as if a 
limitation to an individual or a qualification in respect or manner or time 
added nothing new. 
 [The trick occurs] likewise in [fallacies] that assume the original 
[question] and [in the fallacies from] the non-cause and in those that make 
many questions one. For in all these, the trick depends on a small difference. 
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 For we fail to consider with precision both the definition of a premise and a 




Chapter 8: That the List of Sophistical Refutations is Complete; How a Sophistical 
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 Since we grasp the number of [causes] from which apparent 
syllogisms come about, we also grasp the number of ways sophistical 
syllogisms and refutations might occur. I not only call a sophistical refutation 
and syllogism what merely appears to be a syllogism or refutation but also 
what is [a refutation or syllogism] while appearing proper to the thing 
(πρᾶγμα). These are the [fallacies] that fail to refute according to the thing 
and [fail to] expose those who are ignorant, which is [the work] of the testing 
art. The testing art is part of dialectic. It can syllogize to what is false through 
the ignorance of the one who grants the argument. Yet sophistical 
refutations—even if they syllogize to a contradiction—do not show whether 
[the answerer] is ignorant; for [sophists] tie up even someone who knows 
using these arguments. 
 Clearly, we grasp them by the same method. For whatever [causes] 
make the audience think that [a contradiction] is syllogized by way of 
questions, may make the answerer think so too. Hence, syllogisms will be 
false through these [causes], either through all or some. For what he thinks he 
would have granted when he wasn’t questioned, he would also grant if he 
was. (Except, in some cases, placing an additional question for what is 
lacking and exposing what is false occurs at the same time, e.g., in [fallacies] 
from speech or solecism). Accordingly, if fallacies of contradiction are due to 
apparent refutations, clearly syllogisms with false conclusions would also 
depend on the same number of sources an apparent refutation does. 
 Now, apparent [refutation] results from the parts of true [refutation] 
because an apparent refutation results from excluding each [part]. For 
instance, a [reduction] into the impossible is due to not following on account 
of the argument, and the [fallacy] of making two questions one is due to a 
[defect in the definition of] premise, and the [fallacy of the accident] is from 
[using] what is accidental instead of what is through itself, so too with this 
[fallacy’s] branch: the [fallacy] of assuming the consequent. Moreover, [in 
fallacies from speech, the conclusion] does not follow in respect to the thing 
but in respect to the speech. Next (instead of syllogizing a contradiction of 
the universal and according to the same and in relation to the same thing and 
in the same way) a fallacy may be from [syllogizing] what is in a certain 
respect or from one or another of these qualifications. Again, the fallacy of 
assuming the original [question] is due to “not reckoning in the original 
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fallacies occur. For they should not be from more, but they will all be from 
those aforementioned. 
 A sophistical refutation is not a refutation simply, but in relation to 
someone and it is likewise for the syllogism. For unless the [fallacy] from 
equivocation assumes [the name] signifies one thing and the [fallacy] from 
common-form [assumes it signifies] this alone, and likewise for the others, 
there will be no refutation nor syllogism—neither simply nor in relation to 
the answerer. Yet if they assume this, there will be [a refutation] in relation to 
the answerer, but there will not be [a refutation] simply. For they have not 





Chapter 9: In What Respect the List of Sophistical Refutations is Complete 

































       10 
 Without knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) of everything that is, one should not 
try to grasp all the [sources] through which people are refuted. No one art 
can do this. For perhaps sciences are infinite and so clearly demonstrations 
are too. These [demonstrations] are also true refutations. For whenever it is 
possible to demonstrate, it is also possible to refute someone who contradicts 
the truth. For example, if someone laid down that the [side of a square] is 
commensurate with the diagonal, one would refute him by demonstrating 
that it is incommensurate. Hence, there will need to be people who have 
knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) of all things. For some [refutations] will be from 
principles of geometry and conclusions that follow from these, others will be 
from principles of medicine, and others from those of other sciences. 
 Moreover, false refutations will likewise be among things which are 
infinite.  For there is a false syllogism according to each art. For example, the 
geometrical is according to geometry, and the medical according to medicine. 
I call ‘according to an art,’ what is according to its principles. Plainly, 
therefore, one must not grasp the places of all refutations, but those from 
dialectic. For [dialectical places] are common to every art and ability. And it 
is the [work] of the one who has knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) to consider 
refutation according to each science, both if it merely appears to be, and if it 
is, on account of what it is; but it is [the work] of dialecticians [to consider 
refutation] from common things and under no one art. For if we grasp [the 
places] from which there are endoxic syllogisms about anything whatsoever, 
we grasp [the places] from which there are refutations. For refutation is a 
syllogism of contradiction, so that a refutation is either one or two syllogisms 
of contradiction. 
 We grasp, then, the number of [sources] due to which all such 
[refutations] come to be. If we grasp this, then, we also grasp their untyings. 
For the objections to these [refutations] are their untyings. We also grasp by 
how many [sources] apparent [refutations] come to be—not apparent to 
anyone whatsoever but to a certain kind of people. For if someone examines 
from how many [sources] there seems to be [a refutation] to any chance 
person, the number is unlimited. Clearly, therefore, the ability to grasp from 
how many [sources] either a real refutation or an apparent refutation—either 
dialectical, or apparently dialectical, or testing—come to be through common 
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 There is no distinction that some people say there is between 
arguments ‘towards the name’ and others ‘towards the thought.’ For it is 
strange to assume that some arguments are towards the name and others are 
towards the thought, but not the same arguments. For what is ‘not towards 
the thought’ except when [a questioner] uses a name for something different 
from what the answerer thought he was being asked about when [the 
answerer] granted [the question]? Yet ‘towards the name’ is the same thing. 
[An argument] is ‘towards the thought’ when [a questioner uses a name] for 
what [the answerer] had in mind when he granted [the question]. 
 Now if they (i.e., both the questioner and the answerer) were to think 
that a name signifies one thing when it signifies many things—for instance, 
“being” and “one” signify equally many things, and the argument is that 
everything is one, but the answerer [responds] and the questioner inquires 
assuming that [the names] have one meaning—will the argument be directed 
towards the name or towards the answerer’s thought? Yet if someone thinks 
that [a name] signifies many things, clearly it is not towards the thought. For 
‘towards the name’ and ‘towards the thought’ primarily concern arguments 
which signify many things, but then they concern any argument whatsoever. 
For being directed towards the thought does not depend on the argument, 
but on how the answerer relates to the granted [premises]. Accordingly, they 
can all be directed towards the name because in this circumstance being 
towards the name is not being towards the thought. For if not all [arguments 
can be directed towards the name], some will be neither towards the thought 
nor towards the name. Nevertheless, they say all are [towards one or the 
other], and all are divided into being either towards the name or towards the 
thought and not into others. 
 Moreover, only some syllogisms that depend on what is said 
ambiguously are from the name. For it has been strangely stated that ‘from 
the name’ describes all [fallacies] from speech. But some [arguments] are 
fallacies, not by how the answerer relates to [the granted premises], but by 
the argument itself having the sort of question which signifies many things. 
 Speaking generally, to discuss refutation without first discussing 
syllogism is out of place (ἄτοπος). For a refutation is a syllogism, so one 
must [discuss] syllogism before false refutation. For such a refutation is an 
apparent syllogism of contradiction.  Therefore, the cause will either be in the 
syllogism or in the contradiction (for the contradiction must be attached)—
sometimes in both if it is an apparent refutation. The [argument] about 
“speaking of the silent” has [its cause] in the contradiction, not in the 
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syllogism, but [the argument that] “someone can give what he does not 
have” has [its cause] in both. [The argument that] “Homer’s poetry is a figure 
on account of the circle” has [the cause] in the syllogism. That [which has the 
cause] in neither is a true syllogism. 
 But returning to the place where the argument left off: are arguments 
in mathematics directed towards the thought or not? And if an answerer 
believes that “triangle” signifies many things and granted [a question 
regarding triangle] not referring to a figure concluded to have [angles equal 
to] two right angles, then has [the questioner] argued towards his thought, or 
not? 
 Besides, if a name signifies many things, but an answerer does not 
know or think that it does, how has [the questioner] not argued towards his 
thought? Or how else should one question except by making a distinction? 
Suppose a person was to ask if speaking of the silent is possible or not, or if it 
is “yes” in a way and “no” in another way, then if the answerer was to grant 
it in no way, and yet it could be concluded dialectically, then has not [the 
questioner] argued towards his thought? Yet the argument seems to belong 
to those from the name. 
 Hence, there is not a certain kind of argument directed towards the 
thought. But some [arguments] are towards the name, and yet these 
[arguments] do not exhaust all refutations nor all apparent refutations. For 
there are also apparent refutations that are not from speech, as for instance, 
those from accident and others. 
 If someone claims to distinguish, claiming that “By ‘speaking of the 
silent,’ sometimes I mean one thing, and other times another thing,” then this 
claim is, in the first place, at least strange. For sometimes the question does 
not seem to have many meanings, and it is impossible to make a distinction 
when one does not believe there is one. In the second place, what else will 
didactic teaching be? For [teaching] will make clear that it has [more than one 
meaning] to a person who has neither considered, nor knows, nor supposes 
that it is said otherwise. For what prevents this from happening with 
[phrases] that are not twofold also? Are the units in fours equal to twos?  Some 
twos are present in one way but others in another way. Again, Is knowledge 
(ἐπιστήμη) of contraries one or not? Some contraries are known but others are 
unknown. Thus, the person making this claim does not seem to know that 
teaching is different from dialectic and that the teacher must not question but 











































 Still, requiring someone to affirm or deny is not characteristic of a 
demonstrator, but of a person who exacts tests. For the testing art is a certain 
aspect of dialectic, and it does not consider the knower but the ignorant man 
who pretends to know. Now a dialectician considers common things 
according to a subject, but a sophist appears to do this. Now one [kind of] 
apparent syllogism is the contentious and sophistical syllogism concerning 
things on which dialectic employs the testing art—even if its conclusion is 
true. (For it tricks us in regard to the reason why.) Again, some fallacies seem 
to be according to an art although they are not according to the particular 
[art’s] method. For false-diagrammatics are not contentious (for [such] 
fallacies are according to what falls under the art), not even if there is some 
false-diagrammatic about the truth, as that of Hippocrates or the squaring of 
the circle by means of lunules. But how Bryson squared the circle—even if 
the circle is squared—is still sophistical because it is not according to the 
subject. Therefore, an apparent syllogism about these things is a contentious 
argument, and a syllogism which appears to be according to the subject—
even if it is a syllogism—is a contentious argument because it appears to be 
according to the subject so it is tricky and unjust. 
 For just as injustice in the athletic contest has a certain look and is a 
kind of dirty-fighting, so too the contentious art is dirty-fighting in a dispute. 
For, in the former case, those who play for victory at all costs snatch at 
everything, and in the latter case, the contentious disputers do the same. 
Therefore, those so inclined for the sake of victory itself seem to be 
contentious men and strife-lovers, but those so inclined for the sake of their 
reputation in order to make money seem to be sophistical. For the sophistic 
art is—just as we said—an art of money-making due to appearing wise; for 
this reason, they aim at apparent demonstration. Again, strife-lovers and 
sophists are occupied with the same arguments, but not for the same 
purposes. The same argument will be both sophistical and contentious but 
not for the same reason. If the purpose is apparent victory, the [argument] is 
contentious, if the purpose is apparent wisdom, it is sophistic. For the 
sophistic art is an apparent, but not real, wisdom. 
 In a way, the contentious argument relates to the dialectical one as the 
false-diagrammer is to the geometrician. For it argues fallaciously from the 
same [premises] as dialectic, and the false-diagrammer from the same 
[premises] as the geometer. Yet the [false-diagrammer] is not contentious 
because he makes false diagrams from the principles and conclusions under 










































contentious applied to other [disciplines]. For example, the squaring of the 
circle by means of lunules is not contentious, but that of Bryson is. The 
former cannot carry over to anything other than geometry alone because it is 
from [geometry’s] proper principles but the latter [carries over] against many 
interlocutors—those who do not know what is possible and impossible in 
each case; for [the argument] will adapt. Or as Antiphon squared the circle. 
Or if someone should deny that it is better to walk after supper on account of 
Zeno’s argument, it is not medical. For [the argument] is common. 
 Now if the relation of the contentious [argument] to dialectical was in 
every way similar to that of the false-diagrammer to the geometer, then [the 
contentious argument] would not be contentious about those things. As a 
matter of fact, a dialectical [argument] does not concern some definite genus, 
nor is it able to demonstrate anything, nor is it of such a kind as the 
universal. For everything is not in a single genus, and even if it were, all 
beings would not fall under the same principles. Accordingly, no art which 
demonstrates the nature of anything is interrogative. For a person cannot 
grant either of the two parts [of the contradiction indifferently] because a 
syllogism does not come about from both. Still, the dialectical art is 
interrogative. If [dialectic] did demonstrate, it would not ask—if not about 
everything, then at least about the first things and proper principles. For 
supposing [the answerer] did not granted these, [dialectic] would no longer 
have anything from which to argue further against [the answerer’s] objection. 
 Yet the same art is also a testing art. For the testing art is not an art like 
geometry, rather it is an art which someone could have even without having 
knowledge. For even a man who does not know a subject can expose an 
ignorant person with a test —if, that is, the latter concedes [questions]. [The 
questioner does this] not based on what he knows nor based on proper 
[principles] but based on the consequences which a person can know without 
knowing the [relevant] art (but which, if he does not know them, he must be 
ignorant of the art). Clearly therefore, the testing art is not scientific 
knowledge of anything definite. For this reason, it is also about everything. 
For all the arts use some common [principles] too. Accordingly, everyone, 
even common men, take part in dialectic and the testing art in a certain way. 
For, up to a certain point, everyone attempts to interrogate those who profess 
[knowledge]. For what they use in this interrogation are the common things. 
For people know them no less, even if they seem to say quite irrelevant 
things. Consequently, all men refute. For they unartfully participate in what 















 Many of these things concern all [subjects], but they are not the sort of 
things that constitute a particular nature and genus (rather they are like 
negations), while other things are not of this kind, but are proper. Hence, a 
person can exact a test about everything from these things, and it is a definite 
art, and it is not of the same kind as those which demonstrate. For this 
reason, the contentious person is not in all respects like the false-diagrammer. 
For the contentious person will not be fallacious from principles of some 
definite genus, but will deal with every genus. 
 Accordingly, these are the ways of sophistical refutations. It is easy to 
see that it is characteristic of the dialectician to consider about them and to be 
able to make them. For the investigation (μέθοδος) of premises comprises 











































 And we have spoken about apparent refutations. As for exposing that 
a person speaks falsely and leading an argument into a disreputable opinion 
(for this was the sophist’s second aim), in the first place, this occurs especially 
from a manner of inquiring and through questioning. For questioning—
without determining what is laid down—is a good trap for these [purposes]. 
For interlocutors are more likely to err when they speak without a plan, and 
they speak without a plan whenever they have nothing laid down before 
them. Both asking about many things—even if what is being argued against 
is determined—and requiring that [the answerer] say what he thinks, 
produce an easy means of leading him into a disreputable opinion or a 
falsehood. It also leads him towards what one has plenty of attacks against—
whether he affirms or denies any of these questions, when he is questioned. 
Yet, nowadays people are less able to work evil by these means than before. 
For [answerers] inquire, “what has this to do with what was asked in the 
beginning?” Again, an element for obtaining either something false or a 
disreputable opinion is not asking for a position frankly, but claiming to ask 
out of a desire to learn. For the pretense produces a location for attack. 
 Leading [the answerer] to the kind of positions that [the questioner] 
has plenty of arguments against is a sophistical place proper to exposing that 
something is said falsely. Yet, a person can do this both well or poorly just as 
was mentioned before. 
 Again, to elicit a paradox, consider the group to which your 
interlocutor belongs, and then ask about something that [the group] says 
which is paradoxical for many people. For there is a [position] of this sort in 
each [group]. An element in these matters is to hold the [paradoxical] 
positions of each [group] among your premises. And the proper untying of 
these [devices] is brought about by showing that the disreputable opinion 
does not follow on account of the argument. And a competitor always desires 
this also. 
 Moreover, argue from their wishes and public opinions. For people do 
not say and wish the same things. On the one hand, they make the most 
respectable claims. On the other hand, they wish for what appears profitable. 
They say, for example, that one ought to die nobly rather than to live for 
pleasure, and to toil justly rather than to be rich dishonorably, but they wish 
contrary things. We should lead a man who speaks according to his wishes 
into his public opinions, but he who speaks according to the latter into his 
hidden wishes. For in both cases, he must assert paradoxes. For they will say 


























 The most common place used for making someone say paradoxes is 
due to what is according to nature and what is according to law—just as 
Callicles is represented as saying in the Gorgias and as all the ancients 
thought followed. For they supposed nature and law to be contraries, and 
justice to be good according to law but not good according to nature. 
Therefore, against someone who speaks according to nature one should reply 
according to law, and against someone [who speaks] according to law [one 
should] lead on to nature; for either way, it amounts to stating paradoxes. For 
them, what is according to nature was the truth, but what is according to law 
was the opinion of most people. Hence, clearly even they tried either to 
refute the answerer or to force him to state paradoxes, just as people also do 
nowadays. 
 With some questions, answering either way is disreputable, for 
instance, Should a person obey the wise or his father? and Should one do what is 
expedient or what is just? and Which is worthier of choice, to do wrong or to suffer 
wrong? We should lead [our opponents] into [opinions] contrary to the many 
and to the wise: if he speaks as those trained in argument, then [we should 
lead him] into [opinions contrary] to the many, but if he speaks as the many, 
then [we should lead him] toward [opinions contrary] to the wise. For some 
people say that the happy man is just by necessity, but for the many, that a 
king is unhappy is a disreputable opinion. Leading into disreputable 
opinions in this manner is the same as leading into the opposition of what is 
according to nature and according to law. For law is the opinion of the many, 





























 We must, then, seek paradoxes from these places. Regarding [the aim 
of] making someone babble (we have already said what we mean by 
babbling), all the following kind of arguments are inclined to produce it. If it 
makes no difference whether a person says the name or gives the account, 
then “double” and “double of half” are the same. Hence If it is double of half, 
then it will be double of half of half. And if one again lays down double of half in 
place of double, then “of half” will be said three times: double of half of half of 
half. Also, Is it the case that a desire is for pleasure? Yet, [desire] is an appetite for 
pleasure. Hence, desire is an appetite for pleasure for pleasure. 
 All such arguments consist of (a) [terms] relative to something where 
these [terms], not only the genera but also the things themselves, are said 
relative to something, and assigned relative to one and the same thing (as for 
instance, appetite is appetite for something, and desire is desire for 
something, and double is double of something, i.e., double of half)—and 
consist of (b) any [terms] which, while they are not at all relative, the things 
whose habit or passion or something of this sort they are, their substance is 
included in their account as well, as predicated of these things. For example, 
Odd is a number having a mean, and this is an odd number; therefore this is a 
number number having a mean. Again, If snub is a concavity of the nose, but this is 
a snub nose; therefore this is a concave nose nose. 
 Sometimes [sophists] who do not make people [babble] appear to do 
so. For they do not ask whether “double” signifies something or not when it 
is said by itself, and if it does signify something, whether it signifies that 
same thing or something else. Nevertheless, they assert the conclusion right 











































 We have already said what sort of thing a solecism is. A person can 
make it; not make it, but seem to; or make it, but seem not to. If, as Protagoras 
used to say, “wrath” (ὁ μῆνις) and “helmet” (ὁ πήληξ) are masculine, then 
according to [Protagoras] a person who calls [wrath] “destructive” 
(οὐλομένην) commits a solecism, but he does not seem to do so to others. 
And, a person who calls [wrath] “destructive” (οὐλόμενον) appears to 
commit a solecism, but does not. Clearly, therefore, someone might also be 
able to bring this about through art; wherefore many of the arguments 
appear to syllogize a solecism when they do not syllogize a solecism, just like 
refutations. 
 Nearly all apparent solecisms are from this {τόδε}, namely whenever 
the inflection indicates neither masculine nor feminine, but neuter. “He” 
(οὗτος) signifies a masculine, but “she” (αὕτη) signifies a feminine; still “it” 
(τοῦτο) is inclined to signify something neuter, but “it” also often signifies 
either [masculine or feminine]. For instance, “what is it” (τοῦτο)? “It is 
Calliope,” or “It is a log,” or “It is Coriscus.” 
 Now, the inflections of masculine and feminine are all different, and 
some of the neuter are different while some are not. Often, then, when “it” 
(τοῦτο) is granted, they syllogize as if “him” (τοῦτον) had been used. They 
argue in the same way swapping other inflections. The fallacy happens 
because “it” (τοῦτο) is common to many inflections; for “it” (τοῦτο) 
sometimes signifies “he” (οὗτος) and sometimes “him” (τοῦτον). It ought to 
signify alternately: “he” (οὗτος) ought to be combined with “is” (ἔστι), and 
“him” (τοῦτον) with “to be” (εἶναι), as for example, “It is Coriscus” (ἔστι 
Κορίσκος) and “[I think it] to be Coriscus” (εἶναι Κορίσκον). And it happens 
likewise with feminine names and with so-called “inanimate” names when 
they have a nominative form of a feminine or masculine [name]. For only 
names which end in -ον have the nominative form of an inanimate [name], 
e.g., “log” (ξύλον,) and “chord” (σχοινίον). Other names that do not [end in 
-ον have a nominative form] of a feminine or masculine [name], some of 
which we apply to inanimate things. For instance, the name “skin” (ἀσκὸς) is 
masculine, but “couch” (κλίνη) is feminine. For this reason, there will be the 
same difference between “is” (ἔστι) and “to be” (εἶναι) in such cases. 
 In some way, a solecism is like refutations that are said to depend on 
‘expressing things that are not alike in a similar way.’ For just as one finds 
himself committing a solecism on things in the latter, so too one ends up 
committing a solecism on names in the former. For man and white are both 









 Accordingly, it is apparent that one must try to syllogize a solecism 
from the aforesaid inflections. 
 These, therefore, are the species of competitive arguments and the 
parts of the species, and the ways are those mentioned. Still, it makes no 
small difference if the parts of the interrogation are marshalled somehow in 
order to escape detection, just as in dialectical [arguments]. One therefore 











































 Surely length is one [resource] useful for refuting. For it is difficult to 
see many things at once. To create length, one should use the elements 
mentioned before. Another [resource] is speed, because when people lag 
behind, they do not see as far ahead. Moreover, there is anger and love of 
victory because when people are agitated, they are not as able to stay 
watchful. The elements of [producing] anger are clearly wishing to engage in 
foul play and behaving altogether shamelessly. Another [resource] is 
alternating questions—both if someone has many arguments against the 
same thing, and if someone has arguments both for and against the same 
thing—because [the answer] ends up guarding against either several or 
contrary attacks all at once. 
 In general, all the [resources] for concealment that have been 
previously mentioned are also useful for competitive arguments. For the  
purpose of concealment is escaping detection, and the purpose of escaping 
detection, the trick. 
 When dealing with people who deny whatever they think is for [a 
questioner’s] argument, one should ask his questions in the negative as if he 
wishes the contrary, or even as if he asks impartially.  For [opponents] cause 
less trouble when it is not clear what [answer] one wishes to secure. And in 
dealing with particulars, whenever [an answerer] grants a particular case, 
one should often not ask him to induce the universal, but instead use [the 
universal] as if he granted it. For sometimes even the interlocutor himself 
thinks that he has granted it, and he gives the impression to the audience 
because they recall induction and assume the question would not have been 
asked in vain. In cases where there is no name to signify the universal, one 
should at least use a likeness towards his advantage because likeness often 
escapes detection.  And in order to secure a premise, one should ask about it 
by contrasting with its contrary. For instance, if [a sophist] wants to secure 
that it is necessary to obey your father in all things, [he would ask], Is it 
necessary to obey your parents in all things or to disobey them in all things? and 
Should it be conceded that many times many is many or few? For if forced, [an 
answerer] would be more disposed to concede that it is many. For when 
contraries are placed side by side, they appear to people smaller and greater 
and worse and better. 
 Often, a strong appearance of refutation is produced by a questioner’s 
most agitating and sophistical insinuation: he doesn’t ask for the final 
proposition but instead states it conclusively, as though he has syllogized 






























 If a paradox has been laid down, it is also sophistical to require—when 
a reputable position is originally proposed—that the answerer say what 
seems to be, and to put the question about such things in this way: “Does it 
seem so to you?” For if the question is one of the premises of the syllogism, 
either a refutation or a paradox must result. There is a refutation when he 
concedes, but there is a disreputable opinion when he neither concedes nor 
states that it is reputable. When he does not concede but agrees that it is 
reputable, there is something looking like a refutation. 
 Furthermore, just as in rhetorical arguments, so too in refutations one 
must look in the same way for positions contrary either to what [an 
opponent] says or to the people whom he admits speak and do rightly, or to 
people that have such a reputation, or to similar people, or to the majority, or 
to all people. 
 Again, just as answerers while they are being refuted often equivocate 
if they are about to be refuted, so questioners must sometimes resort to this 
against objectors—if [a refutation] follows in one sense, but not another—
[saying] that they have secured [an answer] in the former sense, as Cleophon 
does in the Mandrobulus. Also, if questioners are hindered from an argument, 
they must cut short what remains of the attack, and the answerer—if he 
anticipates this—must object and proclaim it publicly beforehand. Sometimes 
[a questioner] must also attack something other than the stated position, by 
excluding the latter, if he has no attack against the stated position—just as 
what Lycophron did when ordered to praise the lyre. Against those who 
demand [to know] what it is that one attacks, since it is held that a questioner 
should explain his accusation, (though when some things are said it is easier 
to keep guard), one should state what universally occurs in refutations, the 
contradiction. That is, one should say that [his aim is] to deny what the 
answerer affirmed or affirm what he denied, and not, [for example], that 
knowledge of contraries is or is not the same. And it is not necessary to ask 
for a conclusion in the form of a premise; a questioner should not ask for 

































 We have now discussed the sources of questions, and how a person 
should ask [questions] in competitive disputations. Next, we should address 
answering—how one should untie [sophisms] and why and for what 
purpose such arguments are useful. 
 Now there are two [reasons] why they are useful for philosophy. First, 
because they make us attend to how many ways each [name] is said, and 
what sort of things happen similarly and what sort of things differently, both 
concerning the things and concerning the names. For most [fallacies] are from 
speech. Second, [they are useful when] inquiring by oneself because a person 
who is easily committed to a fallacy by someone else and does not notice it 
often may also suffer this by himself. 
 Third and finally, [they are useful] for reputation: by seeming to have 
trained in everything and to be inexperienced with nothing. For objecting to 
arguments—when someone participates in them and is not able to determine 
their faults—fosters suspicion, seeming as though he does not have qualms 
on account of the truth, but on account of inexperience.  
 It is obvious how answerers should reply to this kind of argument if 
we have rightly specified the sources of fallacies and fittingly distinguished 
the advantages sought in interrogation. When a person takes on an 
argument, to see and untie its fault is not the same thing as to be able to meet 
it swiftly when questioned. For we often do not recognize what we know 
when it is put differently. Still, just as in other things more speed or 
sluggishness are for the most part due to training, so also in arguments; 
accordingly, if the point is clear to us, but we are untrained, then we often 
miss the right moment. Sometimes it happens just as it does in geometrical 
diagrams. For there even after we analyze [a figure], we sometimes cannot 
construct it again; so too in refutations, although we know [the source] from 
which the argument is strung together, we do not see how to break the 











































 First then, just as we say a person should sometimes prefer to syllogize 
endoxically rather than truthfully, so too one should sometimes untie 
endoxically rather than according to the truth. For, in general, one should not 
fight against contentious people as if they refute but as if they seem [to 
refute]. For we deny that they really syllogize; accordingly, one should set 
them straight so that they do not seem [to refute]. For if a refutation is an 
unequivocal contradiction based on premises, then it might not be necessary 
to distinguish against amphibolies and equivocation (for they do not produce 
a syllogism) but one should distinguish for no reason except that the 
conclusion looks like a refutation. Hence, one should be aware not of being 
refuted, but of seeming to be. For asking ambiguous [questions], equivocal 
questions, and all tricks of that kind mask even a true refutation and make it 
unclear who is refuted and who is not. For [an answerer] is allowed to say in 
the end—when the conclusion is drawn—that he has not denied what he 
affirmed except equivocally, even if he referred as much as is possible to the 
same thing. Hence it is unclear if he has been refuted. For it is unclear if he is 
speaking the truth now. On the other hand, if [the questioner] had asked an 
equivocal or ambiguous [question] after he distinguished [the various 
meanings], the refutation would not be unclear. Further, what the 
contentious wish for—now less than they did before—would have occurred: 
namely, that the answerer reply “yes” or “no.” Now, however, the answerer 
must add something [to his answer] in correction of the premise’s defect 
because questioners do not ask well. Nevertheless, when he distinguishes 
sufficiently, the answerer must say either “yes” or “no.” 
 If someone assumes that [an argument] according to equivocation is a 
refutation, the answerer cannot escape being refuted in some way. For in 
terms of what is visible, one must deny in respect to the name what he 
affirmed and affirm what he denied. For how some people correct [this 
argument] is not helpful at all. For they do not say that Coriscus is musical 
and unmusical, but that this Coriscus is musical and that this Coriscus is 
unmusical. For to say “this Coriscus is unmusical” (or musical) will be the 
same speech as “this Coriscus is [unmusical]”—the very [speech] which he 
both affirms and denies at the same time. But [the phrase] likewise does not 
signify the same thing because neither does the name [Coriscus] in this 
circumstance. So, what differs? It is strange, indeed, if he uses simply 
“Coriscus” in the one case, but adds “a certain” or “this” in the other. For [the 











































 Moreover, since it is not clear whether a person who does not 
distinguish the senses of an amphiboly is refuted or not refuted, and 
distinguishing is allowed in arguments, it is apparent that simply granting 
the question without distinguishing is a fault. Hence, even if he is not 
[refuted], his statement is at least like the [statement] that has been refuted. 
Nonetheless, it often transpires that, although they see the amphiboly, they 
hesitate to distinguish so that they do not seem trivial about everything 
because of the prevalence of people who ask such [questions]. Accordingly, 
when they thought an argument would not result from [the amphiboly], they 
often met a paradox. Therefore, since distinguishing is allowed, one must not 
hesitate, just as it was said earlier. 
 If no one made two questions into one, then there would not be a 
fallacy from equivocation and a fallacy from amphiboly, but either a 
refutation or not. For what is the difference between asking if Callias and 
Themistocles are musical and [what a person would ask] if they both—being 
different—had one name? For if [the name] signifies more than one thing, 
then he asks more [than one question]. For if expecting to receive simply one 
answer for two questions is incorrect, then clearly it is improper to answer 
any equivocal question simply, even if it is true according to all [the 
meanings], as some people claim to be the case. For it is no different than if 
he asked whether Coriscus and Callias are at home or not at home—whether 
both are present or not present—because in both cases there are many 
premises. For if a saying is true, it is not one question because of this. For it is 
possible that it is true to say simply “yes” or “no” when asked a countless 
number of different questions. Despite this, one should not give one answer 
because it ruins the discussion. This [situation] is like what would happen if 
the same name were applied to different things. Therefore, if one should not 
give one answer for two questions, then clearly neither should we say “yes” 
or “no” in cases of equivocation. For the speaker, instead of answering [the 
question], only spoke. Still, among disputants, it is somehow assumed so 
because they do not notice the result. 
 Now, as we said, since some arguments seem to be refutations but are 
not, in the same way some things seem to be untyings but are not. Indeed, we 
say that sometimes one should use these [apparent untyings] more than true 
[untyings] in competitive arguments and in responding to what is twofold. In 
the case of what is reputable opinion, we should answer by saying “it is.” For 
[answering] in this way makes a side-refutation least likely. On the other 
hand, if one is forced to say something paradoxical, in this situation 
especially we must add “it seems so” because in that way there can be no 










































original [question], people think we should do away with any [premise] near 
[the conclusion] and never concede it on the ground that it begs the original 
[question]. Whenever someone asks for the sort of proposition that follows 
necessarily from the thesis, and it is false or disreputable, we should say the 
same thing. For necessary consequences seem to be part of the same thesis. 
Still whenever the universal is not taken in name but by way of a 
comparison, we should say that [the questioner] does not take it as it was 
granted nor as he put it forward; for often a refutation occurs even from this.  
 When a person is prevented from [using] these [solutions], he should 
pass to the objection that [the argument] has not been properly represented, 
responding to it according to the mentioned definition. 
 Now, when names are said properly, one must either answer simply 
or by distinguishing. When we grant [questions] while supplying context in 
[our] thought, e.g., all questions that are asked not distinctly but in a 
shortened way, the consequence is a refutation. For instance, Is it the case that 
what is ‘of the Athenians’ is the property of the Athenians? Yes; and likewise, with 
other cases. Well then, is man ‘of the animals?’ Yes. Hence, man is a property of 
animals. For we say that man is ‘of the animals’ because he is an animal, and 
Lysander is ‘of the Laconians’ because he is a Laconian. Therefore, when [the 
question] put forward is indistinct, clearly it should not be conceded simply. 
 Whenever it seems that if one (A) of two [premises] is so, then the 
other (B) is necessarily so, and the other (A) is not necessarily so when the 
latter (B) is so, then one should grant the weaker before [the stronger]. For it 
is more difficult to syllogize from more things. 
 If [an interlocutor] argues that there is a contrary to one, but there is 
not a contrary to the other—when the argument is true—you should say that 
there is a contrary of the other but it has no established name. 
 Regarding some of the things that they say, many people would say 
that anyone who does not agree with them is mistaken, but not [regarding] 
others, as for instance, opinions upon which people dispute (because many 
people are not decided whether the soul of animals is destructible or 
immortal). Accordingly, in those things in which it is unclear whether what is 
put forward is said with custom—whether as judgments, (for they call 
judgments both true opinions and general statements), or as “the diagonal is 
incommensurate [with the sides of a square]” of which the truth is doubted—
someone may readily escape detection when he changes the names for 
things. On the one hand, he will not appear to be a sophist because it is 
unclear which of the two is true. On the other hand, he will not seem to be 







 Moreover, he should object to whatever questions he foresees and say 



























 A correct untying is the exposure of a false syllogism, [namely 
exposing] from what sort of question the falsehood ensues, and a syllogism is 
called false in two ways: either if it has syllogized the false or if it appears to 
be a syllogism, when it is not. There may be, then, the untying just mentioned 
or the correction of an apparent syllogism [by exposing] the question due to 
which it appears [to follow]. Consequently, the untying of [an argument] that 
has been syllogized results from doing away with the argument’s [ premise], 
while [untying others] that appear [to have been syllogized] is by 
distinguishing. Again, since some of the arguments that have been syllogized 
have a true conclusion, but some a false, one can untie [arguments] with a 
false conclusion in two ways: either by doing away with one of the questions 
or by showing that the conclusion is not so. But [one can] only [untie 
arguments] with false premises by doing away with [a premise] because the 
conclusion is true. Accordingly, those wishing to untie an argument should 
first consider if it is syllogistic or unsyllogistic, then whether the conclusion is 
true or false. Hence, we untie either by distinguishing or doing away [with a 
premise], and by doing away [with a premise] either in one way or another 
as was mentioned earlier.  
 It makes the greatest difference whether or not one unties the 
argument while he is being questioned because foresight is difficult, but 






























 Now, some refutations from equivocation and amphiboly consist of a 
question signifying more [than one thing], but others consist of the 
conclusion being said in many ways. For example, the conclusion in 
“speaking of the silent” is twofold, but one of the questions is an amphiboly 
in “the one who knows not knowing fully.” And the twofold sometimes is 
but sometimes is not, but the twofold signifies, on the one hand that which is 
and on the other hand that which is not. 
 Therefore, whenever what is [said] in many ways is in the conclusion, 
there is no refutation unless he obtains the contradiction in addition, as for 
example, in “sight of the blind;” for there would not be refutation without 
contradiction. Whenever [what is said in many ways] is in the questions, it is 
not necessary to deny beforehand what is twofold because the argument is 
not towards this, but on account of this. 
 At the beginning, therefore, one should answer against both the 
double name and speech as follows: it is in one way, but it is not in another 
way, as for example that “speaking of the silent” is [possible] in one way but 
not in another. Again that “things which need to be” are things which must 
be done and are not things which must be done because “things which need 
to be” is said in many ways. If [the double meaning] goes undetected, one 
should correct it at the end by adding to the question, Is there speaking of the 
silent? No, but there is speaking about him. Again, [one should answer] likewise 
when what is has several meanings in the premises, Do they not fully know 
what they know? Yes, but they do not know in this way. For it is not the same 
thing [to say] that it is not possible [that those who know] fully understand 
and [to say] that it is not possible that those who know in this way [fully 
understand]. 
 In general, one should argue that he did not deny the thing that he 












































 It is also evident how one should untie arguments from composition 
and division. For if the argument, when composed, signifies something 
different from when it is divided, one should say the contrary when he 
concludes. All of the following questions (λόγοι) are from composition and 
division: Was he struck with what you saw him being struck with? Again, Did you 
see him with what he was struck with? Now, this has something of the questions 
from amphiboly, but it is from composition. For that from division is not 
twofold because when it is divided it is not the same speech, since “record” 
and “record” said without the accent signifies a different thing. Yet in written 
works, the name is the same, whenever it is written with the same letters and 
in the same [order]—although even here they already add additional signs—
but the sounds which are uttered out loud are not the same. Accordingly, 
that from division is not twofold, and it is manifest that not all [apparent] 
refutations are from the twofold, as some people say. 
 Therefore, the answerer should distinguish because “to see someone 
being beaten with your eyes” is not the same thing as saying “to see with 
your eyes someone being beaten.” Again, Euthydemus’ saying, In Sicily, do 
you know about the triremes in Piraeus? And again, Can a good man who is a 
cobbler be a bad man? Yet, there may be a good person who is a bad cobbler; so, he 
will be a good bad cobbler. Or again, Is it the case that things—the knowledge 
(ἐπιστήμη) of which is good—are good to learn? But knowledge of the bad is good; 
thus, bad learning is good. But the bad is both bad and a learning, so bad learning is 
bad, but knowledge of bad things is good. Again, Is it true to say now that you have 
come to be? Thus, you have come to be now. Or, does it signify something 
different when it is divided? For it is true to say now that you have come to 
be, but not that you have come to be now. Again, Can you do what you are able 
to do as you are able? Yet, while you are not playing the cithara, you have ability to 
play the cithara; hence you are able to play the cithara while you are not playing the 
cithara. Rather, he does not have this ability: to play the cithara when he is 
not playing the cithara, but when he is not playing, he has [the ability] of 
playing. 
 Some also untie this [example] in another way. For they say that if an 
[answerer] grants that he does as he is able, it does not follow that he can 
play the cithara when he is not playing it. For it has not been granted that he 
will do as he is able to do in every way; and “to do as he is able” and “to do 
in every way as he is able” are not the same thing. Clearly, they do not untie 
[these arguments] properly because arguments from the same [place] have 
the same untying. Moreover, this will not fit for all instances [of the fallacy] 
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 nor in all ways of questioning; for it is not relative to the argument, but 











 There are no arguments from accent—either as written or as spoken— 
except for some which might occur, as the following: Is it the case that where 
you reside (οὗ καταλύεις) is a house? Yes. Is it the case that “you do not reside” 
(οὐ καταλύεις) is the denial of “you reside.” Yes. Still, you said that where you 
reside is a house; hence a house is a denial. Surely, it is clear how one should 
untie [this fallacy] because what is said with a flat accent does not signify the 











































 It is clear also how one should reply to [fallacies] from things said in 
the same way, [but] are not the same, since we grasp the kinds (γένη) of 
categories (κατηγορίαι). For the [answerer] granted, when asked, that one of 
the [words] that signifies a ‘what it is’ does not belong [as a predicate]. The 
[questioner], however, showed that some relative or quantity—which seems 
to signify ‘what it is’ because of the speech—belongs. For example, [the 
fallacy of figure of diction used] in the following argument: Is it possible both 
to act upon and to have acted upon the same thing at the same time? No. 
Nonetheless, surely it is possible to see something and at the same time to have seen 
the same thing according to the same [respect]. Again, Is there an instance of acting 
that is an instance of undergoing? No. Nonetheless, “is cut,” “is burnt,” and “is 
perceiving” are all said in the same way and all signify an instance of undergoing. 
And again “to say,” “to run,” and “to see,” are all said in the same way. But surely 
“to see” is an instance of perceiving, so that it is both something of undergoing and 
acting upon at the same time. 
 Of course, in the former case, if someone—who granted that it is not 
possible to act upon and to have acted upon the same thing at the same 
time—were to say that seeing and having seen is possible, he would not yet 
have been refuted, [i.e.,] as long as he said that seeing is not an instance of 
acting upon but of undergoing. For this question is necessary as well. Still, 
the listener assumes he has granted it when he granted that “cutting” is an 
acting upon, and “having cut” a having acted upon; and so on with other 
things expressed in a like manner. For the listener himself adds what is left 
out supposing that it is said in a like manner. But really, it is not said in a like 
manner, but seems to be on account of speech. The same thing occurs as in 
equivocals because, in the case of equivocals, the man who is ignorant of 
arguments supposes that he denied the thing which he affirmed, and not the 
name.  However, an additional question is necessary: does [the answerer] say 
the equivocal name with one thing in view, [or not]? For if he grants this, he 
will be refuted. 
 The following arguments are like the [arguments mentioned] above: A 
person lost what he had [before], if he no longer has it. For he who lost only one die 
will not have ten dice. Rather, he has lost what he does not have, though he had 
it before. But, it is not necessary that he lost as much or as many as he does not 
have. Thus, after the questioner asked about what the man has, he concludes 
with regard to the ‘how many.’ For the ‘how many’ is ten. Consequently, if 
[the questioner] asked from the beginning, Has a person lost as many things as 










































only grant] either so many or a part of them. Again, [it is argued] that 
someone may give what he does not have because he does not have only one 
die. Or, he has not given what he does not have, but as he does not have it, 
i.e., [insofar as it is only] one die. For ‘only’ does not signify a ‘this’ (τόδε) or 
a quality (τοιόνδε) or a quantity (τοσόνδε). Rather [‘only’ signifies] how 
something relates to another: for instance, that something is not with another. 
It is as if he asked Can someone give what he does not have? and then, after the 
answerer denies this, he asked if someone could give something quickly 
which he has not received quickly; and when the answerer affirms this, he 
were to syllogize that someone could give what he does not have. Evidently, 
he has not syllogized because [to give] quickly is not to give a ‘this’ (τόδε) but 
to give in a certain way (ὧδε). And someone might give something in a way 
in which he did not receive it: for instance, when one receives something 
with pleasure, he may give away it with pain. 
 All of the following [arguments] are similar: Could someone punch with 
a fist he does not have? Or, Could he see with an eye he does not have? For he does 
not have only one. Now, some people untie this by saying that someone who 
has more than one eye (or whatever else) also has only one. Some others 
untie it the way [they untie the argument] that a man received what he has: 
this man (A) gave only one counting stone; and that man (B) surely has, they 
say, one counting stone from him (A). Others directly do away with the 
question saying that he (B) can have what he (B) has not received. For 
instance, a man can have sour wine, although he received a good wine 
because it was spoiled at the time of reception. 
 Still, as mentioned earlier, all of these [people] do not untie in relation 
to the argument, but in relation to the man. For if this was an untying, then 
someone, who grants the opposite, would not be able to untie [the 
argument], just as it is in other cases. For example, if the untying is it is in a 
certain respect but not in another, then, if the [answerer] granted that it is said 
simply, [the argument] would conclude. If it does not conclude, then it would 
not be an untying. In the mentioned [examples], we say that there is no 
syllogism, even when all [the opposite answers of the proposed solutions] are 
granted. 
 Moreover, the following [examples] also belong to this group of 
arguments: Is it the case that what is written, someone wrote? It is written that 
“You are seated,” which is now a false statement. Yet, it was true when it was 
written. Thus, the true and the false were written at the same time. For that a 
statement or opinion is true or false does not signify a ‘this’ (τόδε), but a 
quality (τοιόνδε). (For the same account also applies to an opinion.) Again, Is 


























slow. Well then, he has not spoken of what he learns but how he learns. Again, 
“Is it the case that someone treads on that through which he walks? But he 
walks through the whole day.” Rather he has not spoken of what he walks 
through, but when he walks, nor does “to drink a cup” [signify] what he 
drinks, but out of what [he drinks.] Further, Is it the case that what someone 
knows, he knows either by learning or by discovering it [himself]? But if he 
discovered one of two things and learned the other, then he [does not know] both in 
either way. Rather, does ‘what’ hold of each thing, but not of all things 
[together]?  
 Again, there is the argument that there is a third man apart from 
[man] itself and particular [men]. For ‘man’ and every common [name] does 
not signify a ‘this something’ (τόδε τι) but a certain such (τοιόνδε) or a 
quantity or relation or something of this sort. It is likewise in the case of 
‘Coriscus’ and ‘musical Coriscus’—are they the same or different? For the 
one signifies a ‘this something’ (τόδε τι) but the other signifies a such 
(τοιόνδε). Consequently, it is not possible to set it out. ‘Setting out’ does not 
produce the third man, but conceding that it a ‘this something’ (τόδε τι) does. 
For what man is cannot be a ‘this something’ (τόδε τι), as Callias is. Nor will 
it make a difference if someone should say that the thing being set out is not 
what a ‘this something’ (τόδε τι) is, but what sort of thing; for what is apart 
from the many will be something one, as for instance, ‘man.’ 
 Evidently then, one should not concede that what is predicated in 
common is a ‘this something’ (τόδε τι) in all cases, but that it signifies either a 






















 On the whole, an untying of arguments from speech will always be 
according to the opposite of the source of the argument. For instance, if the 
argument is from composition, then the untying is by division, but if from 
division, then by composition. Again, if it is from a sharp accent, then the 
untying is a flat accent, but if from a flat, a sharp. If it is from equivocation, 
one can untie it by using the opposite name. For example, if a person 
happens to say that something is un-souled—after denying that it is—clearly, 
he should say in what sense it is ensouled. But if he said that it was un-
souled, and then syllogized that it was ensouled, he should say how it is un-
souled. One should untie cases of amphiboly in a similar manner. If the 
argument is from a likeness of diction, then the untying will be from the 
opposite. For instance, Is it the case that someone may give what he does not have? 
Rather, it is not what he does not have but how he does not have, e.g., “one die 
alone.” Or, Is it the case that one knows [singly] what he knows either through 
learning or discovery? Nonetheless, it is not the things [collectively] which he 
knows [either through learning or discovery]. Again, he treads upon what he 











































 There is one and the same untying for all [fallacies] from accident. For 
it is indefinite when a person should say that something belongs in the thing 
{πρᾶγμα}, when it belongs in its accident. And in some cases it seems [to 
belong]—and they say so—but in other cases they say that it is not necessary. 
Consequently, when the conclusion has been drawn, one should say for all 
alike that it is not necessary—though he ought to have an example to put 
forward. 
 The following sort of arguments are all from accident: Do you know 
what I am about to ask you? or Do you know who is coming? or [Do you know] who 
is veiled? or Is the statue your work? or Is your dog a father? or Is a few times a few 
a few? For it is clear that in all these [examples] what is truly predicated of the 
accident is not necessarily [truly predicated] of the thing (πρᾶγμα) also. For 
all the same [predicates] seem to belong only to whatever is one and 
undifferentiated according to substance. Yet, in the case of the good, “to be 
good” and “to be asked about the good” are not the same—nor in the case of 
who is coming (or in who is veiled): “to be coming” and “to be Coriscus” [are 
not the same]. Accordingly, if I know Coriscus, but I do not know who is 
coming, it does not follow that I know and do not know the same thing. Nor 
is [the statue] my work, if it is mine and it is a work. Rather, it is my property 
or thing or something else. [One should untie] other cases in the same way. 
 Some untie this by doing away with the question because they claim a 
person can know and not know the same thing, but not in the same [respect]. 
Accordingly, by not knowing who is coming but knowing Coriscus, they 
claim they know and do not know the same thing—but not in the same 
[respect]. And yet, in the first place—as we said already—the solution of 
arguments from the same [source] must be the same. This [solution] will not 
hold if someone adopts the same axiom: not in the case of knowing, but in 
the case of being or being in a certain state (e.g., “If this is a father and is 
yours”). For if this [solution] is true in some cases, namely, that a person can 
know and not know the same thing; still, the proposed [solution] has no 
share in these [other] cases. 
 There is nothing to prevent the same argument from having many 
faults. But the exposure of every fault is not an untying. For someone can 
show that a falsehood has been syllogized, but not show that from which [it 
has been syllogized], as [with] Zeno’s argument that to be moved is 
impossible. Therefore, even if someone attempts to prove that [motion] is 
possible, he misses the mark—even if he syllogizes it ten thousand times. For 






































[i.e., exposing] that from which it is false. If, therefore, [a sophist] has not 
syllogized—whether he attempts to prove something false or even something 
true—clarifying this is untying. 
 Perhaps, there is nothing to prevent this [solution] from holding in 
some cases. Except in these cases, at any rate, this would not seem to be so. 
For one knows both that Coriscus is Coriscus, and that the person who is 
coming is the person who is coming. To know and not to know the same 
things seems possible: as to know that he is white, but not to know that he is 
musical. For thus, he knows and does not know the same thing, but not in the 
same [respect]. He knows who is coming, i.e., Coriscus, both that he is who is 
coming and that he is Coriscus. 
 Similarly, people who untie [the argument concluding] that every 
number is small miss the mark in the same way as those already mentioned. 
For, although [the argument] does not conclude, if they omit this [fact] and 
say it has concluded a truth (because every [number] is both many and few), 
then they miss the mark. 
 Some people also untie syllogisms by means of the twofold, as for 
example, [in the argument] that it is your father, or son, or slave. And yet, if 
the refutation appears to be from what is said in many senses, then evidently 
the name or speech must apply properly (κυρίως) to many things. But no one 
says properly that this child is of this man when [the man] is child’s master. 
Rather the composition is by the accident: Is he yours? Yes. But he is a child; 
thus, he is your child. But he is not your child because he happened 
accidentally to be both yours and a child. 
 Also [there is the argument] that ‘something of evils’ is good because 
prudence is a ‘knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) of evils.’ But ‘this is of these’ is not said 
in many ways; rather, [it expresses] possession. If perhaps [the genitive is 
said] in many ways—for we also say that man is of animals, but not [that he 
is] some possession [of animals]; even if anything related to evils is described 
as of something, it is of evils for this reason, but it is not [one] of the evils—then 
[the argument] seems to be from simply and in a certain respect. Yet, perhaps 
something of evils can to be good in two ways, but plainly not in this 
argument, but rather if some good slave should be of the wicked. Though 
perhaps it is not so. For if something is good and of him {=his}, it is not at once 
the good of him {=his}. Nor is the saying that ‘man is of animals’ said in many 
ways, for if we signify something by truncation, it is not said in many senses. 
For example, we also say half of the phrase as when [we say] “Sing, goddess, 











































 One should untie arguments from something being said properly or in 
a certain respect—or somewhere or in some way or relative to something, 
and not simply—by considering the conclusion against its contradiction, i.e., 
if [the conclusion] can be subject to any of these [qualifications]. For 
contraries, opposites, and affirmation and negation, cannot belong simply to 
the same thing. There is nothing to prevent each belonging in a certain 
respect or relative to something or in a certain manner, or one simply but the 
other in a certain respect. Consequently, if one belongs simply, but the other 
belongs in a certain respect, there is not yet a refutation. We should look for 
this feature in the conclusion with relation to its contradiction. 
 All the following such arguments have this [characteristic]: Is it possible 
that nonbeing is? But surely it is something which is not. Similarly, Being will not 
be also because it will not be something of the things that are. Or, Is it possible for 
the same person to be honest and dishonest at once? or Is it possible for the same 
person to obey and disobey the same person at once? Rather, to be something and 
to be are not the same (for nonbeing, if it is something, is not simply). Nor if a 
person is honest about this or in this [respect], must he be honest. For the one 
who swears that he will be dishonest is honest only when he is dishonest 
about this. Yet he is not honest; nor does the disobedient person obey, but he 
obeys something. The argument about the same person being honest and 
dishonest at once is similar. It appears troublesome, however, because it is 
not easy to see whether one should concede that he is honest or dishonest 
simply. Nothing prevents him from being a liar simply but truthful in some 
respect or about something, namely, to be true in some [oath] but not to be 
himself truthful. 
 It also occurs similarly in cases relative to something, and in some 
place, and at some time. All of the following arguments result from this: Is 
health (or wealth) good? But to the fool who also does not use it rightly, it is not 
good. Therefore, the good is not good. Or, Is being healthy (or being powerful in the 
city) good? But there are times when it is not good. Therefore, the same thing is good 
and not good for the same person. Rather, is there something to prevent what is 
good simply from not being good for this person, or good for this person, but 
not good now or here? Is it the case that what the prudent would not wish for is 
bad? Nonetheless, he would not wish to throw away the good. Consequently, the bad 
is good. [This is fallacious] because to say that the good is bad is not the same 
as saying that throwing away the good [is bad]. Also, the argument about the 
thief is [fallacious] in a similar way. For if the thief is bad, obtaining [goods] 
























obtaining [goods] is good. Again, disease is bad, but not the expulsion of 
disease. 
 Is the just preferable to the unjust, and the ‘justly’ to the ‘unjustly’? But to be 
put to death (ἀποθανεῖν) unjustly is preferable. Again, Is it just that each person 
has his own things? Still, whatever things [the legislator] decides according to his 
opinion, even if they are false, have authority from the law. Therefore, the just and 
what is not just are the same. Again, Which of the two ought one to bring to trial: 
the one who says just things, or the one who says unjust things? But it is just for the 
one who suffered injustice to say adequately what he suffered, but these are unjust. 
For even if it is preferable to suffer something unjustly, it does not follow that 
the ‘unjustly’ is not preferable to the ‘justly.’ Rather the ‘justly’ [is preferable] 
simply. Nonetheless, nothing prevents the ‘unjustly’ to be preferable to the 
‘justly’ in this [instance]. Again, having one’s own things is just; having 
another’s things is unjust. Still, nothing prevents this decision from being 
just, for example, if it is according to the judge’s opinion. For if something is 
just in this or that way, it is not also just simply. Likewise, although things 
are unjust, nothing prevents talking about them from being just. For if to 
speak is just, it does not need to be about just things any more than if to 
speak were helpful, would it need to be about helpful things; and similarly 
with just things. Accordingly, if what is said is unjust, it does not follow that 
someone who talks about unjust things wins [the trial] because he talks about 





















 Now for those arguments which result from the definition of 
refutation—as written before—one must reply by considering the conclusion 
against the contradiction. [This is] to ensure that it will be of the same, 
according to the same, relative to the same, in the same way and at the same 
time. If in the beginning it is asked in addition, one must not accept that it is 
impossible for the same thing to be double and not double. Instead one must 
say [it is possible], only not in the way it was once accepted to constitute a 
refutation. All of the following [examples] are due to this sort of thing: Does 
the person who knows that this is that know the thing? And is it similar with one 
who is ignorant? However, someone who knows that Coriscus is Coriscus might be 
ignorant that he is musical. Hence, he knows and is ignorant of the same thing. Or Is 
a magnitude that is four cubits long greater than a magnitude that is three cubits 
long? But it may come to be four cubits long from being three cubits. Thus, the 













 If it is obvious, one should not concede—by saying what is the case—
[a question] that begs or assumes the original [problem]—not even if it is an 
endox. If it goes unnoticed, one should, on account of the vileness of such 
arguments, turn the ignorance (ἄγνοια) back upon the questioner on the 
ground that he has not practiced dialectic. For a refutation is without 
[assuming] the original [problem]. Next, [the answerer should say] that he 
did not grant [the original problem] to be used [as a premise], but for [the 
















 And one should expose [fallacies] that conclude through the 
consequent in respect to the argument itself. Consequents follow in two 
ways: either as the universal follows from the particular (ἐν μέρει): as the 
animal from man (because it is supposed that if this (A) is with this (B), then 
this (B) also is with this (A)); or according to oppositions: for if this follows 
this, the opposite follows the opposite. Mellissus’ argument depends on this. 
For if what has come to be has a beginning, he thinks that what has not come 
to be does not have a beginning. Thus, if the heavens have not come to be, 
then they are infinite also. Nonetheless, this is not the case because the 










 Again, in fallacies that syllogize with some additional [premise], 
consider if the impossibility follows even when the addition is subtracted. 
Thereupon one should manifest this and say that he granted [the addition] 
not because he believed it, but for the sake of the argument; and that the 































 Now, for [fallacies] that make many questions one, one should 
distinguish immediately in the beginning. For a question is one when it has 
one answer. And so, one should neither affirm nor deny many answers for 
one question nor one answer for many questions; but rather, [one should 
have] one answer for one question. Just as it is in the case of equivocals, 
where sometimes [an attribute] belongs to both [meanings of the equivocal 
word] but other times to neither (such that a simple answer does not bring a 
disadvantage to the answer, even though the question is not simple), so too 
in these cases. Thus, whenever many [attributes] belong to one [subject] or 
one [attribute] to many, no contradiction follows for the one conceding 
simply—even though he has made this mistake (ἁμαρτία). [A contradiction 
does follow], however, whenever [an attribute] belongs to one [subject] but 
not the other, or many [attributes] to many. Again, in a way both belong to 
both but, then again, in a way neither belong to either. Accordingly, one 
should watch out for this, for instance, in the following arguments: If one 
thing is good, but another bad, then to say that these are good and bad is true, and in 
turn [it is true to say] that these are neither good nor bad (because both are not both). 
Hence the same thing is good and bad and neither good nor bad. Again, If each itself 
is the same as itself and different from the other (since they are not the same as the 
others but the same as themselves, and also different from themselves), then the same 
things are both different from and the same as themselves. Moreover, If the good 
becomes bad, and the bad, good, then they would become two. Moreover, So of two 
unequal things—each itself being equal to itself, it follows that they are equal and 
unequal to themselves. 
 Now the above [arguments] fall under other untyings also because 
“both” and “all” are said with more than one meaning. It certainly does not 
follow that one affirms and denies the same thing except in name. And this 
would not be refutation. Instead, there will clearly be no impossibility when 
an interlocutor affirms or denies one [term] of one [term], and one question is 




























 Concerning [arguments] that lead a person into saying the same thing 
many times, evidently one should not grant that predicates of relative terms 
signify anything in isolation by themselves. For example, [one should grant 
that] “double” without “double of the half” [signifies anything] because the 
former appears in the latter. For “ten” is in “ten minus one,” and “to do” is in 
“not to do,” and generally an affirmation is in its contradiction. But all the 
same, supposing someone says that this is not white, he does not [thereby] 
affirm that [the same thing] is white. Perhaps “double” does not signify 
anything, in the same way that neither does “half.” And even if it does 
signify something, it still does not signify the same thing as when combined 
[with the other term]. Nor does knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) in a specific kind 
[signify] the same thing as it does in general (as for example if it is medical 
knowledge); but, in general, it is knowledge of the knowable.  When dealing 
with predicates of terms by means of which [the predicates] are indicated, 
one should say that the indicated [predicate] is not the same in isolation as it 
is in an account. For “concave” has the same general meaning [when it is 
said] concerning the snubbed and the bow. And nothing prevents it from 
signifying different things when it is applied (προστιθέμενον) to the nose or 
to the leg. For here it signifies the snub-nosed, and there it signifies the bow-
legged; and to say “a snub nose” is no different from saying “a concave 
nose.” One should not grant this speech in the nominative. For it [would be] 
false. For snubbed is not a concave nose, but something of a nose, i.e., 
something [the nose] suffers. Accordingly, there is nothing strange if a snub 











































              Concerning solecisms, we have already said on account of what each 
seems to follow; and now it will be evident, concerning the arguments 
themselves, how one should untie them. For all the following arguments 
fabricate [solecism]: Is it the case that something is truly that (τοῦτο) which (ὃ) 
you call it truly? But you call something (τι) a stone (λίθον). Therefore, something 
(τι) is a stone (λίθον). Rather to call it a “stone” (λίθον) is not to call it “what” 
(ὃ) it is but “whom” (ὅν), nor “thing” (τοῦτο) but “him” (τοῦτον). If, 
therefore, someone were to ask, Is it the case he is truly him (τοῦτον) whom (ὅν) 
you call him truly? he would not seem to be speaking common Greek, just as if 
he were to ask, Is it the case that he (οὗτος) is her whom (ἣν) you say he is? 
              Yet, it makes no difference to speak this way of “log” (ξύλον), or of 
whatever things signify neither feminine nor masculine. And, therefore, there 
is no solecism: If what you say it is, it is, but you say it is a log, therefore it is a log. 
But “stone” (λίθος) and “he” (οὗτος) have a masculine inflexion. At least if 
someone were to ask, Is he (οὗτος) she (αὕτη)? And then in turn, [if one were 
to ask] But what? Is he not Coriscus? and then after say, Therefore he is she, then 
as long as the answerer does not concede this, he would not have syllogized 
a solecism—not even if “Coriscus” signifies a “she.” Rather one must ask this 
supplementary question. But if it is so, and he does not grant it either, then it 
is not syllogized: neither in reality, nor with respect to answerer. 
 Likewise, then, “he” (οὗτος) must signify the stone even in the above 
example. If it is not so, and he does not grant it either, one should not state 
the conclusion, although it appears [to follow] because the word’s dissimilar 
case appears to be similar.  Is it true to say that this (αὕτη) is whatever you say 
she is? You say that this is a shield (ἀσπίδα); therefore, this (αὕτη) is a shield 
(ἀσπίδα). Rather it is not necessary if “this” (αὕτη) does not signify shield 
(ἀσπίδα) but shield (ἀσπίς), and “this” (ταύτην) signifies shield (ἀσπίδα). 
Nor if what you say he (τοῦτον) is, he (οὗτος) is, but you say that he 
{τοῦτον} is Cleon (Κλέωνα), and therefore he (οὗτος) is Cleon (Κλέωνα). For 
he (οὗτος) is not Cleon (Κλέωνα) because the question was that he (οὗτος) 
and not him (τοῦτον) is what I say he is. For if the question is asked in this 
way, it would not be Greek.  
 Again, Do you know this (τοῦτο)? But this (τοῦτο) is a stone (λίθος). 
Therefore, you know a stone (λίθος). Rather, “this” (τοῦτο) does not signify the 
same thing in the statement Do you know this? and in the statement This is a 
stone, but it signifies this (τοῦτον) in the earlier one and this (οὗτος) in the 
later one. Again, Is it the case that you know that (τοῦτο) of which (οὗ) you have 








stone (λίθου). Rather in the one, “of which” (οὗ) is said of “of a stone” but in 
the other, “this” (τοῦτο) [is said of] a “stone” (λίθον). But it was granted that 
you know that of which you have knowledge, and you know “that,” not “of 
that,” so that you know “stone,” not “of a stone.” 
              Now it is clear from what has been said that the aforesaid kind of 
arguments do not syllogize but [only] appear to, and both through what they 











































 It must also be understood that of all [the aforesaid] arguments, that 
some are easier, while others are more difficult, to discern from what and in 
what the listener commits fallacies—though [the cause of the more difficult] 
is often the same as [the cause of the easier]. For one must call arguments 
from the same [place], the same. Nonetheless, the same argument appears to 
some to be from speech, but to others to be from accident, and still to others 
to be from something else. For each, when carried over, is not equally clear. 
Accordingly, just as in [fallacies] from equivocation—which seem to be the 
most guileless form of fallacy—some are clear even to the vulgar. (For almost 
all comical arguments are from speech. For example, A man carried the chariot 
down the ladder, and Where are you bound? Towards the yardarm, Which of the two 
cows gave birth earlier? Neither, but both gave birth in the rear, and Is the North 
Wind clean? No, not at all, for he killed the beggar and the drunk. Again, Is he 
Meek? “No, not at all, he is Wilde. And most other comical arguments also 
occur in the same way.) Nonetheless, other [fallacies from equivocation] 
appear to go undetected even by the most experienced. (A sign of this is that 
they often fight about names, as for example, whether “being” and “one” 
signify the same thing in all cases, or something different. For to some 
“being” and “one” appear to signify the same thing; but others untie the 
argument of Zeno and Parmenides by saying that “being” and “one” are said 
in many ways.) Similarly, concerning arguments from accident and each of 
the other arguments, some will be easier to examine, but others more 
difficult. And grasping what genus each argument is in, and whether it is a 
refutation or not, is not equally easy in all cases. 
 A subtle argument is one that produces the most perplexity; for it has 
the greatest sting. The perplexity is twofold: one, in [arguments] that 
syllogize, which of the questions one should do away with; the other, in 
those that are contentious, how one should address [the question] put 
forward. Thus, in those that syllogize, subtler arguments force one to inquire 
further. A syllogistic argument is subtler if it does away with what is 
especially endoxical based on exceedingly reputable opinions. For though it 
is one argument, when the contradiction is transposed, it will result in 
syllogisms that are all similar because it will always do away with an endox 
from equally endoxical [premises]. Accordingly, he is necessarily perplexed. 
Therefore, this sort of argument—one that produces the conclusion equal to 
the questions—is subtle, but [an argument] that depends on [questions] that 
are all alike is second. For this argument will likewise make one perplexed 
























For he must do away with one, but it is unclear which one he must do away 
with. 
 The subtlest contentious argument is, first, one that is initially unclear 
whether it is syllogized or not, and also whether the untying depends on a 
falsehood or a distinction. Second is the one where the untying clearly 
depends on a distinction or doing away with [a premise]—though it is not 
evident which question one should do away with or distinguish when 
untying [the argument], or whether it depends on the conclusion or on one of 
the questions. 
         Sometimes, therefore, an argument which does not syllogize is 
guileless if the premises are quite improbable or false. Yet, sometimes the 
argument is not worthy of being looked down upon. For whenever some 
question—of the sort concerning what the argument is about and through 
what [the argument] is—is left out, the argument is guileless. For it has not 
secured this in addition and has not syllogized. But whenever something 
superfluous [is left out], the argument is in no way easily looked down upon, 
but is reasonable. Still, one of the questions has not been asked well. 
            And just as it is possible to untie sometimes towards the argument, 
sometimes towards the questioner and the questioning, and sometimes 
towards neither of these, likewise it is also possible to ask and to syllogize 
towards the thesis, towards the answerer, and towards the time—whenever 












































              Now, from how many and from what sort of [places] fallacies come 
to be among those practicing dialectic—and both how we are to show that 
someone speaks falsely, and how to make him state paradoxes; and from 
what [places] solecism results; and how we should question and what the 
question’s arrangement should be; and for what all such arguments are 
useful; and about answering, both generally and every [particular kind]; and 
how we should untie arguments and solecisms—let what we have said about 
all of these things be sufficient for us.  There remains, by recollecting the 
initial purpose, to say something brief about it and to draw what has been 
said to an end.  
              Now, we undertook to find a certain ability to syllogize about a 
presented problem based on the most endoxic beginnings possible because 
this is dialectic’s proper [καθ᾽ἁυτὴν] activity and that of the testing art. But 
since it is further ascribed to [dialectic]—through its proximity to sophistic—
that it can test not only dialectically but also as if with knowledge, we 
proposed therefore not only to unfold the discipline’s stated proper 
activity—i.e., to be able to seize (λαβεῖν) an argument—but also how, when 
undergoing an argument, we should defend a thesis consistently through the 
most endoxic premises possible. We have mentioned the cause for this; and 
this was also why Socrates used to ask [questions], but never used to answer 
because he would not concede that he knew. 
         It has been clarified in the foregoing, for how many [problems 
dialectic is applicable], and from how many [premises] it will come about, 
and whence we will be well supplied with these, and further how we should 
ask and arrange every interrogation and about how we should answer and 
how we should untie syllogisms. Also, all the other things that belong to the 
same method of argument have been clarified. And, an addition to these 
things, we have gone through fallacies, as we already mentioned earlier. 
            Evidently, therefore, we have a fitting completion of what we have 
undertaken. Nonetheless, what has happened concerning the treatment must 
not go unnoticed by us.  For, among all discoveries, those grasped from the 
earlier toil of others have progressed part by part by the successors coming 
after. But original discoveries have customarily made little progress at first, 
though they are much more useful than what later developed out of them. 
For, as they say, the beginning is perhaps greater than everything, which is 
why it is also more difficult. For inasmuch as it is greatest in power, so too it 
is smallest in magnitude; and thus, it is the most difficult to see. But when 































very thing which happened in the case of rhetorical speeches, and also in the 
case of nearly all the other arts. For those who completely discovered 
beginnings, advanced unto something small; but those now highly 
esteemed—inheriting from many men who advanced as from succession part 
by part—developed [the art] in this way: Tisias after the founders, 
Thrasymachus after Tisias, Theodorus after him; and many men have 
contributed many parts. This is why it is no wonder that the art has a certain 
magnitude. 
           But concerning this discipline, it is not the case that some of this 
treatment was finished while other parts were not—but they had not even 
begun. For even the paid teachers’ instruction concerning contentious 
arguments was like Gorgias’ discipline. For some used to give rhetorical 
arguments to be learned by heart, while others [used to give] questioning 
[arguments to be learned by heart], which each supposed that most of the 
arguments of the other side would fall. Accordingly, their students had from 
them an instruction that was swift, but unartful. For they thought that they 
could teach by giving, not the art, but things taken from the art: just as if 
someone, after he claimed to hand down knowledge of how to prevent pain 
in the feet, did not teach shoemaking or where one would be able to procure 
such things, but rather gave many kinds shoe. He has assisted with respect to 
what was needed, but did not hand down an art. 
 Again, there already existed many and ancient writings about 
rhetorical [arguments], but about syllogistic ones, we had altogether nothing 
to mention from before. Rather toiling for a long time, we discovered by 
practice. 
            If it appears to you who wonder that the investigation—beginning out 
of such conditions—is fittingly well off alongside the other treatises built 
from tradition, the remaining proper activity for all of you, or our audience, 
is to have forbearance for the insufficiencies of the investigation and to have 







Chapter 1: Nature and Existence of Sophistical Refutations 
164a20-23.  A number of ancient Greek philosophers and rhetoricians emphasize the 
importance of a good beginning. For instance, in the fragments of Antiphon we find, 
“When someone correctly begins something, no matter what it is, it is also likely to end 
correctly. Whatever seed one plants in the earth, one should expect the harvest to be 
similar” (Gagarin, 2002, p. 193). Characters in Plato’s dialogues repeatedly underscore 
this idea: “For, as the saying goes, ‘the beginning is half of the work,’ and every man 
always commends a good beginning; but it is truly, as I think, something more than the 
half, and no man has ever yet commended as it deserves” (Laws 753e). Cf. also Republic 
377a. Aristotle himself underlies a good beginning’s importance in other places, “The 
beginning is admittedly more than half of the whole” (NE 1098b6-7). Cf. also, SE 
183b23ff. 
Why the emphasis on good beginnings? As is clear from the introduction, the 
etymology of “error” suggests that a mistake results from a disordered movement of 
reason—hence the importance of knowing what road or method to follow, both in 
general and in each particular science. As every artist must make certain steps before 
others, the philosopher must often consider some things before others. As Euclid said, 
“There is no royal road,” (i.e., a way of circumventing the order of intelligibility for the 
sake of expediency), and a road implies an order. Cf. Morrow, 1992, p. 57. Failing to 
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take the proper road is to wander and err. Failing to make the proper beginning will 
result in a disordered movement of reason; it will result in error.  
Aristotle and Plato are not only in agreement about the necessity of making a 
good beginning, but also about what makes a beginning good, and that is a natural 
beginning. In Plato’s Timaeus, Timaeus asserts “Now in regard to every matter it is most 
important to begin at the natural beginning” (Timeaus 29b2-3). Further evidence from 
Aristotle, in addition to this passage in the Sophistical Refutations, can be found in an 
almost identical characterization at the beginning of his Poetics. Compare the Greek 
ἀρξάμενοι κατὰ φύσιν πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων [beginning first from first things 
according to nature] (Poet 1447a12-13) to that of the current passage: ἀρξάμενοι κατὰ 
φύσιν ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων (SE 164a22-23).  
Still, the question remains: How does Aristotle make a natural beginning to the 
Sophistical Refutations? Albert the Great suggests that manifesting the subject matter’s 
existence could be the beginning which Aristotle characterizes as first according to 
nature. At the start of the second book of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, Aristotle states 
that there are four kinds of questions: that it is, on account of what it is, if it is, and what 
it is (APo 89b23-25). The first of these questions is if it is. Albert the Great notices this 
order, “Incipiemus enim a quaestione, an est sophisticus elenchus, quae secundum naturam 
prima est inter quaestiones quator, quae de scibilibus fieri possunt, an est, quia est, quid est, et 
propter quid est. [For we will begin with the question, if there is a sophistical refutation, 
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which is the first question according to nature among the four questions that can be 
made of knowable things, if it is, that it is, what it is, and on account of what it is.]”  Cf. 
Albertus Magnus I, 1890, tr. 1, c. 2, p. 527ba. Before one can determine what the nature 
of the sophistical refutations are, it is natural that he first show that such things exist. 
164a24-b26.  The central argument in the first chapter is for the existence of sophistical 
refutations based on example. Naturally, it is clear to anyone who has experience with 
being deceived by fallacious arguments that they exist. Aristotle, however, may have 
felt the need to give an argument for the existence of sophistical refutations both 
because not everyone has this experience and because the argument reveals something 
about the nature of sophistical refutations.   
Since the structure of any argument by example is complex, it may be helpful to 
note a few general points about this kind of argument. Aristotle makes two general 
claims about the argument from example. In the Rhetoric, he says that it is an argument 
from part to part: “The ‘example’ has already been described as one kind of induction; 
and the special nature of the subject-matter that distinguishes it from the other kinds 
has also been stated above. Its relation to the statement it supports is not that of part to 
whole, nor whole to part, nor whole to whole, but of part to part, or like to like” (Rhet 
1457b26-30, trans. Roberts). Elsewhere, Aristotle shows that the argument from example 
is abnormal in that it involves four terms. He explains, “’Example’ occurs when the 
major term is shown to belong to the middle by means of a term which is similar to the 
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third. It ought to be known both that the middle belongs to the third term, and that the 
first belongs to that which is similar to the third [Παράδειγμα δ' ἐστὶν ὅταν τῷ μέσῳ 
τὸ ἄκρον ὑπάρχον δειχθῇ διὰ τοῦ ὁμοίου τῷ τρίτῳ. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ μέσον τῷ τρίτῳ καὶ 
τὸ πρῶτον τῷ ὁμοίῳ γνώριμον εἶναι ὑπάρχον]” (APr 68b38-40).  
Aristotle manifests the meaning of these general claims with an example. 
Presumably the argument is formed by a speaker at a meeting where the Athenians 
must decide whether or not to make war with the Thebans. The speaker, wishing to 
avoid this war, argues that the war would be evil. That the war with the Thebans is evil 
is the ultimate conclusion of the argument. Since arguments from example have four 
terms, it cannot contain all four in one argument; there are actually two arguments, 
resulting in a first conclusion, then a second ultimate conclusion.  
In his explicit words, the speaker argues, "The war of the Athenians against the 
Thebans is an evil because war of the Thebans against the Phocians was evil” (cf. APr 
69a1-19). 
Premise: Thebans vs. Phocians is evil 
Conclusion: Athenians vs. Thebans is evil 
While inductions characteristically move from particular premises to a universal 
conclusion and syllogisms characteristically move from universal premises to more 
particular conclusion, arguments from example move from particular premises to 
equally particular conclusions; the argument moves part to part (cf. Rhet 1457b30ff). 
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Second, the argument concludes that the major term, “is evil” belongs to the 
minor term “war between the Athenians and Thebans” by means of a similar term, “the 
war between the Thebans and the Phocians.” It is only insofar as the two wars are like 
one another that the argument has force.  In Aristotle’s example, the two wars are like 
one another by means of what he calls the middle term, “a war between neighbors." 
Thus, the total force of the argument comes in an unspoken premise that a war between 
neighbors is evil.  This premise is the conclusion of a truncated induction as well as the 
major premise of a syllogism: 
Induction: 
1) Thebans vs. Phocians - is evil  
Thebans vs. Phocians - is a war between neighbors,  
Therefore, a war between neighbors - is evil. 
Syllogism: 
2) A war between neighbors - is evil 
Athenians vs. Thebans - is a war between neighbors 
Athenians vs. Thebans - is evil. 
The argument from example combines a cutoff induction with a syllogism. Unlike 
induction, this kind of argument does not gather a large or complete enumeration of 
particulars to conclude a universal, but rather uses a single or small enumeration of 
particulars ultimately to conclude another particular. The single particular does not 
strictly speaking allow one to conclude that war between neighbors is always bad. It 
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relies on a similarity between minor terms in the induction and syllogism. The more 
alike the two terms, the more persuasive the argument.  
What is the structure of Aristotle’s argument from example to show that 
sophistical arguments exist?  
Induction:  
1) In other things – some of them are what they seem to be, but others seem to be, 
but are not.  
In other things – this happens through some likeness between what is what it 
seems to be and what is not what it seems to be.  
Wherever there is such a likeness – some things are what they seem be, but others 
seem to be, but are not. 
 
Syllogism: 
2) Where there is such a likeness - some things are what they seem to be, but others 
seem to be, but are not. 
In arguments - there is such likeness. 
Therefore, in arguments - some are what they seem to be, but others seem to be, 
but are not. 
 
In the Gorgias, Socrates also makes the observation that likeness is a cause of error 
(Gorgias 465c).  The argument given by Aristotle has force insofar as the likeness that 
causes error in other things is similar to the likeness that is found between real and 
apparent argument. Apparent arguments exist insofar as there exists some likeness 
between them and genuine arguments that may deceive a person into mistaking one for 
the other.  
Aristotle’s examples of likeness are all taken on the sensible level. Heraclitus said 
that “nature loves to hide” (DK B123). On the sensible level, things may appear to be the 
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same while being different in nature. One may mistake salt for sugar but no one would 
mistake salt for pepper because the visible and tactile likeness between salt and sugar is 
lacking in salt and pepper. On a sensible or imaginable level, a syllogism and a fallacy 
may appear to be the same, yet one is a sound and trustworthy argument while the 
other carries little to no weight at all. Thus, Aristotle’s account of sophistical refutations 
includes not only an explanation of how each fails to be a genuine refutation, but also 
how each appears to be a genuine refutation through its likeness to genuine refutation. 
The closer a falsehood is to the truth the more apt it is to deceive; I am more likely to 
convince someone that I am one inch rather than six inches taller than my true height.  
In equivocation, for example, there is the likeness of vocal sound in a word used with 
different meanings. The cause of the appearance of refutation is the identity of vocal 
sound and the cause of the defect is diversity of meanings. The etymology of ‘mistake’ 
suggests that when things bear a close likeness, we often fail to distinguish between 
them and as Aristotle says, “most people do not distinguish [τὸ διορίζειν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι 
τῶν πολλῶν]” (NE 1172b3). Thus, we call intelligent people ‘sharp’ because of their 
ability to make sharp distinctions and thereby avoid error. 
In regards to the discussion on natural beginnings, Aristotle’s claim that he is 
making a natural beginning may also be based on the fact that he begins by showing 
that likeness is a cause of error. He argues in the Physics that it is natural to begin with 
the general before the particular (Phys 189b30-32). Cf. also Poet 1447a8-16. By beginning 
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with what is common to a subject matter, one can prevent unnecessary repetition. With 
the partial exception of the fallacy of ‘begging the question,’ all sophistical refutations 
deceive because they appear to be real refutations, either through their likeness to 
syllogisms or through their premises’ likeness to endoxes. Perhaps then Aristotle’s 
account of likeness as a universal cause of deception is the natural beginning of this 
subject matter. Likeness as a cause of deception is discussed more thoroughly in the 
Introduction I.II Subject Matter. 
164b23.  The Greek word λιθάργυρος (which I translated as Litharge) is a composition 
of two Greek words: λίθος meaning “stone” and ἄργυρος meaning “silver.” Litharge is 
a naturally occurring silver-colored stone made from lead monoxide exposed to a 
current in the air. Cf. Onions I, 1973, p. 1223. 
164b27-165a2.  I have supplied argument for λόγος here as the genus of syllogism, 
although the word λόγος is not in the text. However, in the Prior Analytics (24b18-22), 
Aristotle uses λόγος when he defines syllogism as “an argument (λόγος) in which, 
when certain premises have been put down, something else, other than the premises 
laid down, follows by necessity by the premises being so,” and then adds, “by, ‘by the 
premises being so,’ I mean that they happen through them, and by ‘it happens through 
them,’ that no extrinsic term is needed for the necessity to arise.”  Again, in the Topics 
(Top 100a25-27), Aristotle gives an identical definition to his definition in the Prior 
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Analytics. Cf. also a paraphrase of the definition SE 168a21-23. For further analysis of 
this definition, cf. Introduction, I.II, Subject Matter. 
165a2-3.  In Chapter 20 of the Prior Analytics II, Aristotle gives an almost identical 
definition of refutation (APr 66b11). He notes that a refutation may come about whether 
or not the interlocutor affirms or denies questions since syllogisms come about from 
both affirmative and negative premises. However, an interlocutor must concede at least 
one affirmative premise and one universal premise for a refutation to be possible 
because every valid syllogism has both an affirmative premise and a universal premise.  
As Dorion notes, the refutation as here defined applies equally well inside and outside 
the context of dialectical disputation (Dorion, 1995, p. 206). Cf. also SE 170a23ff. For 
further analysis of this definition, cf. Introduction, I.II, Subject Matter. 
165a3-19.  We have analyzed, at some length, Aristotle’s argument for the existence of 
sophistical arguments. He observes that things appear to be other than they are through 
some likeness to something else. Since there is a likeness between genuine and 
counterfeit arguments, a listener may mistake the counterfeit for the genuine. 
Counterfeit arguments have an appearance likely to deceive an experienced listener. 
To complete his argument, Aristotle devotes nearly the rest of this paragraph to 
illustrate the minor premise of the final part of the argument from example: there is a 
great likeness between genuine argument and counterfeit argument. However, earlier 
Aristotle indicated in passing that there is also a cause for deception in the hearer 
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himself, namely, his inexperience (SE 164a26-27), which makes him see the arguments 
as from afar, and prevents him from fully grasping the distinctions necessary to discern 
the counterfeit from the genuine. After claiming that there are several causes of this 
likeness in the arguments themselves, he then exemplifies these causes through the 
sophistical place derived from words, i.e., the fallacy of equivocation.  
To manifest why words may be a fertile ground for producing apparent 
arguments, Aristotle argues that equivocation is necessary. We cannot use things 
themselves in conversation, and so instead we use language to signify things. Our 
words and more generally our language, however, do not have a one to one 
correspondence with the nature of things. For instance, the order in which we name 
things is often not the order in which they are. Again, there are many things that do not 
have names at all. More importantly, sometimes our speech and names are more similar 
than the things which they signify. Any instance of a likeness in language not 
translating over into the things themselves is fertile ground for the sophist’s devices. 
Thus, Socrates describes the sophist Dionysodorus, as wanting to catch him “in his 
snares of words” (Euthydemus 295d). For a more thorough account of Aristotle’s 
argument for the necessity of equivocation, cf. Appendix, I.IV, The Necessity of 
Equivocation. 
165a5-6.  The Greek word which I translate as place is τόπος. Obviously, the word’s 
meaning here is not place in its original sense of physical place, but rather in the 
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extended sense used in Aristotle’s logical treatise bearing its name: Topics. A place is a 
template—expressible in a most universal proposition usually composed of logical 
intentions—outlining potential endoxes that may be used to refute a given opinion. The 
subjects of the Topics are dialectical places and the subjects of the Sophistical Refutations 
are sophistical places. The notion of place is just as fundamental in the Sophistical 
Refutations as it is in the Topics; just as the Topics could aptly be renamed Genuine 
Refutations, so also the Sophistical Refutations could aptly be renamed Sophistical Topics. 
Despite the importance of the notion of place, Aristotle says very little about its nature. 
This scarcity has made ‘place’ difficult to understand, so difficult that some 
commentators—such as Tricot or Schreiber—avoid saying anything about it altogether. 
The notion of place is considered more thoroughly in Introduction, II.VIII, Fallacies as 
Places. 
165a6.  The Greek word πρᾶγματα (which I translate as things) should not be confused 
with any neuter plural adjective with a definite article. For πρᾶγματα here and 
elsewhere is opposed to λόγος and ὄνομα (cf. also SE 175a9, SE 168a29).  
165a9-10.  The Greek word ψῆφος (which I translate as “counting stone”) was a small 
round pebble used by the Greeks to tally numbers both in the trade of goods and in 
voting.  
165a18.  This cause through which counterfeit syllogisms appear to be genuine is the 
fact that there can be likeness in speech but unlikeness in meaning.  
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165a19-37.  Aristotle completes the chapter by first explaining why someone would use 
sophistical refutations and then outlining his treatise. Aristotle’s sophist, like the 
sophists from Plato’s Euthydemus (271c, 272a), are also characterized by being paid. Cf. 
also Apology 19e. Sophists, according to Aristotle, desire knowledge of sophistical 
refutations because the ability to appear to refute any interlocutor mirrors the wise 
man’s ability to actually refute. Appearing wise establishes a reputation on the basis of 
which a sophist is paid for teaching. Thesophist has both the ability to produce 
sophistical refutations and the desire to deceive (NE 1164a22-33, Meta 1004bl7-26, Rhet 
1355b15-21, SE 171b27-29). For a further account of Aristotle’s description of a sophist 
consult the Introduction, I.II, Subject Matter. 
Albert the Great offers this final suggestion as to how Aristotle begins his treatise 
from the natural beginning: “We will begin, therefore, with the goal, which is first 
according to nature: for although a goal is the end as that to which the sophist leads, 
nevertheless it is first in his intention. What is first in intention however is first 
according to nature because it is the cause of all those things that are [ordered] to that 
end [Incipiemus igitur a metis, quae primae sunt secundum naturam: quia quamvis meta sit 
ultimum sicut ad quod ducit sophista, tamen haec est prima in intentione ejusdem: primum 
autem in intentione est primum secundum naturam, quia ipsum est causa eorum omnium quae 
sunt ad finem illum] (Albertus Magnus I, 1890, tr. 1 c. 2, p. 527ba). The practical intellect 
begins with its knowledge of its chief end and works backward to its more proximate 
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ends. By beginning the treatise with an explanation of why the sophist would use 
sophisms, Aristotle gives what is first in the mind of the sophist.  
Chapter 2: Distinction of Arguments in Dialogue 
165a38-39.  In Chapter 2, Aristotle locates the arguments treated in the Sophistical 
Refutations as one of the four kinds of arguments in dialogue (τῶν ἐν τῷ διαλέγεσθαι 
λόγων). This division of arguments is often contrasted with the four kinds of syllogism 
(συλλογισμός) given in the first chapter of the Topics (100a25ff). Cf., for instance, 
Schreiber, 2003, pp. 1-2. It is fitting that Aristotle gives his list of arguments in dialogue 
as part of the Sophistical Refutations rather than in some other logical work because 
argument in dialogue is proper to the sophist precisely as sophist. The sophist does not 
carry on argument by himself. His aim in argument is to appear wise, and this aim does 
not include appearing wise to himself but to others. The sophist then needs some sort of 
audience, even if the only audience is his opponent.  
One might object that because the Topics’ purpose is to provide an art by which a 
dialectician will be able discern the best available means for refuting his opponent, the 
dialectician similarly requires an opponent and therefore a dialogue too. Herein is the 
telling difference: a dialectician will discern the available means to refute his opponent 
even if he never has the opportunity to do so. For the dialectician is ultimately 
concerned not with the sophistic goal of appearing wise to others but with knowing and 
delighting in the truth regardless of others.  
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165b1-3.  Didactic argument here is not synonymous with demonstration because it 
assumes a dialogue between a teacher and student. In didactic arguments, a student 
must concede his opinions to his teacher, and to do so requires trust. Cf. Top 159a29-30. 
Yet Aristotle claims that the didactic argument proceeds from true and proper 
principles. He claims further that demonstrative art does not proceed by interrogation 
because demonstration is tied to one side of a contradiction; it must reason from what is 
true, first, and proper. Cf. SE 172a15-16. How then can the back and forth of 
conversation be involved? Perhaps this form of argument could be exemplified by 
Socrates’ dialogue with the slave boy after it has become obvious that one cannot 
double a square by constructing a square on a length double the side of the original 
square. In the ensuing conversation, the slave boy makes clear that one can double the 
square by using the diagonal as the side merely through his answers to Socrates 
questions. The dialogue demonstrates a truth with the slave boy conceding merely his 
own opinions and yet he comes to know something he previously did not know 
through what is first and proper. The argument contains the back and forth of a 
dialogue, but it is didactic at the same time. Cf. Meno 83c3ff.  
165b3-4.  Aristotle defines a dialectical syllogism as “that which syllogizes from 
endoxes,” in the Topics. Cf. Top 100a30. He defines endoxes (ἔνδοξοι) as “things which 
seem to be to all or to most or to the wise, and to all the latter or most or to the most 
knowing and well-reputed.” Cf. Top 100b22-24. A dialectical syllogism does not give 
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demonstrative certainty and has no determined subject matter of discourse. Cf. SE 
172a12-13 and 170a38-39. The dialectical syllogism is presented in the Topics as derived 
from the concessions of the answerer during dialectical disputation. Cf. SE 172a15-17, 
171b5, 171b9-10, 172a21.  That said, one can see by the definition of dialectic that it is 
useful outside of dialectical disputation. Such dialectical syllogisms can be found in 
Book One of the Physics, Book One of the De Anima, and in Book Three of the 
Metaphysics. For a more thorough discussion of dialectic and the meaning and function 
of endoxes, see Introduction II.VI What is Aristotelian Dialectic. 
165b4-6.  While Aristotle makes testing (πειραστικὸς) argument a different kind (γένη) 
from dialectical argument, later he claims that the testing art is part of dialectic. Cf. SE 
169b25-26 and 171b4-5. This apparent contradiction leads Dorion to claim that testing 
argument is more a species of the dialectical argument, than an argument of an entirely 
different nature. Cf. Dorion n. 18, p. 214. The contradiction, however, is a superficial 
one. The same art may use different kinds of arguments such as in the cases where 
dialectic uses both induction and syllogism, and rhetoric uses both enthymemes and 
arguments from example. Α testing (πειραστικὸς) argument and a dialectical argument 
may be different kinds of arguments while the testing art (πειραστική) may be part of 
the dialectical art (διαλεκτική). As discussed in the introduction, Aristotle clearly 
considers it to be the function of the same art to discern real and apparent means of 
persuasion. For, he claims that the rhetorician enquires into real and apparent 
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persuasion and the dialectician enquires into real and apparent syllogism. Cf. Rhet 
1355b13ff. By Dorion’s reasoning, a single art could only consider one of the two.  Thus, 
Aristotle’s claim in the present text is not inconsistent. The testing argument may be a 
different kind of argument than the dialectical argument, but the dialectical art may 
inquire into both, just as it inquires into sophistical refutations also.   
165b6-7.  Perhaps the reference is to the Topics 159a25ff. However, as Dorion points out, 
the text from the Topics seems unsatisfactory because it is mostly from the perspective of 
the answerer while the text here appears to refer to a mode of questioning, and 
consequently assumes the questioner’s perspective. Cf. Dorion pp. 214-15. Poste, 
therefore, takes the reference to be evidence of a lost text of Aristotle. Cf. Poste p. 103. 
Aristotle will have more to say about this sort of argument at SE 172a21-36. 
165a7.  A contentious (ἐριστικός) disputant is not synonymous with a sophistic 
(σοφιστικός) disputant, although both men use the same arguments, apparent 
refutations. A disputant is contentious if he cheats out of love for victory itself; he is a 
strife-lover (φίλερις). A disputant is a sophist if he cheats to gain a reputation of being 
wise so that he can make money. Cf. SE 171b22-34. 
165b7-8.  In this passage, Aristotle gives only two alternatives for a contentious 
argument: 1) if it is a real syllogism but the premises are not genuinely endoxic or 2) if 
the syllogism is merely apparent. One could divide this second option into two as 
Aristotle does at Top. 100b23-27 where he states that the same argument may be both 
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apparently but not really syllogistic and have premises that appear but are not genuine 
endoxes or an argument may have genuine endoxes but only appear to be syllogistic. 
Cf. Top, 100b23-101a25. Some commentators think that Aristotle gives another kind of 
category of sophistical refutation that encompasses arguments that appear to be 
germane to the subject at hand but are not. Cf. Dorion p. 215 and Foster, p. 47. Cf. SE 
169b20-23; 171b8-12 and notes ad loc for an account of my disagreement with this 
interpretation.  
One may question how it is possible for a premise to appear to be an endox 
without actually being one. How can something seem to be generally accepted, when it 
is not? Aristotle answers, “[N]othing of what is called endox has its likelihood entirely 
on the surface, as the principles of contentious arguments happen to.” Cf. Top 100b27-
28. For example, “speaking of the silent is possible” appears to be an endox. Cf. SE 
166a12-14. However, this position is only an endox if one takes “of the silent” as an 
objective and not a possessive genitive. It is possible to speak about silent things but 
silent things cannot speak. The Sophistical Refutations unfolds the places where the 
sophist looks for premises that will appear to be endoxic while they are not actually 
endoxic, and that can be used in multiple disciplines. For another example from the 
Sophistical Refutations cf. SE 178b34-38 and note ad loc. 
 On another matter, when Pacius gives the subject matter of the Sophistical 
Refutations, he divides the sophistical syllogism from the dialectical and didactic 
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syllogism, Quicquid concluditur aut est necessario verum, aut probabile, aut falsum. 
[Whatever is concluded is either necessarily true, or probable, or false] Cf. Pacius, p. 
479. A demonstration would be conclusive of the true, the dialectical syllogism of the 
probable, and the sophistical syllogism of the false. A dialectical syllogism, however, 
may contain false premises and a false conclusion because endoxic premises are 
sometimes false. Clearly, Pacius means that the conclusion of a sophistical syllogism is 
always false. His division reveals a certain confusion regarding sophistical reasoning. 
While on face value, this seems to be a reasonable division of the arguments, the 
conclusion of sophistical refutation is not necessarily false. In fact, the premises are not 
necessarily false either. Consider the following fallacy: 
1) If an argument is a demonstration, then the conclusion is true. 
The conclusion of the Pythagorean Theorem is true. 
Therefore, the Pythagorean Theorem is a demonstration. 
In this example, both the premises and the conclusion are true. However, the conclusion 
does not follow necessarily from the premises, although it appears to. The argument 
commits the fallacy of assuming the consequent. Pacius’ neat division of the three types 
of syllogism according to the respective conclusions’ truth, probability and falsity is 
incorrect. For the conclusion of the dialectical syllogism may be false, while the 
conclusion of a sophistical syllogism may be true. 
 On the other hand, it is accurate to say that the subject of the Sophistical 
Refutations is false syllogism as long as false is understood in the sense in which 
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Aristotle calls things false which appear to be other than they are. Cf. Meta 1024b21ff. A 
sophistical refutation is a false syllogism in the way that false teeth or false money are 
false. Sophistical refutations may not be accurately called false in the sense that their 
premises and the conclusion do not reflect reality. 
Chapter 3: The Aims of the Sophist 
165b12-16.  Aristotle has already characterized the aim of the sophist as to appear wise. 
Cf. SE 165a20ff. Here, however, he gives five aims. How are the aims related? The desire 
to appear wise is the common aim of every sophist. A sophist appears wise by 
overcoming any interlocutor, and to do so he aims to cause his interlocutor to speak so 
as to reflect some intellectual corruption. Any individual sophist may have a number of 
different particular aims to bring about this appearance. Chapter 3 lays out five 
corruptions of the intellect that the sophist aims to produce the appearance of in his 
opponent. These are the five proximate aims of the sophist in any discussion. Which 
particular aim the sophist chooses is determined by the context of the discussion. The 
aims are ordered from most desirable to least desirable because the corresponding 
intellectual corruption are ordered from most to least severe.  
Aristotle will discuss sophistical refutation from the perspective of the sophist in 
Chapters 4-11 and sophistical refutation from the perspective of the answerer in 
Chapters 19-30. He discusses the aims of falsehood and paradox in Chapter 12, 
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of solecism from a sophist’s perspective in Chapter 14 and from an answerer’s 
perspective in Chapter 32. 
165b15.  The Greek word ἀδολεσχῆσαι (which I translate as babble) does not have an 
exact equivalent in English. The fifth aim of the sophist is to make his interlocutor 
repeat the same exact words over and over. It is not to have him make the same point 
over and over or to simply utter nonsense. Cf. examples at SE 173a34-b11. Aristotle 
discusses babbling from a sophist’s perspective in Chapter 13 and from an answerer’s 
perspective in Chapter 31. 
165b19.  The second aim is traditionally understood to be forcing the adversary to say 
something manifestly false. Pacius has a clear paraphrase of Aristotle‘s second aim in 
line with this interpretation: Secunda scopus est falsitas, id est, ut cogetur quis fateri quod est 
manifeste falsum [the second aim is falsity, that is, that someone is forced to admit that 
which is manifestly false]. Cf. Pacius, I Soph Elench., tr. 2, c. 3, a. 2, p. 482a. While 
Pacius’ paraphrase is interpretive, it is also reasonable. The only way to show that a 
statement is false when it is not clearly false is by using contradiction, but the first and 
the second aims must be distinct. If the sophist does not then succeed in producing the 
contradiction of what his interlocutor conceded at the beginning, he will content himself 
with forcing him to state something manifestly false—not any false statement, but a 
manifestly false statement. As Albert the Great points out, non sequitur falsum nisi ex falso 
[the false does not follow except from the false] (Albertus Magnus I, 1890, tr. 1, c. 5 p. 
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533b). If the sophist can lead his opponent into saying something manifestly false, then 
he simultaneously discredits the premises leading to that false conclusion because it is 
impossible for a false conclusion to follow from true premises. However, the first and 
the second aims of the sophist remain distinct. For to lead a person into contradiction 
does not mean that either side of the contradiction is manifestly false, but that both 
sides of the contradiction cannot be true. Moreover, a refutation requires that the 
interlocutor explicitly accepts the exact contradiction of the refutation’s conclusion 
whereas the interlocutor need not accept the contradiction of an argument’s conclusion. 
The second aim reveals that the answerer’s opinions are false, but not that they are 
inconsistent.  
165b19-20.  παράδοξος (which I translate as paradox) is an antonym to endox 
(ἔνδοξος). Aristotle also uses the word as a synonym to ἄδοξος (which I translate a 
disreputable opinion). Cf. SE 172b10-11 where Aristotle refers to this third aim by using 
ἄδοξος as opposed to παράδοξος. Chapter 12 unfolds the places that the sophist uses to 
lead his interlocutor into stating a paradox.  
 What is manifestly false and what is a paradox are not the same. Aristotle’s 
meaning of paradox is what is opposed to common opinion, either of all men, or most, 
or the wise, or the wisest of the wise, i.e., endoxes. However, some endoxes are false 
such as the opinion that time is uniform or—to use an example more pertinent to 
Aristotle—that democracy is the best form of government. Opinions that are opposed to 
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false endoxes are paradoxes, but they are not manifestly false. Some paradoxes can be 
true; all false statements are false. 
Chapter 4: Apparent Refutations from Speech 
165b23-27.  Aristotle has explained the five aims of sophists. Of the five aims, the ability 
to produce sophistical refutations is the most desired, and so Aristotle first proceeds to 
consider the various ways of doing so. 
The primary division of Aristotle’s thirteen sophistical refutations is into two: 
those from speech (παρὰ τὴν λέξιν) and those outside of speech (ἔξω τῆς λέξεως). 
Unfortunately, Aristotle provides no explanation of the division other than the names of 
the two parts and the fallacies that fall under them. Fallacies from speech play on some 
ambiguity, genuine or apparent, in speech. How are we to understand the purely 
negative characterization of one class of fallacies as outside of speech? Various 
interpretations can be found even in a single commentator.  Michael of Ephesus, for 
instance, first characterizes the fallacies outside of speech as those from thought: τοῦ δὲ 
ἐλέγχου μέρη εἰσὶ δεκατρία· ἓξ μὲν τὰ “παρὰ τὴν λέξιν,” ἑπτὰ δὲ τὰ παρὰ τὴν 
διάνοιαν, οὓς ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης “ἔξω τῆς λέξεως” καλεῖ. [There are thirteen parts of 
refutation; those “from speech” are six, but those from thought—which Aristotle calls 
“outside of speech”—are seven] (Michael of Ephesus, 1898, p. 5). Later, however, 
Michael of Ephesus (1898, pp. 20, 37) equates the ways “outside of speech” with those 
concerning things (περὶ πράγματα).  
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It is reasonable to suppose that if a fallacy is not derived from speech, then it 
must be either from thought or from things. A fallacy outside of speech is from things, 
however, and not from thoughts. For in some sense, every fallacy is related to thought 
because every fallacy is a way of making an error in thought. Accordingly, it would be 
confusing to categorize only a portion of sophistical refutations as from thought. 
Clearly, one false thought can be the source of another false thought; for—to paraphrase 
Aristotle—a small mistake in the beginning can lead to a great mistake in the end (DeCa 
271b8ff). However, one error in thought being derived from another error in thought 
cannot go on infinitely. At some point, the source of an error in thought cannot be 
another thought. It makes more sense, then, to divide the fallacies according to the 
sources of error other than thoughts. Clearly, ambiguity in language can be a source of 
error. And what else is there besides thoughts and speech? Things.  
Moreover, Aristotle argues that fallacies cannot be divided into those from 
names and those from thought in Chapter 10 (SE 170b12-171b2). Again, it is the nature 
of a fallacy to appear to be a refutation while failing to be a genuine refutation. Thus, all 
deception resulting from sophistical refutations comes about due to some likeness (SE 
164a26). It is clear that all of the fallacies from speech are based on a likeness in speech; 
the answerer fails to notice that different expressions signify more than one thing on 
account of the likeness of those expressions. Thus, the source of some fallacies is a 
likeness in speech as such. One can gather, then, that the deception all of the fallacies 
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outside of speech is due to a likeness that is not in the speech itself, but due to some 
other likeness. Examples of these others likenesses are the likeness between what is 
through itself and what is through an accident in the fallacy of the accident or the 
likeness between what is so simply and what is so in a certain respect in the fallacy of 
what is said in some respect. These are likenesses in reality. The source of fallacies 
outside of speech then is a likeness in things as such.  
Additionally, this division is in harmony with the dialectician’s tools; the 
division of fallacies into those derived from the likeness of speech and those derived 
from likeness in things corresponds to the distinction between the second and third 
tools of dialectic (cf. Top 105a20-34). The second tool is the ability to distinguish 
different senses of vocal expression (Top 106a1-107b37). The third tool is the ability to 
discover differences in things (Top 107b38-108a6).  
The Medievals generally considered the division of fallacies according to speech 
and according to things. The author of the De Fallaciis explains that this division is 
based on some fallacies arising due to the unity of expression and some arising due to 
apparent unity in things: Hoc autem contingit dupliciter. Uno quidem modo ex parte vocis, 
quando propter unitatem vocis creditur esse unitas rei per vocem significatae; sicut illa quae per 
nomen canis significantur, unum esse videntur, quia hoc nomen canis est unum. Alio modo ex 
parte rei: ex eo scilicet quod aliquae res quae aliquo modo conveniunt simpliciter unum esse 
videntur, sicut supra dictum est de subiecto et accidente [This happens, however, in two 
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ways. In one way, indeed, on account of the expression, when on account of the unity of 
expression it is believed that there is a unity of the thing signified through an 
expression; as those things which are signified through name dog appear to be one 
since this name dog is one. Another mode is on account of the thing. Namely, because 
some things which come together in some way seem to be one simply; as was said 
above concerning subject and accident.] ((ps) Aquinas, 1976, c. 4). Modi autem arguendi 
per quos arguitur ad redargutionis metam ducendo, sunt duo, scilicet secundum apparentiam in 
diction ... et alii modi sunt extra dictionem secundum rem accepti [However, there are two 
modes of arguing by which one argues in leading to the goal of refutation, namely on 
account of appearance in speech … and other modes have been accepted outside of 
speech on account of the thing] (Albertus Magnus I, 1890, tr. 1, c. 6, p. 535a). [I]n 
aliquibus dubitatio fit ex parte rei, in aliquibus ex parte verborum et nominum. [In some cases, 
error arises on account of the thing, in other cases on account of the words or names.] 
(Aquinas, 1953b, lect. 1, n. 238). This also appears to be Allan Bäck’s position (2015, p. 
143 and p. 146). 
 One must note, however, that fallacies outside of speech often involve 
ambiguous language, but that ambiguous language is not the source of the fallacy as 
such. Albert the Great offers the following helpful observations:  
[P]raenotandum est quod penes causam apparentiae diversae distinguuntur fallaciae, et 
non penes causam non existendi: quia eaedem causae non existendi possunt esse in 
diversis fallaciis, ut dicit Aristoteles, et non potest una causa apparentiae in diversis 
fallaciis…. In omnibus enim fallaciis et in diction et extra dictionem oportet sermonibus 
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uti: sed ille sermo in fallaciis extra dictionem sumitur sermo prout subjacet rei, in 
fallaciis in diction sumitur sermo prout res subjacet sermoni: et ideo principium 
deceptionis est in sermone in fallaciis in dictione, in fallaciis autem extra dictionem 
sumitur prout est in re et refertur ad sermonem [it must be noted that diverse 
fallacies are distinguished within the causam apparentiae, and not with the causam 
of non existendi: since the same causes of non-existence are able to be in diverse 
fallacies, as Aristotle says, and there cannot be one cause of appearance in 
diverse fallacies…. For in all fallacies both in speech and outside of speech it is 
necessary to use language, but the language in fallacies outside of speech is the 
language as subject to the thing, in fallacies from speech the language is as thing 
subject to the language: and so, the principle of deception is in the language in 
fallacies from speech, in fallacies outside of speech, however, it is as it is in the 
thing and related to the speech] (Albertus Magnus I, 1890, tr. 3, c. 6, p. 568a). 
 
The above observations by Albert explain a tendency to reduce fallacies outside of 
speech to fallacies from speech. Cf. for instance, Poste, 1866, p. 156-157 or Bueno, 1988, 
p. 12. Perhaps this explains in part why Wittgenstein (1976, pp. 109, 132, 133) thought 
all error could be reduced to imperfection in speech. If we cannot distinguish two 
things in reality, then their supposed identity will carry over into the way we speak 
about them. Thus, fallacies from the accident, for example, involve the same phrase 
signifying two different things over the course of a syllogism. The reason why a fallacy 
from the accident is not a fallacy inside of speech is that the ultimate source of the error 
is not from speech but from things. This explains why Aristotle gives similar examples 
of fallacies inside of speech and outside of speech. It may even be permissible for one 
example to be categorized as two different kinds of fallacy. For nothing prevents the 
same argument from committing multiple fallacies (Albertus Magnus I, 1890, tr. 3, c. 7, 
p. 570). Cf. also SE 179b17-26 and note ad loc.  Aristotle thinks that Mellisus’ argument, 
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for instance, commits two fallacies: it commits the fallacy of equivocation which is a 
fallacy inside of speech and it commits the fallacy of assuming the consequent which is 
a fallacy outside of speech (cf. Phys 186a6ff).  As D. Botting (2012c, p. 213) puts it, “Each 
(type of) fallacy has a unique solution (namely, the opposite of whatever causes the 
fallacy), but each fallacious argument does not.” Cf. also SE 179a11ff. 
165b27.  I translate the Greek σχῆμα λέξεως as ‘figure of diction’ as opposed to ‘figure 
of speech’ to avoid confusing this fallacy with the use of rhetorical devices such as irony 
or metaphor. One could accurately get at Aristotle’s meaning with the translation ‘form 
of expression.’ I reject this admittedly less awkward translation in favor of ‘figure of 
diction’ because of my translation’s etymological connection with the common Latin 
rendering of the fallacy figurae dictionis.  
165b27-30.  Aristotle—after having enunciated the six sophisms inside of speech—states 
cryptically that one can prove his division is exhaustive either by induction or by 
syllogism. In fact, Aristotle does not form such a syllogism or induction, but he does say 
it is based on the fact that “we can fail to signify the same thing with the same names 
and speeches in so many ways.” This claim by Aristotle reveals how he is dividing his 
fallacies from one another. The fallacies are divided from one another based on the kind 
of likeness in speech by which reason mistakes the apparent for the real.   
 Various commentators have tried to bring out what exactly the syllogism to 
which Aristotle refers might be. I find Sylvester Maurus’s interpretation (1885, c. 3, a. 2, 
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n. 4, p. 571b) the most explanatory of Aristotle’s claim.  Probatur inductione et syllogismo; 
Inductione quidem, quia nulla potest afferri fallacia dictionis, quae non reducatur ad aliquam ex 
his; syllogismo vero, quia tot sunt fallaciae dictionis, quot sunt modi per quos iisdem nominibus 
et eadem oratione possumus plura significare; sed tales modi sunt sex; ergo, etc. - Probatur 
minor; vel enim plura significamus, quia aliquod nomen est aequivocum, et est aequivocatio; vel 
quia tota oratio plura significat, et est amphibologia; vel quia quasdam voces aliud significant 
compositae, aliud divisae, et sunt fallaciae compositionis ac divisionis; vel quia eaedem voces 
aliud significant cum accentu, aliud sine accentu, et est falIacia accentus; vel demum quia eadem 
figura dictionis significat diversa, et est fallacia figurae dictionis [It is proved with induction 
and syllogism. There is induction, in fact, because no one can offer a fallacy from 
speech, which is not reduced to one or other of these things; there is syllogism, 
however, because there are as many fallacies from speech as there are modes through 
which we can signify many things with the same name and speech. But such modes are 
six; therefore, etc., —the minor premise is proved: for either we signify many things 
because some name is equivocal, and it is equivocation; or because the entire address 
signifies many things, and it is amphiboly; or because certain words signify one thing as 
composed and another thing as divided, and these are the fallacies of composition and 
division; or because the same words signify one thing with an accent and another thing 
without an accent, and this is the fallacy of the accent; or finally because the same figure 
of diction signifies different things and this is the fallacy of figure of diction].  
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 Sylvester’s interpretation of the syllogism that Aristotle claims manifests that the 
exhaustiveness of his division can be put in the following way. 
1) Every twofold meaning is from these six places. 
Every fallacy from speech is from twofold meaning. 
Therefore, every fallacy from speech is from these six places.  
While Sylvester’s syllogism is not unreasonable, it seems to require the major premise to 
be justified by induction. How can we know this induction is complete? In the 
commentary tradition, one interpretation is prevalent: language deceives by actually 
signifying more than one thing or by potentially signifying more than one thing, or by 
seeming to signify more than one thing. This influential interpretation was first 
espoused by Galen in his De Captionibus (1977, c. 3, p. 6). The following chart represents 
the necessary divisions underlying Galen’s argument that the six fallacies from speech 
exhaust all twofold meaning in speech. 
Twofold Meaning  
τὸ διττόν 
In a name  
(ἐν ὀνόματι) 
In a phrase  











Composition and Division 
σύνθεσις καὶ διαίρεσις 
Imagined 
φαντασίᾳ 
Figure of Diction 
σχῆμα λέξεως 
 




For Aristotle language deceives by signifying more than one thing or by seeming to 
signify something other than what they signify. Galen crisscrosses the distinction 
 172 
between the simple name and complex speech with the distinction between actual, 
potential, and imagined multiplicity. Clearly, language is either simple, as in a simple 
word, or complex, as a speech or phrase. One name or speech may have two meanings 
actually or potentially. That seems to be complete. However, with figure of diction, a 
name or speech has one meaning, but it seems or is imagined to have another. ‘To be 
seen’ is not an instance of undergoing in reality, but it appears to because it is 
grammatically passive (cf. SE 166b10-19 and notes ad loc). 
  We find this same division of fallacies inside of speech in Michael of Ephesus 
(1898, p. 22), who claims, πᾶν δὲ διττὸν ἐν ὀνόματι καὶ λόγῳ ἢ δυνάμει ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ ἢ 
φαντασίᾳ [Every twofold meaning in name or in speech is either potential or actual or 
imagined]. The author of the De Fallaciis makes a similar claim ((ps) Aquinas, 1976, c. 5), 
Ex parte autem vocis est principium motivum sive causa apparentiae ex eo quod una vox multa 
significat: quod contingit per multiplicationem vocum. Est autem multiplex triplex: scilicet 
actuale, potentiale, et phantasticum [The moving principle or cause of appearance is on the 
part of the voice from the fact that one word signifies in many ways: this happens 
through the multiplication of voices. There are however three ways of multiplicity: 
namely, actual, potential, and imaginative]. Even Albert the Great seems to follow 
Galen’s interpretation. Cf. Albertus Magnus I, 1890, tr. 2, c. 1, p 537a. 
Galen’s claim is that every multiplicity in meaning is either actual, potential or 
imaginary, and every actual, potential or imaginary multiplicity corresponds to one of 
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the six fallacies from speech. Taking this as our base principle we now have a syllogism 
to justify the major premise of Sylvester’s syllogism: 
2) Every twofold meaning is either actual, potential, or imagined. 
Every actual, potential, or imagined twofold meaning is from these six places. 
Therefore, every twofold meaning is from these six places. 
Obviously, it is not perfectly evident that this is what Aristotle had in mind when he 
alluded to there being a syllogism to show that his division was complete. Nonetheless, 
the repetition of this interpretation of Aristotle speaks to the persuasive force of Galen’s 
division. His division appears complete, and his claim helps identify what is proper to 
each fallacy. However, this cannot be the exact division that Aristotle used because he 
divides the fallacies from speech into two groups: those that are twofold and those in 
which the speech or name are different based on whether or not the repeated words or 
phrases are actually the same. Cf. SE 168a24ff and note ad loc. The fallacies of 
composition and division are not based on twofold speech because the speech is 
different when it is composed and when it is divided. The fallacy of the figure of diction 
is not based on twofold speech because—although there is one speech—it does not have 
one of the apparent meanings. 
However, Galen’s interpretation is correct insofar as it claims that in the fallacy 
of figure of diction, the twofold meaning is only imagined; the word or phrase never has 
one of the imagined meanings. The fallacy is still twofold in the sense that there is one 
word or phrase that appears to have two meanings. The fallacy is distinguished from 
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those of amphiboly and equivocation because their phrases or words can have both 
meanings even if the questioner takes the speech for a different meaning than the 
answerer intended. Cf. Schreiber, 2003, p. 89. The fallacy of the figure of diction is 
distinguished from the fallacies which are not based on the twofold because, in those 
fallacies, the phrases or words are not the same. These qualifications to Galen’s 
understanding are reflected in the revised chart below. 
Twofold Meaning  
τὸ διττόν 
In a name  
(ἐν ὀνόματι) 
In a phrase  
(ἐν λόγῳ)  







(The words or phrases are the 
same, but the twofold meaning 
is only imagined.) 
Figure of Diction 
σχῆμα λέξεως 
 




(The words or phrases is not 
actually the same) 
Accent 
προςῳδία 
Composition and Division 
σύνθεσις καὶ διαίρεσις 
 
165b28.  In this difficult passage, I translate καὶ as especially. The "especially because" 
clause is explaining the introduction of syllogism; it is more parenthetical than the 
parentheses "if we should take up another way." For the use of καὶ as a responsive 
adverb cf. Denniston, 1950, p. 293ff. 
165b30-166a6. The fallacy of equivocation is a particularly important fallacy for the 
sophist (cf. SE 175a5-10, 165a4-5, 182b22ff, Rhet 1404b37-39). For a thorough explication 
of this fallacy and Aristotle’s examples, cf. Appendix I.V What is the Fallacy of 
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Equivocation. Most of Chapter 4 consists of Aristotle’s elucidation of each fallacy inside 
of speech through exemplification.  
Obviously, examples of fallacies from speech often do not apply in translation. 
Sometimes the English cannot express the ambiguity at all. Other times the English can 
reproduce the ambiguity, but rather awkwardly. For the sake of clarity, I have chosen to 
put Aristotle’s examples of the fallacies in italics while attempting to clarifying the more 
difficult examples in my commentary or appendices. When Aristotle references 
particular phrases or words from his examples, I have placed these phrases or words in 
quotes.  
165b34.  Here, μανθάνειν is a Greek word that can mean either to understand or to 
learn. The reader may take the sentence as ambiguous meaning either that those who 
are literate already understand what is taught by the teacher or that those who are 
literate learn what is taught by the teacher.  
165b35.  The Greek δέοντά (which I translate as “what needs to be”) may mean things 
which ought to be. Aristotle claims in the Topics (110b10) that the Greek word δέον can 
mean either what is expedient (τὸ συμφέρον) or what is noble (τὸ καλὸν).  
166a6.  What distinguishes amphiboly from equivocation? Aristotle claims that both 
equivocation and amphiboly are from the twofold (SE 168a23ff and note ad loc). In 
equivocation, however, it is a name (ὀνόμα) that means several things, but in 
amphiboly, it is a discourse (λόγος) that means several things. (Ps) Aquinas (1976, c. 7) 
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says that Sicut autem aequivocatio provenit ex eo quod dictio penitus eadem plura significat, sic 
amphibologia ex eo quod una oratio penitus eadem plura significat [However, just as 
equivocation results from the fact that the name—while remaining the same—signifies 
many things so amphiboly results from the fact that one speech—while remaining the 
same—signifies many things].  
166b6-7.  The Greek grammar is ambiguous as to whether it signifies “wishing the 
enemies to capture me,” or “wishing me to capture the enemies.” Here the sophist takes 
advantage of the ambiguity in the Ancient Greek accusative infinitive construction. In 
all of Aristotle’s examples of amphiboly, the ambiguity is related to grammatical 
construction. Amphiboly is due to diversity in the construction where one term can 
serve two different functions in a statement. The ambiguity is not the result of a term 
having two meanings, but from a term’s potential to serve two different functions in the 
phrase. For this reason, the ambiguity can only result in a complex speech where 
different terms bear some relation to one another. It should also be noted that the Greek 
word ἀμφιβολία is sometimes used by Aristotle with a nontechnical meaning to refer 
to the ambiguity of a word (cf. SE I75b29ff, Poet 146Ia25-26; Galen, 1977, p. 117; and 
Kirwan, 1979, p. 41). 
166b7-12.  In the first example, the Greek grammar is ambiguous as to whether it 
signifies “Does one know that which one knows?” or “Does that which one knows 
know.” The same applies to the next two examples. 
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166b12-14.  It is possible that example is taken from Plato (Euthydemus 300b). Suppose 
the answerer has taken up the position that speaking of the silent (or speechless) is 
impossible. For no silent person speaks insofar as he is silent. The sophist may then try 
to secure the following premises 
1) Speaking of rocks is possible 
Every rock is silent 
Therefore, speaking of the silent is possible.  
In this sophism, the conclusion does actually follow. However, the conclusion only 
appears to contradict the original position of the answerer. 
One should note that Aristotle’s examples in the Sophistical Refutations are 
generally more playful than philosophically pernicious. Aristotle probably chose simple 
examples to manifest that they are in fact fallacious since such examples obviously do 
not follow. One downside to this approach is that readers may not consider the fallacies 
as truly dangerous. One serious example of the fallacy of amphiboly is the following: 
1) Truth requires that the way we know things be the way things are 
The way we know things is as universal 
Therefore, truth requires that what we know exists universally 
The phrase, “the way we know things” is ambiguous. The phrase may mean either A) 
the way we understand things to exist or B) our manner of knowing them. The first 
premise is true with the phrase bearing the A) meaning, but the second premise is true 
with the phrase bearing the B) meaning. 
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166a14-21.  Aristotle distinguishes what he calls three ways or modes to produce 
equivocation of amphiboly. Since there is no example provided to instantiate the second 
way (τρόπος), determining how to distinguish the first two ways is difficult. The first 
way is from speaking properly (κυρίως) and the second way is from being accustomed 
(ἔθω) to speak in a certain manner. Aristotle could mean the second way of refutation 
involves words and phrases that are not actually ambiguous, but that are in a sense 
when they are used metaphorically.  The second way, then, would not involve 
equivocation in the strict sense of the categories where the word properly has more than 
one meaning, but when we are accustomed (ἔθω) to speak metaphorically (cf. Poet 
1457b1-6; Schreiber 2003, p. 182-183). One might say, “I am accustomed to calling my 
wife honey,” or “I am accustomed to calling my neighbor a pig.” To see Aristotle’s 
understanding of metaphor, consult Appendix I.II Two Kinds of Name. 
 One might object that it is not possible to use the confusion of a metaphorical 
intention and a word’s real meaning as grounds for a fallacy. For who would confuse 
the real meaning of honey with the metaphorical intention when a man calls his wife 
honey? Yet, there are cases, particularly in theology, where the metaphorical intentions 
are confused with the real meanings of the word (cf. Aquinas, 1947, I, q. 3, art. 1, obj., 1-
3).  
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This third way in which something can be said in many ways is a simple 
restatement of amphiboly where the syntactical function of a univocal word is 
ambiguous given the grammar of a statement or phrase. Cf. Schreiber, 2003, p. 185.  
166a16.  I take it that the Greek adverb κυρίως (which I translate as “properly”) signifies 
that the speech or the word actually has several meanings.  Cf. SE 180a1-2. The Greek 
noun ἀετὸς has several meanings including “eagle,” “gable,” and “bandage.” The 
Greek noun κύων can mean “dog,” “Cynic philosopher,” or “Dog-star,” i.e., the star 
Sirius. 
166a23-32.  When the ambiguous statement from which the apparent refutation comes 
about is true in a composed sense but false in a divided, it is the fallacy of composition. 
Luckily, the fallacy translations into English with relative ease. The fallacy’s ambiguity 
upon which this fallacy depends can be exemplified with Mother Goose’s nursery 
rhyme, “Twenty Nails:” 
Every lady in this land 
Has twenty nails, upon each hand 
Five, and twenty on hands and feet: 
All this is true without deceit. 
The rhyme is full of various phrases that taken in composition are false but taken in 
division are true. For example, if “upon each hand” is taken in composition with “has 
twenty nails” then “Every lady in this land has twenty nails upon each hand” is false. 
However, if “upon each” is taken in division with “has twenty nails,” then the 
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statement “Every lady in this land has twenty nails” is true. There are similar 
ambiguities in other parts of the rhyme. 
 Notice that the punctuation in the example nulls any real ambiguity in the 
rhyme. Proper pronunciation of this rhyme would reflect this punctuation.  
166a26-27.  Deleting καὶ μὴ γράφοντα γράφειν with Wallies. 
166a33-38.  When an ambiguous statement from which an apparent refutation comes 
about is true in a divided sense but false in a composed sense, the argument commits 
the fallacy of division. How can we distinguish the fallacies of composition and division 
from the fallacy of amphiboly? Both involve ambiguity that can only take place in a 
phrase or statement. Aristotle will say later that the fallacy of ambiguity involves 
phrases that are truly twofold where the fallacies of composition and division do not 
(SE 168a24ff). As is the case with the fallacy of accent, the meaning of a vocal sound 
depends on its pronunciation. In Aristotle’s example: “God-like Achilles left a hundred 
fifty men,” the meaning of the phrase is determined by whether or not there is a pause 
between “hundred” and “fifty.” For Aristotle, pronouncing the words with or without 
the pause makes two different statements simply speaking just as changing the accent 
on the same letter can make two different words simply speaking. The overall point is 
that in fallacies of composition and division the ambiguity, or “twofoldness,” that is 
played upon by the sophist is not truly there. One might say with Galen and others that 
it is only there potentially. With the fallacy of amphiboly, the ambiguity is truly there. 
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One famous example of this kind of fallacy results from the argument that God 
cannot have knowledge of future contingents (Aquinas, 1952, q. 2, art. 12, ad. 4; 1947, I, 
q. 14, art. 13, ad. 3.): 
1) Everything known by God must necessarily be. 
No future contingent things must necessarily be. 
Therefore, no future contingent thing is known by God. 
166b1-9.  The fallacy of the accent is the use of two different words that differ only in 
their accentuation in an apparent syllogism as if they were the same word. This fallacy 
differs from the fallacy of equivocation in that the fallacy of equivocation uses the same 
word but with two different meanings whereas the fallacy of accent uses different words 
that share the same letters in the same order. The fact that the fallacy of equivocation is 
far more prevalent than the fallacy of accent is verification of Aristotle’s claim that 
likeness is the cause of error. For the vocal sounds of two word differing merely by 
accentuation are similar, but the vocal sound of one word used with two different 
meanings is identical. Just as no one during conversation would confuse the word 
“record” with “record” in English, no one during dialectical disputation would confuse 
two words with different accentuations but the same spelling in Greek. It does seem at 
least possible that someone may do so while reading because the words are identical on 
the page. The fallacy exists, but it hardly exists in most languages. Obviously, the danger 
posed by this fallacy would be increased in heavily accented languages such as Chinese. 
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Oesterle gives a happy example: “To incense a person is, presumably, to surround him 
with perfumed smoke. This may or may not incense him” (Oesterle, 1963, p. 255). 
 We often make a similar error in writing when we mix up words like accept and 
except or illusion and allusion. These are words that are similar or identical in sound 
but differ in spelling. Still, it is hard to see how one would deceptively form a 
sophistical refutation out of this error either. 
As far as the Sophistical Refutations is concerned, the fallacy of accent is, for 
the most part, important for what it reveals about other fallacies—that the fallacies of 
composition and division are not derived from phrases that are actually the same (SE 
168a25-34 and notes ad loc). 
166b4-5.  The Greek reads “τὸ μὲν οὗ καταπύθεται ὄμβρῳ” (Part of which rots in the 
rain) and is amended to read “τὸ μὲν οὐ καταπύθεται ὄμβρῳ” (It does not rot in the 
rain.) The difference lies solely in the οὐ being pronounced more sharply. I have 
replaced the Greek with an equivalent English example: “the invalid ought to be put 
aside.” 
166b7-8.  In Greek, δίδομεν means “we grant,” while διδόμεν is an alternate infinitive 
form of διδόναι. Thus, with the change in accent, the passage may read in the 
imperative, “grant him to attain what he prays for.” 
166b10-19.  The fallacy of the figure of diction, or in Latin figurae dictionis, should not be 
confused with the so-called etymological fallacy which mistakes a word’s etymology for 
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the word’s meaning. For instance, people often confuse the etymology of philosophy 
with its meaning. First philosophy is not the first love of wisdom. Again, a centipede 
does not have a hundred legs. For a more pernicious example of what is called the 
etymological fallacy, cf. Aquinas, 1947, I, q .13, art. 2 ad. 2. 
The fallacy of figure of diction results from imagining that words or phrases have a 
twofold meaning—although they do not—because of their likeness to words or phrases 
that have a different meaning (cf. Schreiber, 2003 p. 89). Thus, these fallacies play on the 
various uses of different case endings, prefixes, or use of phrases in speech. For 
example, when words are grammatically active, one might assume the signify active 
realities. Consider the following example,  
1) Every in- prefix is a privative  
      e.g., incapable, inarticulate, invalid 
          The word inflammable contains the in- prefix 
          Therefore, the word inflammable contains a privative. 
Who would have predicted that such a seemingly benign fallacy would pose a grave 
danger to the inexperienced WD-40 user?!  
Hamblin finds this serious example from John Stewart Mill’s Utilitarianism (1863, 
c. 4): “The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible, is that people 
actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible, is that people hear it: and so of 
the other sources of our experience. In like manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is 
possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire it.” 
Hamblin (1970, p. 26) states, “to say that something is visible or audible, is to say that 
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people can see or hear it, whereas to say that something is desirable is to say that it is 
worthy of desire or, plainly, a good thing. Mill is misled by the termination ‘-able.’”  
166b14.  Perhaps Aristotle is making a reference to Topics (103b20ff). 
166b20.  All six fallacies from speech are alike formed by mixing up one real or 
apparent signification of a word or speech with another real or apparent signification of 
a word or speech. Thus, all six fallacies from speech involve language that can—at least 
in appearance—have multiple significations.  
166b21-27.  The last lines of Chapter 4 would be more fitting placed as the first lines of 
Chapter 5.  
166b23.  πρός τι is normally translated as in relation to or relative to. A more concrete 
and literal translation is “towards something” which I do not use on account of its 
eccentricity. It is the same phrase that Aristotle uses to denote his category that we call 
relative. 
166b25.  More literally τὸ ἑπόμενον (the consequent) could be translated “what 
follows.” 
Chapter 5: Apparent Refutations Outside of Speech 
166b28-36.  Chapter 5 takes up the fallacies outside of speech, the first of which is the 
fallacy of the accident. Among other things, the fallacy of the accident assumes that 
whatever is predicated of a predicate belong to its subject. Aristotle claims this is not the 
case. On face value, this claim seems to violate Aristotle’s “said of all” principle made in 
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the Categories (1b10-17): “When one is predicated of another as of an underlying, 
whatever [things] are said of what is being predicated will also be said of what is 
underlying, as ‘man’ is predicated of this man, but ‘animal’ of man. Therefore, ‘animal’ 
will also be predicated of this man. For this man is both man and animal.” However, the 
“said of all” principle assumes the strict sense of univocal for all predicates made at the 
beginning of the Categories. For more on this point, cf. Appendix II.V “Said of All” 
Principle. 
166b30.  The Greek word, which I translate as “happen accidentally,” is συμβέβηκεν. It 
is a finite form of συμβεβηκὸς which is commonly translated as accident or coincident. 
The importance of this word in Aristotelian philosophy cannot be overstated.  
166b37-167a20.  The fallacy of what is said simply or in a certain respect is derived from 
mixing up what is said in some qualified way with what is said simply. In many 
instances, something can be true in some qualified way but not simply or vice versa. 
When my neighbor walks through my front door, he may cease to be outside, but he 
does not cease to be simply.  
Famously, Aristotle holds that Meno’s paradox is an example of the fallacy of 
what is simply and what is in some respect. In Plato’s Meno (80 D-86), the character 
Meno argues that he and Socrates cannot look for what virtue is, since it is impossible to 
look for something if you do not know what it is. No one can inquire about that which 
he knows or about that which he does not know; for if he knows, there is no need for 
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inquiry; and if not, he will not be able to find it. No one can recognize what he does not 
know!  
Aristotle claims that Meno’s argument commits the fallacy of what is simply and 
what is in a certain respect (APr 71a24-b9). To know something in some way does not 
require that one know it simply, and one need only know it in some way in order to 
look for it. For example, I know the number of people in the room in some respect, 
namely as being some number and as being attached to the people I see in the room. 
Still, I do not know the number simply until I have counted. Meno’s paradox commits 
the fallacy of simply and in some respect. 
This particular example of the fallacy of what is simply and what is in a certain 
respect will help us see why this fallacy is not a fallacy inside of speech. For since we 
primarily come to know what we do not know through argument, we know the 
conclusion in some respect through knowing the premises. The conclusion must be 
known potentially in the premises if the conclusion is to come to be known simply. 
Aristotle says (Phys 195a18-19), αἱ ὑποθέσεις τοῦ συμπεράσματος ὡς τὸ ἐξ οὗ αἴτιά 
ἐστιν [suppositions are the cause of the conclusion in the sense of that from which]. The 
effect, however, preexists potentially in its cause from which. Thus, the conclusion, 
before it is demonstrated from first principles, is known potentially in the first 
principles. Meno’s paradox plays on a failure to distinguish between what is known 
potentially and what is known actually. 
 187 
 Aristotle gives a similar solution to Anaxagoras’ idea that everything has an 
infinite number of infinitely small parts of everything else. Anaxagoras thought that 
because things are generated from one another, they must previously have existed in 
one another simply. For nothing can be generated from nothing. Just as I cannot take 
money from out of my pocket unless there was money actually in my pocket, 
Anaxagoras thought that you could not get a chicken out of an egg unless the chicken 
was actually in the egg before. Aristotle’s response to Anaxagoras is that generated 
things do not exist simply in what they were generated from, but that they exist in the 
material in some respect, namely potentially.  
 Both of these examples show us that the distinction between what is simply and 
what is in a certain respect is not a distinction of speech but a distinction in things. 
Clearly, a failure to distinguish between things will result in our speaking about them 
as if they are the same, although they are in fact different. However, the primary cause 
of the deception in the fallacy of what is simply and what is in a certain respect is a 
failure to make a distinction in things. Thus, Aristotle correctly categorizes this fallacy 
as outside of speech.  
 The Medievals often characterize the fallacy as what is so simply and what is so 
in some imperfect way. When something is in some respect, additions are usually made 
to qualify the sense in which it may be spoken about. One knows the conclusion of an 
argument in the premises in some imperfect way. The plant is in the seed in some 
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imperfect way. The Ethiopian is white in some imperfect way, and so on. Thus, the 
author of the De Fallaciis for instance, claims ((ps) Aquinas, 1976, c. 11), secundum 
perfectum et imperfectum accipitur fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter [the fallacy on 
account of what is in some respect and what is simply is taken on account of the perfect 
and the imperfect]. Cf. also Aquinas, 1953a, q. 1, art. 1, ad. 1. and q. 7 art. 1 ad. 1. The 
Medievals’ language of ‘imperfect’ is in harmony with Aristotle’s implication that what 
is said in part (ἐν μέρει) is opposed to what is said simply (SE 168b40). For the part 
stands to the whole as imperfect to perfect. The fallacy is based on a failure to 
distinguish in things what is so simply and what is so in some imperfect way.  
167a1.  This fallacy appears to be a paraphrase from an argument given by the Eleatic 
Stranger in Plato’s Sophist (237a-241b).  
167a5.  The Greek πάρεγγυς τῆς λέξεως which I translate as “resemblance in speech” 
could be more literally translated as nearness in speech. Thus, Aristotle appears to be 
claiming that confusing being simply or in some respect is from a similarity in speech. 
Yet, the fallacy is considered as outside of speech. How can we account for this 
discrepancy? A little below, Aristotle will identify which instances of the distinction 
between what is simply and what is in a certain respect are deceptive. He says they are 
deceptive “whenever something is said in some respect, [and] what is simply might also 
seem to follow, and in all cases where it is not easy to perceive which of these is 
properly assigned” (SE 167a14-17). There will be “nearness in speech,” however, 
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whether or not these suppositions apply, yet some examples are obviously not 
deceptive such as Aristotle’s Ethiopian example. Thus, it is not the nearness of speech 
simply that is the source of this fallacy’s apparent credibility. The similarity in language 
is a result of our inability to distinguish things.  
167a12.  Reading οἴοιτ' ἂν with Wallies (Ross, 1958, p. 197).  
167a19.  Reading without κατηγορεῖν with Wallies (Ross, 1958, p. 197). 
167a20-35.  In Chapter 6, Aristotle will reduce all of the fallacies outside of speech—
including the fallacy from ignorance of refutation—to ignorance of refutation. How can 
Aristotle claim that the fallacy of ignorance of refutation is one kind of fallacy outside of 
speech and then later reduce all fallacies including fallacies from speech to ignorance of 
refutation? Perhaps the fallacy of ignorance of refutation is distinct from the more 
general ignorance of refutation to which Aristotle reduces all fallacies, including the 
present fallacy bearing the same name. (Ps) Aquinas says (1976, c. 14), [q]uia vero in 
definitione elenchi ponitur contradictio, quasi differentia quae constituit speciem, ideo specialiter 
omissio eorum quae ad contradictionem requiruntur, ignorantiam elenchi constituit secundum 
quod est fallacia specialis [since, however, contradiction is posited in the definition of 
refutation as the difference which constitutes the species, especially therefore, the 
omission of things that are required for contradiction constitute ignorance of refutation 
in the manner in which it is a specific fallacy]. Cf. also Albert’s commentary (1890, I , tr. 
3, c. 9, p. 573) where he says ignorance of refutation “is said in two ways” with the exact 
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same account as that of (ps) Thomas Aquinas. I suggest, with Albert the Great and the 
author of De Fallaciis, that this fallacy is not derived from the ignorance of any aspect of 
the entire definition of refutation but from ignorance of the proper mark of refutation, 
that is, contradiction. If an argument appears to contradict a proposition previously 
affirmed by the interlocutor—while not actually contradicting it—the argument 
commits the fallacy of ignorance of refutation.   
Reading the specific fallacy of ignorance of refutation as distinct from the general 
ignorance of refutation has at least three virtues. First, it explains how Aristotle can 
reduce ignorance of refutation to ignorance of refutation (SE 168b17-21). How could 
Aristotle reduce something to itself? Second, it matches Aristotle’s examples which 
include cases where there appears to be contradiction, but there is not. Aristotle does 
not include examples where arguments appear to follow, but do not. Third, it matches 
Aristotle’s consideration of untying the fallacy in Chapter 26 where he advises the 
answerer to consider the conclusion of the sophistical refutation against the full 
definition of contradiction (SE 181a1-8). Aristotle does not advise looking to see if the 
argument follows. 
Consider the following example: in Plato’s dialogue Protagoras (339a-e), the 
sophist criticizes Socrates for admiring a poem of Simonides because the poem first says 
that it is difficult to become good while later the poem implies that it is not difficult to 
be good.  A poem, Protagoras says, should not contradict itself. Yet the poem only 
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appears to be contradicting itself.  In reality, there is no contradiction because to be and 
to become are not the same thing. It may be difficult to climb to the top of a mountain, 
but is not difficult to stand at its peak. Difficulty in becoming does not contradict a lack 
of difficulty in being. It is unclear how this fallacious argument could be placed into 
another fallacy besides ignorance of refutation.  Any argument that falsely appears to 
contradict a previously granted proposition of an interlocutor commits the fallacy of 
ignorance of refutation. 
This sophism relies on a legitimate syllogism for one particular conclusion, but 
the sophist draws another conclusion which only appears to follow. Obviously, the 
irrelevant conclusion—which is the genuine contradiction—must look like the actual 
conclusion which is an apparent contradiction; the apparent conclusion looks like the 
real conclusion because it differs from the real conclusion by seemingly insignificant 
details.  As Carrie Swanson says (2017, p. 155), “its stated conclusion contradicts an 
answerer’s thesis, the conclusion which actually follows from its premises does not.” 
Swanson, Yet, the apparent conclusion is the genuine contradiction, and the actual 
conclusion is only the apparent contradiction. As a good lie is one with a lot of truth in 
it, so this fallacy is deceptive because the entire argument made by the sophist can be 
perfectly sound, or even demonstrative. What do we usually do when we think a 
conclusion is false? We examine the argument and look for problems. But with this 
particular sophistical trick, there are no problems with the argument itself! We will be 
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looking in exactly the wrong place, since the argument is fine—it is precisely the 
conclusion that is incorrect. 
167a22.  Omitting ἀλλὰ (ἄλλως in Ross) with Barnes and Dorion. The Greek word 
which I here translate as account is λόγος. Foster, Hasper and Barnes translate the word 
here as definition. This of course would not imply that there is a deficiency in the actual 
definition of refutation, but that some people do not fully understand what refutation 
entails.  
167a23-27.  Aristotle obviously benefited from engaging in dialectic at Plato’s academy 
for twenty years. We can find this doctrine of the necessary elements of contradiction, 
albeit in nascent form, in the Sophist (230b).  
167a24.  συνωνύμος (which means univocal in the Categories 1a5) has its transliteral 
meaning in this passage. Cf. Rhet 1405a1 where Aristotle uses the same word with its 
transliteral meaning. While it may take the reader by surprise that Aristotle does not 
consider a contradiction genuine if both sides of the contradiction use truly 
synonymous terms to signify the same thing, he will clarify his meaning later (SE 
168a28-33).  
167a35.  This last parenthetical remark appears to indicate his awareness that fallacies 
outside of speech often result in ambiguity inside of speech. As was noted above, if one 
fails to make a distinction between two things, such as what is through itself and what 
is according to accident, then he will speak about them in the exact same terms. What 
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places an argument among the fallacies outside of speech is that the ultimate cause of 
appearance of refutation is not a likeness in speech, but a likeness in things.  
167a36-39.  Perhaps by “all the ways” Aristotle is referring to the Prior Analytics where 
he discusses begging the question in an apparent demonstration. He states (APr 64b28-
65a38, trans. Smith), “whenever someone tries to prove through itself that which is not 
familiar through itself, he then asks for the initial thing (begs the question).” Aristotle 
then outlines two ways in which someone can beg the question in an apparent 
demonstration: He can either assume what he wants to prove directly, or assume a 
premise that can be known only through the desired conclusion. 
One famous example of this second form of begging the question is Playfair’s 
Axiom used to “prove” Euclid’s fifth postulate. Playfair’s axiom states (1846, p. 29), “In 
a plane, given a line and a point not on it, at most one line parallel to the given line can 
be drawn through the point.” Euclid’s fifth postulate states (Heath, 1956, vol. I, p. 155), 
“If a straight line falling on two straight lines forming two interior angles on the same 
side make angles to less than two rights, then the two lines, if extended indefinitely, 
meet on that side on which the angles make angles less than two rights” [modified 
Heath translation]. Playfair’s axiom first assumes there are such things as parallel lines, 
which is not self-evident because it can be proven from the first four postulates without 
the fifth. Second, and more to the point, the axiom assumes Euclid’s fifth postulate 
when it says, “at most one line parallel.” For it is manifest that all other lines must cut 
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the given line since they will incline to the given line on one side or the other, and this is 
to assume the fifth postulate. Thus, Playfair’s proof for the fifth postulate assumes 
Playfair’s Axiom which in turn assumes the fifth postulate (Augros, 1995, p. 75-80). 
The fallacy of begging the question is often called the Cartesian Circle because 
the fallacy is often attributed to Descartes’ proof of God’s existence. Descartes argues 
that clear and distinct ideas are reliable because God is a non-deceiver. He later argues 
that God exists using premises that he states should not be doubted because they are 
clear and distinct ideas. For further analysis of Descartes’ argument, see Loeb, 1992, pp. 
200-235. 
In strict scientific demonstration, one begs the question by assuming what is 
posterior by nature to prove what is prior by nature because the premises of 
demonstration must be prior by nature to the conclusion (APr 71b29ff). In begging the 
question, the begging may also take place in dialectical disputation. In this case, 
however, one does not necessarily syllogize from what is prior by nature to what is 
posterior by nature “in truth,” but he syllogizes from what is prior according to opinion 
to what is posterior according to opinion (APo 65a36-37). In the Topics (162b34ff), 
Aristotle also lays out five methods of begging the question in dialectic. The methods 
will not be discussed here. For a thorough analysis of these methods, see Schreiber, 
2003, pp. 101-104. 
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For the fallacy of begging the question, Aristotle gives an explanation of the 
“causa apparentiae,” but he does not give an explanation of the “causa non existentiae,” 
because it is clear that a syllogism which assumes the conclusion in the beginning does 
not follow. It is not so clear, however, how one could be fooled by such an argument. 
 I take it that this fallacy does not always deceive because of likeness but 
sometimes because of unlikeness. For one may overlook the assumption of a conclusion 
in a premise because the premise and the conclusion use different but synonymous 
words. In this situation, it is the unlikeness of language that deceives although at least 
part of what is signified is the same. One might argue that such examples are from 
speech. Clearly, however, if the argument does not use synonymous language but 
merely is deceptive because of its great length, then the argument cannot be attributed 
to language. It seems evident, then, that unlikeness of language is not essential to the 
fallacy and it should therefore be categorized as outside of speech. 
167b1-3.  Aristotle is claiming that given a conditional statement, if A, then B, A implies 
B. The interlocutor may expect that B implies A also making the convertible statement 
true: if B then A. Why would anyone be deceived by this fallacy? While this implication 
does not necessarily convert, we are often convinced it does because sometimes it 
happens to convert. Moreover, we are conditioned to reason in this manner because it 
does give some plausibility. This is the form of reasoning employed both in court and 
by the hypo-deductive method of modern experimental science.  
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167b2.  The Greek word ἀκολούθησις which I translate here as “implication,” I 
elsewhere (SE 181a23) translate as “what follows.”  
167b5.  Waitz reads ὑπολαμβάνομεν for ὑπέλαβον (cf. Ross, 1958, p. 198). Hasper may 
make a similar deviation from the Ross reading ὑπολαμβάνουσιν which is not in any 
manuscripts. He does not, however, note this change in his list of deviations (cf. Hasper, 
2013, p. 53). It is therefore more likely that Hasper is reading ὑπέλαβον as a gnomic 
aorist. I also translate ὑπέλαβον here as a gnomic aorist.  
167b8-12.  Apparently, by “demonstrations according to a sign in rhetorical 
arguments,” Aristotle is referring to enthymemes. By pointing out that enthymemes use 
signs based on the same structure as the fallacy of the consequent, Aristotle is both 
pointing out the weakness of the enthymeme from sign and showing the strength of the 
structure of the fallacy of the consequent. While the fallacy of the consequent is a 
sophistical refutation insofar as it can falsely appear to be syllogism, this fallacy has 
some genuine persuasive force as it does in enthymemes. 
167a10.  Reading ἔλαβον as a gnomic aorist.  
167a11.  Cf. also Rhet 1401b23-24. 
167a12-20.  In the Physics (186a5-22), Aristotle claims that Mellisus’ argument is crude 
because it assumes false things, and furthermore it is unsyllogistic and illogical insofar 
as the conclusion does not follow from the premises because it commits the fallacy of 
assuming the consequent.   
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167b21-36.  The syllogism to the impossible (reductio ad absurdum) is a kind of argument 
that shows that a statement is true by proving that its contradiction is false. Aristotle 
teaches that the reduction to the impossible uses a kind of conditional syllogism (APr 
41a21-39). Cf. also APr 29b1ff and APr 65a37-66a15. He manifests this point with the 
following example: Either the diagonal of a square and its side have a unit length that 
measures both lines evenly or they do not. If the side and the diagonal have such a unit, 
then the same number is both odd and even. The same number cannot be both odd and 
even; thus, the diagonal and the side do not have a common measure (cf. Heath, 1956, 
vol. III, p. 2). In this example, something impossible follows necessarily from assuming 
that the side of a square and its diagonal have a common unit length that can measure 
them evenly. Since one side of a contradiction must be true, it is therefore clear that the 
side of a square and its diagonal do not have common measure.  
The fallacy from taking what is not a cause as a cause occurs in a reduction to the 
impossible. A granted premise appears to cause the concluding impossibility, but in fact 
the impossibility results without assuming the premise. Aristotle illustrates the fallacy 
with the following example:   
Granted Premises: 
1) The soul and life are the same. 
2) If coming to be is contrary to ceasing to be,1 then also some kind of coming to be 
is contrary to some kind of ceasing to be. 
3) Coming to be is contrary to ceasing to be. 
4) Death is some kind of ceasing to be. 
5) Death is contrary to life. 
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Impossible Conclusion: 
6) Therefore, life is a coming-to-be and to live is to become.  
The sophist acts as if the first premise—the soul and life are the same—is the cause of 
the conclusion that life is a coming-into being and that to live is to become. He then 
further concludes that the soul and life must not be the same. In fact, this conclusion 
that life is a coming-to-be follows whether or not the answerer grants the first premise. 
Accordingly, the first premise is not the cause of the conclusion but is treated as such. 
Some other premise must actually be the cause of the concluded impossibility.  
167b25.  Aristotle here refers to a premise under the name of a question. One should 
recall that the Sophistical Refutations assumes a context of dialectical disputation. The 
answer to any question in dialectical disputation may serve as a premise in a possible 
refutation.  
167b37-168a11.  The fallacy of making many questions one results from the answerer 
thinking that he is conceding to one question when he is really conceding to two 
questions, thus giving the sophist two different premises from which to argue. The 
sophist mixes two questions one of which is true and the other false so that whether or 
not the answerer answers yes or no he is in trouble. For instance, the sophist asks “Do 
you beat your wife often?” You then proceed to claim enthusiastically, “No!” The 
sophist then addresses the audience, “Ladies and Gentleman, we have a man here who 
proudly affirms he only beats his wife on occasion.” This silly example manifests the 
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way two questions may be compressed into one so that the answerer cannot respond 
with a mere yes or no without getting into trouble. 
167b39.  Aristotle uses here a common grammatical structure in the Sophistical 
Refutations of ὡς + participle. This construction is generally used by Aristotle to indicate 
the grounds on which the answerer concedes to the sophist without Aristotle’s assent to 
the reason’s validity (cf. Smyth, n. 2996). 
168a11-16.  Perhaps Aristotle’s meaning is that a questioner can genuinely refute the 
answerer if he gets him to concede that one and the same attribute can belong to several 
subjects before asking the question that really is many questions. For instance, this may 
occur if the sophist gets the answerer to concede that “things which do not have sight 
but are naturally disposed to have it are blind.” The answerer will be inclined to 
concede because to be blind is to be naturally disposed to sight but not to have it. If the 
sophist then asks the double question if Tiresias and Achilles are blind, the answerer 
will be refuted; he has already admitted that one and the same attribute may belong to 
several subjects. 
Chapter 6: Reduction of Apparent Refutations to Ignorance of Refutation 
168a17-24.  Since all fallacies appear to be genuine refutations and are not genuine 
refutations, each fallacy does not comply with a part of the definition of refutation in 
some way. We can reduce (ἀναλῦσαι) all sophistical refutations to ignorance of 
refutation using the definition of refutation as our new beginning (ἀρχή). Now since a 
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refutation is a syllogism with a contradiction, one can unfold the necessary aspects of a 
genuine refutation according to the definition of syllogism (SE 165a1-2) and the precise 
characterization of contradiction (SE 167a23-25). Evans observes (1975, p. 51) that it is 
not surprising that all sophistical refutations—which are all forms of false reasoning—
can be reduced to the definition of refutation because contradiction is proper to 
refutation and the statement of non-contradiction is the foundation of all reason. From 
the definition of syllogism, one can gather that a refutation must be: 
1) From certain premises being laid down, 
2) Something else, other than the premises laid down, 
3) Follows from necessity, 
4) By the premises being so. 
From the characterization of the contradiction one can gather that the conclusion must 
be: 
5)  A contradiction of one and the same thing 
6)  Not of the name but of the thing, 
7)  Not under the synonymous name, but under the same name, 
8)  According to the same, in relation to the same, in the same manner, in the 
same time. 
 
By reducing all fallacies to ignorance of refutation, Aristotle is showing a priority of the 
fallacies outside of speech over fallacies inside of speech. Since the particular fallacy of 
ignorance of refutation is a fallacy outside of speech, so too is ignorance of refutation 
generally. Aristotle is reducing fallacies from speech to a confusion outside of speech, 
and in so doing, he is giving distinction in reality priority over distinction in language. 
Dorion argues (1995, pp. 90-91) that Aristotle reduces all the fallacies to ignorance of 
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refutation only after he classifies the sophistical refutations as either inside of speech or 
outside of speech precisely to give priority to fallacies outside of speech. Cf. also 
Schreiber, 2003, pp. 144-146.  
168a24-28.  Aristotle divides fallacies from speech into two subcategories: the fallacies of 
equivocation, amphiboly, and figure of diction are from the twofold (διττόν) and the 
fallacies of composition, division, and accent occur because the speech is different. In 
the first category, the fallacies use one and the same speech or word with two different 
meanings. In the latter category, the fallacies use words or speech that appear to be the 
same but are actually different and thus the fallacies of the second category are not 
based on one expression bearing a twofold meaning. Thus, all fallacies from speech play 
on words or phrases that appear to be the same and appear to signify different things. 
Sometimes the words or phrases not only appear to be the same but actually are the 
same, and these are the twofold. Sometimes the words or phrase merely appear to be 
the same but are in fact different. For instance, in the fallacy of accent, the words are not 
twofold because they are actually different words, but the fallacy works only insofar as 
the two words appear to be the same and to bear the same meaning.  
 This division of sophistical refutations from speech also appears to violate 
Aristotle’s claim that fallacies outside of speech correspond to the number of ways we 
may fail to signify the same thing with the same name or speech (SE 165b29-30). How 
can we resolve this difficulty? Galen appears to be correct in claiming that some 
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fallacies from speech do not actually signify many things, but only potentially signify 
many things or are imagined to. Aristotle’s meaning must be that in so many ways 
someone may appear to signify many things with one name or speech just as he often 
calls sophistical refutations, refutations. For instance, two words with the same spelling 
but different accentuation appear to be the same word, but they have two different 
meanings. Thus, there is apparent twofold meaning. Aristotle will repeatedly speak as if 
all the fallacies from speech are based on the twofold (cf. SE 170a8 and note ad loc). See 
also SE 166a35 and 177a34-35 where Aristotle claims the phrases in composition and in 
division are the same λόγος. Edlow in his translation of De Captionibus shares this 
interpretation of Aristotle (Galen, 1977, p. 26). All the fallacies from speech appear to 
take on twofold meaning even if some do not actually take on twofold meaning, and 
this is the apparent ambiguity upon which all fallacies from speech turn. 
 There is another question that should be addressed: How is a sentence taken in 
composition a different sentence when it is taken in division? Edlow claims, “Aristotle's 
view seems to presuppose the following as a necessary condition of sentential identity: 
sentence S is identical with sentence S (1) only if, when written, they have the same 
punctuation, and when spoken, the pauses are placed in the same places.” It is a 
disputed question whether or not there was written punctuation in the time of Aristotle. 
Most people generally agree that there was nothing equivalent to commas in ancient 
Greek that would justify a distinction in the written form of phrase taken in 
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composition as opposed to division. However, Aristotle does claim that only some 
people used some sort of insignia to signify accent (SE 177b7-8). It seems reasonable 
enough to claim that the phrases could have some audible distinction which is why 
Aristotle claims that they are not actually the same λόγος and groups these fallacies 
with the fallacy of the accent. Cf. Galen, 1977, p. 26. For a more extensive account of 
historical evidence for differences in written speech for composition and division in 
ancient times, see Dorion, 1995, pp. 245-249. Galen himself thinks that all fallacies from 
speech involve real ambiguity (Galen, 1977, p. 44). 
How exactly are fallacies from speech reduced to ignorance of refutation? 
Fallacies from the twofold clearly violate clause 6) “not of the name but of the thing,” 
from the characterization of contradiction—as long as the ambiguity is in one of the 
extreme terms. When the ambiguity is in the middle term, the fallacy violates clause 3) 
“Follows from necessity,” because the argument does not actually follow. For in this 
case, the middle term has only apparently unity. In fact, there is no middle term. The 
fallacies from speech that are not twofold not only violate clause 6) or 3) for the same 
reasons, but they also violate clause 7) “not of the synonymous name, but of the same 
name,” because the name or speech in the fallacies is not the same. Thus, all fallacies 
from speech violate either clause 6) or 3), and those that are not twofold also violate 
clause 7). 
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168a25.  “Speech” (λὀγος) here apparently is a fill in for amphiboly. Cf. also SE 169a22. 
This fits with the more general association pointed out by Dorion of amphiboly 
(ἀμφιβολία) with speech (λόγος), and equivocation (ὁνωνυμία) with name (ὄνομα). 
Cf. SE 165b29, 166a15, 169a23, 177a21. ὁμοιοσχημοσύνη (which I translate as “common-
form”) is a fill in for “figure of diction.” Cf. also SE 170a15. 
168a25-26.  Aristotle will begin to clarify this odd interjection concerning a “this 
something” (τόδε τι) later (SE 169a29-36, SE 178b36-179a10 and notes ad loc). Cf. also his 
example of figure of diction at SE 166b12-19. 
168a28-33.  Perhaps Aristotle is justifying one precondition for a true contradiction, 
namely, 7) “not of the synonymous name, but of the same name.” For using two 
synonymous names interchangeably to signify one thing in the course of a syllogism 
prevents the conclusion from being drawn without a further premise that the two 
names signify the same thing. This condition is relevant to the fallacies of composition, 
division, and accent because, for example, just as robe (λώπιον) and cloak (ἱμάτιον) are 
two different words, so too are ὄρος and ὅρος.  
168a29.  The Greek word for “thing” here is πρᾶγμα. Aristotle uses the word as 
opposed to word or speech (SE 165a6 and SE 175a8). 
168a34-b10.  The fallacy of the accident is one of the most important and dangerous of 
the sophistical refutations. Clearly, Aristotle is claiming that the conclusion in the 
fallacy of the accident does not actually follow from the premises. For a detailed 
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analysis of what the fallacy of the accident is and how it can be reduced to ignorance of 
refutation, cf. Appendix II.I Division of Fallacies Outside of Speech.   
168b1.  The Greek word συμβέβηκε (which I translate here and elsewhere as “happens 
accidently”) might also be translated as “just happens.” While it may be striking that 
Aristotle claims that a triangle happens accidentally to be figure, his meaning becomes 
clearer when one considers his meaning of accident in this context. For an account of 
Aristotle meaning of “accident” in the fallacy, cf. Appendix II.II Senses of Accident.  
168b11-16.  The fallacy of what is simply and what is in some respect violates the 
definition of refutation insofar as 5) A contradiction must be of one and the same thing. 
I may know how many students are in my room in a certain respect, i.e., by knowing 
that it is a number and it must be odd or even, etc., and at the same time I might not 
know the number of students in the room simply. Although, I know and do not know 
the number of students in the room, there is no genuine contradiction because what I 
know is not truly one and the same as what I do not know.  
 On the other hand, one can also consider the fallacy of what is simply and what 
is in some respect as violating criterion 3), Follows from necessity, of a syllogism. For 
one might consider the fallacy’s conclusion to the be the statement that actually 
contradicts a previously held position, but such a statement would not follow from 
necessity on account of the premises.  
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168b17-21.  As noted above, I take it that Aristotle’s reduction of the specific fallacy of 
ignorance of refutation to ignorance of refutation in general indicates that he considers 
the particular fallacy as distinct from general ignorance of refutation. How could 
Aristotle think that he is reducing something to itself? In my reading, the ignorance of 
refutation that constitutes the specific fallacy plays on the ignorance of genuine 
contradiction, whereas ignorance of refutation in general plays in addition on ignorance 
of the whole definition of refutation. 
168b19.  The Greek word which I translate as account is again λὀγος. 
168b22-26.  Obviously, the fallacy of begging the original question does not abide by the 
ofttimes added qualification of syllogism that it does not beg the question (cf. also SE 
167a25-26). However, the fallacy also violates clause 2) something else other than the 
premises laid down. The conclusion must be different from the premises assumed to 
arrive at the conclusion. 
168b24.  The phrase “by these [premises] being so” is contained in Aristotle’s definition 
of syllogism (APr 24b18). He also gives an explanation of its meaning: “By ‘by these 
premises being so,’ I mean that they happen through them” (APr 24b20-23). In the 
fallacy of assuming what is not a cause is a cause, the conclusion follows necessarily, 
but not all the “premises” laid down are conditions for the necessity of the conclusion, 
although all appear to be.  
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168b27-29.  Aristotle shows that the fallacy of assuming the consequent can be reduced 
to ignorance of refutation for the same reason that the fallacy of the accident can, 
namely it does not follow necessarily.  
168b28.  The statement, “for the consequent is an accident,” could more literally this 
could be translated: “For the consequent just happens (τὸ γὰρ ἑπόμενον συμβέβηκε)”. 
168b31-35.  Aristotle is here articulating the sophistical place upon which the fallacies of 
accident and consequent are based: “things that are the same by one and the same thing 
are also the same as one another.” Superficially, a concrete premise may appear to be 
true based on this place because there are often cases where it is true. Aristotle shows 
that the place is not always true by the following example: a swan and snow are two 
things the same by one and the same thing, whiteness. In this respect, my translation is 
superior to that of Foster, Hasper, and Pickard-Cambridge because they all translate the 
dative phrase ἑνὶ καὶ ταὐτῷ with “as one and the same thing” whereas I translate it as a 
dative of standard of judgement. This use of the dative is made clear by Aristotle’s 
example because a swan and snow are not the same thing as white, but they are the 
same as one another by or in whiteness. Cf. Smyth, n. 1512, p. 347-348. 
168b35-169a5. Cf. SE 167b13ff and note ad loc. 
168a6-18.  Fallacies from making many questions into one violate criterion 1) “from 
certain premises being laid down” from the definition of syllogism. Aristotle defines 
(APr 24a16) a premise as λόγος καταφατικὸς ἢ ἀποφατικός τινος κατά τινος [a 
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speech which affirms or denies a term of a term]. A premise may be either universal, 
particular, or indefinite and either dialectical or demonstrative (APr 24a17-b15). A 
premise, however, cannot apply one predicate to two subjects or vice versa.  
169a18-21.  In his footnote for this passage, Poste presents (1866, pp. 115-116) a difficulty 
with Aristotle’s claim that the contradiction is apparent in fallacies from speech. Cf. also 
Dorion, 1995, p. 250. If the ambiguity of language is in the middle term, then the 
conclusion does not follow from the premises. In such a case, the problem is that the 
conclusion does not follow, not that the contradiction is apparent. Only if the ambiguity 
is in one of the extremes, then the conclusion may follow but there will not in fact be a 
contradiction. Aristotle himself says as much (SE 171a9-11). To be forgiving of 
Aristotle’s inconsistency, perhaps we could say that he is uncharacteristically speaking 
loosely here. As far as I am aware, no solution has been offered to this difficulty.  
169a18.  The Greek word which I translate as places here is τόποι following Ross and 
Boethius. E. S. Foster along with Michael Ephesus, Jonathan Barnes, W. A. 
Pickard−Cambridge, Louis Dorion, and Pieter Sjoerd Hasper replaces τόποι (places) 
with τρόποι (ways), although manuscripts generally have τόποι. Cf. Ross, 1958, p. 203. 
By doing so, they blur the implication that Aristotle sees the fallacies as places in a 
similar way to the sense of place used in the Topics. That is, the Sophistical Refutations is 
the negative counterpart to the Topics. For a more thorough explanation of this point 
consult Introduction II.VIII Fallacies as Places. 
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 Aristotle claims that all sophistical places can be reduced to the definition of 
refutation, but curiously he does not lay out how the fallacy from taking what is not a 
cause as a cause violates the definition of refutation.  The fallacy of taking what is not a 
cause as a cause reduces to ignorance of refutation by violating criterion 4), by the 
premises being so. Criterion 4) requires that each of the premises is necessary the for the 
conclusion to follow (cf. SE 170a1-2 and note ad loc). For in this fallacy, a premise is 
added from which the resulting impossibility appears to follow, but does not actually 
follow. Each premise laid down must be relevant to the conclusion; when a premise 
appears to be relevant but is not, the argument commits the fallacy of taking what is not 
a cause as a cause. 
Chapter 7: How People are Tricked by Fallacies 
169a22-30.  Albert the Great observes (1890, I, tr. 5 c. 2 p. 617b) a common thread in how 
all fallacies deceive: [I]n omni fallacia tam in dictione quam extra dictionem generatur deceptio 
ex hoc quod discerni non possunt idem et diversem: in fallaciis quidem in dictione, ex hoc quod 
non potest discerni idem in sermone et diversum in re: in fallaciis autem extra dictionem, eo 
quod non potest discerni idem et diversum partim secundum rem et partim sermonem [In all 
fallacies, both in speech and outside of speech, deception happens because what is the 
same and what is different are not able to be distinguished: in fallacies from speech 
indeed, {the deception happens} because what is the same in speech and different in 
reality cannot be distinguished; in fallacies outside of speech, {the deception happens} 
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because what is the same and what is different partly according to the thing and partly 
according to speech cannot be distinguished]. A failure to make a distinction is the 
foundation of every fallacy. In the fallacies from speech, a person fails to make a 
distinction because of a likeness in speech. In the fallacies outside of speech, a person 
fails to make a necessary distinction because of a likeness in things that translates over 
into a likeness in speech as well.  
In Chapter 7, Aristotle shows how each sophistical refutation is the result of an 
overlooked distinction. This chapter then is in harmony with his general account of 
likeness as a cause of error in Chapter 1. For only insofar as things are like one another 
is it possible to fail to distinguish between them. The account of fallacies as caused by a 
failure to make distinctions extends beyond specific fallacies discussed in the treatise. 
For example, the famous algebraic argument that concludes 1=2 hinges on overlooking 
the distinction between dividing a number by zero and dividing by some other number 
(cf. Weisstein, 2017, p. 1).  
All the fallacies from speech result from the failure to distinguish between the 
actual meaning of a word or speech and some of the meaning of the same word or 
speech, either real or imagined. It is interesting to note that the order in which Aristotle 
lists the fallacies inside of speech here retains the order in which he first enumerated 
and subsequently considered them in Chapter 4. The consistency may be a sign that 
Aristotle has listed fallacies in this order for a reason. 
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169a23.  In this case, λὀγος (which I translate here as speech) is a fill in for amphiboly. 
Cf. also SE 168a25. 
169a31-32.  Sylvester Maurus (1885, I, p. 624) makes the following comment on this 
passage: cum saepissime dictiones similes significant similes res, difficile est discerne quando 
dictiones similes significant similes res, quando dissimiles [since very often similar phrases 
signify similar things, it is difficult to discern when similar phrases signify similar 
things as opposed to when they signify dissimilar things]. Cf. also SE 166b15-19 for an 
example from Aristotle. 
169a33.  Retaining ἐπίσταται with Dorion and Barnes. Poste, Hasper, and Forster read 
ἐπισπᾶται. Cf. Poste, n. 2, p. 116.  
169a33-36.  Cf. SE 168a25-26 where Aristotle claims that it is customary to signify 
everything as a this something (τόδε τι). τόδε τι (which I translate literally as this 
something) is often translated as individual substance. It is Aristotle’s technical phrase 
for a reality that subsists or exist through itself and not through adhering in another 
being as an accident does (Cat 3b10-23). Cf. also Sokolowski, n. 34, p. 283. As Aristotle 
explains, “man” does not signify a τόδε τι but “Coriscus” does (SE 178b36-179a10). 
“Being” (τὸ ὂν) may signify a this something when “being” is used under the category 
of substance (Meta 1028a10-15). 
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169a36-39.  Aristotle reveals here a property that is true of all fallacies from speech: they 
occur more when we are in discussion with others or when we think out loud. For the 
likeness that is the cause of deception in the fallacies from speech occurs in the speech.   
Hamblin (1970, p. 60) uses this passage as evidence for his claim that “dialectic is 
unessential to the pursuit of truth.” Dorion claims that “this passage denies the 
dialectician the ability to attain the truth” (Dorion, 1995, n. 107, p. 253). While the 
passage says error is more prevalent in discussion, it does not show that a dialectician’s 
knowledge of the truth would be accidental to his being a dialectician; such a claim is a 
gross overstatement. Clearly, Aristotle does not give dialectic the elevated status it has 
for Plato (cf. Republic, 531d-534e and 537c), but in several places, he argues that dialectic 
is useful for attaining the truth. In the Topics, for instance, he claims it is proper (ἴδιος) to 
dialectic to be the road to the principles of sciences (Top 101b1-15). In the Metaphysics, 
he claims that a dialectician is in a better position to see the truth because he knows the 
arguments on both sides (Meta 995b1-5). For a more thorough discussion for the uses of 
dialectic, consult the Introduction III.I Uses of Dialectic in General. 
169b6.  The Greek word which I translate as “happen accidentally” is συμβέβηκεν. It is 
the finite form of συμβεβηκὸς from the fallacy of the accident. 
169b9-11.  That is, the fallacy of ignorance of refutation occurs because there is a small 
difference between what merely appears to be a refutation and what is genuinely a 
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refutation. The fallacy of what is simply and what is in some respect occurs because 
there is a small difference between what is so simply and what is so in some respect. 
169b11-12.  Aristotle is claiming that if a statement is true in some qualified way, we are 
inclined to concede that the statement is true simply (i.e., in an unqualified way). It 
seems clear enough that it is also possible to move in the other direction. If a person 
does not know what virtue is simply, he will be inclined to think that he does not know 
what virtue is in a certain respect. How can a person know if virtue can be taught if he 
does not know what virtue is? 
169b16-17.  Perhaps the “aforementioned reason” Aristotle is here referring to is from 
169b11-12 where he says we often do not think that a qualification in time or manner or 
relation, etc., makes a difference. As Sylvester Maurus (1885, I, p. 625) puts it “parum pro 
nihilo reputator [something little is regarded as nothing].”  
Chapter 8: That the List of Sophistical Refutations is Complete; How a Sophistical 
Refutation is a Refutation 
169b18-20.  Chapter 8 of the Sophistical Refutations—as this first line makes clear—argues 
that Aristotle’s taxonomy of sophistical refutations is complete (SE 169b18-170a11) and 
then explains in what way a sophistical refutation may be called a refutation (SE 
170a12-19). 
169b18.  Bekker and almost all the manuscripts have ὁπόσα, but Forster reads ὅσα with 
Michael of Ephesus (cf. Ross, 1958, p. 205). I am reading ὁπόσα.  
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169b20-29.  The Greek word πρᾶγμα at SE 169a23 (which I here and elsewhere translate 
as thing, cf. SE 165a8, SE 175a8 and SE 177a31), Forster translates as subject (Forster, 
1955, p. 47). Subject is a possible meaning of πρᾶγμα and likely the word’s meaning at 
SE 171b8ff and SE 170a32. Forster’s translation leans to a certain interpretation of the 
text which introduces a new kind of sophistical refutation. Aristotle claims (APo 71b19-
24) that a principle must be proper to the subject matter to have knowledge (ἐπιστήμη): 
“If knowing is what we have said, demonstrative science must be from [premises which 
are] true and primary and first and immediate and more known and before and causes 
of the conclusion. For thus will the principles be proper to what is demonstrated. For surely a 
syllogism will be without these, but it will not be a demonstration.  For it will not 
produce knowledge.” Cf. also APo 74b21-25. To be a demonstration, a syllogism must 
argue from principles proper to a subject matter. It seems possible that premises could 
appear to be proper to a science, while not actually being proper to that science. One 
could then syllogize from the premises—which would be genuinely endoxic—to 
conclude in what is not knowledge, but appears to be. In this reading, a genuine 
refutation could be sophistical insofar as it merely appears to be “germane to the subject 
in hand.” Foster’s translation leans toward this interpretation.  
Aristotle’s meaning is likely different than this interpretation because it does not 
harmonize with what he says in the rest of the chapter. First and foremost, Aristotle 
concludes the chapter by stating that his original taxonomy of fallacies is complete. 
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How could this be if there was a whole new category introduced in this chapter that he 
had not previously discussed? Second, fallacies of this kind would better fall into the 
category of the false-diagrammatic which Aristotle later excludes from the subject of 
this treatise. Cf. SE 170a20ff and notes ad loc. 
Rather πρᾶγμα in the passage should be interpreted as referring to what the 
answerer signifies in his answers.  This reading is in harmony with SE 177a31-32 where 
Aristotle claims that an answerer should argue that what he said “does not deny the 
thing (πρᾶγμα), but denies the name” when dealing with fallacies of equivocation. A 
genuine refutation may be sophistical which reasons from premises that only appear to 
be endoxic, but are not (Top 100b23, SE 165b8 and note ad loc). Thus, an argument may 
falsely appear to refute an answerer, even though the argument is rigorous because its 
premises are not actually accepted by the answerer, though they seem to be.  
169b25.  The testing art (ἡ πειραστικὴ) is ordered to producing arguments that examine 
or test an interlocutor’s knowledge., Aristotle distinguishes dialectical arguments from 
testing arguments (Top 159a25-36). Cf. also SE 171b3ff. Perhaps Aristotle contrasts the 
testing and sophistical arts because both syllogize to false conclusions. A sophistical 
refutation, however, does not reveal an answerer’s ignorance because it either does not 
syllogize or it does not syllogize to a true contradiction. The testing art reveals 
ignorance in an answerer when it syllogizes to a false conclusion because it syllogizes 
 216 
from the answerer’s real positions to a genuine contradiction of another position that he 
holds.  
169b34-37.  Some arguments ordered to the first aim—refutation—share a common 
property with arguments ordered to the fourth aim—solecism (cf. SE 165b12ff). 
Introducing an additional question into the discussion will often reveal that the 
argument is false. For fallacies from speech, an interlocutor can simply ask which 
meaning of the speech is intended before he answers. Similarly, Aristotle argues that 
with a supplementary question one can untie an argument leading to a solecism (SE 
182a18-26).  
169b40-170a1.  In this difficult paragraph, Aristotle validates his taxonomy of fallacies 
as complete by again showing how each kind of fallacy violates some part of his 
definition of refutation.  
170a1-2. Aristotle is naming the fallacy of non-cause as a cause by its correlative 
genuine refutation: the reduction to the impossible (cf. SE 167b21-36 and note ad loc). 
The fallacy of non-cause as cause leaves out the fourth criterion in the definition of 
syllogism: that the conclusion follows by the premises being so. In other words, in the 
fallacy of non-cause as a cause, the conclusion follows but not on the basis of all the 
premises. The resulting impossibility is thought to be derived from a premise which is 
not in fact its cause.  
170a3.  Cf. SE 169a6-16. 
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170a4-5.  Cf. SE 168b27-169a5. 
170a5-6.  Aristotle here groups all fallacies from speech together. He can do so because 
in all fallacies from speech what the speech signifies appears to be the same; if the 
ambiguous speech is the middle term, then the conclusion does not follow, and if the 
ambiguous speech is one of the other terms, then the conclusion does not contradict the 
previously held position of the interlocutor. As Dorion notes (1995, n. 122, p. 257), 
categorizing fallacies from speech in this way implies that they are all from the twofold. 
Aristotle, however, claims that only three of the fallacies are from the twofold (cf. SE 
16823-28 and notes ad loc). How do we reconcile this discrepancy? Every fallacy from 
speech appears to take on twofold meaning insofar as each involves words or speech 
that look the same but signify different things. This apparent ambiguity is the 
ambiguity upon which all fallacies from speech turn.  
170a8-9.  The phrase “not reckoning in the original [question]” is found in the 
qualifications of syllogism’s definition (SE 168b22-26, SE 167a36-39). Cf. also SE 167a25-
26. 
170a12-19.  In this passage, Aristotle makes explicit what was implicit in his definition 
of sophistical refutation, namely that a sophistical refutation is only a refutation in 
relation to an interlocutor. Due to his inexperience, the answerer may believe that he 
has been refuted. For a sophistical refutation is an argument that appears to be a 
refutation, but is not. This aspect of appearance implies a relation to a beholder; hence 
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the same argument may appear to be a refutation in relation to one interlocutor and not 
to another. A refutation simply speaking is a genuine refutation.  
170a15.  ὁμοιοσχημοσύνη (which I translate as common-form) is a fill in for figure of 
diction. Cf. also SE 168a26. 
Chapter 9: In What Respect the List of Sophistical Refutations is Complete 
170a20-30.  Chapter 9 argues that Aristotle’s treatment of sophistical refutations is 
complete despite the fact that it is impossible for any artisan to have knowledge of 
every possible fallacious argument. Rather the dialectician should determine a complete 
taxonomy of fallacies resulting from principles that may be applied to any science. 
Aristotle already argued that his list fulfills the task in Chapter 8.  
In the first paragraph, Aristotle reasons that it is impossible to have a complete 
knowledge of all genuine refutations. Although dialectic is ordered to reasoning about 
any proposed problem and avoiding refutation in any situation (Top 100a18-21), the 
dialectician does not seek to understand the sources of all refutations. It is impossible to 
know the sources of all refutations without first knowing everything. Every 
demonstrated conclusion has a contradiction, and every demonstration’s conclusion 
refutes anyone holding its contradiction. Thus, there are as many possible refutations as 
there are possible demonstrations, which are themselves based on the proper principles 
of various sciences. Sciences seem to be infinite, so then demonstrations must be 
likewise, and refutations too. Accordingly, one cannot possibly know the sources of all 
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demonstrations nor the sources of all refutations. What the dialectician knows are rather 
the places to look for dialectical syllogisms that will apply in all disciplines. Cf. SE 
170a34-35 and APo 77a26-78a21.  
170a30-b3.  Schreiber thinks Aristotle 170a30-34 is addressing an objection to his own 
attempt to classify fallacies. He quotes De Morgan, for instance, as objecting that “there 
is no such thing as a classification of the ways in which men may arrive at error: it is 
doubted whether there can ever be.” This passage is cited in Hamblin, 1970, p. 13.  
Schreiber misrepresents (Schreiber, 2003, p. 85) Aristotle’s answer to this objection, 
however, by claiming that Aristotle appreciates the infinite variety of error but thinks 
twelvefold taxonomy of fallacies can solve “all such errors.” Schreiber argues that 
Aristotle’s taxonomy claims “these potentially innumerable confusions can all be 
resolved by understanding a relatively limited number of facts about language and the 
extralinguistic world” while holding an infinity of solutions is possible “πρὸς ἡμῖν.” 
Aristotle does indeed argue that his list is complete (169b18-170a11) and that there are 
some resolutions of fallacies that are merely πρὸς τὸν ἐπωτῶντα (Cf. SE 177b27-b34 
and notes ad loc), but, be that as it may, Schreiber fundamentally misunderstands 
Aristotle’s project. Aristotle is neither trying to unfold all errors in reasoning nor to 
explain all possible fallacies.  
Quite the contrary, Aristotle is saying a limited taxonomy of all fallacies and 
their resolutions is impossible without knowledge of everything just as it is impossible to 
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have a knowledge of all genuine refutations. For it would require a knowledge of all the 
sophistical places proper to each art. Aristotle is claiming that his thirteen fallacies are a 
complete list of the ways of producing sophistical refutations proper to dialectic. These 
are fallacies that are based on sophistical places and hold in any discipline. No one art 
considers all fallacies based on the principles proper to particular sciences. In other 
words, Aristotle is here trying to delineate the field in which his list is complete. The 
thirteen fallacies are a complete list of all fallacies that may be used in arguing about 
any subject matter.  
170a30.  ἀλλὰ μὴν (which I translate as moreover) may mark a new item on a list or a 
new stage on a march of thought. Cf. Denniston, 1996, p. 344. 
170b3-11.  Just as the dialectician does not grasp the sources of all syllogisms, but only 
places that can be used to derive endoxes for syllogisms in any discipline, so too the 
sophist does not grasp the sources of all sophistical refutations, but merely the places 
from which one can derive sophistical syllogisms in any discipline. Some fallacies are 
based on what is proper to specific sciences—the understanding of which will be proper 
to the master of that science (Top 101a5-16). Thus, the dialectician considers all 
syllogisms—real or apparent—that are based on principles applicable to any discipline. 
Chapter 10: A False Division of Arguments 
170b12-13.  In Chapter 10, Aristotle argues against a false division of arguments into 
two categories: those ‘towards the thought’ (πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν) and those ‘towards the 
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name’ (πρὸς τοὔνομα). An argument is ‘towards the thought’ when the questioner 
takes a name to signify that same thing that his answerer had in mind when he 
answered his question. An argument is ‘towards the name’ when a questioner takes a 
name in his interlocutor’s answer to mean something different from what the answerer 
intended and then forms arguments against the answerer using the same name, but in 
its unintended sense (SE 170b14-19). As Dorion points out, Socrates describes this 
phenomenon of arguing towards the name (which is the same as not arguing towards 
the thought) in Plato’s Euthydemus: “[Y]ou ask a question with one thing in mind and I 
understand it with another and then answer in terms of the latter” (Euthydemus 295c3-5, 
trans. Sprague). Whoever the original proponent of the division was, Aristotle argues as 
if the division’s proponent thinks all fallacious arguments fall under arguments 
‘towards the name’ and all legitimate arguments fall under arguments ‘towards the 
thought.’ For a thorough account of evidence regarding the original author of this 
division, Cf. Dorion, 1995, n. 135, pp. 261-268. 
170b15-19.  Aristotle’s argument against this division is clear. The division of all 
arguments into those ‘towards the name’ and those ‘towards the thought’ is incorrect 
because some arguments would fall under both categories. Overlap is a sign of a 
inadequate division. Just as a proper definition must distinguish the principles of a 
thing, a proper division will distinguish the parts of a whole, that is, parts that do not 
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overlap. Aristotle takes issue with this division because it does not allow one to see 
different kinds of argument distinctly as some arguments fall into both categories.  
170b23.  Dropping [Ζήνων] as a gloss. Cf. Ross, 1958, p. 208. It is possible that Aristotle 
is referring to the Eleatic’s argument that everything is one (cf. SE 182b25-27). 
170b25.  Aristotle’s question is rhetorical. Aristotle has given an example of an 
argument that must be categorized as towards the thought and towards the name. An 
argument is ‘towards the thought’ when the questioner uses words with the same 
meaning that the answerer does. So, what happens when both questioner and the 
answerer equivocate? The argument is still ‘towards the thought.’ However, it also falls 
under arguments ‘towards the name’ because it uses the same term with equivocal 
meanings although neither interlocutor detects the equivocation. The proposed 
division, therefore, cannot be correct since it would place the same argument on both 
sides of the division. 
170b25-32.  Since ‘towards the name’ means using the same word or words that your 
interlocutor used but with a different meaning, being directed ‘towards the name’ is the 
same as ‘not towards the thought.’ In other words, the proposed division of arguments 
is a relative distinction; it depends on how the interlocutors relate to the argument 
rather than on the objective validity of the argument. Thus, if the answerer erroneously 
thinks that a word is used equivocally, then one would categorize the arguments as 
‘towards the name,’ although there is no equivocation absolutely. For there is no reason 
 223 
why the respondent cannot be mistaken. Aristotle will illustrate precisely this case with 
his triangle example (SE 171a12-16). Clearly then, any argument can be categorized as 
towards the name. Aristotle finds the implications of the proposed division strange or 
absurd (ἄτοπος).  
170b35-40.  Aristotle takes the proposed division to imply that all arguments directed 
towards the name are fallacies, and all arguments directed towards the thought are 
genuine. Aristotle notes that not even all fallacies from speech are based on 
equivocation and that the characterization of an argument as a fallacy must be based on 
the argument itself, not on how a respondent relates to the argument. Some arguments 
equivocate whether or not they use the meaning intended by the interlocutors.  
171a1-11.  As Taran pointed out (1981, p. 74), the passage seems to be a digression from 
the main thread of this chapter which directly argues against the proposed 
name/thought division. As an aside, Aristotle makes the “methodological” point that 
one must discuss refutation before apparent refutation and syllogism. It seems Aristotle 
is implicitly arguing against the name/thought division by arguing against its 
proponent’s method of discussing fallacies. Without a thorough understanding of the 
nature of refutation and therefore syllogism, how can one reasonably classify good and 
bad refutations? 
On another note, Aristotle’s admission (SE 171a5-7) that the same argument can 
violate both the definition of contradiction and the definition of syllogism is verification 
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that the same argument can commit many fallacies, and thus be categorized into two 
different fallacies for different reasons. There is nothing to prevent the same argument 
from having many faults (cf. SE 179b18-19 and note ad loc). Cf. also SE 181b19-20 and 
note ad loc. 
171a8.  The argument that Aristotle says is about “speaking of the silent” is referring to 
the same argument as that of SE 166a12-15. 
171a10.  It appears that the argument concerning Homeric poetry Aristotle also refers to 
in the Posterior Analytics (77b32). Tricot (1939, n. 4, p. 145) gives a reasonable replica of 
the argument:  
1) Every circle is a figure. 
Homer’s epic is a circle (cycle). 
Homer’s epic is a figure. 
171a17-23.  An argument that should be categorized as ‘towards the name’ because it 
equivocates may also be ‘towards the thought’ because it operates in accord with the 
answerer’s intended meaning.  
171a23-25.  Aristotle concludes that there are arguments directed towards the name, 
namely fallacies of equivocation. However, these fallacies do not exhaust all possible 
fallacies or even those from speech. There are not arguments directed towards the 
thought because this is a relative qualification which depends on the answerer’s posture 
towards the argument itself. Aristotle contends that arguments should be categorized 
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based on what they are in themselves and not on how any one answerer thinks about 
them because different answerers will take the same argument in different ways.  
171a25-27.  One of the most prevalent current opinions contrary to Aristotle’s is that all 
fallacies are from speech or language. Wittgenstein’s position (1976, I, pp. 109, 132-133) 
is a particularly strong instance of this.  
171a35.  Restoring the μή, with all translators, that Ross inadvertently drops. The μή is 
in all manuscripts.  
171a36-38.  Perhaps Aristotle is thinking that if knowledge of contraries is the same—
i.e., that through one intention all contraries are known—then all contraries will be 
known or unknown since there is either an understanding of them or not. If knowledge 
of them is the same then either all are known, or all are unknown, but they are not all 
known. Thus, knowledge of contraries is not the same.  Taking the statement 
“knowledge of contraries is the same” severally has a different meaning from taking it 
collectively.   
171a38-b2.  It is not the responsibility of the dialectician to distinguish the meanings of 
words for his interlocutor unless asked, while, in contrast, it is the responsibility of the 
teacher (Top 110a23ff). This last paragraph of Chapter 10 as a whole seems to belong 
more properly to Chapter 11 where Aristotle considers the different functions of the 
teacher or demonstrator and the dialectician and sophist. 
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Chapter 11: The Distinction and Relation of Different Arts of Argument 
171b2-3.  To repeat, the beginning of Chapter 11 could have well included the end of 
Chapter 10. Chapter 11 completes Aristotle’s treatment of the first aim of the sophist, 
i.e., the sophistical refutation, through a comparison of the differences between 
dialectical and testing, sophistical and contentious, demonstrative, and false-
diagrammatic arguments. 
171b3-6.  Aristotle defines testing arguments in Chapter 2 as arguments which 
“syllogize from opinions held by the answerer and from premises that anyone 
pretending to have scientific knowledge must know.” Cf. SE 165b4-6. If a dialectical 
disputation is not for the sake of competing, it may be πείρας καὶ σκέψεως χάριν [for 
the sake of testing or looking]. Cf. Top 159a33. A testing argument “is able to syllogize 
to what is false through the ignorance of the one who grants the argument.” Cf. 169b25-
27. The testing art then is ordered to exposing the ignorance of an interlocutor through 
making testing arguments. The Greek διαλεκτική τις (which I translate as “a certain 
aspect of dialectic” at SE 171b4-5) may be translated more literally as “a certain 
dialectic.” Aristotle will claim elsewhere that it is a part (μέρος) of dialectic. Cf. SE 
169b25. In the Metaphysics, Aristotle states ἔστι δὲ ἡ διαλεκτικὴ πειραστικὴ περὶ ὧν ἡ 
φιλοσοφία γνωριστική, ἡ δὲ σοφιστικὴ φαινομένη, οὖσα δ' οὔ [The dialectical art 
employs the testing art concerning issues which philosophy knows, but the sophistical 
art appears to know, but does not]. Cf. Meta 1004b25-26. 
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171b6.  The Greek word πρᾶγμα (which I translate here as subject) I elsewhere translate 
as thing (SE 171b18). 
171b6-22.  Aristotle gives two kinds of apparent syllogism. The first is the sophistical or 
contentious syllogism which—when it leads to a contradiction—is the subject matter of 
the treatise. The contentious syllogism concerns the same things that dialectic does 
when it employs its testing art (περὶ ὧν ἡ διαλεκτικὴ πειραστική ἐστι, b9). Dialectic 
concerns places which “are common to every art and ability” (SE 170a36). As a result, 
sophistic uses common sophistical places to derive apparent endoxes or to produce 
apparent syllogisms, e.g., a sophist can use the fallacy of equivocation in any discipline. 
Some apparent syllogisms, such as false-diagrammatic (ψευδογράφημα) fallacies 
(παραλογισμοί), concern the sort of premises that demonstrations use, that is, premises 
that are proper to a discipline. Hence false-diagrammatic fallacies argue from false 
premises that are proper to a discipline.  
A false-diagrammatic may be a false demonstration which relies on false 
premises proper to geometry; it is often caused by a poorly drawn diagram although 
not necessarily. Alexander of Aphrodisias supplies a number of these fallacies in his 
commentary on the Topics (2001, 21-25, p. 12). Aristotle gives two examples of false 
syllogisms for a geometric conclusion. The first is that of Hippocrates which is a false-
diagrammatic. The second is that of Bryson which is a contentious syllogism because it 
relies on faulty reasoning that can be used outside of geometry. Both arguments are 
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fallacious, although Hippocrates’ argument relies on a mistake that cannot be used 
outside the sphere of geometry, and Bryson’s mistake can (APo 75b41, APr 69a32). 
Speculation is conflicting about the exact nature of Hippocrates’ and Bryson’s 
arguments (cf. Thomas, 1980, I, pp. 234-253, 310-313, and 314-317; Aquinas, 2007, pp. 76-
79; Poste, 1866, p. 245ff). For a synoptic account of the various interpretations, cf. 
Dorion, 1995, pp. 282-285. 
171b22-34.  Apparent refutations, then will not be used only be sophists strictly—who 
use deceitful arguments to appear wise in order to make money—they will also be used 
by anyone whose desire to win overpowers their sense of fair play, a strife-lover. When 
a sophist uses an apparent refutation, it is a sophistical. When strife-lover uses an 
apparent refutation, it is a contentious.  
171b28-29.  Cf. SE 165a21-23 
171b34-172a2.  Aristotle shows (APo 75a38-b20) that οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν ἐξ ἄλλου γένους 
μεταβάντα δεῖξαι, οἷον τὸ γεωμετρικὸν ἀριθμητικῇ [one cannot demonstrate while 
changing from one genus to another in the Posterior Analytics. A dialectical topic, 
however, can be used in different subject-genera. This discrepancy is also found in 
fallacious arguments. Thus, the false-diagrammatic fallacy is to the demonstration as 
the sophistical syllogism is to the dialectical syllogism. 
172a7.  Aristotle also cites Antiphon’s argument as one that violates the fundamental 
assumptions of a science. Such an argument is not refuted by that science because a 
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science cannot prove its principles (Phys 185a13-20, Top 101a37-b4). For an account of 
Antiphon’s argument, cf. Heath, 1981, vol. I, pp. 221-223; Thomas, 1980, pp. 310-317; 
and Apostle, 1981, p. 120. 
172a8-9.  Zeno has a number of arguments concluding that motion is impossible (cf. 
Phys 239b100ff, DK A25-28). Obviously, Zeno’s arguments do not proceed from terms 
and principles proper to the subject of medicine, and thus it would be absurd if the 
doctor as doctor argued against them.  
172a9-11.  Perhaps, Aristotle is pointing out that his original analogy is not perfect 
because dialectic is not a science the way in which geometry is a science. For one might 
think that since the relation of false-diagrammatic to geometry is the relation of 
pseudoscience to a science, then the relation of sophistic to dialectic must be the relation 
of pseudoscience to a science. He argues, however, that if dialectic were a science, 
sophistical reasoning would not be able to argue about geometrical issues. However, we 
find contentious reasoning applied to matters of geometry such as the argument of 
Antiphon. Thus, dialectic and contentious reasoning do not use principles proper to a 
subject-genus. Rather, as he says below, it proceeds from answers to questions. 
Therefore, dialectic does not demonstrate because demonstration proceeds from proper 
principles. Instead, dialectic uses common dialectical places to determine which 
questions to ask in order to lead an interlocutor into contradiction. For a more thorough 
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discussion of the relation between demonstration and a dialectical syllogism, cf. 
Introduction II.IV Aristotle’s Division of Syllogisms. 
172a11-21.  Aristotle appears to be making that case that three marks of science are not 
true of dialectic. A science has a specific subject genus, it demonstrates, and its 
conclusions are commensurately universal (καθόλου) with the subject. For example, 
geometry will not show that an equilateral triangle has angles equal to two rights, but 
that a triangle does. Commensurately universal is a special sense of universal which 
Aristotle explains (APo 73b26-27): καθόλου δὲ λέγω ὃ ἂν κατὰ παντός τε ὑπάρχῃ καὶ 
καθ' αὑτὸ καὶ ᾗ αὐτό [I call “universal” what belongs according to all and according to 
itself and as such].  Since dialectic is not ordered to scientific knowledge, but the 
refutation of an opponent, its conclusions and premises need not have any of the 
properties necessary for a demonstration.  
172a21-34.  Aristotle’s allusion to Socrates is unmistakable (cf. Apology 21b). A 
dialectician does not need to have knowledge of any science to be able to refute 
someone who claims to have knowledge of that science. Dialectic, insofar as it is 
ordered to the refutation of an opponent, is also a testing art. It can reveal an 
interlocutor’s ignorance, through his refutation. It does so through the use of common 
principles (τὰ κοινά) that may be applied to any science, e.g., dialectical places and 
axioms. Thus, Socrates can be ignorant of what virtue is, and still be able to expose 
Meno’s ignorance of what virtue is (Meno 70a-80e). Socrates is able to manifest that 
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Meno does not know what virtue is through principles that would apply to any 
definition in any science: namely that a definition should express what all instances of 
the thing defined have in common (Meno 72a-73c), and a definition should be 
commensurately universal with the thing is defines (Meno 73c-74b and 77b-78b). Again, 
in the Gorgias (474cff), Socrates uses the dialectical place ‘if a contrary belongs to a 
contrary, then its contrary belongs to the other contrary’ (Top 113b27-114a7) to get 
Polus to assume the endox that ‘if doing injustice is shameful, then acting justly is 
admirable.’ This dialectical place could be used in other disciplines to produce endoxes, 
e.g., if the rapid motion of creates heat, then the slow motion of particles creates cold. 
Again, every refutation involves a contradiction, so the knowledge of the axiom of non-
contradiction is part of the foundation of dialectic and, in fact, all discursive reasoning 
(cf. Wians, 2006, pp. 337-340). The dialectician is able to be ignorant about a discipline 
and still test whether or not someone else has knowledge of the discipline using axioms 
or dialectical places that can be applied to any discipline.  
172a29.  Cf. Meta 1004bb19-20. 
172a29-30.  Such as the principle of non-contradiction, the principle of the excluded 
middle, the “said of all” principle, and so on (cf. Meta 996b33-997a10, APo 77a26-35). 
172a34-36.  Cf. Rhet 1354a1-12.  
172b5-8.  While Aristotle advises a dialectician to form a systematically ordered 
collection of other school’s positions and opinions which he may draw from to use as 
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premises in refutations (Top 105b12-18), this is not what he is referring to here. Given 
the context, the investigation (μέθοδος) of premises must refer back to a knowledge of 
dialectical and sophistical places which serve as templates to determine which endoxic 
or apparently endoxic premises one opponent will likely accept. 
Chapter 12: Eliciting False Statements and Paradoxes 
172b9-11.  Sylvester Maurus (1885, p. 598) accurately describes Chapter 12 as de locis per 
quos sophista ducit ad finem seu metam falsi et inopinabilis [concerning the places through 
which the sophist leads his opponent to the end or goal of what is false or 
inconceivable]. After unfolding the places to look for sophistical refutation—which is 
the sophist’s primary goal—Aristotle now turns to the places by which the sophist may 
bring about his secondary goals. He first considers those that force an opponent to state 
what is false or paradoxical. Since these two goals are so valde affines [strongly related], 
Aristotle treats them together. Some of the same places used for leading an opponent 
into saying something manifestly false are useful for leading him into asserting a 
paradox, and vice versa.  
172b10.  The Greek word that I translate as “disreputable opinion” is ἄδοξος, the 
substantive adjective. The word is the antonym of ἔνδοξος, but it is also plainly a 
synonym for παράδοξος. Cf. SE 165b19-20 where an almost identical phrase is rendered 
with παράδοξος in place of ἄδοξος. I maintain the actual distinction between the two 
words in translation by translating παράδοξος as paradox.  
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172b12-16.  When no dialectical problem has been laid down—a question which is the 
subject of inquiry—then the answerer does not know which of his stated opinions the 
sophist will try to refute (Top 104b1-5).  When he does not foresee which position his 
interlocutor is trying to refute, he cannot adjust his answers to prevent the refutation. 
172b16-21.  Aristotle is more forthcoming concerning this place in the Topics (111b32-
112a16). Cf. also Top 116a20 and SE l72b26. A questioner will try to lead his opponent 
into taking a position that the questioner has many arguments against. In the passage 
from the Topics, Aristotle explains that sometimes the position will be germane to the 
question under discussion, and other times it will merely appear to be. Obviously, this 
place is relevant for both a dialectician and a sophist. Poste notes (1866, p. 135) that this 
common activity of the dialectician and sophist shows their affinity.  
Dorion gives a reasonable example for Plato’s dialogue Lesser Hippias (364c-369e). 
In the dialogue, Socrates leads Hippias away from the discussion of Achilles superiority 
to Odysseus in Homer’s poetry to a discussion of whether or not a truthful person and a 
liar are distinct. A frustrated Hippias then criticizes Socrates for “pick[ing] out whatever 
is the most difficult part of the argument, and fasten[ing] unto it in minute detail, and 
not disput[ing] about the whole subject under discussion” (369b9-c9, trans. Grube).  
 On another note, the Greek word that I translate with the plural “attacks” is 
ἐπιχείρημα (SE 172b19). Aristotle opposes this word to a demonstrative syllogism and 
defines it as a dialectical syllogism (Top 162a16). Robin Smith, however, argues that the 
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passage is spurious (1997, p. 144). Spurious or not, this technical use of the word does 
appear harmonious with Aristotle’s use in the text here and elsewhere. Cf. also its use 
throughout Chapter 15 for example. Moreover, I am reading ἄγειν rather than ἄγει 
with Hasper and Dorion (cf. Ross, 1958, p. 214). 
172b21.  Element (στοιχεῖον) is another name that Aristotle uses for a place (τόπος) or 
topic. In the Rhetoric (1403a18-19), Aristotle says, τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ λέγω στοιχεῖον καὶ 
τόπον· ἔστιν γὰρ στοιχεῖον καὶ τόπος εἰς ὃ πολλὰ ἐνθυμήματα ἐμπίπτει [I call the 
place and the element the same, for a place and an element are that into which many 
enthymemes fall]. For a discussion of Aristotle’s use of the word τόπος in the Sophistical 
Refutations, consult the Introduction II.VIII Fallacies as Places. 
172b27-28.  Aristotle is probably referring to Top 111b32-112a16. Cf. also SE 172b19 and 
note ad loc. 
172b29-173a30.  In the remainder of the Chapter, Aristotle lays out the places used by 
the sophist as means to lead an opponent into stating a paradox. All such places are 
based on some opposition. The first place is based on the opposition between what an 
interlocutor’s philosophical school holds and what is common opinion. The second 
place is based on the opposition between what the interlocutor says and what he does 
or wishes. The third place is based on what is according to law and what is according to 
nature. Finally, the fourth place is based on the opposition between the opinions of the 
wise and the opinions of the many. The sophist uses these oppositions because on one 
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side are opinions that the interlocutor will accept, but on the other side, there are 
endoxes. Thus, the interlocutor will likely accept the opinions espoused by his school, 
even if they will lead to opinions that are contrary to endoxes, i.e., opinions that are 
paradoxes.  
172b29-31.  The Greek word γένους (which I translate as group) typically means genus 
in Aristotle’s logical works. Most likely, Michael of Ephesus is correct in interpreting 
γένους as referring to a philosophical school or intellectual heritage (1898, p. 101): 
σκόπει καὶ ἐξέταζε ὁποῖός τίς ἐστιν οὗτος καὶ ποίας αἱρέσεως καὶ ποίου δόγματος 
ἀντέχεται τῆς φιλοσοφίας, εἰ Περιπατητικός ἐστιν ἢ Στωικός [consider and examine 
thoroughly what sort of person he is and what sort of inclinations and what sort of 
doctrine of philosopher he cleaves to—if he is a Peripatetic or a Stoic].   
172b31-32.  Aristotle advises dialecticians to form a systematically ordered collection of 
other school’s positions and opinions which they may draw from to use as premises in 
refutations (Top 105b12-18). 
As noted by Poste (1866, n. 2, p. 136), the Greek word θέσεις (which I translate as 
positions) is probably used here as a synonym for paradoxes just as Aristotle defines 
θέσεις in the Topics (104b19-29). Thus, I have inserted [paradoxical] before positions. 
Aristotle is saying that if the interlocutor is of a certain school—say a Peripatetic—the 
sophist leads him to concede one of the positions of that school that is contrary to the 
opinion of the many—like that the heavens are made of a fifth element. Again, if the 
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interlocutor is an Eleatic, the sophist should lead him to concede that motion is 
impossible. If he is a Heraclitean, the sophist should lead him to concede that one 
opposite can be its other opposite.  
172b33-35.  Aristotle’s solution to this particular device of the sophist highlights a 
distinction between the way a sophist leads opponents into paradoxes and the way a 
dialectician leads opponents to paradoxes. A dialectician will try to show that a paradox 
is a necessary consequence of the opponent’s position on the original dialectical 
problem (Top 159a18-20). In contrast, a sophist will ask questions regarding paradoxes 
that the answerer holds which do not follow from the answerer’s original position on 
the dialectical problem. The sophist, in effect, tries to move to a topic of conversation in 
which he can easily make the answerer look foolish. Aristotle advises the answerer to 
untie this device by noting that the sophist’s question is irrelevant.  
172b35.  A competitor (ὁ ἀγωνιζόμενος) is probably a synonym for a contentious or 
eristic arguer (cf. SE 165b11-13, SE 174a12, SE 175a2).  
172b36-173a6.  Cf. Rhet 1399a29-34 where Aristotle makes the same point. 
173a7-9.  For Callicles’ account of the distinction between what is according to nature 
and what is according to law, see Gorgias, 482e-484b. 
173a10-18.  In the course of Plato’s dialogue (Gorgias 474c-484b), the character Callicles 
accuses Socrates of using this place against Polus. Polus originally takes the position 
that it is better to do what is unjust than to suffer what is unjust. According to Callicles, 
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this is the correct position according to nature: no one naturally desires to suffer 
injustice.  Socrates leads Polus to admit that it is more shameful to commit injustice than 
to suffer injustice. This position is true only according to law. For the many, seeking to 
avoid suffering injustice from the stronger, have collectively created the law or custom 
that doing injustice is shameful, and to that end have indoctrinated the citizens of the 
polis at a young age. Socrates argues that it follows that committing injustice is more evil 
than suffering injustice by using Polus’ admonition. Theoretically, this sophistical place 
preys on the interlocutor’s inability to distinguish what is so according to nature and 
what is so according to the law or custom. Since what is according to law is contrary to 
what is according to nature, a sophist may readily find a premise that is according to 
law to syllogize to the contradiction of what is according to nature. 
173a21-22.  Again, Aristotle is probably referring to Plato’s Gorgias (468e-474b) where 
Socrates maintains the position that it is better to suffer injustice than to commit it, and 
Polus acts as if he has manifested that Socrates’ position is false merely by forcing 
Socrates to apply the principle to a particularly severe concrete instance. Aristotle, of 
course, maintains that the better man would choose to suffer injustice (Rhet 1364b21-
23). 
173a25-27.  Plato also portrays this tension in his Gorgias (470c-479e). Cf. also Republic 
344a-c. 
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Chapter 13: Eliciting Babbling 
173a31-40.  Chapter 13 discusses the places by which a sophist may induce his opponent 
to babble. Cf. SE 165b16-17 where Aristotle defines to babble (ἀδολεσχεῖν) as to say the 
same thing many times. In the Topics (130a32-34), he cautions against repetition because 
it causes obscurity and confusion which he connects to babbling. In this first paragraph, 
Aristotle claims that a sophist may induce babbling by switching a name for an account 
(λόγος) in the course of a dialogue.   
173b1-5.  Aristotle now lays out two different kinds of words where the distinction 
between the name and its account can leave a fertile ground form for the sophist’s 
devices. The first kind are names that fall into Aristotle’s category of relation.  
173b5-11.  As Waitz (1846, II, p. 554-555) and Dorion note (1995, p. 311), the syntax of 
this passage is obscure. Nevertheless, its meaning seems clear enough given the 
examples. Aristotle claims his examples of odd and snub are not “at all relative.” 
Neither odd nor snub imply a reference or point to something else the way in which 
relatives do. However, when we give an account of odd, we indicate the thing of which 
odd is a property (affection), i.e., number. Number is given in the account of odd. We 
say, odd is a number that has a mean. Thus, the sophist reasons that since three is an 
odd number, and odd is a number that has no mean, then three is a number that has a 
mean number. He simply replaces the name with the account to produce the babbling. 
In the same way, we often say snub is a curvature of a nose—thus indicating the thing 
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of which it is an affection—when we describe it. Thus, if a man has a snub nose, then he 
has a curvature of the nose nose.  
173b12-16.  The sophist may give the impression that his opponent’s answer results in 
babbling because he assumes that the term—such as double—signifies by itself. 
Aristotle’s solution to this sophistical device is to claim that “double” in the phrase 
“double of half” does not signify anything by itself (SE 181b25-182a6). 
Chapter 14: Eliciting Solecism 
173b17-25.  In Chapter 14 (SE 165b20-21), Aristotle discusses the fourth aim of a sophist 
is to make his interlocutor commit a real or apparent solecism, i.e., “to make the 
answerer commit a barbarism in his speech on account of an argument.”  For example, 
to be forced by argument to use a feminine noun with a masculine definite article or to 
use a word in the accusative case as a subject of a finite verb is a solecism. 
  In this passage, Aristotle argues that there is an art of producing apparent 
sophisms by manifesting that people can mistake feminine for masculine nouns. μῆνις 
and πήληξ are both feminine nouns in Greek. They should both bear the feminine 
participle οὐλομένη rather than οὐλόμενος mistakenly applied to them by Protagoras 
(οὐλομένη is the feminine accusative middle participle of ὄλλυμι (destroy); its 
masculine counterpart is οὐλόμενος). “Sing of the destructive wrath” (οὐλομένην 
μῆνιν) is from the first line of Homer’s Iliad.  By Homer saying οὐλομένην μῆνιν, it 
appears Protagoras erroneously concluded Homer was committing a solecism. If 
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Protagoras could make such a mistake, then surely the inexperienced are quite 
susceptible to the same. Since it is possible to make such a mistake, there is an art for 
producing it.  
173b25-31.  The statement τοῦτο ἔστι Κορίσκος [it is Coriscus] may appear to be a 
solecism because the phrase pairs τοῦτο (which is typically neuter) with Κορίσκος 
(which is masculine).  
173b31-39.  The neuter demonstrative pronoun τοῦτο can be nominative or accusative, 
but the masculine οὗτος can only be nominative, and the masculine τοῦτον only 
accusative. As Aristotle remarks, τοῦτο can stand in for either οὗτος or τοῦτον. The 
examples illustrate that when τοῦτο is construed with ἔστι, it is equivalent to οὗτος, but 
when construed with εἶναι, τοῦτο is equivalent to τοὗτον. For ἔστι Κορίσκος, the place 
of the subject can be filled by τοῦτο or οὗτος indifferently. For εἶναι Κορίσκον, the 
reader should supply the subject with τοῦτο or τοῦτον. 
174a5-9.  By ‘expressing things that are not alike in a similar way,’ Aristotle is referring 
to the fallacy of figure of diction (cf. SE 166b10-11). There is likeness between the way a 
person commits the fallacy of figure of diction and the way a sophist induces his 
opponent to commit a solecism. The fallacy of figure of diction plays on the fact that the 
same phrase, word, or part of a word may signify different things. For example, seeing is 
passive in reality while hitting is active in reality, and both are active in speech. The 
similarity of the names may lead one to think that they signify the same sort of reality. 
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In the same way, a sophist will play on the fact that the same word ending may be 
common to both the masculine and feminine or nominative and accusative to lead his 
opponent to an apparent barbarism. The result of the fallacy of the figure of diction is 
an apparent refutation while the result of an argument leading to a solecism is an 
apparent barbarism. Their cause is the same: similarities in speech.  
174a12-13.  Aristotle here marks not only the end of his treatment of solecism from the 
perspective of the sophist but also his treatment of the sophist’s aims in general.  
174a13-16.  I take it that the last few lines of Chapter 14 mark the beginning of the 
subject matter treated in Chapter 15. They at least foreshadow Chapter 15. The passage 
that Aristotle refers to regarding marshalling or arranging questions to escape detection 
is from the Topics (155b1-157a17). Cf. also SE 174a26-29 and note ad loc. 
Chapter 15: Marshaling and Conducting Interrogation 
174a17-20.  As mentioned at the end of Chapter 14, Chapter 15 discusses the places or 
elements (Aristotle uses element is as a synonym for place cff. Rhet 1403a18-19; SE 
172b23 and note ad loc) a dialectician or sophist may use in the composition of his 
questions so as to bring about a refutation. These elements are not principles of endoxes 
but rules for the manner of questioning. As Saint-Hilaire pointed out (1837, p. 435), 
Aristotle does not condemn all of the methods used in Chapter 15 because he prescribes 
them likewise to the dialectician. Dorion (1990, pp. 41-74) has dealt with this topic in 
detail. Aristotle’s first two examples, length and speed, are fairly self-explanatory. 
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174a18.  Forster thinks the “elements mentioned before” refers to Chapter 1 of Book VIII 
of the Topics. Perhaps, Forster is thinking of the passage at Topics 157a1-5 which isn’t 
much more than a paraphrase of the current text. Dorion claims that Aristotle is 
referring to the entire passage of Topics 155b26-157a5, but clearly the majority of that 
passage deals with how the dialectician may conceal his purpose by means other than 
simple length.   
174a20-24.  This unfriendly device seeks to shake the answerer’s composure by goading 
him until he becomes incensed. Shameless behavior and open sophism lead to the 
answerer’s loss of good judgement. This passage underlies the importance for the 
sophist to determine the context of the argument. Although the Sophistical Refutations is 
ordered to unfolding fallacies that can be used in any discipline, the sophist should be 
attuned to the circumstances at hand, taking into account not only the audience, but 
also the intellectual and emotional disposition of his opponent not excluding the 
consideration of the “group” to which he belongs (SE 172b30ff).  
174a24-26.  Questions to be used as premises in the same refutation should not be asked 
one after another because the answerer will easily discern which answers will lead to 
his refutation. The sophist can hide the logical connection between questions by mixing 
them in with premises of other arguments—either for or against his desired conclusion. 
Aristotle advises the dialectician to conceal the logical order of his questions through 
this method (Top 156a23-26, APr 66a33-b4). 
 243 
174a26-29.  Any method that a dialectician may use to conceal his means or purpose 
will also be of use to the sophist (cf. Top 155b1-157a17). In the passage, Aristotle notes 
that the answerer will be less likely to concede premises he views as being close to his 
refutation, and thus Aristotle advises methods by which the dialectician may conceal 
his ends and his means in a dialectical interrogation. Questions that lead to a 
perspicuous argument will be ill-suited for a dialectician—as well as a sophist—because 
the conclusion of the argument will be too easily detected. The answerer will clearly see 
which answers he must avoid giving.  
The dialectician’s use of disguise does not make him a sophist because his goal is 
a conclusion that actually contradicts his interlocutor’s previously held position, and 
that actually follows from premises which are actually endoxic. A dialectician uses 
methods of concealment merely to prevent the answerer from declining to accept 
premises precisely because the answerer sees that they will lead to his contradiction. As 
Aristotle notes, people are more likely to concede what they think when they are unable 
to see the implications of their answer (Top 156b8-10). Manifesting the actual 
consequences of an interlocutor’s opinions is not deceptive even if the dialectician 
conceals his method of bringing about this manifestation. The sophist in contrast is 
deceptive through and through.   
Robin Smith claims (1997, p. 105) there are two stages in deciding what questions 
a dialectician will ask his interlocutor. With the use of dialectical places and his 
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systematic lists of endoxes, the dialectician first determines which premises he will use 
for the refutation of his opponent. This step will “yield a bare-bones argument 
consisting of undecorated premises and conclusion.” Next, the dialectician considers 
the form and order of the questions that will be answered as premises and adds 
additional questions used for induction, bulk, concealment, and clarity. Cf. also Top 
155b1-28. A sophist, then, will also work through these two stages, although the places 
that he uses for determining premises will be one of the thirteen sophistical refutations, 
and he will use additional questions ordered to destabilizing his interlocutor in panic or 
anger, concealing his goal, confusing his opponent, and so on. 
174a30-33.  The sophist should sometimes pose his questions in a way that make it seem 
as though he is looking for an answer contrary to the one he is truly looking for. For 
example, when a questioner wants the answerer to concede that knowledge of 
contraries is not the same, the sophists should pose a question like the following: “Is it 
not the case that knowledge of contraries is the same” (cf. Michael of Ephesus, 1898, p. 
111).  Other times, a sophist should pose his questions such that he seems impartial to 
the answer. Aristotle gives similar advice to the dialectician saying that he should 
conceal whether or not an answer will be used for something else or is asked for the 
sake of itself, and he more generally advises the questioner to make it as unclear as 
possible whether he wants a negative or positive answer to a question (Top 156b4-9).  
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174a37-40.  Perhaps, Aristotle is claiming in the current passage that a sophist will treat 
two things that are similar to one another as if they fell under the same universal when 
they do not. For, as Aristotle claims (Top 157a17-33), πολλὰ τῶν οὐχ ὁμοίως 
λεγομένων ὁμοίως φαίνεται λέγεσθαι [many things appear to be said in a like 
manner when they are not said in a like manner]. How can the sophist bring about this 
deception? Aristotle explains that when there is no name by which to signify the 
universal, the questioner should state οὕτως ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων [and so on in 
all cases of this kind]. It is often difficult to discern what things fall under “cases of this 
kind,” and which do not.  
Aristotle exemplifies how to use likeness (ὁμοιότης) to establish a universal (Top 
156b10-18). To establish that knowledge of contraries is the same, a dialectician should 
point out that perception of contraries is the same, and vice versa. This plausible 
(πιθανός) method of establishing a universal is like induction, but differs from it 
because the likeness used to establish the universal will not fall under the universal as 
an instance of it. Cf. also Top 160a37-39.   
174b8-11.  Aristotle gives an analogous tactic that is used in rhetorical speech (Rhet 
1401a3-12).  
174b12-18.  Aristotle is referring to a situation in which the opponent is defending a 
paradox. In such a case, he advises the sophist to ask questions regarding reputable 
opinions that lead to the contradiction of the paradox in the form of, “Does this 
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reputable opinion seem so to you?” No matter which way the interlocutor answers, the 
sophist achieves one of his goals. If the answerer concedes the question, the sophist will 
syllogize to his contradiction. If the answerer denies the question, then he will have 
affirmed that a reputable opinion does not seem to be the case, another paradox. 
Finally, if the answerer tries to thread the needle by denying the question but conceding 
that the opinion is reputable, something looking like a refutation will come about 
because it will appear to the audience that he only denied the question to avoid being 
refuted. This method becomes more plausible when considered in conjunction with the 
places useful for inducing a paradox laid out in Chapter 12.  For instance, the sophist 
will consider the group to which his opponent belongs and bring up paradoxical 
positions which that group holds (SE 172b29ff). If his interlocutor accepts the paradox, 
then the sophist will place him on the horns of this new dilemma, forcing him either to 
compound his espoused paradoxes, be refuted, or look as if he has been refuted.  
174b17.  As was said earlier, given Aristotle’s wording, it is clear that disreputable 
opinion (ἄδοξος) is a synonym for paradox (παράδοξος).  Cf. SE 172b10 and note ad loc. 
174b19-23.  Just as the sophist should look in the answerer’s positions for opinions 
contrary to other positions he holds, so also should he look for positions that are 
contrary to the positions of those people with whom the answerer agrees. Michael of 
Ephesus considers these people to be the philosophers who the answerer reveres (1898, 
p. 115). For instance, when the sophist is arguing against a Platonist, he will attempt to 
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lead his opponent to admit something that is contrary to the Platonic teachings. For if 
the audience believes that the answerer cannot even maintain the positions of his 
master, then he will appear to be responding not in the way that he thinks, but simply 
as to maintain his position at all costs. The same can be said about looking for positions 
held by the interlocutor that are contrary to the positions of reputable people, or 
positions of those like the interlocutor, or positions of the many or all people. For in all 
these cases, the audience will assume that the answerer holds their positions, and thus, 
showing that his positions are in contradiction with one of those positions is almost as 
good as his explicit refutation. Cf. Rhet 1398b21ff where Aristotle treats of this tactic in 
the rhetorical argument.  
174b27.  The Mandrobulus may be a dialogue of Speusippus (cf. Taran, 1981, p. 242-246). 
174b30-33.  According to Michael of Ephesus (1898, pp. 118-119), Lycophron was called 
upon to give a eulogy for the lyre, but was unable due to lack of inspiration. Instead, he 
gave a eulogy to the constellation Lyra. Cf. also Rhet 1401a15-16. 
174b38-40.  Aristotle gives the same advice to the dialectician (Top 158a7-13). 
Chapter 16: Why Studying Sophistic is Useful 
175a1-4.  The beginning of Chapter 16 marks the primary division of the Sophistical 
Refutations. The first half of the work treated the subject matter from the perspective of 
the sophist: Aristotle considered the sources of the primary and secondary sophistical 
aims and as well as the manner in which the sophist should conduct his interrogation. 
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Aristotle now gives his intention for the remaining part of the work: he will take up the 
subject matter from the perspective of the answerer by treating how the answerer 
should untie sophistical refutations, why this method of untying will be sufficient, and 
what are the uses of the study of sophistical refutations for the philosopher. Aristotle 
begins with the last item of his list—i.e., to uses of this study for the philosopher—in 
Chapter 16.  
175a5.   Studying the sophistical art is clearly useful for the dialectician who wishes to 
avoid being taken in by sophistical arguments. Aristotle is concerned with showing 
here why it is useful for the philosopher too. Cf. Meta 1004b17-26 where Aristotle 
distinguishes the philosopher from the dialectician. The dialectician employs his testing 
art concerning the same kinds of the things that the philosopher knows. A dialectician 
can successfully employ his testing art in matters in which he does not have scientific 
knowledge because his arguments do not reason from the proper principles of a science 
but rather from his opponent’s answers and from common principles and places. The 
dialectician uses his testing art to manifest that an opponent who pretends to know 
does not know because the opponent does not know things that anyone who truly has 
knowledge would know (cf. SE 172a21-34 and notes ad loc).  
175a6-12.  For a discussion of the philosophical importance of distinguishing different 
senses of names and the kinds equivocation, cf. Appendix II: Equivocation and its 
Fallacy. Cf. also SE 165a4-6, where Aristotle claims that the one place most naturally 
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suited and common for the production of sophistical refutations is based on names. 
Further, the distinction of the senses of words exemplifies a more universal use of 
sophistic. Familiarity with fallacies enables a student to recognize many distinctions 
necessary to the philosopher, such as the distinction between simply and in a certain 
respect or between what is accidental and what is through itself. Cf. Introduction III.III 
Two Uses Proper to Sophistic for a discussion of both of the uses laid out in this 
paragraph. 
175a12-14.  Aristotle begins by saying that he will state two uses, and then adds this 
third use. This discrepancy seems to indicate reputation’s secondary importance. 
Aristotle places measured importance on maintaining one’s reputation elsewhere: “It is 
especially with matters of honor and dishonor, then, that the great souled man is 
concerned. And he will take pleasure in a measured way in great honors and those that 
come from serious human beings, on the grounds that he obtains what is proper to him 
or even less—for no honor could be worthy of complete virtue, but he will nevertheless 
accept it inasmuch as they have nothing greater to assign him, ” (NE 1124a4–8, trans. 
Bartlett). This point in discussed more thoroughly in Introduction III.III Two Uses 
Proper to Sophistic. 
175a14-16.  Aristotle is referring to a situation in which an interlocutor encounters a 
sophistical refutation, is not fooled by it, and thus objects to the argument, but without 
being able to say precisely what is wrong with the argument. Such a situation is not 
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dangerous to the interlocutor primarily because the interlocutor knows, at least in some 
vague way, that there is no genuine refutation. However, the argument is dangerous 
insofar as the audience will likely believe he is objecting to the argument without 
grounds because—being uneducated about fallacies—he cannot articulate how the 
apparent refutation errs. Compare this passage to Top 160b17–22, where Aristotle 
advises dialecticians to avoid maintaining disreputable opinion (ἄδοξος) because they 
will gain a reputation of maintaining theses merely for the sake of argument which will 
ultimately undermine their authority. 
175a17-20.  The Greek word πλεονεξία which I translate as “advantages” Forster (1955, 
p. 87) translates a “fraudulent methods” and Pichard-Cambridge (1928, p. 297) as 
“forms of dishonesty”. According to LS, the word may have a pejorative sense, though 
not necessarily. Dorion thinks the passage refers to the methods described in Chapter 15 
(1995, pp. 327-329) and argues—convincingly, I think—that most of those methods are 
neutral. The sophist may use such methods with ill intent, but the dialectician in fair 
play. However, given the context of passage, it seems possible that “advantages” could 
refer to the sophistical devices used for attaining the sophist’s secondary aims. 
Certainly, Aristotle’s emphasis on the importance of training to recognize and challenge 
devices in the opportune moment applies equally well to the places used for the 
sophist’s secondary aims.  
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175a20-30.  To be able to answerer sophisms in the opportune moment, one must not 
only know the various sophistical refutations, but must be trained in dealing with them. 
Byrne notes (2001, pp. 413-414) that “analyze” (a28) refers to the process of geometrical 
analysis. As the geometrician sometimes cannot reconstruct the figure which manifests 
the intelligible connection of what is given and the conclusion in a geometrical problem 
even after he has solved the problem, so too a dialectician may not be able to untie a 
sophism even if he knows the kind of fallacy that the sophism commits. Aristotle’s 
emphasis on the importance of training indicates that to acquire the third use’s benefits, 
maintaining one’s reputation, the philosopher should sustain a habit of solving 
sophisms. 
Chapter 17: Apparent Untying of Fallacies 
175a31-41.  An apparent solution to a sophistical refutation is sometimes superior to a 
true solution. Sten Ebbesen comments (2011 p. 78), “although not explicitly mentioned, 
the audience is present in this quotation. What Aristotle says indirectly is that the 
audience may not be able to appreciate a rigid lesson in what went wrong in our eristic 
(contentious) opponent’s argument, and our first job in the disputation is to prevent the 
audience from believing that we have been refuted.” Ebbesen identifies why a 
dialectician would use an apparent solution as opposed to a genuine one: the audience 
just cannot follow the subtle distinction necessary for an accurate refutation. 
Additionally, Ebbesen’s comment underscores the importance of the audience. In this 
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context, the answerer already knows that he has not been refuted, so he is not in danger 
of being deceived by the apparent refutation. An answerer would not use this tactic for 
the sake of the questioner because he is characterized as contentious and therefore not 
principally concerned with the truth.  The only remaining party is the audience. 
Accordingly, we can take the following methods described by Aristotle in this chapter 
as ordered primarily to shaping the audience’s opinion.  
Aristotle advises using apparent solutions for apparent refutations, and not for 
genuine refutations. In fact, the whole of Chapter 17 describes methods for responding 
to arguments that are specifically apparent, rather than genuine. Aristotle holds that the 
great souled man “cares more for the truth than what people think” (NE 1124b27-29, 
trans. Crisp). Still, regard for the truth allows the philosopher to use apparent solutions. 
As Sten Ebbesen puts it (2011 p. 77), “if our antagonist uses counterfeit money, we are 
allowed to pay back with the same coin.” This tactic may be used, therefore, to prevent 
the appearance of refutation when the true untying of a false refutation is too difficult 
for the audience to understand. As Aristotle says, we should distinguish for no other 
reason except that the apparent refutation looks like a refutation (SE 175a40).  
Notice that the analogy which Aristotle offers in the first line of the chapter gives 
a justification of this practice of untying fallacies “endoxically.” In dialectic, it is 
permissible to lead an opponent from his own opinions to a conclusion that is untrue. 
Still, such activity is in service to the truth insofar as the dialectical syllogism shows that 
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an interlocutor’s opinions are truly not in harmony with one another. Similarly, untying 
a sophistical argument with an apparent solution can still be in service to the truth in so 
far as a false refutation that appears to be a refutation will no longer appear to be a 
refutation.  
175b1-6.  When the answerer appears to be refuted, truly or falsely, he can claim the 
refutation is the result of equivocation even if it is not. This tactic may make the 
refutation uncertain in the eyes of the audience when they cannot judge if he is correct.   
175b7-14.  In Plato’s dialogue Euthydemus (295a-296d), the sophist Euthydemus becomes 
angry at Socrates for not answering in terms of “yes” and “no,” but by asking questions 
and making distinctions in his answers (295d1-2): κἀγὼ ἔγνων αὐτὸν ὅτι μοι 
χαλεπαίνοι διαστέλλοντι τὰ λεγόμενα, βουλόμενός με θηρεῦσαι τὰ ὀνόματα 
περιστήσας [I realized he was annoyed with me for making distinctions in his 
statements because he wanted to ensnare me with his words]. In general, a sophist 
hopes his interlocutor will respond with a simple “yes” or “no” to his questions. For 
example, if the sophist asks, “Are things that need be good?”—if the answerer responds 
with a simple “yes” or “no”—the sophist will be able to get him into a contradiction by 
using both meanings of “things that need be” (cf. SE 165b34ff). However, if the 
answerer responds “If you mean by ‘things that need be,’ what is necessary, then no, 
but if you mean by ‘things that need be’ what ought to be, then yes,” then the answerer 
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will have alluded the equivocation. The sophist wishes to avoid this outcome by 
demanding a simple “yes” or “no” answer. 
 Although the sophist makes this demand, the dialectician may also do the same. 
Aristotle claims (Top 158a14ff) that dialectical premises should be phrased such that a 
person can answer them with a simple “yes” or “no.” Moreover, he repeatedly 
emphasizes that the answerer should reply with a simple “yes” or “no,” so long as the 
questions are unambiguous (SE 175b14, Top 160a30-33). In dialectical disputation, this rule 
enables dialectic to proceed without the answerer derailing the conversation with 
tangents and elliptical replies. Socrates himself implies this rule when he exhorts the 
character, Polus, to answer with a simple “yes” or “no” (Gorgias, 475e1).  
175b15-19.  I do not retain Ross’ emendation to the text: ἔλεγχον <ἔλεγχον> εἶναι 
which he justifies through the Λ manuscript of Michael Ephesus. I translate the original 
ἔλεγχον εἶναι with Boethius and the other English translators. Cf. Ross, 1958, p. 224 
and Boethius, 1975, p. 36.  
 Concerning the meaning of the text, Aristotle is pointing out the necessity of 
making distinctions when faced with ambiguous questions. If the answerer does not 
recognize specific questions as ambiguous, then he will not be able to avoid refutation 
because no matter which way he answers a skilled sophist will have handy tricks 
designed to bring about a sophistical refutation from either answer. 
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175b19-27.  Aristotle disagrees with a proposed solution to the fallacy of equivocation 
which adds a demonstrative pronoun as a determinant to an equivocal word to clarify 
its distinct meaning. He argues instead that “this Coriscus” and “Coriscus” are equally 
equivocal. When the proponents of the solution argue that “this Coriscus” does not 
have the same meaning in the statement “this Coriscus is unmusical” as it does in the 
statement “this Coriscus is musical,” Aristotle responds that neither does “Coriscus” 
itself have the same meaning in both cases; the proposed solution makes no difference.  
175b28-32.  Aristotle cautions the respondent not to let any ambiguity go by without 
clarification even when he does not think the argument will turn on the ambiguity. 
When faced with an ambiguous question, the answerer has a right to say that he does 
not understand and await clarification from the questioner, or he can affirm or deny 
with the addition of a relevant distinction of the ambiguous word or phrase.  
175b34.  The Greek word πυκνότης (which I translate as “prevalence”) would be more 
literally translated as “thickness” or “density.” I choose my translation to avoid the 
possibility of conveying an unhappy metaphor with a more literal translation.  
175b38.  The passage which Aristotle is referring to is from the Topics (160a17-34).  
175b39-176a11.  Aristotle draws a likeness between the fallacies of equivocation and 
amphiboly and the fallacy of making two questions into one, noting that the former two 
fallacies do not follow if the latter does not follow. For example, when a sophist asks the 
question “Are things that need to be good?” and the answerer responds “Yes,” then the 
 256 
sophist functions as if his interlocutor had affirmed two questions: “Are necessary 
things good?” and “Are things that ought to be good?” Thus, one way of looking at any 
fallacy based on ambiguity is to reduce it to the problem of making many questions 
one.  
Ultimately, this reduction does not violate the integrity of the fallacies from 
speech as individual fallacies. Fallacies are distinguished by their causes which are two: 
“causa apparentiae” and “causa non existentiae." The fallacies from speech have a different 
cause of appearance than the fallacy of making two questions one. On the one hand, the 
fallacy of equivocation is a fallacy from speech and is based on the likeness of the vocal 
sound of the equivocal word. On the other hand, the fallacy of making two questions 
one is based on the likeness between a question to which a simple yes or no answer 
provides one declaration and a question to which a simple answer provides two 
declarations.  
 As Schreiber notes (2003, p. 161), Aristotle is acting here with the opposite 
tendency of modern logicians, most of whom try to reduce all fallacies to fallacies due 
to language. Aristotle, in contrast, is reducing the two most prevalent fallacies from 
speech to a fallacy outside of speech.  
175b39.  Reading ἐποίει, MpS. Cf. Ross, 1958, p. 225. 
176a12-18.  In the Topics (160a24-28), Aristotle takes a different position. There he claims 
that in the situation when both senses of the term are either true or false, one ought to 
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answer simply and only distinguish when one sense is true and the other false. 
Sympathizing with Aristotle's oscillation on this point is easy. Maintaining a proper 
balance between the desire for clarity with the necessity of forming a cohesive dialogue 
is obviously difficult. Whatever the optimal method in this particular circumstance may 
be, it is clear that one must distinguish the meanings of a word or phrase when it is true 
in one sense, but not in another. 
176a19-21.  Cf. SE 164b25 
176a23-27.  A side-refutation (παρεξέλεγχος) appears to be a refutation of one of the 
interlocutor’s positions, but not his position on the established dialectical problem (cf. 
also SE 181a21 and Top 112a8). The side-refutation was not given by Aristotle as one of 
the sophist’s goals—unless he included it under refutation. While it may sound strange 
that a sophist does not desire all refutations equally, if an interlocutor is refuted on a 
certain point, but he maintains the central issue of the argument consistently, he has not 
lost the argument. It is helpful to keep in mind that the apparent refutation is only a 
means to a higher end for the sophist: appearing wise. Conquering the central issue 
manifests the sophist’s ability to refute more than a refutation on a side issue, and thus 
gives him a greater appearance of wisdom. Nonetheless, the sophist will take what he 
can get, and the answerer should avoid even the side-refutation.  
Whenever the answerer is asked about a reputable opinion which does not lead 
to his contradiction, he should affirm it to avoid a side-refutation and to avoid stating 
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something paradoxical. If the affirmation is out of the question because it would lead to 
his refutation, then the answerer ought to reply, “it seems so.” In doing so, he will 
neither state something paradoxical, yield a position vulnerable to attack, nor affirm a 
statement that will lead to his contradiction.  
176a27-33.  With this slick advice, Aristotle is saying that if a sophist asks a question 
that will quickly lead to the answerer’s contradiction, he can avoid answering it by 
stating that it begs the question. For premises that are near the conclusion often appear 
to be identical to the conclusion itself. In the Topics (162b35-163a29), Aristotle unfolds 
five ways of concealing a conclusion among one’s premises without awakening the 
suspicions of the answerer.  
176a33-35.  In the process of inducing a universal assertion that has no name, the 
dialectician or sophist will ask “Is it so in all like cases?” Cf. Top 157a21ff, SE 174a37-40 
and note ad loc. Aristotle suggests one apparent solution to the argument is for the 
answerer to claim that the sophist is applying “all like cases” in a way that the answerer 
did not concede.  
176a36-37.  The Greek word διορισμόν, translated here as “definition,” may be the 
masculine accusative singular of διόρισις meaning distinction, but διορισμόν may also 
be the masculine accusative singular of διορισμός which I elsewhere translate as 
“definition.” Barnes, Pickard Cambridge, and Forster think this word refers to the 
distinction of the fallacies given at SE 168a17ff. The term more likely refers to the 
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definition of refutation given at SE 165a1-4 and unfolded as it pertains to the solution of 
fallacies at SE 168a20ff. Maurus (1885, p. 610) and Dorion (1995, p. 335) share this 
interpretation.  
In this reading, Aristotle’s advice is that in the case where all the previous tactics 
cannot be employed, one can state that a proper refutation has not been reached while 
laying out its full definition with all of its qualifications. The merits of this tactic are 
twofold: in the first place, the answerer portrays himself to have a command over the 
discipline, and in the second place, he will confuse most questioners and most of the 
audience who will not be able to discern whether or not his criticism is accurate on such 
short notice.  
176a38-b7.  Whenever a question is indistinct and can be taken in a number of ways, the 
answerer should never supply what he believes to be its meaning in his head. Rather 
than conceding with a simple “yes” or “no,” he should respond by distinguishing, e.g., 
“If we use ‘of the Athenians’ (Ἀθηναίων) as a possessive genitive, then anything ‘of the 
Athenians’ is a property of the Athenians. If we use ‘of the Athenians’ as genitive of a 
divided whole, then everything that is ‘of the Athenians’ is not their property.”  
176b8-11.  It is useful for the answerer to overcomplicate the argument intentionally. 
Thus, if he is going to concede two statements (A) and (B), but (A) being so implies that 
(B) is so and not vice versa, then he should concede (B) before he concedes (A). Doing so 
necessitates that the questioner secure both premises, and thereby it makes his task 
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more complicated. To my mind, Aristotle is not in any way referring to the fallacy of 
assuming the consequent although the fallacy’s logical structure is similar to the 
situation described here. 
176b11-13.  Aristotle may be referring to the dialectical place that uses the absence of a 
contrary to manifest two things are different. One way to show that a word has two 
different meanings, for instance, is to show that at times the word refers to something 
that has a contrary and at other times it refers to something that does not have a 
contrary (Top 106a10-21). 
176b18.  The Greek word I translate as “judgment” here is γνώμη. In the Rhetoric 
(1394a22ff), Aristotle defines this word as a “general statement that concerns practical 
conduct.” He claims that since enthymemes are syllogisms dealing with practical 
subjects, the judgment is a premise of the enthymeme considered apart from the rest of 
the argument. 
Chapter 18: Untying Fallacies in General 
176b29-33.  In the fifth book of the Metaphysics (1124b27-1125a2), Aristotle gives several 
meanings of false (ψευδής). Two of those meanings are respectively connected with the 
two instances of a false syllogism given here. Sometimes false is used to signify a 
statement which does not correspond to reality because it predicates something of 
something about which it is not true. For instance, the statement “a circle is three-sided” 
is called false. Aristotle’s first instance of false syllogism corresponds with this meaning 
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of false because it concludes or uses a false statement. However, sometimes, false is used 
to signify a thing insofar as it appears by nature to be other than it is. For example, fool’s 
gold or a dream are called false with this meaning (cf. Meta 1124b22-25). Aristotle’s 
second instance of a false syllogism is called false in this meaning because it deceptively 
appears to be a syllogism. 
While Aristotle says here that a syllogism may be false in two ways, in the Topics 
he says an argument (λόγος) is called false in four ways: “One way is when it appears to 
come to a conclusion though it does not do so (which is called a contentious deduction 
{συλλογισμός}). Another way is when it comes to a conclusion but not one relevant to 
what was proposed (which happens most to those leading to the impossible). Or, it 
comes to a conclusion relevant to what was proposed, but yet not in accordance with 
the appropriate study (and this is when it appears to be medical though it is not 
medical, or geometrical though it is not geometrical, or dialectical though it is not 
dialectical), whether what follows is false or true. In another way, if it is concluded 
through falsehoods. The conclusion of such an argument will sometimes be false but 
sometimes true: for a falsehood is always concluded through falsehoods, but it is 
possible for a truth to be concluded even though not from truths, as was also stated 
earlier” (Top 162b3-15, trans. Smith). 
Aristotle’s first and last meanings of false argument resemble his two meanings 
of false syllogism, though his fourth meaning of false argument clarifies his first 
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meaning of false syllogism. Aristotle’s first meaning of false syllogism is that which 
“has syllogized the false” (συλλελόγισται ψεῦδος). One might believe this 
characterization encompasses only syllogisms that conclude in a false statement. 
Instead, it also includes arguments that conclude through falsehoods; the last meaning of 
false argument corresponds to this meaning. Such a “syllogism” may or may not have a 
false conclusion. That is, a syllogism is false because its premises are false, not because it 
has a false conclusion. This reading of Aristotle is confirmed when further down the 
paragraph (176b36-177a2) we read that some [false] syllogisms—that do indeed 
syllogize—have a true conclusion. Moreover, Aristotle shows in many other places that 
it is possible to syllogize to a true conclusion from false premises (APr 54a1-a4, APo 
88a20-21, Top 162a11). When dealing with such a syllogism, the interlocutor’s only 
means of rebuttal is to attack the premises because the conclusion is unassailable on 
account of its truth. In contrast, whenever the conclusion is false, the answerer can untie 
the argument either by doing away with one of the premises or by showing that the 
conclusion is not true. 
Aristotle’s middle two meanings of false arguments given in the Topics have no 
corresponding meaning to false syllogisms because they are false not as syllogisms, but 
as being not to the point—which can make an argument false but not as a syllogism—or 
as being outside the discipline at hand.  
 263 
176b33-36.  Foster, Tricot, and Pickard Cambridge all consider “the untying just 
mentioned just” to be referring to the apparent untyings given in Chapter 17. As Dorion 
notes, however, it is unlikely that the apparent untyings explained in Chapter 17 could 
also be called corrections (ὀρθὴ) untyings (SE 176b34-35). It is more likely that Aristotle 
is referring to the untying mentioned at SE 176b29-30: “[exposing] from what sort of 
question the falsehood ensues.” 
176b36-177a6.  In the Topics (160b23-40), Aristotle explains what it is to do away with 
(ἀναιρέω) a premise—or a question that leads to a premise—when untying false 
arguments. Rejecting any premise whatsoever will not appropriately untie an 
argument, even if the premise is false. Aristotle uses the following argument as an 
example: 
1) Whoever is sitting is writing 
Socrates is sitting 
Socrates is writing. 
In Aristotle’s imaginary state of affairs, Socrates is neither sitting nor writing when this 
argument is made. Pointing out that Socrates is not sitting, however, does not untie the 
argument because when Socrates is sitting the argument will still be false. If a 
dialectician does away with the second premise, then the argument will appear to 
follow in some cases. Since the argument is always false, it must be untied in all cases 
(πάντως), and thus be shown to be false in all cases. There is one particular premise 
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that should be done away with—that whoever is sitting is writing—if a dialectician is to 
untie the argument properly.  
On the one hand, by manifesting that the conclusion of an argument is untrue, 
one shows either that the argument is not syllogistic, or that one or many of the 
premises are untrue, or both. On the other hand, Aristotle claims in Chapter 24 that 
showing that a false syllogism’s conclusion is false is not a true untying unless it 
exposes that by which the argument is false. For example, arguing that motion is real is 
not a solution to Zeno’s paradoxes because it does not reveal what is erroneous in 
Zeno’s arguments. Poste takes Aristotle to be flatly contradicting himself on this point 
(1866, n. 2, p. 145). However, given the passage from Top 160b23-40 discussed in the 
above note, we can see that in some cases demonstrating that a conclusion is false will 
also demonstrate the false premise that is the root of certain false syllogisms. Let us 
repeat Aristotle’s example. 
1) Whoever is sitting is writing. 
Socrates is sitting. 
Socrates is writing. 
In the situation where Socrates is sitting, manifesting that Socrates is not writing also 
manifests that whoever is sitting does not need to be writing. In some instances, doing 
away with a conclusion also does away with the premise that is the root of a falsehood 
because the other premise is undoubtable. Whenever one of two premises in a syllogism 
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is undoubtable, and one shows that the conclusion is false, one has therefore shown that 
the remaining premise is false.  
177a6.  Cf. SE 176b36ff 
177a6-8.  Cf. SE 175a20-30 and note ad loc.  
Chapter 19: Untying the Fallacies of Equivocation and Amphiboly 
177a9-12.  In Chapter 19, Aristotle discusses how the answerer should meet as sophist 
who tries to refute him using the fallacies of equivocation or amphiboly. In general, he 
should meet the fallacies of equivocation and amphiboly by stating in what sense he 
affirms and in what sense he denies each question, or by stating in what sense the 
conclusion follows and in what sense it does not. 
Commenting on the current passage, Dorion contradicts Aristotle by claiming 
that the ambiguous phrase in this example is “obviously” (manifestement) in the premise 
(1995, n. 282, p. 337). He cites Plato’s Euthydemus (300bff) where the question “Is 
speaking of the silent (σιγῶντα λέγειν) possible?” is used as a premise of a sophistical 
refutation regardless of whether the answer is “yes” or “no.” Cf. also SE 166a12-13 
where Aristotle first lays out his “speaking of the silent” example.  The Greek σιγῶντα 
λέγειν can mean either that “silent things speak” or “to speak about silent things.” On 
the one hand, if the interlocutor answers yes, the sophist uses the answer to form the 
premise, “it is possible for silent things to speak.” On the other hand, if the interlocutor 
answers no, then the sophist takes the answer as the premise that “it is not possible to 
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speak about silent things.” Thus, with this rendition of the argument, the amphiboly is 
in the premises. That all said, there is no reason to contradict Aristotle here because 
nothing prevents this ambiguity from showing up in a conclusion as in the argument 
from Poste (1866, n. 1, p. 147):  
1) To speak of stones is possible. 
To speak of stones is to speak of the silent. 
Therefore, to speak of the silent is possible. 
177a13-15.  Aristotle does not give us much context for this example. Poste interprets 
the Greek μὴ συνεπίστασθαι τὸν ἐπιστάμενον (which I translate as “the one who 
knows not knowing fully”) as ambiguous through its accusative infinitive construction 
(1866, n. 2, p. 60). The phrase has an ambiguity directly parallel to that of “speaking of 
the silent.” This interpretation places the example under the fallacy of amphiboly. 
Dorion argues instead that it is unlikely to be a case of amphiboly since Aristotle has 
already given an example of this kind of fallacy in this chapter (1995, n. 289, p. 339). In 
Dorion’s mind, the question works on the equivocal meanings of knowing: one can 
know, in a sense, what one is not currently thinking about or one can only know what 
he is currently thinking about. Dorion’s reading is reinforced by Aristotle’s advised 
clarification of the question given below (SE 177a28): “yes, but they do not know in this 
way (οὕτως).”  
 Regardless, Aristotle’s overall point in this paragraph is clear. The ambiguous 
word or phrase may be any one of the terms in a syllogism. If it is the middle term, then 
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the ambiguity will only lie in the premises, and not in the conclusion. If the minor or 
major term is ambiguous, then the ambiguity will appear in the conclusion. 
177a16-17.  Perhaps, Aristotle means that the questioner should obtain the explicit 
affirmation of the conclusion, and not only the premises of the refutation.  This way, at 
least in words, the answerer will contradict himself. Taking Aristotle’s previous 
example, a sophist asks if to speak of the silent is possible. The answerer claims that the 
silent cannot speak, and then the sophist obtains affirmation of the following two 
premises: a) to speak of stones is possible and b) to speak of stones is to speak of the 
silent. The sophist should force the answer to state explicitly what follows from these 
two premises: to speak of the silent is possible. By stating the conclusion, the answerer 
produces more of an appearance of refutation. In this way, the answerer will bring 
about the audible effect of contradicting himself, although he has done so only 
according to speech.  
177a17-18.  This example is based on exactly the same syntactical structure as the 
“speaking of the silent” example. The Greek phrase τὸν τυφλὸν ὁρᾶν uses the 
accusative infinitive construction that can mean either “the blind one sees” or “seeing 
the blind one.” I use the analogous ambiguous English phrase “sight of the blind.” 
177a18.   “Contradiction” is the specific difference in the definition of refutation (SE 
165a2-3). 
177a23-24.  Aristotle discusses his “things which need to be” example at SE 165b35. 
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177a24-26.  The Greek phrase adds the masculine singular demonstrative pronoun 
τόνδε. By adding the demonstrative τόνδε before σιγῶντα, the answerer specifies that 
σιγῶντα refers to the object of the speaking and, with the help of negation, he rejects 
the absurd interpretation where silent things are understood as the subject of the 
speaking. With these clarifications, the answerer shows that the only question he is 
ready to affirm is "Is it possible to speak of silent things?" 
Chapter 20: Untying the Fallacies of Composition and Division 
177a33-35.   Chapter 20 treats of how one can untie fallacies of composition and 
division. In all cases, the untying or solution involves pointing out that the sophist is 
taking a proposition in a divided way when the proposition was conceded or follows 
only in a composed way, or vice versa.  
177a36-37.  The argument to which Aristotle refers may be exemplified in the following 
manner: 
1) He was struck with what you saw him being struck with. 
What you saw him being struck with was your eyes. 
He was struck with your eyes. 
The fallacy is based on the two different ways to take the first premise: He was struck 
with what you saw him being struck with. In English, if the second “with” is taken in 
combination with “struck,” the first premise is likely to be accepted by an interlocutor. 
However, for the fallacy to follow, the second “with” in the first premise must rather be 
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divided from “struck” and taken together with “saw.” In Greek, the ambiguity depends 
on whether one takes the dative relative pronoun ᾧ with εἶδες or τυπτόμενον. 
177a37-38.  This example plays on the same ambiguity going in the other direction: 
2) Your eyes are what you saw him being struck with. 
You saw him being struck with what he was struck with, i.e., the stick. 
Your eyes are what he was struck with, i.e., the stick. 
 
177a38-b9.  Aristotle here gives his reason for the distinction between the fallacies of 
composition and division and the fallacy of amphiboly. Aristotle says questions of 
composition and division “have something of the questions from amphiboly” because 
both are due to mixing up different perceived meanings in speech. The fallacies, 
however remain distinct. In the fallacy of amphiboly one speech or phrase has a twofold 
meaning—although only one meaning is accepted—but in the case of fallacies of 
composition and division there are two different phrases—though they appear to be the 
same—each with its own meaning (cf. SE 168a24-34 and notes ad loc). 
 This passage appears to contradict other passages (SE 165b29, SE 166a35) where 
Aristotle implies that the fallacies of composition and division rely on the same speech. 
To my mind, Aristotle calls the different speeches or statements (λόγοι) “the same” in 
those passages the way he calls sophistical refutations “refutations.” Aristotle calls two 
statements that use the same words in the same order “the same” because they appear 
to be the same.  
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So why does Aristotle say these λὀγοι must, in fact, be different? The statements 
have different pronunciations. To explain his meaning, Aristotle uses an analogy. Two 
Greek words that share the same letters and order but differ in accent—technically in 
their aspiration—are ὄρος and ὅρος. ὄρος with the soft breathing mark signifies a 
wooden implement used for pressing grapes (cf. LS entry). ὅρος with the rough 
breathing mark signifies a limit or boundary. I have taken the liberty of replacing ὄρος 
and ὅρος with the two English words record” and “record. Point being that while two 
words can be identically written, they are not the same word if they have different 
meanings according to different pronunciations. So just as we should not say two words 
with the same letters and order are the same if they are pronounced differently, neither 
should we say that a statement taken in composition is the same as a statement taken in 
division.  
177b6.  Aristotle indicates that in the past words were written in Greek without accents 
and breathing marks, but in his time, writers had begun to use markings to distinguish 
between words in written works. 
177b10-26.  There is some obscurity in this paragraph because Aristotle unties some of 
the fallacy’s examples, but others he leaves tied-up. For instance, Aristotle offers his 
solution to the sophistical conclusion that you have come to be now because it is true 
now that you have come to be. For when one divides “now” from “you have come to 
be” it signifies something different from when one takes it in composition with “you 
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have come to be” (SE 177b20-22). Yet in his trireme example, he offers no solution (SE 
177b12-13).   
Michael of Ephesus claims that Aristotle trireme example refers to the following 
argument (1898, p. 146): 
1. Questioner: Are you now in the Piraeus? 
Answerer: Yes 
Questioner: Do you know about the triremes which are in Sicily? 
Answerer: Yes 
Questioner: Therefore, you know about the triremes in the Piraeus in Sicily. 
177b27-34.  In the final paragraph of the chapter, Aristotle challenges an untying 
alternative to his own untying of the cithara example. The proposed alternative claims 
the answerer did not concede that one will do what he is able to do “in every way.” 
Aristotle’s first criticism of this untying is that it does not apply to all fallacies from 
composition, but only to this instance. Aristotle employs this principle elsewhere (SE 
179b11-12). Aristotle’s second criticism is that it does not apply to “all ways of 
questioning” (πάντως ἐρωτωμένοις) because it does not actually give the reason of 
why the fallacy fails to follow. If the questioner were to make his original question, 
“Can you do as you are able to do in every way?” the fallacy could still follow, and the 
proposed solution would not untie the fallacy. Certainly, the answerer, who would 
concede the former question, might not concede this new one. Nonetheless, the 
rephrased question remains an endox and will likely be accepted by many answerers. 
Thus, the proposed solution may solve the sophism towards or relative to (πρὸς) an 
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opponent, yet it does not solve the sophism relative to the argument (πρὸς τὸν λόγον). 
It is not the question’s lack of “in every way” that makes the question appear to be so 
while not being so. Rather the true solution makes clear that “to be able to play the 
cithara while not playing the cithara” has a different meaning in composition from what 
it has in division. The answerer concedes the phrase with the divided meaning, but the 
questioner uses the composed meaning. This account implies that a true solution 
explains why the premise appears to be an endox while not being an endox. More 
generally, a true solution gives the reason why the argument does not truly refute in 
any instance (cf. SE 179b17-26 note ad loc). 
Aristotle gives three criteria here for judging whether proposed solution is also a 
proper solution, and I have argued that he implies a fourth criterion.  
1. Every proper solution of a fallacy applies to all fallacies that fall under the 
same place 
2. Every proper solution applies to all ways of questioning 
3. Every proper solution is relative to the argument (πρὸς τὸν λόγον) and not 
only the interlocutor. 
4.  
Therefore, every proper solution gives the reason why the fallacy does not refute. 
Chapter 21: Untying the Fallacy of Accent 
177b35-178a2.  Chapter 21 is Aristotle’s limited treatment of how to untie the fallacy of 
the accent. The fallacy was first discussed at SE 166b1-9. Obviously, it is not the most 
dangerous fallacy. Aristotle’s made up example plays on the distinction between οὗ 
(which is a genitive singular relative pronoun) and οὐ (which is a negative adverb). In 
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the example, two different words with two different significations, distinguishable 
merely by their accent and use, are confused. 
Chapter 22: Untying the Fallacy of Figure of Diction 
178a4-5.  In this chapter, Aristotle discusses untying the fallacy from figure of diction 
which he here describes as the fallacy from being said in the same way (παρὰ τὸ 
ὡσαύτως λέγεσθαι). He has also described the fallacy as from common-form 
(ὁμοιοσχημοσύνη, SE 170a15). Aristotle originally introduced the fallacy at SE 166b10-
19. The sophistical place that underlies the deceptive nature of the fallacy is the 
proposition: What is expressed in the same way is the same thing (SE 166b11). 
Whenever two things are expressed in the same way, and they are not the same, a 
person may likely consider them the same. The fallacy plays on this tendency. For this 
reason, Aristotle claims that the fallacy’s trick occurs through a likeness in speech (SE 
169a30-169b2). 
1778a5-8.  Swanson is incorrect when she claims that the fallacy of figure of diction 
results in a category mistake “in Aristotle’s technical sense of category” (2017, p. 182). 
“The kinds of categories” (τὰ γένη τῶν κατηγοριῶν) should be interpreted as more 
general than the strict notion of categories which Aristotle lays out in the Categories (cf. 
Albertus Magnus II, 1890, tr. 2, c. 5, p. 675, Ebbesen, 1981, I, p. 8, and Dorion, 1995, p. 
347-348). While knowledge of these ‘categories’—the most universal univocal genera—
is certainly included in the knowledge useful for untying this fallacy, not every instance 
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of the fallacy can be solved by a distinction of ‘categories’ in the strict sense. Category 
here has the sense of common predicate. Sylvester Maurus accurately claims (1885, p. 
616) that the fallacy fundatur in eo quod quae non sunt eadem significantur simili figura 
dictionis [is founded on the fact that things which are not the same things are signified 
by a similar figure of diction]. Cf. also (ps) Aquinas, 1976, c. 10. When a likeness in the 
way things are expressed leads one to think there is a likeness in what is expressed, one 
commits a mistake based on the figure of diction. If we have things placed in their 
proper categories—common predicates—then we are less likely to be fooled when a 
sophist expresses something in one category with a form similar to the way he 
expresses something in another category. Sometimes masculine things are signified by 
feminine nouns and vice versa (SE 166b11-12). Masculine and feminine animals belong 
to the same ‘category’ in the word’s strict sense, but can clearly be said to be in different 
categories in the less strict sense of the word. Again, sometimes a universal is signified 
in the same way as a particular and thus is considered as particular (SE 178b36ff). Yet 
the fallacy also involves mistakes such as confusing a passive reality for an active reality 
because it is signified actively. Confusing active and passive realities result in ‘category’ 
mistakes in the sense of most universal univocal genera. 
 For Aristotle, the knowledge of the genera of categories may prevent one from 
falling victim to this fallacy, although the fallacy is from speech. It is knowledge of a 
distinction in things that prevents a deception through a likeness in speech.  
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178a9-11.  As Michael of Ephesus first pointed out, the following argument is not an 
instance of the previously described confusion between the category of substance and 
the categories of relation and quantity. Instead, it is an instance of a fallacy of the figure 
of diction. 
Although ‘to see’ (ὁρᾶν) is grammatically active just as is ‘to act upon’ (ποιεῖν), 
seeing is an instance of undergoing (πάσχειν), not acting upon (ποιεῖν).  The 
grammatical similarity of ‘to see’ and ‘to act upon’ leads to the confusion that they are 
the same sort of actions. In Aristotle’s example, the sophist persuades his interlocutor to 
accept the endox that it is impossible to act upon and to have acted upon the same thing 
in the same respect. Apparently, the answerer concedes this supposition because acting 
upon is a movement (κίνησις), as opposed to a complete activity (ἐνέργεια, cf. Meta 
1048b16-36, DA 431a6-7). However, ‘to see’ is an activity, and thus the answerer 
concedes that one can be seeing and have seen at the same time in the same respect. The 
result is an apparent refutation based on the likeness of figure of diction between ‘to 
see’ and ‘to act upon.’ 
 This example, as well as all future examples in this chapter, fall under the 
category of figure of diction because people imagine words or phrases to have 
meanings that they do not have on account of their similarity to words or phrases that 
do have those meanings. In this example, ‘to see’ is imagined to be an instance of ‘to act 
 276 
upon’ because both words are grammatically active, though ‘to see’ signifies an 
undergoing and a complete activity. 
178a11-16.  This example plays off the fact that verbs may be both grammatically active 
or passive, while the actions that the words signify are either instances of undergoing 
(πάσχειν) or acting upon (ποιεῖν) in reality. For another instance of this mistake, cf. 
Aquinas, 1952, q. 8, art. 6, obj. 3 & ad 3. 
178a16-28.  Just as an answerer is not truly refuted by a sophistical refutation based on 
equivocation unless he concedes that he used the equivocal word with the same 
meaning, in this example the answer is not actual refuted unless he grants mistakenly 
that ‘to see’—which is an undergoing in reality—is an acting upon.  
178a32.  Reading ὅσον δὲ μὴ ἔχει ἢ for ὅσα δὲ μὴ ἔχει ᾗ with Hasper and Barnes. Cf. 
Ross, 1958, p. 232.  
178a36-178b7.  Although in speech we sometimes use “only one die” in the same way 
we use “one die,” they do not signify the same reality.  As Aristotle puts it, one die is a 
“this,” but “only one die” signifies how a “this” relates to particular things—namely that 
it is not with another. In the principle one cannot give what he does not have, ‘what’ 
applies to ‘this somethings,’ i.e., individual substances (cf. SE 168a25-26, SE 169a33-36 
and notes ad loc. Besides “only,” other adverbs may also lead to this confusion as 
Aristotle illustrates in the next example with “quickly.” For adverbs express the how one 
gives, not what one gives.  
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178b8-10.  The fallacy plays on the confusion of between “an eye” and “only one eye.” 
A person cannot see with an eye he does not have.  Still, he can see with only one eye 
although he has two. Again, he cannot punch with a fist that he does not have, but he 
can punch with only one fist. The sophism is analogous to Aristotle’s previous example 
of only one die. For a thorough analysis of this and other examples from this chapter, cf. 
Schreiber, 2003, pp. 38-46. 
178b10-11.  Since this sophistical refutation results from the answerer conceding that a 
man can see with only one eye when he does not have only one eye, the answerer may 
get out of the contradiction by saying that a person with two eyes also has only one eye. 
This proposed solution is a contradiction of the conclusion of the sophistical argument. 
178b11-13.  Aristotle here draws a comparison between a proposed solution to the 
example concluding that one can give what he does not have and the way in which 
some people untie another example (SE 178a38ff). Aristotle does not completely flesh 
out this other example. Schreiber’s interpretation is reasonable (2003, p. 41): 
 “Is it the case that what one person gives to another that second person has?” 
 “Yes” 
“But one person gave another only one [counting stone], yet the second person 
has ten [counting stones], not only one.” 
 
The proposed solution to the argument claims that a man has only one counting stone 
from a person who gave him one counting stone. In other words, both proposed 
solutions attempt to contradict the conclusion of the sophistical refutation.  
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178b14-16.  In another proposed solution to the previous fallacy, some people deny the 
original question that what one person gave to another, the second person has.  
Accordingly, the second solution contradicts the premise, while the first solution 
contradicts the conclusion.  
178b16-23.  If a proposed solution is genuine, then a sophistical refutation becomes a 
genuine refutation when an answer explicitly grants the opposite of the solution (τὸ 
ἀντικείμενον); a genuine solution must address the underlying root of the fallacy (SE 
179b17-26). For example, in dealing with the fallacy of equivocation, if the answerer 
concedes that he uses the word in the same sense—that is, he concedes the opposite of 
the genuine solution—then he is refuted. The proposed solutions do not work because 
even when an answerer explicitly concedes the opposite of the proposed solutions, the 
argument remains inconclusive. Take for instance the proposed solution to the eye 
example which claims that a person having many eyes also has only one eye (SE 
178b10-11). If this solution were genuine, then when an answerer concedes that the 
person does not have only one eye—a reasonable concession—then the sophist’s 
refutation would be genuine. However, the argument remains sophistical even when 
the answerer concedes the opposite of the proposed solution, and accordingly, the 
solution does not address the true cause of the fallacy (SE 176b29-30 and SE 179b17-24). 
176b16.  Cf. SE 177b33ff. 
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178b24-29.  As with previous examples, this example turns on the implication that the 
“what” (ὃ) in “what is written” (ὃ γέγραπται) includes the truth quality in which it was 
written. In truth, the what only includes the ‘this’ (τόδε) that was written, and not the 
quality (τοιόνδε).  
178b34-36.  This example plays on the confusion between taking “what” collectively 
rather than severally.  It is a true endox that what someone knows severally, he knows 
either through learning or self-discovery, but it is not an endox collectively. The 
argument is a good example of the sophism that is not due to apparent reasoning, but 
an apparent endox. 
178b36-179a8.  Following C.D.C. Reeve (2016, n. 179, pp. 295-296), it appears that 
Aristotle is referring to the same argument from Plato’s Parmenides (132a1-b2). In 
argument, one should supply “man” for “large,” 
“I suppose you think that each form is one on the following ground: whenever 
some number of things seem to you to be large, perhaps there seems to be some 
one character, the same as you look at them all, and from that, you conclude that 
the large is one.” 
“That’s true,” he said. 
“What about the large itself and other large things? If you look at them all in the 
same way with the mind’s eye, again won’t some one thing appear large?” 
“It seems so.” 
“So, another form of largeness will make its appearance, which has emerged 
alongside largeness itself and the things that partake of it, and in turn another 
over these, by which all of them are large. Each of your forms will no longer be 
one, but an unlimited multitude.” [trans. Grill and Ryan] 
 
Aristotle mentions in Categories 5 (3b15-23): 
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But in the case of second substances, it appears, from the form of their names, 
that they signify a “this something,” when one says “man” or “animal.” Indeed, 
this is not true; but rather they signify how something (ποιόν τι) is. For what is 
underlying is not one, as is first substance, but “man” and “animal” are said of 
many. They do not, however, signify how it (ποιόν τι) is simply, as does “white.” 
For “white” signifies nothing other than how, but species and genus mark out 
how it is concerning substance. For they signify a certain substance as how it is. 
But they mark out more by a genus than by a species. For the one saying 
“animal” takes in more than the one saying “man.” [trans. Coughlin] 
 
Obviously, the metaphysical considerations of both this passage from the Categories and 
the passage above in the Sophistical Refutations are enormous (Meta 990b15ff and Meta 
1038b34-1039a3). As far as the Sophistical Refutations is concerned, suffice it to say that 
although Socrates and man may be used similarly in speech, i.e., man is rational, and 
Socrates is rational, one cannot reason about them in the same way because they do not 
signify the same kinds of things.  Socrates and every individual man signifies a ‘this 
something,’ and as a result, a sophist cannot reason about a particular man in the same 
manner as he can reason about the universal man. 
Chapter 23: Untying Fallacies from Speech in General 
179a11-12.  Chapter 23 serves as a general summary of Aristotle’s account of how to 
untie fallacies from speech. In these first lines, Aristotle notes that untying fallacies from 
speech is based on the opposite of the source of the argument. That is, in every fallacy 
from speech the sophist takes something that the answerer says to signify with an 
unintended meaning. To untie all these fallacies, the answerer should clarify the 
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intended meaning of his speech, thereby negating the meaning in which the sophist 
uses it.  
179a12-15.  Schreiber (2003, pp. 90-91) argues that this passage justifies his position that 
the fallacy of composition is the same fallacy as that of division. For just as there is not 
one fallacy for the acute and another for the grave accent, neither should there be one 
fallacy of composition and another fallacy of division. Schreiber’s position is reasonable.  
179a15-19.  The precise example of the fallacy of equivocation is difficult to discern; 
Aristotle does not name the equivocal word but merely implies that it takes on the 
predicate ensouled and un-souled (ἄψυχον). Sylvester Maurus gives an example 
reflective of the general interpretation by commentators (Maurus, 1885, p. 620; Michael 
of Ephesus, 1898, p. 159-160; Tricot, 1939, p. 104; Dorion, 1995, n. 335, p. 365): 
“Is every dog (canis) ensouled?” 
“Yes” 
“But is the constellation canis major ensouled?” 
“No” 
“Therefore, every dog is not ensouled, but some are un-souled.” 
Whatever the precise example that Aristotle alludes to is, the genuine solution 
articulates in what sense the equivocal name may be—in Maurus’s example canis—un-
souled. The answerer may solve the sophistical refutation by pointing out in what sense 
of the equivocal word the thing the word signified may be called un-souled, and in 
what sense of the equivocal word it may not.  
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179a19.  My translation includes λέγειν (which is bracketed by Ross) following all the 
manuscripts and every English translator. Cf. Ross, 1958, p. 235.  
179a20.  “Likeness of diction” (ὁμοιότητα λέξεως) is apparently another name for the 
fallacy of figure of diction (σχῆμα λέξεως). 
179a21-22.  Cf. SE 178a36-b7 and note ad loc. 
179a23-24.  Cf. SE 178b34-36 and note ad loc. 
179a24.  Cf. SE 178b31-33. 
Chapter 24: Untying the Fallacy of the Accident 
179b26-27.  In Chapter 24, Aristotle discusses untying the fallacy of the accident (τὸ 
συμβεβηκὸς). This fallacy’s trick turns on an interlocutor’s inability to distinguish 
“what is the same and what is different” (SE 169b4). More specifically, Aristotle claims 
this fallacy results from using what is accidental in place of what is through itself (SE 
170a4). The fallacy of the accident occurs “whenever anything is thought to belong to a 
thing {πρᾶγμα} and its accident in a like manner” (SE 166b28-29). It may be reduced to 
ignorance of the definition of syllogism insofar as there is no syllogism of what is 
accidental (SE 168a34ff). I argue in my appendix on this fallacy that it plays on the 
failure to make a distinction between being through itself (καθ' αυ ̔τό) and accidental 
being. Cf. Appendix II.III What is the The Fallacy of the Accident.  
179a27-31.  Aristotle’s method of manifesting invalid forms of “syllogisms” is to 
produce an example in which a particular type of conclusion might appear to be true 
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and another conclusion of the same logical form that is obviously false (cf. for instance, 
APr 26a2-8). If one can give an example of an evidently false conclusion from an 
argument of a particular form, then he has manifested that the conclusion does not 
follow necessarily, and consequently that the argument is not a syllogism. Here he 
states one must be equipped with examples using an accidental middle term where the 
conclusion is evidently false. That way, an answerer will be able to manifest that an 
argument from the accident is not a syllogism, but merely appears to be.  
179a32-33.  Judging from the way in which Aristotle speaks about this argument below 
(SE 179a39-b1), it appears to run as follows: 
Do you know about the good? 
Yes. 
Do you know what I am about to ask you?  
No.  
I am about to ask you about the good.  
Therefore, you don’t know about the good. 
179a33-34.  As is clear below (SE 179b1-4), Aristotle is alluding to the following two 
arguments: 
1. Do you know who is coming? 
No. 
Do you know Coriscus?  
Yes. 
Coriscus is coming; therefore, you know who is coming. 
2. Do you know who is veiled? 
No. 
Do you know Coriscus? 
Yes. 
Coriscus is veiled; therefore, you know who is veiled. 
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179a34-35.  Aristotle is referring to an argument given in Plato’s Euthydemus (298e1-10).  
Is that dog a father? 
Yes. 
Is he your dog? 
Yes.  
Then he is your father. 
The previous argument appears to be analogous to the one above (Cf. SE 179b5-6): 
 Is that statue a work of art? 
 Yes. 
 Is it your statue? 
 Yes. 
 Then it is your work of art. 
179a35.  The example to which Aristotle refers in this passage has been interpreted in 
multiple ways (cf. Poste, 1866, n. 5, pp. 156-157; Schreiber, 2003, p. 23 and Hamblin, 
1970, n. 2, p. 86). With Schreiber and Dorion, I consider the reconstruction given by 
Joseph as plausible (Joseph, 1916, p. 587). 
Six is a small number 
 Thirty-six is six (namely, six groups of six). 
 Therefore, thirty-six is a small number.  
 Therefore thirty-six (which is a large number) is a small number. 
179a35-39.  The Greek phrase which I translate as “truly predicated of” is ἀληθεύεσθαι 
κατά. The same phrase is used in the same sense at Topics 132b4. Cf. also Top132a31 
and NE 1100a35. 
 Concerning the meaning of the text, Aristotle’s advises the answerer to untie the 
fallacy of the accident by pointing out that not everything that can be said of an 
accident, can be said of the thing itself. Aristotle holds that the fallacy of the accident 
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arises through the connection of many different accidentally related things belonging to 
the same thing. Although Coriscus and “who is coming” are ταὐτό πως [are in a way 
the same] (cf. Meta l024b30-32), not everything that can be predicated of “who is 
coming” can be predicated of Coriscus, or vice versa, because ‘Coriscus who is coming’ 
is only an accidental being just as ‘musical man’ is an accidental being. All the same, 
predicates belong only to τοῖς κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀδιαφόροις καὶ ἓν οὖσιν ἅπαντα 
[whatever is one and undifferentiated according to substance] or a being through itself 
(καθ' αὑτό). Cf. SE 179a38.  The same analysis can be applied to all the examples in this 
chapter.  
179a39-b1.  Aristotle is referring to the argument he alluded to at SE 179a33.   
179b7-16.  Any genuine solution to a fallacy must apply to every fallacy of the same 
kind. The dog being a father is accidentally connected to its being your dog. Likewise, 
your knowing Coriscus is accidentally connected to his coming. Both fallacies play on 
the accidental connection in beings. The proposed solution—that it is possible to know 
and not to know the same thing in different respects—is not applicable to the “Is your 
dog a father?” example.  
179b7.  I have not retained Ross’s replacement of διαιροῦντες for ἀναιροῦντες because 
it is not supported by the manuscripts and does not seem to bring any further clarity to 
the text. Cf. Ross, 1958 p. 236 and Dorion, 1995, n. 358, pp. 375-376. 
179b11.  Cf. SE 177b31-33. 
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179b17.  This almost parenthetical line in the Sophistical Refutations seems to be the 
solution to many difficulties within the text (cf. for instance, Evans, 1975, p. 50; Cf. 
Poste, 1866, n. 3, p. 156 and n. 5, pp. 156-157). Cf. also SE 181b18-19 and note ad loc. 
Aristotle thinks that the same argument can have more than one difficulty. In the 
example of Coriscus is coming, it is true that a person can know Coriscus and not know 
Coriscus, but not in the same respect. The “Do you know who is coming?” example 
appears to have defects other than committing the fallacy of the accident; the proposed 
solution claims that the conclusion does not contradict the answerer’s previously held 
position because it is possible to know and not to know the same thing in different 
respects. The solution claims that the argument commits the fallacy of ignorance of 
refutation (SE 181a8-11). 
Nevertheless, a satisfactory solution points out why the conclusion appears to 
follow while no contradiction truly follows. In contrast, showing that an argument is 
false by showing that the conclusion is false is not a genuine solution. Demonstrating 
that motion exists does not solve Zeno’s paradox because it does not explain why 
Zeno’s argument does not work. A genuine solution must show that from which (παρ' ὃ) 
an argument concludes something false (SE 179b20). In other words, a satisfactory 
solution must both show that from which the contradiction appears to follow as well as 
why no contradiction follows. The fallacy of the accident does not syllogize because 
there is no syllogism of the accident. Since the argument does not syllogize at all, 
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whether or not the apparent conclusion contradicts the interlocutor’s previously held 
position, the proper solution to the argument is manifesting the argument does not 
follow.  
179b20-23.  Cf. Top 160b5ff. 
179b23-33.  Aristotle is bringing up another problem with the proposed solution to the 
“Do you know who is coming?” argument. It is possible to know and not to know the 
same thing as it is possible to know Coriscus and not know that he is musical. 
Nevertheless, the proposed solution is susceptible to the following rebuttal by the 
sophist: “Is it not the case that you know that Coriscus is Coriscus and that the one who 
is coming is the one who is coming?” Aristotle’s solution avoids these squabbles by 
manifesting that the argument does not follow regardless. 
179b32.  With Dorion and Forster, I drop the ὄν added by Ross because it neither 
clarifies the text nor alters the implied meaning. Cf. Dorion, 1995, n. 367, p. 377, Ross, 
1958, p. 237. 
179b34-37.  The proposed solution to the “Is a few times a few a few?” example that 
Aristotle is criticizing appears to be the position that every number is small relative to a 
much larger number. Thus, a person might consider one hundred large relative to two, 
but it is small relative to a million.  As Aristotle says above, if an argument does not 
syllogize, but an answerer attempts to solve the fallacy by qualifying the conclusion, 
then he does not untie the argument because he does indicate the that from which. 
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Whenever an argument does not syllogize, only by pointing this out does one untie the 
fallacy satisfactorily. 
179b38-39.  Aristotle is evidently aware that instances of the fallacy of the accident 
involve ambiguous speech, and consequently, there is a tendency to categorize them as 
fallacies from speech. Poste, for instance, believes that the “Do you know who is 
coming?” example is an instance of the fallacy of equivocation (1866, n. 3, p. 156 and n. 
5, pp. 156-157). Aristotle is pushing back against this tendency. 
179b39-180a1.  Aristotle appears to be contradicting himself here (cf. Poste, 1866, n. 9, p. 
157, Dorion, 1995, n. 373, p. 379). In Chapter 4, he lists the three species of equivocation 
and amphiboly: those that signify in many ways properly, those that signify in many 
ways through being accustomed to speak metaphorically, and those that signify in 
many ways only in combination with other words (cf. SE 166a14-21 and notes ad loc). 
Why is the fact that ‘your’ (σός) is not properly (κυρίως) said in many ways inhibit the 
word from being equivocal? Aristotle is not claiming that the only form of equivocation 
is when the word is used properly with more than one meaning. Rather, he neglects the 
other two ways of equivocation because they are evidently not options in this example. 
No one would believe that the example uses ‘your’ (σός) metaphorically, nor would 
anyone believe that the syntactical function of ‘your’ is ambiguous. Therefore, Aristotle 
argues against the only viable option relevant to the example. Whether or not my 
interpretation is accurate, Aristotle’s overall point is clear: the example commits the 
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fallacy of the accident, and since there is no syllogism of the accident, to note as much is 
the correct solution of this example. 
180a1-7.  That the boy is both a child and the slave of his master is an accidental 
composition or unity. A slave child is an accidental being like musical Socrates (cf. Meta 
1017a7-22). 
180a6.  συμβέβηκεν (which I translate as happened accidentally] is a finite form of 
συμβεβηκὸς which is commonly translated as ‘accident’ or ‘coincident.’ The word may 
be translated more literally as “just happened” or “just fell together.” 
180a8-22.  As noted by Barnes (Aristotle, 1984, p. 307), the arguments in this paragraph 
are based on the different usages of the genitive case and do not have a “natural” 
equivalent in uninflected languages. We do not normally say, for instance, that man is 
of animals (τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῶν ζῴων), using the partitive genitive, but that man is an 
animal (SE 180a11). Still, the meaning of “man is of animals” is conveyed in the English, 
albeit awkwardly.  
180a12.  Anything that is in relation to a relative opposite it can be said to be of that 
opposite as two can be said to be half of four. According to Aristotle, knowledge is 
among things in the category of relation (Cat 6a7-b14). Thus, knowledge is said to be of 
its object which in this case is evils, i.e., knowledge of evils. 
180a21-22.  The phrase “Sing, goddess, the rage” (μῆνιν ἄειδε, θεά) is a restatement of 
the opening words of Homer’s Iliad. 
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Chapter 25: Untying the Fallacy of What is Simply and What is in Some Respect 
180a23-31.  Chapter 25 describes how to untie the fallacy of what is simply and what is 
in some respect. In this kind of sophistical refutation, the conclusion of the refutation 
does not contradict the opinion of the answerer because the “affirmation and denial are 
not of the same thing” (SE 168b10-16). Cf. also 168b38-167a20 and notes ad loc. The 
dialectician, therefore, must consider the conclusion of his supposed refutation in 
relation to the conclusion’s contradiction to verify that the previously held position 
applies in the same respect. If it does not, then there is no refutation but only the fallacy. 
180a32-34.  The two examples here should be compared to those of Chapter 5. Cf. SE 
167a1-4. They play on confusing being simply and being in some qualified way. Non-
being, simply, is not, but it is a matter of opinion. These examples are to some extent 
inspired by Plato’s Sophist (237a-241b) and Parmenides’ fragment (DK B8).  
180a34-b7.  Aristotle never explicitly lays out the precise argument behind these two 
examples. Zaslawsky argues that sophists used such statements as “I swear that I am 
lying” or “I order you to disobey me” to contradict the answerer’s position that the 
same person cannot be honest and dishonest at once, nor obey and disobey (1982, pp. 
243-244). For the self-referential statement “I swear that I am lying” is both honest and 
dishonest at once. A number of scholars have noted the apparent similarities between 
Aristotle’s examples and the infamous Liar’s paradox (cf. for instance, Ebbesen, 1981 
pp. 42-45, Dorion, 1995, pp. 384-386). Paolo Crivelli has a detailed analysis of different 
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scholarly interpretations of Aristotle’s example (2004, pp. 63-65). Crivelli interprets 
Aristotle as treating a “strong” version of the liar’s paradox where Aristotle is dealing 
with self-referential statements such as “I am lying in this statement.” In other words, 
Crivelli interprets the example as precisely the argument outlined by Zaslawsky. While 
no interpretation of this passage is beyond dispute, it is doubtful that Aristotle is 
considering the liar’s paradox for the simple reason that his explicit solution to the 
example at SE 180b5-7 is, as Crivelli notes, “hopeless” if it is to regarded as for the 
“strong” liar’s paradox (2004, p. 66).  
 In my interpretation, which is admittedly dull by comparison, Aristotle’s 
example lacks the self-referential character of the “strong” liar’s paradox. Instead, the 
example turns on the possibility of there being a man who is a habitual liar, but is in 
some respect honest because some of his claims are true such as his claim that he will 
later lie (SE 181b1-2). The other example concerning one who disobeys can be 
interpreted similarly, as when a person is ordered by two different authorities to do 
different things (cf. Maurus, 1885, p. 624). 
180b7-21.  All of the examples in this paragraph appear to turn on a sophist’s ability to 
produce an instance in which something good simply—for instance, power—was bad 
for a particular person. Aristotle’s solution is reminiscent of his qualification of the best 
regime: a regime may be the best simply, but bad for a certain people at a certain time 
(Pol 1288b20-40). In the same way, power may be good simply, but bad for Nero.  
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180b12.  Following Pickard-Cambridge and Dorion, I have rejected Wallies’ and Ross’s 
replacement of βέλτιον for ἀγαθόν. Cf. Ross, 1958, p. 239. 
180b21-23.   In the Topics (118a34-40), Aristotle points out a dialectical place that states 
that two terms share the same comparison as their inflected forms and vice versa. 
Aristotle’s example is that if the ‘justly’ (τὸ δικαίως) is preferable (αἱρετώτερον) to the 
courageously (ἀνδπείως), then justice is preferable to courage and vice versa (Top 
118a36-40). Aristotle seems to be assuming the context of this dialectical place. Since 
that the just is preferable to the unjust is an endox, that the ‘justly’ is preferable to the 
‘unjustly’ is an endox too.  
 Xenophon’s Apology recounts how Apollodorus told Socrates that he found it 
especially hard to bear that Socrates was to be put to death unjustly. Socrates answered 
rhetorically, “Apollodorus, my dearest friend, would you prefer to see me put to death 
justly (δικαίως ἀποθνῄσκοντα) instead?” (Xenophon, trans. C.D.C. Reeve, p. 28). 
Although what is done ‘justly’ is preferable to what is done ‘unjustly’ simply, what is 
done ‘unjustly’ is preferable to what is done ‘justly’ insofar as Socrates is concerned. Cf. 
also SE 180b28-31. 
180b23-24.  Aristotle appears to be alluding to a fallacy in which the sophist tries to 
show that a judge’s decision can be both just and unjust because he can mistakenly 
render property to an unlawful owner (SE 180b31-34). Cf. also Rhet 1366b9-11 where 
Aristotle claims that justice is the virtue by which everyone enjoys his or her 
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possessions by the law, and injustice is the vice by which men enjoy other people’s 
possessions in defiance of the law. 
Chapter 26: Untying the Fallacy of Ignorance of Refutation 
181a1-5.  Chapter 26 deals with untying the fallacy of ignorance of refutation. In my 
interpretation, the fallacy is not derived from the ignorance of any aspect of the entire 
definition of refutation, but from ignorance of the proper mark of refutation, i.e., 
contradiction. If an argument appears to contradict a proposition previously affirmed 
by the interlocutor—while not actually contradicting it—the argument commits the 
fallacy of ignorance of refutation. Aristotle first treats of the fallacy at SE 167a20-35. In 
this passage, Aristotle advises the answerer to challenge the fallacy by considering if the 
conclusion of the “refutation” meets all the qualifications of contradiction. Cf. also SE 
167a23-27. 
181a5-8.  If the questioner asks at the beginning of the dialogue whether something can 
be both double and not double, the answerer should reply yes because there is no 
stipulation that it is at the same time, in the same respect, relative to the quantity, and 
so on. By answering yes, the respondent will avoid the sophistical refutation. The 
answerer should answer no only if the sophist includes these stipulations in his 
question. Cf. SE also 167a29-33. 
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181a11-14.  Perhaps Aristotle’s example is referring to something that grows from being 
three cubits long to being four cubits long, and so the magnitude is both equal to and 
greater than a three-cubit long magnitude, but not at the same time. 
Chapter 27: Untying the Fallacy of Begging the Question 
181a15-17.  Chapter 27 treats of untying the fallacy of begging the question. Aristotle 
first introduces the fallacy of begging the question in Chapter 5 where he points out that 
they are deceptive insofar as the answerer is unable to distinguish the same from the 
different. That is, the answerer does not see that the conclusion has been assumed in the 
premises because the conclusion was altered in some way. Cf. SE 167a37-40 and notes 
ad loc.  
In the passage, Aristotle claims that if a dialectician notices his opponent begging 
the question, he should reject his assumption by noting that his opponent begs the 
question, even when the assumption is an endox. 
181a17-21.  If the dialectician concedes the original question, then after the conclusion is 
drawn he should still accuse his opponent of not arguing dialectically. He should claim 
to have conceded the original question not to be used a premise, but as a confirmation 
of his position on the established question. 
181a19.  Cf. SE 167a25-27 and 168b25-26. 
181a21.  A side-refutation (παρεξέλεγχος) appears to be a refutation of one of the 
interlocutor’s positions, but not his position on the established dialectical question (cf. 
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Top 112a8 and SE 176a24 and note ad loc). A side-refutation may use the answerer’s 
opinion on the original question as a premise to the refutation of some other point. 
Chapter 28: Untying the Fallacy of the Consequent 
181a22-24.  This chapter discusses untying the fallacy of affirming the consequent. 
Aristotle claims that the fallacy of assuming the consequent occurs whenever it is 
assumed that an implication converts (SE 167b2). People tend to assume that things that 
are “the same by one and the same thing are also the same as one another” (SE 168b31-
32 and note ad loc). For examples, if someone is carrying a nine-millimeter handgun on 
West Avenue, and someone shot a clerk on West Avenue with a nine-millimeter 
handgun, then we might assume that they are the same person. The fallacy of assuming 
the consequent can be reduced to the ignorance of refutation because the argument does 
not follow necessarily (SE 169a3-5).  
181a24-25.  One cannot assume that every animal is a man because every man is an 
animal. Whenever the predicate is not commensurately universal with the subject, the 
statement will not convert. Thus, if the subject is more particular than the predicate and 
a person assumes that the statement converts, then he commits the fallacy of assuming 
the consequent. 
181a27-28.  Cf. Phys 186a5-22, SE 168b35, SE 167b13-19 and note ad loc. 
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181a28-30.  Although it is true that everything that has no beginning, i.e., is infinite 
(ἄπειρος), did not come to be, it is not necessary that everything which did not come to 
be had no beginning. 
Chapter 29: Untying the Fallacy of Taking the Non-cause as Cause 
181a31-35.  In this chapter, Aristotle explains how to untie the fallacy of taking the non-
cause as a cause. The fallacy occurs in arguments that syllogize to an impossibility 
when a “premise” that does not cause the impossibility is assumed to do such (167b20-
37 and notes ad loc). A statement that is not a genuine premise of the argument is 
assumed to be a premise due to which the impossibility results (SE 169b13ff). In this 
passage, Aristotle advises the dialectician to consider if the impossibility will result 
regardless of whether or not the statement is assumed. If it does, the dialectician should 
point out that the statement is not necessary for the argument and say that he granted it 
merely for the sake of argument. 
Chapter 30: Untying the Fallacy of Making Many Questions One 
181a36-39.  This chapter discusses untying the fallacy of making many questions one. It 
occurs when the answerer overlooks that there are many questions and gives one 
answer as if there is only one question (SE 167b38-a1 and note ad loc). In dialectic, 
questions become premises for refutations. An answer to a complex question, therefore, 
may give the sophist a number of premises to use against his opponent. Accordingly, 
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the fallacy makes use of the ignorance of a premise’s account (λόγος) because a premise 
is one term said of one term (169a6-18 and note ad loc).  
Just as it is Aristotle’s advice to distinguish the different senses of a word when 
confronted with a question that has an equivocal word, so also Aristotle advises the 
answerer to distinguish both questions that the questioner hides in his apparently 
singular question. It is necessary for the interlocutor to parse out how the questioner 
really asks more than one question with his interrogation. If the questioner asks the 
question, “Do you beat your wife often?” the answerer must respond, “You are actually 
asking if I beat my wife and if I do so often. No, I do not beat my wife, and therefore I 
do not beat her often.” 
181a39-b3.  Cf. SE 175b39-176a16 and notes ad loc. When a word or phrase in a question 
has multiple meanings, a simple answer will give the sophist as many premises as there 
are meanings.  
181b3-7.  Sometimes complex questions can be answered simply without the danger of 
contradiction. To use Aristotle’s simple example, if Coriscus and Callias are both at 
home, an answerer can give a simple yes to the question “Are Coriscus and Callias at 
home?” without affirming something incorrectly. Nevertheless, it is still a mistake 
(ἁμαρτία) to answer a complex question simply because, according to Aristotle (SE 
176a9-12), it ruins the discussion (τὸ διαλέγεσθαι).  
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181b7-13.  Whenever two opposed attributes belong to two different subjects 
respectively, an answerer must be wary of affirming that the two subjects are both of 
the opposed attributes. Aristotle’s example is something close to the following: 
 “Can the same thing be both good and bad?” 
 “No.” 
“Are virtue and vice good and bad?” 
“Yes.” 
“Therefore, the same thing is both good and bad.” 
Good and bad are not true of both subjects respectively, but good belongs to one, and 
bad belongs to the other. One could make a similar argument to reason that the same 
thing is neither good nor bad.  
181b13-15.  Each thing is the same as itself as A is A, but different from other things as 
A is not B. Thus, in one respect a person can say that things are the same as themselves, 
and in another respect, things are different from themselves.  
181b15-16.  In an example similar to the example at SE 181b11, the fallacy reasons that 
two things can become both good and bad because A becomes good and B becomes 
bad.  
181b16-18.  In one sense, two things can be said to be the same as themselves, and 
similarly, two unequal things can be said to be equal to themselves. Nonetheless, 
insofar as they can be said to be different from themselves, they can be said to be 
unequal to themselves (SE 181b14).  
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181b19-20.   “Both” and “all” are equivocal insofar as they can be said severally or 
collectively. Thus, a sophist can equivocate between the two meanings to makes 
statements such as, “Both A and B are different from themselves,” and “Both A and B 
are the same as themselves.”  
This is the only example of a fallacy where Aristotle explicitly gives two different 
satisfactory resolutions. The examples above may be considered as instances of the 
fallacy of making many questions one or the fallacy of equivocation. Aristotle already 
claimed that nothing prevents one argument from having many faults. Still, he claims 
acceptable solutions must expose not only a fault, but must expose that from which the 
falsehood results (SE 179b17-26 and note ad loc). Cf. also SE 176b29-177a5 and notes ad 
loc. Aristotle also denies (SE 177b27-b34 and notes ad loc) some solutions because they 
do not apply to all fallacies that fall under the same place; do not apply to all ways of 
questioning; or are not relative to the answerer only, and not the argument (πρὸς τὸν 
λόγον). In this paragraph, however, Aristotle acknowledges the possibility that the 
same argument may have more than one proper solution.  
181b20-24.  Cf. SE 167a23-24, SE 168a27-33 and SE 177a30-32 where Aristotle repeatedly 
argues that a true refutation is an affirmation and negation not only of the name, but the 
thing. 
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Chapter 31: Untying Arguments Leading to Babbling 
181b25-26.  Since Aristotle has concluded his explanation of how to untie sophistical 
refutations, he now turns to how the answerer should respond to some secondary ends 
of the sophist. In this chapter, Aristotle explains how the answerer can avoid being 
forced to babble (ἀδολεσχεῖν). To induce babbling, which is the fifth aim of the sophist, 
is to make his interlocutor repeat the same exact words over and over (SE 165b15-16 
and note ad loc). Aristotle discusses the place which sophists use to induce babbling in 
Chapter 13. 
181b26-33.  Aristotle is referring to his example of an argument used to induce babbling 
using relative terms such as “double” (SE 173a34-36). If an answerer affirms that 
“double” and “double of half” are the same, then a sophist may replace “double” in the 
phrase “double of the half” with “double of the half” resulting in the babbling phrase 
“double of the half of the half.” The answerer should respond to his example by 
claiming “double” in the phrase “double of half” does not signify anything in isolation, 
instead only the whole as whole signifies. 
181b28.  With Forster, Pichard-Cambridge, and Dorion, I have retained ἄνευ which 
Ross (1958, p. 243) replaced with ἀντὶ.  
181b33-34.  Perhaps Aristotle’s point is that whether or not “double” in the phrase 
“double of half” signifies anything by itself, it clearly does not carry the same meaning 
in a phrase where it is not united to its correlative opposite. The answerer must, 
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therefore, claim that the sophist can take the account of “double” outside of a phrase 
where it is united with its correlative opposite and replace “double” in the phrase 
“double of half” (SE 173b11ff).  
181b34-35.  Aristotle places knowledge in the category of relation because knowledge as 
such is of the knowable (Cat 11b24). Therefore, the statement that knowledge is 
knowledge of the knowable is an endox. A specific kind of knowledge, such as the 
science of medicine, is knowledge of health and sickness. Accordingly, a sophist may 
replace “knowledge” in “knowledge of health and sickness” with “knowledge of the 
knowable” with the result that medicine is called “knowledge of the knowable of health 
and sickness,” and so on over and over.  
181b35-36.  Snub, for instance, which may be predicated of a nose, has “nose” in its 
definition. Hence snub is a predicate and is predicated of something included in its 
definition, namely nose. In Chapter 13, Aristotle gave two places to look for endoxes to 
induce babbling: relatives—which Aristotle at the beginning of this chapter —and the 
terms predicated of or linked with other terms that falls within their own definition—
which Aristotle treats at the end of the chapter.  For instance, odd may be linked with 
number in the phrase odd number, but number is also in the definition of odd (SE 
173b1-11 and note ad loc). Cf. also Dorion, 1995, n. 428, p. 398. 
182a3-6.  Cf. SE 173b9-10 where Aristotle explains the reasoning to which this solution is 
directed: “If snubness is a concavity of the nose, and there is a snubbed nose, then there 
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is a concave nose nose.” When the sophist asks—using the nominative—if snub is a 
concave nose, the answerer should respond, “No, but it is something of a nose 
(ῥινὸς)”—using the genitive. 
Chapter 32: Untying Arguments Leading to Solecism 
182a7-9.  Cf. 173b26-174a16 where Aristotle discusses different means a sophist can use 
to force his opponent to make apparent solecisms—a barbarism made on account of an 
argument (SE 165b21-22). Since English is not an inflected language, it is difficult to 
reproduce Aristotle’s examples in translation. I have included the Greek words in 
parentheses when relevant.  
182a10-11.  There is no adequate way to represent this form of argument in a non-
inflected language. The argument is based on the accusative infinitive construction 
where the subject of εἶναι is accusative and consequently has an accusative predicate. 
When the accusative is predicated of a normal nominative subject, it and the nominative 
are paired through an ἔστιν, a violation of Ancient Greek grammar.  Solecism results 
from the fact that the nominative neuter “τι” (something) is said to be an accusative 
masculine “λίθον” (stone). 
182a11-15.  Aristotle is saying that the accusative word “λίθον” should have the 
accusative relative pronoun “ὃν” and the accusative pronoun “τοῦτον.” Obviously, the 
requirement does not carry over to the word “stone” in English. 
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182a15-16.  Since the nominative and accusative forms of Ancient Greek words are 
identical in the neuter, the sophist will not play on their distinction to produce 
solecisms.  
182a16-18.  Since log ξύλον is neuter, it matches the neuter τοῦτο, and there is no 
apparent solecism.  
182a19-24.  Aristotle appears to be saying that unless the answerer explicitly admits that 
she (αὕτη) can signify Coriscus, the argument does not follow even if Coriscus does 
signify a female.  
182a24-27.  As the example of Coriscus required a supplementary question, so too the 
stone (λίθος) example requires a supplementary question. For the stone example does 
not conclude unless the answerer admits that stone (λίθον), which is accusative, in “but 
you call something a stone” (φῂς δ 'εἶναί τι λίθον) can be signified by “he” (οὗτος) 
which is nominative, and not τοῦτον which is accusative. 
182a27-31.  Again, the argument is based on the accusative infinitive construction where 
the subject of εἶναι is an accusative, and therefore, the accusative and the nominative 
are paired through ἔστιν in the conclusion.   
182a31-34.  The nominative pronoun οὗτος is not a stand-in for the accusative form 
Κλέωνα, but the nominative form Κλέων. 
182a34-39.  The solecism results from ἐπίστασαι [you know], which should take an 
accusative direct object, taking the nominative direct object λίθος. 
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Chapter 33: Difficult and Easy Untying 
182b6-31.  Chapter 33 treats ways in which are one instance of a fallacy may be more 
difficult to deal with than another. Interpretations of this passage are varied. Schreiber 
takes the passage to be saying that the same argument may be a sophistical refutation 
for different reasons for different people because it will appear to be genuine for 
different reasons (2003, n. 8, p. 81). Dorion (1995, n. 443, p. 401), however, understands 
Aristotle to be claiming that an argument that is modified (μεταφερόμενον, which I 
translate as when carried over at SE 182b12) can go from being a fallacy outside of 
speech to a fallacy inside of speech. Poste offers yet another interpretation; he thinks 
that τὸ μεταφερόμενον refers to the fact that a sophistical place may be carried over 
from one discipline to another (1866, p. 163). This is the characteristic universality of 
dialectic—and in this case sophistic. 
 Poste’s interpretation fits best with Aristotle’s argument in this paragraph, 
although nothing in the argument necessitates that the being carried over 
(μεταφερόμενον) implies application to various sciences. Thus, Aristotle argues that, at 
times, even the vulgar (τοῖς τυχοῦσίν) can recognize the fallacy of equivocation while 
at other times even the most experienced cannot. In other words, the more or less 
deceptive nature of any instance of a fallacy is not directly determined by the kind of 
fallacy that it is because two arguments may committ the same fallacy, and yet, one is 
easy to untie and the other difficult.  
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182b16-17.  The Greek word δίφρος (which I translate as chariot) may also signify a 
desk chair. Hence, the not so comical statement is that a man carries a desk chair down 
the ladder (cf. Tricot, 1939, n.1, p. 130). 
182b17.  The question plays on the Greek word στέλλεσθε (which I translate as bound) 
which may also signify the action by which a sailor takes in a sail (cf. LS). The 
questioner is asking where the sailor is going. The sailor responds according to this 
second meaning, “to the yardarm.” 
182b17-18.  The Greek word ἔμπροσθεν (which I translate as earlier) may also mean 
before in space, that is, in front. Thus, the comical exchange results from mistaking the 
word as signifying the order in space when it signifies the order in time. 
182b19.  The Greek word βορέας (which signifies the serene North Wind) may also 
signify the god of that wind (ὁ βορέας) who has committed violent acts.  
182b20-21.  The Greek word εὔαρχος (which I translate as meek) is meant “in the sense 
of ‘tractable, manageable, submissive to authority’ is used of slaves in the pseudo-
Aristotelian Oeconomica (I 1344bl4)” (Einarson, 1936, p. 332). The respondent, however, 
takes the word to be a proper name and responds that his name is Ἀπολλωνίδης 
(which I take the liberty of translating as Wilde).  
182b25-27.  The solution through the equivocation of Zeno’s and Parmenides’ argument 
that being is one is, of course, that of Aristotle (SE 170b21-24, Phys 186a23ff).  
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182b32-37.  Since a sophistical refutation either merely appears to syllogize or its 
premises are only apparent endoxes, the proper solution may involve making the 
necessary distinctions to show why the argument merely appears to syllogize or 
making the necessary distinctions to show that why a premise is only an apparent 
endox or both. The answerer can be perplexed about which premise he must do away 
with, or how to distinguish the questions such that an apparent contradiction does not 
appear to follow. 
182b37-183a4.  The obscurity of this passage is Aristotle’s reference to a technical 
process of transposing a contradiction (μετατιθεμένης τῆς ἀντιφάσεως) to produce 
further arguments that syllogize to the contradiction of both of the premises by using 
the other premise. 
Converting consists of transposing a conclusion to make a syllogism to establish 
that either the major term does not belong to the middle, or the middle to the 
minor. For when the conclusion is converted, and one of the premises is 
preserved, one must do away with the other remaining premise (APr 59a1-5). 
 
With Pickard-Cambridge, Tricot, and Dorion, I am using the example of Pacius (1966, p. 
529-530) to exemplify this process. 
1) All mothers love their children. 
Medea was a mother. 
Medea loves her children. 
The dialectician may then take the contradiction of the conclusion and one of the 
premises to syllogize against the remaining premises using the rules of conversion 
established in the Prior Analytics (59b1-60).  
 307 
2) Medea did not love her children. 
Medea was a mother. 
Some mothers do not love their children. 
3) Medea did not love her children. 
All mothers love their children. 
Medea was not a mother. 
Aristotle’s overall point is that when the premises and contradiction of the first 
argument’s conclusion are all equally endoxical, it is unclear where the argument’s 
falsehood lies. All syllogisms are similar (a39) in that they do away with an endoxical 
proposition with equally endoxical premises. No one of the three syllogisms stands out 
as defective, and as a result, the original argument causes perplexity. Cf. Tricot, 1939, n. 
4, p. 131.  
183a2.  With Dorion, Hasper, and Grote, I reject the ἢ κατασκευάσει which Ross 
bracketed. Cf. Ross, p. 247 and Dorion, 1995, n. 453, p. 405. 
183a4-7.  A fallacy in which the conclusion and premises are equal or alike in their 
endoxic nature is the second most subtle of the arguments that syllogize. It is more 
difficult to attack a sophistical argument when it is not clear where the defect lies. If all 
of the premises appear to be equally endoxical, then the answerer has no probable 
indication which premise is that from which the sophistical refutation results.  
183a8-10. Cf. SE 176b35-36 where Aristotle claims an argument can be false either 
because it syllogizes to a false conclusion or because it merely appears to syllogize. If it 
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is unclear in which of these ways an argument is sophistical, then the argument is more 
difficult to untie. 
183a24.  Cf. Top 161a9-12. 
Chapter 34: Epilogue 
183a27-36.  Aristotle begins Chapter 34 by recounting the contents of the Sophistical 
Refutations. The remainder of the chapter is not only a conclusion of the Sophistical 
Refutations, but a conclusion of his consideration of dialectic as a whole. Chapters 4 and 
5 of the Sophistical Refutations laid out Aristotle’s list of 13 sophistical refutations. In 
Chapter 12 Aristotle discussed leading an opponent in to speaking falsely or stating 
paradoxes. In Chapter 14 he discusses producing solecisms (Chapter 13, which Aristotle 
does not reference, discusses methods used for making an interlocutor babble). Chapter 
15 determined how the sophist should marshal his arguments, and Chapter 16 showed 
how the study of such arguments are useful for the philosopher. Chapters 17 and 18 
treated answering such arguments in general, and Chapters 19-30 discussed untying 
each fallacy in particular.  
183a30.  In this passage, I take the correction of Pacius and replace συλλογισμός with 
σολοικισμὸς because it makes Aristotle’s enumeration of different subject matters that 
he treats in the Sophistical Refutations more complete and it avoids unnecessary 
repetition. With Forster, Pickard Cambridge, Poste, Tricot, Hasper, and Dorion, the 
same replacement is made at SE 183a33. Cf. Ross, 1958, 248. 
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183a37-b6.  This recollection of the beginning purpose is a recollection of the beginning 
of the Topics. Aristotle says at the beginning of the Topics (Top 100a18-21), 
The purpose of the treatise is to find a method from which we will be able 
(δυνησόμεθα) to syllogize about every proposed problem from endoxes, and, 
[from which], we ourselves will say nothing contrary when maintaining an 
argument.  
 
Cf. also Top 159a15-25. In Aristotle’s recollection of the Topics’ purpose, he also 
mentions the testing art which is most thoroughly discussed in Chapter 11 of the 
Sophistical Refutations. This recollection forms part of the justification for considering the 
Sophistical Refutations as a sort of appendix to the Topics. For a more thorough discussion 
of the function of the Sophistical Refutations in Aristotle’s Organon, consult the 
Introduction II.V The Sophistical Art as Part of the Dialectical Art. 
183b1.  Reading προκατασκευάζεται (translated as is ascribed further) which is in 
almost all manuscripts in place of Ross’s conjecture of προκατασκευαστέον. Cf. Ross, 
1958, p. 248. 
183b6-8.  It is difficult to imagine that Aristotle did not have Socrates in mind when he 
composed the Topics and the Sophistical Refutations. Nonetheless, outside of him being 
used as an accidental subject of examples, this is the only mention of the person 
Socrates in both treatises.  In Plato’s dialogues (cf. for instance, Meno 70a-79b), Socrates 
often claims ignorance about a subject and then goes on to manifest the ignorance of his 
many interlocutors about that same subject. According to Aristotle, Socrates is able to 
expose the ignorance of his interlocutor without knowing because Socrates knows the 
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testing art. Aristotle defines testing arguments as those which “syllogize from opinions 
held by the answerer and from premises that anyone pretending to have scientific 
knowledge must know” (SE 165b4-6). Aristotle claims that in contrast to an art like 
geometry, a person can have the testing art without knowledge. Even though Socrates 
may not know a relevant art, using common principles he is able to expose those who 
similarly do not know (SE 172a21ff and notes ad loc). A testing argument “is able to 
syllogize to what is false through the ignorance of the one who grants the argument” 
(SE 169b25-27). 
183b8-9.  Cf. Top 101b11-19 and 103b20-104a2. 
183a9-10.  Aristotle gives numerous dialectical places in which to look for endoxes in 
Books II-VII of his Topics.  
183a10-12.  Aristotle treats the manner in which a dialectician is to arrange and answer 
his questions in Book VIII of his Topics.  
183a16-33.  Aristotle ends his treatise by returning to how it began, emphasizing the 
importance of the beginning. As Aristotle says, once the beginning has been discovered, 
it is easy to have on and discover the rest. His words here echo what is said in the 
Nicomachean Ethics, 
Let this serve as an outline of the good; for we must presumably first sketch it 
roughly, and then later fill in the details. But it would seem that anyone is 
capable of carrying on and articulating what has once been well outlined, and 
that time is a good discoverer or partner in such a work; to which facts the 




Aristotle has done completed the difficult task of making a good beginning. It is now up 
to his predecessors (who apparently need not be of any particular ability) to fill in the 
details.  
184b2.  Reading ἀλλ’ ἢ with Barnes, BDS. Cf. Ross, 1958, p. 250. 
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Appendix I: Equivocation and its Fallacy 
Introduction 
 
The concept of equivocation is fundamental in Aristotle’s philosophy. In its 
traditional order, Aristotle’s Organon—and indeed his entire corpus—begins with an 
account of equivocation (Cat 1a1-6). Aristotle makes the ability to distinguish the 
different senses of a name the second tool of his dialectical art (Top 105a24-25). 
Moreover, awareness of the diverse signification of names is one of two chief uses that 
the philosopher has for the study of sophistic (SE 175a5-10). Aristotle himself 
distinguishes the meanings of names in every discipline that he treats and devotes an 
entire book of his Metaphysics (1012b34-1025b3) to various meanings of the most 
universal names. The most naturally adapted and most common place to derive a 
sophistical refutation is that on account of names (SE 165a4-5). Aristotle implies that this 
fallacy eludes even the most experienced (ἐμπειροτάτους, SE 182b22). Hence it is 
“crucial for us to have a precise and accurate understanding of what Aristotle means” 
by ‘equivocation’ and ‘said in many ways,’ “if we are to have a clear grasp of many 
fundamental areas of his philosophy.”136 
To unfold Aristotle’s account of equivocation and the fallacy of equivocation, let 
us begin by reviewing Aristotle’s account of name, and afterward, distinguish between 
proper and metaphorical naming. In doing so, we shall see that equivocal naming is a 
                                                     
136 Brakas, 2011, p. 135. 
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kind of proper naming. Subsequently, we will examine Aristotle’s argument that using 
equivocal names is necessary. The following will then be undertaken: an unfolding of 
Aristotle’s understanding of the fallacy of equivocation and how to untie the fallacy; a 
survey of the logical places Aristotle uses to distinguish the multiple meanings of 
names; and finally, an attempt to classify various forms of equivocation. 
I.I What is a Name? 
 
In the book of Genesis, God brings every beast of the field and bird of the air 
before Adam to see what he would call them. What Adam called an animal was the 
living creature’s name.137 The act of naming is distinctively human—a result of man’s 
reason. Firstly, it requires that one can recognize the things that he names, and 
secondly, insofar as many names signify universal natures, naming requires the ability 
to recognize universal natures.138 Aristotle defines name as part of a higher genus, that 
of vocal sound (φωνή). To understand Aristotle’s meaning of name, therefore, one must 
first understand his meaning of vocal sound. 
The things in vocal sound (φωνή) are symbols of the undergoings (πάθημα) in 
the soul, and the written things are [symbols] of the things in vocal sound. And 
just as the written things are not the same for all, neither is vocal sound the same 
[for all]. However, those of which these are the signs first, these undergoings of 
                                                     
137 Cf. Genesis, 2:19-20. 
138 It should be obvious that I am using “name” here and throughout the essay in a broad sense to include 
universal names like “man” and “animal” rather than in the more limited including only proper names 
like “Charles” and “Fido.”   
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the soul are the same for all, and those of which these are likenesses, the things, 
are already the same.139 
In this sketch of Aristotle’s understanding of vocal sound, it is a symbol or sign of the 
undergoings in the soul which are themselves likeness of things. Every sign creates a 
sensible impression and brings to mind something other than itself.140 As a sign, speech 
brings to mind the undergoings of the soul. Aristotle uses undergoings, as opposed to 
thoughts, because vocal sounds can signify through thoughts and passions of the soul. 
What is important here is that speech does not directly signify things.141 We do not, 
therefore, name and speak about things as they are simply, but as they are insofar as 
they are known to us.142  
Aristotle defines name (ὄνομα) as “vocal sound (φωνὴ), significant according to 
convention, without time, no part of which signifies separately.”143 In this definition, 
ὄνομα bears the meaning of not just any name but a noun. The definition divides name 
from such vocal sounds as groans and gasps by being significant by convention (DeIn 
16a27-30). It divides name from speech because the parts of the speech signify 
                                                     
139 Ἔστι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθημάτων σύμβολα, καὶ τὰ γραφόμενα τῶν ἐν τῇ 
φωνῇ. καὶ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ γράμματα πᾶσι τὰ αὐτά, οὐδὲ φωναὶ αἱ αὐταί ὧν μέντοι ταῦτα σημεῖα 
πρώτων, ταὐτὰ πᾶσι παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ὧν ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα πράγματα ἤδη ταὐτά (DeIn 
16a3-7). 
140 Cf. Augustine, 2009, II.1, p. 32.  
141 Of course, our names signify things (otherwise, how could they be said of them?), but they do so 
through thoughts. Aristotle is not making the claim that we only signify thoughts insofar as they are 
things. If this were the case there would be no difference between second intention names like genus, 
subject, predicate, and middle term and first intention names like dog and cat.  
142 Cf. Aquinas, 1947, Ia-IIae, q. 25, art. 2 ad. 1; Ia, q. 13, intro.  
143 Ὄνομα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ φωνὴ σημαντικὴ κατὰ συνθήκην ἄνευ χρόνου, ἧς μηδὲν μέρος ἐστὶ 
σημαντικὸν κεχωρισμένον (DeIn 16a20-21). 
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separately (DeIn 16b26-27), and it divides name from the verb (ῥῆμα) because the verb 
signifies with time (DeIn 16b6-7). Aristotle will also use ὄνομα with its more general 
meaning dropping the modifier that it signifies without time. More generally, a name 
(ὄνομα) is a vocal sound that signifies by custom and no part of which signifies by 
itself. Aristotle uses this more general meaning to include verbs and adjectives. We say, 
for instance, that “run” names an action. Thus, Aristotle calls the sophistical place of 
equivocation that “on account of names” (SE 165a5), while his examples of equivocal 
names include equivocal verbs (cf. SE 165b31, SE 166a20-21, SE 165b34). Name then is a 
vocal sound that signifies by custom no part of which signifies by itself. 
I.II Two Kinds of Name 
There are two fundamental kinds of names: the metaphorical name and the 
proper name.144 In some cases, a name applies to two different things, but it only 
signifies one of the things “according to convention,” and the other thing by a figure of 
speech. When used as a metaphor, the same name does not truly apply to the thing 
because it does not signify the thing. Aristotle describes using a metaphor (μεταφορά) 
as, “giving a thing a name that belongs to something else” (Poet 1457b7-8, trans. 
Bywater).145 For example, when Boston Celtics fans called Ray Allen “Benedict Arnold” 
                                                     
144 I do not use “proper name” here to refer to the names that refer to particular things, such as “Luke” or 
“Macintosh.” Rather I am using proper name here to refer to a name that is not used as a figure of speech 
or metaphor.  
145 I take it that Aristotle is using metaphor (μεταφορά here generally to include any instance in which 
the meaning of the speech is different form the meaning of the speaker, i.e., all figures of speech. Thus, 
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because he left the Celtics to play for the Miami Heat, they did not mean that he was 
Benedict Arnold (although that is the person that the name referred to). They meant 
that Allen was like Arnold because he was a traitor. The Celtic fans used a metaphor. 
Naming a thing by a name that does not properly apply to it is to use a name 
figuratively or improperly. The name keeps exactly the same meaning but is imposed 
on a subject to which it does not apply. This improper naming stimulates the mind and 
appeals to the imagination and emotion by ‘metaphor,’ that is, a ‘carrying across’ of the 
name.146 The definition of the nature signified by the name stays the same in 
metaphorical naming although it is applied to things with different natures. When what 
one means by a name does apply to the thing which is named, then the name has been 
used properly. Thus, there are two kinds of names: the proper name and the 
metaphorical name. 
I.III Proper Names: Equivocal vs. Univocal Naming 
Proper names may be further distinguished into two kinds: the univocal name 
and the equivocal name.  In the first chapter of his Categories, Aristotle distinguishes 
two ways in which things have a proper name in common:  
                                                     
metaphor would include such figures as antonomasia, synecdoche, and metonymy; It is not limited to the 
strict meaning of metaphor where the name is given a thing that is like what the name signifies. In this 
way, the translateration of the word falls short.  
146 Cf. De Koninck, 1961, p. 28.  
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Things are called equivocal (ὁμωνύμα) whose name alone is common but the 
account of the substance (οὐσία)147 according to the name is different. For 
instance, both man and the drawing are called animal because the name of these 
alone is common but the account of the substance according to the name is 
different. For if someone gives the ‘what it is’ (τί ἐστιν) for each of them to be an 
animal, he will give a distinct account of each. Things are called univocal whose 
name is common and the account of the substance according to the name is the 
same, as for instance, both man and ox [are called] animal. For man and ox are 
called by the common name animal, and the account of the substance is the same. 
For if someone gives over an account of the ‘what it is’ for each of these to be an 
animal, he will give over the same account. 148 
 
If two things share a proper name in common, they may be called either equivocal or 
univocal; the division is exhaustive.149 In the case of equivocal things, the account of the 
‘substance’ or ‘what it is’ signified by the name is different, although the same name 
applies to both things. The name ‘animal’ properly signifies both the human being and 
the statue, but the statue and the human being are animals equivocally because the 
“account of the substance” signified by ‘animal’ is different in each case. ‘Animal’ 
                                                     
147 Aristotle uses the phrase “account of the substance” (λόγος τῆς οὐσίας) to signify the speech that 
makes known the essence of a thing. As the name is used here, ‘substance’ signifies the ‘what it is’ (τί 
ἐστιν) of a thing as is clear from what follows immediately in the text: “for if someone gives over the 
‘what it is’ for each of them to be animal, he will give over a distinct account of each.”  Substance is an 
equivocal word and does not have the meaning it has later in the treatise when it is used to name the first 
category. In other places, Aristotle uses substance and ‘what it is’ interchangeably. Cf. Top 108b20ff, 
where Aristotle refers to the category of substance as ‘what it is.’ Thus, the “account of the substance” 
means the account of what the thing is or the definition.  
148 Ὁμώνυμα λέγεται ὧν ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερος, οἷον ζῷον 
ὅ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ γεγραμμένον· τούτων γὰρ ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος τῆς 
οὐσίας ἕτερος· ἐὰν γὰρ ἀποδιδῷ τις τί ἐστιν αὐτῶν ἑκατέρῳ τὸ ζῴῳ εἶναι, ἴδιον ἑκατέρου λόγον 
ἀποδώσει. συνώνυμα δὲ λέγεται ὧν τό τε ὄνομα κοινὸν καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ὁ 
αὐτός, οἷον ζῷον ὅ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ βοῦς· τούτων γὰρ ἑκάτερον κοινῷ ὀνόματι προσαγορεύεται 
ζῷον, καὶ ὁ λόγος δὲ τῆς οὐσίας ὁ αὐτός· ἐὰν γὰρ ἀποδιδῷ τις τὸν ἑκατέρου λόγον τί ἐστιν αὐτῶν 
ἑκατέρῳ τὸ ζῴῳ εἶναι, τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ἀποδώσει (Cat 1a1-12). 
149 Cf. Shields, 1999, pp. 11-12.  
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means sentient being when it signifies the human being, but it means likeness of a 
sentient being when it signifies the statue. In contrast, Aristotle calls things univocal 
when they both share the same name and the same account of the substance signified 
by the name.150 Thus man and ox are univocal insofar as animal is said of both and the 
name signifies the same ‘substance’ in each.151 
Aristotle calls things equivocal or univocal whereas in English we usually apply 
the adjective ‘equivocal’ to names. Although it strikes the English ear as odd, there is no 
philosophical inconsistency in calling things equivocal in English as well. The 
relationship between the name and the things is same in both English and Ancient 
Greek. While Aristotle uses ὁμωνύμα as an adjective that applies to the relation of two 
things to a name that applies to them, we use equivocal as an adjective that applies to 
the relation of a name to two things it applies to; there is a logical connection between 
the English word equivocation and the Greek ὁμωνύμα. One can make the same 
distinction with our word univocal and the Greek word συνώνυμα. Aristotle will also 
refer to names as said equivocally (ὁμωνύμως λέγεται) or said in many ways (cf. PrA 
32a20, Top 148a23, Meta 1035b1, GC 322b29-32). 
                                                     
150 It should be noted that the definition that Aristotle renders here of univocal is narrower than the use of 
the English term. Aristotle characterizes univocal things as when the definition of their substance, or 
what they are, is the same; not only when the meaning of the word is the same more generally. Aristotle 
appears to use this strict meaning of univocal in order show in what way terms can be ordered to one 
another under one category. 
151 One may ask why Aristotle uses two substances and not two accidents as examples of univocal 
naming. Perhaps the answer to this question lies in the fact that only substances have definitions and a 
‘what it is’ strictly speaking.  
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Aristotle uses the name ‘animal’ to exemplify both univocal and equivocal 
things. Although univocal is opposed to equivocal, Aristotle can use the same name as 
an example of both because the distinction between an equivocal and univocal use of a 
word is relative. Just as the same number can be double or half, so can the same word 
be used equivocally or univocally. One can use ‘chair’ equivocally because it can signify 
‘something to sit on’ and ‘the head of a department,’ but one can also use ‘chair’ 
univocally when it applies to two pieces of furniture in my office. Thus, Christopher 
Kirwan argues that “equivocation is primarily an activity: men equivocate, and if words 
do too, that is in the sense that they are the instruments by which men equivocate.”152 
Properly speaking, names are only equivocal in use, and because man can use the same 
vocal sound in different ways, he can use the same name univocally or equivocally. 
I.IV The Necessity of Equivocation 
Aristotle claims that almost every name is polysemous (GC 322b29-33). 
Philosophical names such as substance, accident, being, one, before, cause, good, justice, 
and so on are all equivocal. It is also true that even common words like table, chair, bat, 
ball, bank, bark, and so on are equivocal. In fact, most everyday words in the English 
language have multiple meanings. It is rarer for a word to have a single meaning. Some 
technical words, such as the chemical compound barrelene, have only one meaning.  
                                                     
152 Kirwan, 1979, p. 35. 
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Such words signify things that are so far removed from common experience that they 
are unlikely to take on new meanings. 
What is the cause of the prolific equivocation in language? Aristotle goes so far 
as to argue that equivocation is necessary, that language without equivocation is 
impossible.  
[S]ince in discussion we cannot put forward things themselves,  and so we use 
names as symbols instead of the things just like those who count with counting 
stones.  Nevertheless, it is not the same, because names and the number of 
speeches are limited, while things are unlimited in number. One and the same 
speech or name must signify more [than one thing].153 
 
In discourse, man cannot put forward the things themselves, and therefore he uses 
vocal sounds to signify the things. Aristotle claims that the number of things is infinite, 
but the number of names is finite.154 If his starting points are true, then it follows that in 
every language man will naturally use the same word to signify many things. 
                                                     
153 ἐπεὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα διαλέγεσθαι φέροντας, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἀντὶ τῶν 
πραγμάτων χρώμεθα ὡς συμβόλοις, τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐπὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων 
ἡγούμεθα συμβαίνειν, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ψήφων τοῖς λογιζομένοις. τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ὅμοιον· τὰ μὲν γὰρ 
ὀνόματα πεπέρανται καὶ τὸ τῶν λόγων πλῆθος, τὰ δὲ πράγματα τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἄπειρά ἐστιν. 
ἀναγκαῖον οὖν πλείω τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ τοὔνομα τὸ ἓν σημαίνειν. (SE 165a6-14). It is striking that 
despite Christopher Shield’s thorough treatment of homonymy in Aristotle overall, he could overlook 
this passage. Cf. Shields, 1999, p. 285.  
154 Things here must include universal natures. Otherwise, Aristotle’s argument will fall victim to the 
objection of Hintikka (1959, p. 146; 1973, p. 17), who argues that Aristotle’s argument only establishes the 
existence of common names, but not ambiguous names. Things can include universal natures, however, 
and if there is no established limit to the number of universal natures that man may desire to signify, then 
the argument establishes the existence of equivocal words equally well. Cf. Dorion, 1995, p. 208-209. 
Schreiber also reads Aristotle to be arguing that there are a limited number of names but there are an 
unlimited number of particulars that we wish to signify through universal natures. That is, Schreiber 
thinks that Aristotle’s argument works to establish the necessity of universal univocal words but fails to 
establish the necessity of equivocal words. The problem with this reading is obvious, either Aristotle 
makes a critical error of confusing equivocal names with univocal names or he is not establishing the 
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Nevertheless, it is not clear that the number of things that one may wish to 
discourse about is unlimited. Aristotle denies the existence of an actual infinite in 
number or magnitude (Phys 202b30-208a25). Concerning the potentially infinite, he 
states, “one must not, however, take ‘being in potency’ as meaning that, [e.g.,] if this 
statue is able to be, this statue will also be, and so also the infinite is what will be in act” 
(Phys 206a19-23, trans. Coughlin modified). Marcus Berquist clarifies this passage by 
pointing out that, “in the numbers and divisions of a line, the possibilities are infinite. 
But this does not mean that the infinite is one of the possibilities.”155 The division of 
magnitude is potentially unlimited because one can never come to the smallest part, 
and numbers are potentially unlimited because there is no determined greatest.156 There 
is not actually an infinite number of things, nor a line that has been actually infinitely 
divided into small parts. The number of things that we wish to signify is unlimited 
insofar as there is no determined limit to the things we may wish to signify just as there 
is no determined limit to how high one can count. Aristotle does not think there is an 
actually infinite number of things.  
Another puzzle in Aristotle’s argument is his claim that the number of names is 
necessarily limited. A long tradition of commentators have interpreted this passage as 
                                                     
existence of names that can be used in fallacies, but the context shows clearly that he is. Cf. Schreiber, 
2003, pp. 11-18. 
155 M. Berquist, 2007, p. 106-107. 
156 Cf. Phys 206b4-20; Aristotle, 2005, n. 42, p. 63. 
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meaning that the limited number of words results from the limited number of letters or 
sounds.157 Dorion takes this argument given by the commentators to be “evidently 
erroneous.”158 Nothing in the nature of vocal sounds limits their number because one 
can always—among other things—augment sounds to change a name.  
Either Aristotle’s argument is manifestly false, or one should read the argument 
in another way. Perhaps what he means is that the number of names is limited by how 
vocal sounds come to be names. No name is such by nature (DeIn 16a25). That is, all 
names are established through convention, and it is that fact that limits the number of 
possible names. One cannot simply create new words to signify whatever one wishes, 
but must have some means of establishing it conventionally. Moreover, often a new 
name must signify a nature that is not easily understood. In such cases, we use a name 
which signifies a nature with some connection or analogy to the nature we wish to 
signify. Since man names things as he knows them, and he knows many things through 
other things, it is natural for him to signify the same thing by the same name. According 
to Glen Coughlin, “our order of naming follows this order of knowledge. Because of 
this characteristic of our naming, we can often use the order among analogous names to 
better perceive the natural order in our knowing.”159 For instance, the name ‘before’ 
applies to what is prior in being because of its analogy to prior in time (cf. Cat 14a26-
                                                     
157 Cf. Ebbesen, 1981, I, p. 179. 
158 Cf. Dorion, 1995, n.5, p. 207: “evidemment erronee.” 
159 Coughlin 2007, p. 5. 
 323 
b24), and the name ‘healthy’ applies to medicine because of its connection with health 
in an animal.  In such cases, there is an order in our naming because we know one thing 
through the another.160  Thus Aristotle says, “knowledge is always chiefly about what is 
first, on which other things depend and through which they are named” (Meta 1003b17-
18, trans. Sachs). In other words, since the way we come to know is progressive in the 
sense that we move from the more to the less known depending all the way on the 
former, naming is progressive also.161 The ability to establish a conventional 
signification by repeating a vocal sound that has an analogous or connected meaning to 
what one wishes to signify limits the possible number of names. This part of the process 
of naming necessitates equivocation in every language.162 
                                                     
160 Thus, Aristotle in the fourth book of the Metaphysics argues that there is one science of being even 
though ‘being’ is said in many ways. For ‘being’ is primarily said of substance, but it is also said of 
attributes of substance, ways into substance, destructions and privations of substance, and so forth. All 
other meanings of ‘being’ point toward the primary meaning of ‘being.’ They are known through the 
primary meaning of ‘being’ and accordingly, they are “named through” the primary meaning of ‘being.’ 
Subsequent ‘beings’ are naturally called by the same name just as it is natural to use the same name 
‘healthy’ to apply to medicine, the body, and urine. Cf. Meta 1003a31-b19. Owen famously called a form 
of this primary meaning of an equivocal word upon which all other meanings have a logical dependence 
the “focal meaning.” Cf. Owen, pp. 168-169.  
161 Cf. De Koninck, 1961, pp. 22-34, especially p. 25 and 32.  
162 It is for this reason that one should not be surprised when the five senses of the Greek word ‘πρῶτον’ 
that Aristotle lays out in the Categories apply equally to different English meanings of ‘before,’ just as the 
three meanings of ‘τὸ ὑγιεινὸν’ apply equally to three English meanings of ‘healthy.’ It is no accident that 
vocal sounds can have the same equivocal significations in different languages. The same could be said 
for the eight meanings of ‘in’ given in the Physics (210a14-25) or the five meanings of ‘principle’ given in 
the Metaphysics (1012b34-1013a23) and so on.  
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I.V What is the Fallacy of Equivocation? 
Like most sophistical refutations, Aristotle does not explicitly define the fallacy 
of equivocation. (Ps) Thomas Aquinas characterizes this fallacy as “the deception 
coming from that which is one in name but many in significations.”163 The fallacy of 
equivocation results from the mixing up of the senses of a word in an apparent 
refutation. Since almost all words used in philosophy are equivocal, it is impossible to 
avoid using equivocal words in syllogisms. However, it is possible to avoid using 
words equivocally in the course of an argument. The fallacy of equivocation is the using 
of a name equivocally in an apparent refutation while appearing to use the name 
univocally. The sophist puts forward an argument in which three vocal sounds apply to 
the minor, middle, and major terms respectively. However, the sophist uses one of the 
vocal sounds with multiple meanings, and thus either the minor, middle or major term 
is equivocal. Consequently, there is either no genuine syllogism or no genuine 
contradiction.  
There are two principal causes of sophistical refutations: the cause of the 
argument’s failure to be a genuine refutation, and the cause of the argument’s 
appearing to be a genuine refutation. The cause of the argument’s failure to be a real 
                                                     
163 [F]allacia autem aequivocationis est deception proveniens ex eo quod unum nomen plura significat ((ps) 
Aqiinas, 1976, c. 6). 
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refutation is the diverse significations of the word. The cause of the appearance of a 
refutation in the fallacy of equivocation is the likeness of speech.  
To understand this fallacy better, let us consider Aristotle’s examples. Aristotle 
gives four examples of sophisms taken from equivocation and shows by these four 
examples that the word equivocation sometimes occupies the role of middle term, and 
sometimes the role of the major term or minor term.  
Aristotle’s first example (SE 165b31ff):  
1) Every grammar teacher learns (μανθάνειν) the things that their students 
recite to them. 
Every grammar teacher knows (μανθάνειν) the things that their students 
recite to them. 
Hence, those who know learn. 
This example, likely taken from Plato’s Euthydemus (275d-276c), plays on the various 
meanings of the Greek term ‘learn’ (μανθάνειν). In the argument, ‘learn’ is an 
ambiguous major term that means both ‘understanding’ through the use of science, 
and also ‘acquiring science.’ Thus, according to one sense of the word, the first premise 
is true because grammar teachers understand what their students recite to them. With 
this meaning, the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises of the argument as 
long as the major term ‘learn’ is also taken to mean ‘understand’ in the conclusion. 
Nonetheless, the argument does not likely conclude in a refutation because the 
interlocutor most likely agreed that those who know do not learn—in the sense of 
acquiring knowledge. It is unlikely that the interlocutor agreed that those who know 
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do not ‘learn’—meaning understand. The interlocutor conceded that it is the ignorant 
who learn because he hears the word ‘learn’ in the sense of acquiring knowledge. The 
sophist takes the word ‘learn’ in its other sense, meaning to understand. If the 
interlocutor cannot distinguish the two senses of the word, he will be obliged to 
concede that it is the learned who learn, although there is not a genuine contradiction. 
In Aristotle’s second example (SE 165b34), the middle term is equivocal: 
2) Everything that needs to be is good. 
Evil things need to be. (For evil is often inevitable.) 
Therefore, evil things are good.  
This fallacy results from the middle term "things that need to be" (τὰ δέοντα) having a 
double meaning. On the one hand, ‘things that need to be’ may mean what ought to be 
or what is desirable which is usually not evil, and never evil as such. On the other hand, 
‘things that need to be’ may mean what is inevitable, which is often evil. In this 
argument, as long as the premises are true then there is no syllogism because the first 
premise is true only using the former meaning, but the second premise is true only 
using the latter meaning. The middle term’s unity is merely apparent, and no 
conclusion follows necessarily. If one takes the same meaning in both premises, then 
one of the premises is surely paradoxical and not likely to be acceptable to one’s 
interlocutor. Consequently, either the premises are true, and the argument does not 
follow, or the argument follows, but one of the premises is only an apparent endox. 
Either way, the result is a sophistical refutation.  
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In addition, Aristotle characterizes the fallacy of equivocation as committing the 
mistake of making two questions one (SE 175b39-176a19). The questioner, for instance, 
puts forward the question, “Is it the case that things that need to be are good?” When 
the interlocutor answers ‘yes,’ the questioner effectively acts as if the interlocutor has 
granted two separate questions. He proceeds as if the interlocutor has conceded both 
that everything that should be is good and that everything that happens necessarily is 
good. In other words, any fallacy of equivocation may be reduced into the fallacy of 
making many questions one. 
In accordance with these two examples, Aristotle points out that sometimes the 
equivocal term is only in premises because it is the middle term, and other times the 
equivocal term is in the conclusion because it is the minor or major term (SE 177a9-11). 
When the name used equivocally is the middle term, there are two ways to analyze the 
argument. Firstly, a person could say that the fallacy is only an apparent syllogism 
because there are not three but four terms: one of the terms is used with a double 
meaning. Secondly, a person could analyze the same refutation by holding that there 
are only three terms but that one of the premises is not a true endox, but only appears to 
be.  
When the word used equivocally is the major or minor term, there are two 
analogous ways to analyze the argument. Firstly, one may analyze the fallacy by 
holding that the term which shows up in the conclusion does not have the same 
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meaning as the same term in the premise, and thus the conclusion does not follow. 
Secondly, one may hold that the term which shows up in the conclusion has the same 
meaning as the term in the premise, but that the conclusion does not contradict a 
previously held statement of the interlocutor. Christopher Kirwan sums up this 
characteristic of the fallacy of equivocation succinctly (1979, p. 36): “the upshot of this is 
that equivocation is a fault in a piece of reasoning when each of the meanings between 
which the reasoner equivocates justifies a part of his reasoning but no one of them 
justifies it as a whole.”  
Aristotle provides two other examples (SE 165b38ff) which mirror one another: 
3) The sitting man is standing up.  
The one standing up has stood up. 
Thus, to sit and to stand are the same. 
Or again: 
4) The one recovering is healthy. 
The sick man is recovering. 
Thus, to be sick and to be healthy are the same. 
The sophist argues for these absurd conclusions using a confusion between the past 
and the present. Aristotle clarifies the ambiguity in the fallacy by stating,  
For, “the sick man doing or suffering anything whatsoever” does not signify one 
thing, but sometimes [it signifies] he who is now sick (or sitting), and at other 
times he who was sick before. Albeit the man who is sick was recovering even 
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while he was sick, but he is not healthy while he is sick, rather he is the man 
who was sick before, but not now.164  
 
The adjectives ‘sitting’ and ‘sick’ can be taken in the present or in the past. The 
argument is equivocal in that it takes terms that apply in the present as applying in the 
past or vice versa.165  
The last two examples reveal that the fallacy of equivocation may involve more 
ambiguities than only those resulting from Aristotle’s description of equivocation given 
in the Categories. Not only do his examples of the fallacy include names signifying 
different kinds of things, they also include names that signify the same thing differently 
qualified, such as ‘the sitting man’ and ‘the man who is sick.’  ‘The sitting man’ signifies 
the same person but in one sense as the man who is sitting and in another way as the 
man who was sitting. The fallacy of equivocation may result from mixing up meanings 
of a term that signifies two different things or from mixing up the meanings of a term 
that signifies the same thing in different ways.  
Presented as they are, Aristotle’s examples appear quite insignificant and 
benign, posing no danger to the mind; their falsity is obvious.166 Why does Aristotle use 
such simple examples? Aristotle unfolds the fallacy to us in clear examples to render its 
                                                     
164 τὸ γὰρ τὸν κάμνοντα ὁτιοῦν ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν οὐχ ἓν σημαίνει, ἀλλ' ὁτὲ μὲν ὅτι ὁ νῦν κάμνων [ἢ 
καθήμενος], ὁτὲ δ' ὃς ἔκαμνε πρότερον. πλὴν ὑγιάζετο μὲν καὶ κάμνων καὶ ὁ κάμνων· ὑγιαίνει δ' οὐ 
κάμνων ἀλλ' ὁ κάμνων, οὐ νῦν, ἀλλ' ὁ πρότερον (SE 166a2-6). 
165 Cf. Tricot, 1939, n. 5, p. 8. 
166 In fact, Aristotle uses the ambiguous term “things that need to be” as an example of being said in many 
ways that no one could fail to notice (Top 110b10). 
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nature. The purpose of using an example is to manifest something. The clearer the 
example is in its subject matter, the fewer obstacles there are that the student must 
overcome. With examples, difficulties can arise on the occasion of the matter. The 
similarity which is the principle of manifestation in the example must always be as 
manifest as possible. If Aristotle had given more difficult examples, the form of fallacy 
would have been far from obvious because it would have demanded too many 
distinctions.  
In dealing with a difficult instance of the fallacy, a person can easily be fooled. 
He will be more vulnerable if he has not understood how this fallacy comes about in 
simpler instances. Other examples are more pernicious than Aristotle’s examples: 
5) What is before other things is in time. 
God is before creation. 
Therefore, God is in time.167 
This example, taken from Saint Augustine’s Confessions, reveals the deceptive power of 
the fallacy of equivocation. From this fallacious reasoning, one may easily come to the 
opinion that creation, and therefore God’s existence, is impossible. In Aristotle’s 
Categories, he lays down five senses of ‘before.’ In the first sense, the word ‘before’ can 
signify what is before in time (Cat 14a26-30), and in the second sense, it signifies what 
is before in being (Cat 14a30-35). The first premise of the example is true only in the 
first sense of ‘before,’ while the second premise is, according to Saint Augustine, true 
                                                     
167 Cf. Augustine’s description of a “carnal” question, 1960, ch. 11, p. 250 and Heisenberg, 2000, p. 78-79. 
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only in the second sense of ‘before.’ That is, God is not before creation in the sense that 
there was some time when God existed and creation did not exist. God is before 
creation in the sense that creation could not exist without God but God could exist 
without creation. The middle term of the argument has only ostensible unity and 
accordingly the conclusion does not follow. 
What sort of equivocation is deceptive? While examining his third tool of 
dialectic (Top 105a20-33)—the tool of finding differences—Aristotle claims that 
discovering the difference between things that are far apart is evident (Top 108a5). He 
advises the dialectician, therefore, to practice distinguishing between things that are 
similar to one another. This principle also applies to the distinction between meanings 
of a word. When two meanings of a word are wholly unrelated, the equivocation is 
evident to everyone. In contrast, when the distinction between the senses of a name is 
subtle, the inexperienced are apt to be deceived. For instance, Aristotle argues that the 
different senses of justice are harder to distinguish than other equivocal words because 
they are near (σύνεγγυς) to one another (NE 1129a23-31). Without possessing a distinct 
knowledge of the various senses of a name, one is inclined to fall back on a prior and 
already familiar sense of that same word. In the fallacy taken from the Confessions, the 
reader is inclined to understand God’s priority to creation as being prior in time. The 
meanings of ‘before’ are connected and consequently apt to be confused. Equivocation 
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is deceptive when the various meanings of the word are confused on account of their 
proximity with one another.  
I.VI How to Untie the Fallacy of Equivocation 
Aristotle claims that those who are inexperienced with the power of names are 
susceptible to the fallacy of equivocation (SE 165a16).168 While anyone who does not 
know that it is possible for a name to bear multiple meanings will be vulnerable to the 
fallacy of equivocation, the knowledge that names can to bear multiple meanings will 
not make one impervious to the fallacy of equivocation. Aristotle claims that “the trick 
of [fallacies] from equivocation and speech occurs through being unable to distinguish 
what is said in many ways.”169 Only the ability to distinguish between different senses 
of particular names used in an argument will make one impervious to the fallacy of 
equivocation.  
Having established that the defense against this fallacy lies in the answerer being 
able to distinguish between different meanings of a word, Aristotle divides the 
answerer’s responses into two kinds based on whether the equivocal word is used only 
                                                     
168 Dorion notes that according to LS one meaning of δύναμις is “meaning.” He argues however that the 
principal cause of the vulnerability to paralogisms, therefore, is not the rather benign knowledge of the 
meaning of a word, but the otherwise serious ignorance of the possibility of a word having several 
meanings. Cf. Dorion, 1995, n. 7, p. 209. Certainly, ignorance of the possibility that a word can have 
several meanings will make one susceptible to the fallacy of equivocation. However, the dialectician must 
have much more experience with the power of names to be able to avoid the fallacy of equivocation. He 
must be able to distinguish the meanings of words as they are used in argument. 
169 Ἡ δ' ἀπάτη γίνεται τῶν μὲν παρὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν καὶ τὸν λόγον τῷ μὴ δύνασθαι διαιρεῖν τὸ 
πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον (SE 169a22-24). λὀγος here is apparently a fill in for amphiboly. Cf. SE also 
168a25. 
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in the premises, or in the conclusion.  When the question posed as a premise has more 
than one meaning in a dialectical disputation, Aristotle advises the answerer to 
respond: “in one sense, yes, and in another sense no.” When the conclusion has a 
double meaning, the answerer should indicate that the conclusion does not contradict 
the thing (πρᾶγμα) previously granted but only the name (SE 177a16-34). Both of these 
solutions to the fallacy of equivocation require that the answerer is able to distinguish 
the various senses of names. If the answerer recognizes that a name used in an 
argument has multiple meanings, then the sophist cannot ensnare him. The true 
dialectician will ask, “what do you mean by this word?” The inexperienced adversary 
who is ignorant of the doctrine of homonyms, however, will consider words as having 
only one meaning and fall into the sophist’s trap. 
The ability to identify promptly exact meanings of words is difficult. 
Accordingly, Aristotle advises that the prudent answerer should also attack the sophist 
by explicitly accusing him of committing the fallacy (SE 175b1-8 and note ad loc). This 
tactic requires that the answerer is able to show that the fallacy of equivocation is 
possible. The easiest way to do so is through two kinds of examples. Every sophistical 
refutation must both fail to be a refutation and appear to be a refutation. A simple 
example most effectively demonstrates that equivocation corrupts argument while a 
more difficult example better illustrates that it can indeed be deceptive. Using this tactic 
does not involve distinguishing the exact meanings of a word, but merely accuses the 
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questioner of using more than one sense in an argument.  This tactic offers the benefit of 
being always at hand in disputation. Interestingly, for Aristotle the appearances matter. 
He notes that it is important to be able to respond promptly when under interrogation, 
and thus to avoid the appearance of refutation (SE 175a17-30-b1). Articulating the 
confused senses of the equivocal name is the only way to destroy the sophism 
completely. Nevertheless, at times it is expedient simply to call an argument equivocal 
and to articulate what the fallacy of equivocation is, even if one cannot exactly articulate 
the different senses of the equivocal name. 
I.VII The Places of Homonymy 
Even so, to untie the fallacy of equivocation completely, one must identify the 
various meanings of a name used in an argument, and consequently, the dialectician 
must be able to distinguish all the senses of a name. Moreover, Aristotle says in the De 
Caelo that it is useful to distinguish the senses of names even when it makes no 
difference for the validity of an argument (DeCa 280b1-5). Confusion regarding the 
different senses of a name is harmful in philosophy even if no fallacy of equivocation 
results from the ambiguity.  For a person will know better what he is stating if he 
clearly understands the various meanings of the words he uses (Top 108a19-20). When 
one considers a principle containing a word whose meanings he does not fully grasp, 
his apprehension of that principle is limited.  Again, someone could form a valid 
argument in which the premises are true, and the conclusion follows necessarily, but he 
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will not be able to grasp the argument with full clarity without full knowledge of the 
meanings of the words it entails. It is imperative, therefore, that a philosopher is able to 
distinguish the different senses of words.170 
As was noted above, Aristotle calls this ability the second tool of his dialectical 
art. In the first book of the Topics, Aristotle unfolds numerous places which aid us in 
perceiving that a word is equivocal and in identifying the different senses of that word. 
Let us examine four such places: those using opposites (Top 106a10-b28), those using 
inflection (Top 106b29-107a2), those using genera (Top 107a13-17), and those using 
more and less (Top 107b13-18).  
Opposites:171 One place to look to see if a name has diverse meanings is to see 
whether or not there are one or many contraries to that name (Top 106a10-21). “In most 
cases,” a name used with one meaning will have only one contrary, and likewise the 
reverse.172 For example, by noting that sharp is contrary to both flat and dull, one can 
detect that the word is equivocal. Similarly, ‘many’ is evidently equivocal because it is 
contrary both to one and to few. Aristotle uses this place to distinguish two senses of 
justice, noting that it is contrary to unfair as well as unlawful (NE 1129a23-b1).173 It is 
                                                     
170 The necessity of appreciating the different senses of a word applies equally well to the theologian. For 
what theologian could understand the Lord’s words “I am Alpha and Omega, the first and the last, the 
beginning and the end” (Rev. 22:13), without knowing the various senses of beginning and end.  
171 Aristotle lays down four different species of opposites in the Categories (11b15-13a37). 
172 Aristotle does not think these places will apply universally. Therefore, he will sometimes qualify their 
universality (cf. NE 1129a24: ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ). 
173 While it may seem that injustice is not contrary to justice but the privation of justice, Aristotle calls 
justice contrary to injustice (cf. Cat 10b12-14). 
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clear then that if two things bear the same name but have different contraries according 
to that name, it is likely that the name is equivocal.   
In another way, one can determine that a name has many senses by looking to 
see if there is a contrary to one thing but not to another which shares its name (Top 
106a37-b4). For example, one can call a group of friends thick, but one does not call 
them thin. Nevertheless, a thick stick is contrary to a thin stick.174 Similarly, it is clear 
that pleasure has multiple meanings because the pain of thirst is a contrary to the 
pleasure of drinking water, although there is no contrary to the pleasure of 
contemplating the conclusion of a geometrical demonstration. Again, loving as a matter 
of the will has the contrary of hating, but loving as a bodily activity has no contrary.  
One can detect equivocation by noticing that one instance of a word has a contrary, but 
that another instance of the same word does not. 
In the Categories, Aristotle points out that there is a middle between some 
contraries, and there is no middle between other contraries (Cat 12a1-10).  If two things 
share the same name, but one has an intermediary while the other does not, then the 
two things are equivocal. For instance, fine as opposed to coarse has no intermediary, 
but fine as opposed to crude or drab has the intermediary of ordinary. One can also use 
                                                     
174 One can detect another meaning of thick by using the prior place and noticing that thick traffic is 
contrary to light traffic. 
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this place to detect equivocation by noticing that two intermediaries are different from 
one another.  
Again, if the contradiction of a name has multiple meanings, then it has multiple 
meanings (Top 106b13-20).  For instance, ‘not to see’ is said with more than one 
meaning: it can mean ‘not to possess sight’ or ‘not to be engaging in the activity of 
seeing.’ A person may say he did not see something and mean that he simply did not 
notice it, but a person may also use the phrase to signify blindness instead. Since ‘not to 
see’ is the contradictory term of ‘to see,’ and the former has multiple meanings, so too 
does the latter.  
Inflection: Another place the dialectician can look for equivocation is to see if the 
inflected forms (πτώσεις) of a name are used in the same way as names with the same 
base. If the inflected form can be said in many ways, then so can the original. For 
instance, a luminous light may shine ‘brightly’ but a bright mind will not. Again, 
‘drying’ and ‘dry’ may refer to a towel, but ‘dryly’ does not. Or one may use ‘dryly’ and 
‘dry’ in reference to a remark, but not ‘drying.’ Again, one could say that the sculptor 
causes the sculpture, but one would not say that the marble causes the sculpture. This 
discrepancy is a sign that there must be more than one sense of cause. Such examples 
illustrate that if a name can be said of one thing, but another name with the same base 
cannot be said of that thing, then the name may be equivocal.  
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More or Less: Another place to detect equivocation is to see if the things signified 
by the word are comparable regarding more and less. Aristotle says that “everything 
univocal is comparable: either they will be equally called, or one will be more so.”175 
Who is brighter, Albert Einstein or the sun? Which is softer, the light of the lamp or the 
down pillow? One cannot compare apples and oranges. When said of the pillow ‘soft’ 
must have a different meaning than when said of the lamp. If a name is said univocally 
of two things and they admit of more and less, then they will be comparable according 
to more and less. 
Genera: Another place to look for equivocation is to see whether or not the uses of 
the name are in the same genera. In other words, a term will not generally be said in the 
same sense of things in different genera.  Rigidity in wood is in the genus of sense 
quality, but rigidity in a man is in the genus of moral quality. In the Nicomachean Ethics 
(1096a23-29), Aristotle uses this same principle to show that good has multiple 
meanings. Since ‘good’ is in the category of substance, quality, quantity, and place, it is 
clear that ‘good’ is polysemous. 
In sum, while the above places are not a complete taxonomy of all Aristotle’s 
ways of uncovering equivocation, the above places illustrate his “sensible”176 approach 
to distinguishing the senses of words. Aristotle seems to offer these places not to use as 
                                                     
175 τὸ γὰρ συνώνυμον πᾶν συμβλητόν· ἢ γὰρ ὁμοίως ῥηθήσεται ἢ μᾶλλον θάτερον (Top 107b17-18). 
176 Cf. Smith, 1997, p. 92. 
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tools during dialectical dispute, but rather during investigations on one’s own.177 
Moreover, he gives no indication that these places apply in all cases. He appeals to these 
places as norms—practical tools at the disposal of the dialectician that may or may not 
be applicable to a given word.  
I.VIII Kinds of Equivocation 
In the Politics, Aristotle claims that when one wants to understand something 
more fully, it is essential to understand how it develops from the beginning (Pol 
1252a25-27). Accordingly, one can better understand equivocal names, if one can come 
to a universal understanding of the way in which they become so. Aristotle 
distinguishes equivocal names into kinds: 
[T]here are among equivocals, some very distant; some having some similarity; 
some near in genus or by analogy, whence they do not seem to be equivocals, 
though they are (Phys 249a23-25, trans. Coughlin).  
 
Some equivocals are very distant while other bear some similarity or nearness to one 
another.  As Plato says, “one should always be on guard concerning likenesses because 
they are most slippery things.”178 When things are like one another, they are harder to 
distinguish, and thus Aristotle says that likeness is a cause of deception. It follows that 
equivocals near to one another often appear to be one and the same and hence lend 
themselves to deceive. 
                                                     
177 Cf. Smith, 1997, p. 93. 
178 τὸν δὲ ἀσφαλῆ δεῖ πάντων μάλιστα περὶ τὰς ὁμοιότητας ἀεὶ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν φυλακήν (Sophist 231a6-
8). 
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In line with Aristotle's distinction between equivocals being more or less distant, 
Aristotle (NE 1096b26-29) distinguishes equivocal by chance (ἀπὸ τύχης) from 
equivocal according to analogy (κατ’ ἀναλογίαν).179 Duane Berquist—who has done 
considerable work articulating the various kinds of equivocation—divides equivocal 
words into two parallel kinds: equivocal by chance and equivocal for some reason.180  
A name is equivocal by reason when there is a reason why the name has more 
than one meaning or when there is a reason why the same name is said of many 
things even though we do not have the same exact meaning in mind when 
saying it of each. Thus, in a name equivocal by reason, there is a connection or 
order among the many meanings.”181  
 
                                                     
179 While here Aristotle divides equivocal names into two, in the passage from the Physics, he appears to 
divide into three: those being very distant, those having some similarity, and those being near. I take 
those being very distant as being equivocal by chance and those being near as being equivocal analogy or 
by reason. Perhaps, an example of the middle kind having some similarity is the word ‘cardinal.’  In some 
sense, it is accidental that ‘cardinal’ signifies both the cleric and the bird since there does not seem to be a 
necessary order between the two meanings and the equivocation will not naturally translate into different 
languages. Yet it appears that the two meanings of the ‘cardinal’ are not simply by chance on account of 
the cleric and the bird’s similar donning of red. This sort of equivocal naming seems to be a result of a 
repeated use metaphor that has hardened into convention. 
180 Berquist’s renaming of tradition’s equivocal by analogy or analogous naming is sensible. For, in his 
own words, “Although many are accustomed to use name equivocal by reason and analogous name to 
mean the same, this is more ex usu loquentium than from the word analogous itself. For this word means 
proportional and whether we use that word to mean a likeness of ratios (as Euclid does) or to mean a 
ratio, it signifies only some kind or kinds of name equivocal by reason. If we want to understand name 
equivocal by reason universally and in all its kinds, it is necessary to separate the other kinds from those 
which are based on a proportion or ratio(s).” Cf. Berquist, 2015, p. 2. Nor was Berquist the first to do so. 
Cf. for instance, Cajetan, 2009, c. 2, n. 20, p. 22. Berquist’s division of equivocals resembles to what Shields 
calls “discrete” and “comprehensive” homonymy. A homonymy is “discrete” if there “definitions have 
nothing in common and do not overlap in any way,” but “comprehensive” if their definitions do not 
completely overlap. Cf. Shields, 1999, p. 11. Still, not every word that is equivocal by reason is a 
comprehensive homonymy. For example, no part of the meaning of before in time is not included in the 
meaning of before in honorability. There meanings do not overlap in any way. Nonetheless, the meanings 
are equivocal by reason as evidenced by the fact that the two meanings are used in Greek, Latin, and 
English. For this reason, and because it mirrors Aristotle’s equivocal by chance/equivocal by analogy 
division, Berquist’s division of equivocals is superior to Shield’s.  
181 D. Berquist, 2015, pp. 1-2. 
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It is purely by chance that the name ‘bat’ is said of the wooden stick and the flying 
rodent. There is no natural order or connection to the meanings of this name. 
Interestingly, names such as bat that are equivocal by chance are rarely, if ever, 
equivocal in more than one language. In contrast, there is a reason why the name 
‘being’ is said both of substance and accident, and accordingly, Aristotle gives an order 
to the two meanings (Meta 1003a31-b19). Naturally, words equivocal by reason share 
the same meanings in many languages.  
Berquist articulates two primary ways in which names may be equivocal by 
reason. 1) Sometimes a name is said of two things—one retains the name as its own, and 
the other receives a new name. 2) Other times, a name is said of one thing, and we see a 
reason to apply that name to something connected with it yet still preserving its own 
separate meaning. In this case, the name equivocal by reason is moved over from one 
thing to another. Berquist’s distinction between these two kinds of equivocation by 
reason is complete because either the name must be transferred to another thing which 
did not previously have that name, or the name must be applied with a new meaning to 
a thing which already had that name.  
One can further divide these two subdivisions into two. 1a) Sometimes a 
common name is said equally of multiple things, but one of them is given a new name 
because it has something special about it, while the other/others which have nothing 
noteworthy retain the original name with a slightly restricted meaning. 
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A. For instance, ‘finger’ is first said of any digit on a hand. Since the thumb has 
the noteworthy aspect of being opposable, we give it a special name ‘thumb’ 
while the rest retain the name ‘finger’ now having another slightly more 
restricted meaning opposed to thumb.  
 
B. ‘Disposition’ is first said of any quality by which one is apt to carry out some 
action, but since habit is noteworthy in so far as it is firm, we assign to it the 
special name ‘habit’ while the other dispositions retains the name 
‘disposition’ (Cat 8b27-9b14).’ 
 
C. ‘Scientific knowledge’ (ἐπιστήμη) is first said of any demonstrated 
knowledge,182 but since wisdom—that is, first philosophy—has the 
noteworthy aspect of being that by which we call someone wholly wise (NE 
1141a12-13), we give it a special name ‘wisdom’ while other forms of 
demonstrated knowledge retain the name ‘scientific knowledge.’183 
 
D. ‘Animal’ first is said of every sentient thing, but since man has the 
noteworthy aspect of being rational, we give man the special name ‘man’ 
while other sentient things retain the name ‘animal’ with the slightly more 
restricted meaning of being opposed to ‘man.’184 
Another kind of equivocal naming happens when 1b) what is signified by name is 
found imperfectly in a thing, which is subsequently given a new name, while the other 
thing(s) retain the old name. As Berquist puts it, “when one thing has simpliciter or 
perfectly what is signified by the common name, and the other has only in an imperfect 
and qualified way the same, the former keeps the common name, and the latter is given 
a new name.”185 
A. For instance, sometimes people call kittens cats, but other times people 
oppose kittens to cats. 
 
                                                     
182 Aristotle calls wisdom a scientific knowledge (NE 1141b).  
183 Hence Aristotle sometimes distinguishes wisdom from scientific knowledge (NE 1139b). 
184 Another example may be the word ‘car’ which first includes trucks and then is opposed to truck. 
185 D. Berquist, 2015, p. 6. 
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B. A dead eye is still called an eye, but only equivocally (Meteor 390a10-15, GA 
734b24-31). 
 
C. Sometimes people say that a boy is a man but other times people oppose boy 
to man. 
 
D. Aristotle sometimes calls an enthymeme a syllogism (Rhet 1355a8, Rhet 
1357a32f, APr 70a10) but other times opposes enthymeme to the syllogism 
(Rhet 1355a14, Rhet 1357a18). 
 
In both these instances of equivocation, we name things as we know them. We are 
aware of the general universal before the particular universal (Phys 184a16-b14), and 
common names are first applied generally and then applied more particularly to a 
subspecies.  
The other primary way to name equivocally is to apply the name of one thing to 
a second—and in some way related—thing.  This may happen in two ways. 2a) 
Sometimes the name is carried over by being generalized and drops part of its meaning. 
With a more general meaning, it is said of all the things of which it was said originally, 
but also of more things than before. 
A. Aristotle uses ‘scientific knowledge’ to mean a certain and stable syllogized 
knowledge through the cause (APo 71b10-14) but then extends the name 
science by dropping ‘through the cause’ to extend to any certain and stable 
syllogized knowledge.186 
 
B. ‘Suffering’ or ‘undergoing’ originally meant passive change for the worse or 
painful change. The word was then extended to mean any change including 
but not limited to that which is for the worse or painful.  
                                                     
186 Cf. APo 78a22ff. Hence, demonstration ‘propter quid’ and demonstration ‘quia’ are distinguished by the 
former making one know scientifically in the strict sense and the latter making one know scientifically in 
the more general sense.  
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C. ‘Road’ originally meant stable even ground upon which to travel, but one 
may drop the material aspect of the meaning of road while keeping the 
notion of before and after thus making it applicable to our experience of 
coming to knowledge. 
In another way 2b) the name is moved over by ratios or the order or relation of 
one thing to another. This way itself can happen in different ways. 
A. For instance, one name is often said of two things because one of them has a 
certain relationship to the other. ‘Health’ is said of the body in the first sense 
of healthy, but it is moved over and placed on a diet because of the diet’s 
causal relation to health, and it is placed on one’s complexion because it is a 
result of health.  
 
B. Sometimes, one name is said of two things by their having different 
relationships to the same thing. e.g., quality and quantity are both equivocally 
called ‘being’ because they each have a relationship to substance, but 
different relationships. Quantity is called ‘being’ because it is the measure of 
substance whereas quality is called ‘being’ because it is a disposition of 
substance. 
 
C. Sometimes one name is said of two things because they have the same 
relationship to different things. For instance, mind : intelligible = eye : 
sensible, and so we might apply the name ‘see’ from the eye to the mind. 
Further in general : particular = whole : parts, and accordingly, we call the 
universal a whole and derive the name ‘particular’ from the name part.  
 





For Aristotle names are symbols of the undergoings of the soul which themselves are 
likenesses to things. Equivocal naming is a form of proper naming as opposed to 
metaphorical naming, and it is a necessary consequence of how we name and how we 
know. The fallacy of equivocation is the result of mixing up different senses of an 
equivocal word. Aristotle claims that one’s inexperience with argument is a cause of 
one’s vulnerability to sophistical refutations. In the case of the fallacy of equivocation 
Equivocals
Equivocal by reason 
(often called 
analogous)
By keeping a common 
name while being 
opposed to the other 
which gets a new 
name 
By not adding 
anything noteworthy 




By having what is 
meant by the 
common name 
perfectly
Examples: cat, man, 
syllogism
By moving the 
equivocal word over 
to another
By extending the 
name through losing 








Examples: Bat, top, 
pitcher
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specifically, those who are unaware and inexperienced with the power of names are 
most susceptible to being fooled. Simply being aware that names can signify more than 
one thing is an insufficient defense against mistakes due to equivocation. Philosophic 
understanding and inquiry necessitate much more work. One must be able to 
distinguish between the different senses of words that are used in any argument to be 
impervious to the fallacy of equivocation. However, Aristotle does not leave us empty-
handed. He supplies us with the places which aid us in perceiving that a word is 
equivocal and in identifying the different senses of that word. Moreover, a 
consideration of the kinds of equivocation enables us to understand how the process of 
equivocation comes about and hence to predict the various possible senses of words.  
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Appendix II: The Fallacy of the Accident 
II.I Division of Fallacies Outside of Speech 
The fallacy of the accident is the most problematic of all the fallacies in Aristotle’s 
Sophistical Refutations. Edward Poste comments that the fallacy is an “ill-defined 
species,” and that we would, “do well to drop it from the list and distribute its contents 
among other classes,”187 criticizing Aristotle for “not speak[ing] very accurately.”188 
Indeed a number of commentators have disparaged Aristotle’s treatment of the fallacy 
of the accident. Louis-Andre Dorion finds it difficult to see how Aristotle’s account suits 
his examples189 and Sten Ebbesen criticizes Aristotle’s description of the fallacy as “no 
masterpiece of clarity.”190 
Although Aristotle’s account may rightly be criticized for its lack of clarity—the 
fallacy has about as many interpretations as it has commentators191—we would do well, 
if possible, to avoid disbanding Aristotle’s fallacy of the accident and distributing its 
contents into the other listed fallacies. Aristotle considers the fallacy of the accident to 
be the most deceptive of all fallacies. He holds that the fallacy deceives even “men of 
scientific knowledge (ἐπιστήμων, SE 168b6).”192 Aristotle obviously took this fallacy 
                                                     
187 Poste, 1866, n. 14, p. 158. Cf. also Bueno, 1988, p. 8. 
188 Poste, 1866, n. 9, p. 157.  
189 Dorion, 1995, n. 58, p. 233. 
190 Ebbesen, 1981, I, p. 224. Cf. also Beuno, 1988, p. 9; Hamblin, 1970, p. 84. 
191 For a thoughtful but head-spinning romp through the history’s many and varied interpretations of the 
fallacy of the accident, cf. Bäck, 2015, pp. 155-163.  
192 For Aristotle, scientific knowledge is the highest perfection of understanding about any given subject. 
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seriously, and his treatment of it should not be considered careless. A particular reading 
of (Ps) Thomas Aquinas’ De Fallaciis193 offers a unique account of the fallacy that allows 
Aristotle to be read in a consistent manner, distinguishes the fallacy from the other 
fallacies outside of speech, and accounts for Aristotle’s examples. The fallacy of the 
accident can be understood as an apparent refutation with a defect in the use of the 
middle term where insofar as the middle term is connected with the minor term, it is 
accidentally connected with the major or vice versa. This reading is not without its own 
difficulties, but it does account for the fallacy’s place in Aristotle’s taxonomy and fits 
with his examples given in the Sophistical Refutations.  
To unfold this thesis, I will first show how the fallacy of the accident is 
distinguished from the other fallacies outside of speech. Second, I will consider the 
different senses of accident that are used in Aristotle’s logical works. Third, I will show 
what the defect is in every argument that commits the fallacy of the accident and give 
(ps) Thomas Aquinas’ illuminating division of the fallacy into three subspecies 
according to this interpretation. Finally, I will offer a unique interpretation of why the 
fallacy of the accident does not violate Aristotle’s “said of all” (dictum de omni) principle 
from the Categories.  
                                                     
193 On the attribution of this text to Thomas Aquinas and other questions, cf. H. F. Dondaine in (ps) 
Aquinas, 1976, pp. 385-400.  
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II.II Senses of Accident 
According to Aristotle, every fallacy fails to be a genuine refutation insofar as it falls 
short of the definition of refutation. He claims that “it is possible to reduce all the 
previously stated ways into the definition of refutation.”194 Let us refresh our memory 
with Aristotle’s definition of refutation: “a syllogism with a contradiction of the 
conclusion.”195 That is, a refutation is a syllogism whose conclusion contradicts a 
previously granted proposition of one’s interlocutor. The interlocutor is refuted when 
two propositions that he grants are in contradiction with one another. An argument is 
an apparent refutation, or a fallacy, in two cases. One, when it is only an apparent 
syllogism, and two, when it concludes in an apparent but unreal contradiction.  
Aristotle does not initially make clear how he arrives at his taxonomy of fallacies 
when he provides his initial list. We will take the fact that every fallacy fails to be a 
genuine refutation insofar as it falls short of the definition of refutation to serve as the 
basis of Aristotle’s confidence in the exhaustive nature of his taxonomy and help to 
clarify how the fallacy of the accident is distinct from the other fallacies outside of 
speech. 
It is clear from the definition of refutation that a contradiction is proper to it, and 
from this one can already understand one fallacy from outside of speech. Namely, if an 
                                                     
194 ἔστι γὰρ ἅπαντας ἀναλῦσαι τοὺς λεχθέντας τρόπους εἰς τὸν τοῦ ἐλέγχου διορισμόν (SE 168a20).  
195 ἔλεγχος δὲ συλλογισμὸς μετ’ ἀντιφάσεως τοῦ συμπεράσματος (SE 165a2-3).  
 350 
argument appears to contradict a proposition previously affirmed by the interlocutor—
while not actually contradicting it—the argument commits the fallacy of ignorance of 
refutation.196 For instance, the sophist Protagoras criticizes Socrates for admiring a poem 
of Simonides because the poem first says that it is difficult to become good while later 
saying that it is not difficult to be good.  A poem, Protagoras says, should not contradict 
itself. Yet the poem only appears to contradict itself (Protagoras 338e-348c). In reality, the 
poem does not because to be and to become are not the same thing. It may be difficult to 
climb to the top of a mountain but is not difficult simply to stand at the top of a 
mountain. Difficulty in becoming does not contradict a lack of difficulty in being. Any 
argument that falsely appears to contradict a previously granted proposition of an 
interlocutor commits the fallacy of ignorance of refutation.  
The other fallacies outside of speech are not as immediately evident. Since the 
definition of the refutation takes syllogism as its genus, it necessary to understand 
Aristotle’s definition of syllogism to understand his meaning of refutation and thereby 
his meaning of fallacy. Aristotle defines syllogism as “an argument in which, from 
certain premises laid down, something else, other than the premises laid down, follows 
from necessity, by the premises being so.”197 If we take apart the definition and consider 
                                                     
196 One should recall from the commentary that although every fallacy is in some sense an ignorance of 
refutation, there is also a subcategory of fallacy called ignorance of refutation, namely, those where there 
is an apparent but not a real contradiction of the answerer’s position on the established problem (SE 
167a21-35 and notes ad loc). Cf. also SE 168b17-21. 
197 συλλογισμὸς δέ ἐστι λόγος ἐν ᾧ τεθέντων τινῶν ἕτερόν τι τῶν κειμένων ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνει τῷ 
ταῦτα εἶναι (PrAn 24b18-20). Cf. also SE 165a1-3. 
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each part at a time, we will see how different fallacies can and do result. A syllogism is 
a speech in which: 
1)  From certain premises laid down, 
2) Something else, other than the premises laid down, 
3) Follows from necessity, 
4) By the premises being so. 
 
Since its connection to the fallacy of begging the question is so obvious, let’s first take 
up the second criterion: something else, other than the premises was laid down. If the 
conclusion falsely appears to be different from one of the premises, the argument 
commits the fallacy of begging the question. Any argument that concludes with a 
proposition that is assumed in one of the premises does not satisfy the second criterion 
of the definition of syllogism, and therefore is not a true refutation.  
The fallacy that follows from making several questions into one violates the first 
criterion: from certain premises being laid down. Aristotle asserts that someone falling 
into this fallacy does not understand the definition of proposition implied by certain 
premises being laid down (SE 169a6-7). For a proposition must predicate one thing of 
one thing. When a supposed premise conjoins two predicates, the conclusion appears to 
follow from premises that are in fact not premises at all because they try to say too 
much and by doing so violate the definition of proposition.   
The third criterion—follows from necessity—is the part of the definition of 
syllogism that the fallacy of the consequent fails to meet. Such a fallacy occurs when the 
premise “if A, then B” is affirmed, and B is then affirmed, and A is inferred. Mellisus 
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argued for example that if the universe were infinite, then it would not have a 
beginning. The universe has no beginning and therefore is infinite. But this does not 
follow. For one could just as easily argue for many falsehoods. For instance, if 
Alcibiades is a father, he is a man, but Alcibiades is a man, and so he is a father. Yet he 
is not a father, although the premises are true. The conclusion does not, in fact, follow 
from the premises, but only appears to do so. Any argument that takes this form fails to 
meet the third criterion of the definition of syllogism and commits the fallacy of the 
consequent. 
It is important to note in dealing with the fallacy of the consequent that Aristotle 
considers the fallacy of the consequent as part of the fallacy of the accident. He states, 
“the consequent is an accident, but it is different from an accident because it is possible 
to take the accident in one [thing] alone. For example, the yellow and honey are the 
same, and the white and swan. On the other hand, the [fallacy] from the consequent is 
always in several things.”198  According to Aristotle, the fallacy of the consequent is a 
certain kind of fallacy of the accident. The text suggests then that the two fallacies share 
the same defect—they do not follow necessarily from the premises. This provides our 
first clue to understanding the fallacy of the accident. 
                                                     
198 τὸ γὰρ ἑπόμενον συμβέβηκε. διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος, ὅτι τὸ μὲν συμβεβηκὸς ἔστιν ἐφ' ἑνὸς 
μόνου λαβεῖν, οἷον ταὐτὸ εἶναι τὸ ξανθὸν καὶ μέλι, καὶ τὸ λευκὸν καὶ κύκνον, τὸ δὲ παρὰ τὸ 
ἑπόμενον ἀεὶ ἐν πλείοσιν (SE 168b28-32). 
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One can also understand the fallacy of ‘simply and in a certain respect’ as a 
violation of the third criterion: follows from necessity. The conclusion of an argument 
violating this kind of fallacy does follow in a certain respect, but not simply as it 
appears to.199 Accordingly, Aristotle holds that Meno’s argument (Meno 80d-86e) 
violates this fallacy not because it does not follow in some way that I know what I don’t 
know, but rather because it does not follow that I know simply what I don’t know 
simply (APo 71a24-b9). Thus the fallacy of simply and in a certain respect violates the 
third criterion.   
Aristotle claims that the fallacy of taking what is not a cause as a cause violates 
the fourth criterion: by the premises being so (SE 168b22-26).200 The fallacy is a faulty 
reduction to the absurd where a “premise” that seems to lead to an absurd conclusion is 
deemed to be the premise responsible for the resulting absurdity. Yet in the argument, 
the said “premise” is not a genuine premise but merely appears to be. The faulty 
conclusion of the reduction does not follow “by the premises being so.” 
How does the fallacy of the accident violate the definition of refutation? In his 
discussion of its defect, Aristotle claims that there is no syllogism of the accident.  
[Fallacies] from accident are exposed when syllogism has been defined. For there 
must also be the same definition of refutation except that contradiction is added. 
                                                     
199 Aristotle appears to characterize the fallacy of what is simply and what is in some respect as following 
by necessity but not actually contradicting (SE 168b10-12). I take it that these are two sides of the same 
coin. Either one can look at the fallacy as following from the premises, and it does not actually contradict 
a previously held statement or one can take that conclusion actually to contradict a previously held 
statement, but it merely appears to follow from the premises. Cf. also SE 169b10-12. 
200 For an example of this sort of fallacy, cf. 167b26-31.  
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For a refutation is a syllogism of contradiction.  Consequently, if there is no 
syllogism of the accident, there is no refutation. For if (C) must be when these (A) 
and (B) are, and (C) is white, then it is not necessary that it is white because of 
the syllogism. Moreover, if a triangle has angles equal to two right angles, but it 
happens accidentally to be a figure or an element or a principle, it is not 
necessary that a figure or an element or a principle [have angles equal to two 
right angles]. For the demonstration is not as figure or as principle but as 
triangle, and it is likewise even in other cases. If, therefore, a refutation is a 
syllogism, then there cannot be a refutation according to accident.201 
 
While portions of this passage are obscure, at least two things are evident. For Aristotle, 
A) there is no syllogism of the accident because the fallacy of the accident does not 
follow necessarily, and B) there is no refutation of the accident because there is no 
syllogism of the accident. Our task then is to discover why the fallacy does not follow. 
Based on the passage above, it may seem as though the fallacy of the accident is 
based on an argument the structure of which does not necessitate its conclusion. One 
example is clearly stated in the text: 
1) All triangles have interior angles equal to two right angles.  
All triangles are figures.  
Therefore, all figures have interior angles equal to two rights. 
 
The syllogism given by Aristotle does not follow; it is a corruption of the third figure 
syllogism Darapti. The proper conclusion should be that some figures have interior 
                                                     
201 Οἱ δὲ παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ὁρισθέντος τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ φανεροὶ γίνονται. τὸν αὐτὸν γὰρ ὁρισμὸν 
δεῖ καὶ τοῦ ἐλέγχου γίνεσθαι, πλὴν προσκεῖσθαι τὴν ἀντίφασιν· ὁ γὰρ ἔλεγχος συλλογισμὸς 
ἀντιφάσεως. εἰ οὖν μὴ ἔστι συλλογισμὸς τοῦ συμβεβηκότος, οὐ γίνεται ἔλεγχος. οὐ γὰρ εἰ τούτων 
ὄντων ἀνάγκη τόδ' εἶναι (τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ λευκόν), ἀνάγκη λευκὸν εἶναι διὰ τὸν συλλογισμόν. οὐδ' εἰ τὸ 
τρίγωνον δυοῖν ὀρθαῖν ἴσας ἔχει, συμβέβηκε δ' αὐτῷ σχήματι εἶναι ἢ πρώτῳ ἢ ἀρχῇ, ὅτι σχῆμα ἢ 
ἀρχὴ ἢ πρῶτον τοῦτό ἐστιν· οὐ γὰρ ᾗ σχῆμα οὐδ' ᾗ πρῶτον ἀλλ' ᾗ τρίγωνον ἡ ἀπόδειξις ὁμοίως δὲ 
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ὥστ’ εἰ ὁ ἔλεγχος συλλογισμός τις, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ὁ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἔλεγχος (SE 
168a34-b5). 
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angles equal to two rights.202  Using the same corrupt structure, one could reason that 
since all men are rational, and all men are animals, therefore all animals are rational. 
The structure of the premises simply does not necessitate the conclusion.  
Nonetheless, this account cannot resolve all of the examples Aristotle gives. In 
some examples of the fallacy of the accident, there is no obvious structural defect.  
2) The one who is approaching is not known to me. 
Coriscus is the one who is approaching 
Thus, Coriscus is not known to me.203  
This example and others appear structurally sound.204 Some other reason must be found 
why the conclusion does not follow. 
We can now see why the fallacy of the accident is the most problematic of all 
Aristotle’s fallacies. While the other fallacies neatly impinge on different parts of the 
definition of refutation, there is no clear reason from the text why the fallacy of the 
accident does not follow. Aristotle does claim, however, that there is no syllogism of the 
accident. Leonard Hamblin noted that the fallacy of the accident is “seldom 
understood” claiming as a cause that it is unclear what ‘accident’ means in relation to 
the fallacy.205 Understanding and resolving the fallacy of the accident should turn on 
                                                     
202 Cf. PrAn 28a10-2918, where Aristotle discusses the third figure syllogism and its defective mutations 
including one structured like argument 1) above. 
203 Cf. SE 179b1-4 
204 Cf. for instance, example 4) below.  
205 Cf. Hamblin, 1970, p. 84.  
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what Aristotle precisely means by the word accident (συμβεβηκὸς) in the fallacy of the 
accident.  
II.III What is the Fallacy of the Accident? 
Let us first distinguish the sense of ‘accident’ used in the fallacy of the accident from 
Aristotle’s other meanings of the word.206 The second tool (ὄργανον) of dialectic is the 
ability to distinguish different senses of a word (Top 105a24-25). This tool’s most 
common place is the comparison of opposite meanings of a word as, for instance, one 
can distinguish the various meanings of sharp by its being opposed to both flat and dull 
(Top 106a9-40). If a term has more than one opposite, then it has more than one 
                                                     
206 Still number of previous interpreters of this fallacy have failed to distinguish the various meanings of 
accident that Aristotle uses. Joseph, for example, describes the fallacy as occurring when a “subject has 
divers accidental predicates, i.e. predicates indicating attributes which are not commensurate with it nor 
essential to it; what is predicable of the subject may or may not be predicable of these accidents, and vice 
versa” (Joseph, 1916, p. 587). Joseph, therefore, interprets συμβεβηκὸς as signifying accident as a 
predicable and perhaps even accident as a predicament. For he does not distinguish the two. He fails to 
see that συμβεβηκὸς indicates accidental being or being per accidens as opposed to being καθ’ αὑτό or per 
se as we will see below. Allan Bäck, who endeavors to distinguish the meanings, conflates the meaning of 
accident as a predicament and the meaning of accident as a predicable. He states, “On the usual view, 
‘accident’ is understood in the sense of ‘accidental predication’: what is not said of but is in a subject; the 
relationship holding when the predicate is not in the essence of the subject [Cat. 2; An. Po. I.4]” (Bäck, 
2015, p. 151). Cf. Bäck also pp. 146-148. Bäck correctly negates the possibility that the fallacy of the 
accident is based on accidental predication, but then wrongly equates accidental predication with the 
accidental categories or predicaments. Later, Bäck conflates accident as a predicament with being per 
accidens: “being per accidens does not have being in its own right but through another” (2015, p. 153). Yet 
Aristotle (Meta 1026a33-b2) lists accidental predicaments (i.e., beings that do not exist in their own right 
but through another) as examples of beings per se when he distinguishes being per se from being per 
accidens! Cf. also Cat 1a20-b6. Bäck does properly identify the fallacy of the accident as using the meaning 
of accident as opposed to per se or καθ’ αὑτό being. So, while I agree with his assessment that the fallacy 
of the accident has to do with being per accidens and that (ps) Thomas Aquinas’ account of the fallacy is 
probably the closest to Aristotle’s meaning, he does not properly distinguish the meanings of accident 
that Aristotle uses and thus, his account of what Aristotle means by accident in the fallacy of the accident 
remains vague.  
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meaning corresponding to its opposites. Let us consider the different words to which 
accident is opposed, and accordingly lay out the various meanings of accident used by 
Aristotle. 
1. Accident as opposed to property. Aristotle defines one sense of accident—accident 
as a predicable—in the first book of the Topics. He defines it as follows, “accident is that 
which is no one of these; it is neither definition, nor property, nor genus, yet it belongs 
to the thing, and is able to belong and not belong to any one [thing]” (Top 102b4-6). An 
accident in this sense is an attribute that does not belong to the essence of the subject, as 
does definition or genus, and is not a necessary effect of the subject’s essence, as is a 
property. Rather, the accident both belongs to the subject and is able not to belong to the 
subject. It merely happens to belong.  
Accident in this sense is a predicable. A predicable is one of the five ways in 
which a name can be univocally and universally said of a subject. Accordingly, this 
sense of accident can only be understood as a kind of relation between a predicate and 
its subject.207 Thus the same term may be one predicable in one statement, but another 
predicable in another. ‘Having interior angles equal to two right angles’ is a property of 
triangles, but an accident of figures. ‘Triangle’ is a species of rectilinear plane figure, but 
a genus of isosceles.  
                                                     
207 Boethius takes the word accident in the fallacy of the accident to be referring to the accidental 
predication in a broad sense of anything that is outside of the definition of the subject. Cf. Gelber, 1987, 
pp. 111-112. For an interpretation similar to Boethius’, cf. Botting, 2011, p. 274 and p. 268.  
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Accident as a predicable is opposed to genus, species, and specific difference 
insofar as it does not signify anything in the definition of the subject. It is opposed to a 
property insofar as it does not necessarily belong to the subject and is not caused by 
what the subject is, while a property will necessarily be in the subject and an effect of 
what the subject is. Thus, accident in this sense is opposed to the other four predicables 
insofar as it is not a necessary predicate. More specifically, we consider this meaning of 
accident as opposed to property because property is the predicable that is closest in 
meaning to accident while still being opposed. 
The meaning of accident in the fallacy of the accident cannot be the meaning of 
accident opposed to property because Aristotle’s examples use property and genus 
predication.208 For instance, in example 1) given above, having interior angles equal to 
two right angles is a property of triangle, and figure is the genus of triangle. Therefore, 
neither of the premises in the example use accidental predication in the sense of 
accident as opposed to property.  
2. Accident as opposed to substance. In the second chapter of the Categories, Aristotle 
divides all beings—said without intertwining—into substances and accidents. Aristotle 
distinguishes four ways of being through a crisscrossing of two divisions: in and not in 
an underlying, and said of and not said of an underlying (Cat 1a20-b8). A primary or 
                                                     
208 Bäck also denies that ‘accident’ in the fallacy of the accident refers to accidental predication (2009, p. 
102).  
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individual substance—like this man or this horse—is what is neither in an underlying 
nor said of an underlying. A secondary or universal substance—like man or horse—is 
said of an underlying but is not in an underlying (Cat 2a10-19). A particular accident—
like this knowledge of grammar or this white—is in an underlying but is not said of an 
underlying, and lastly, a universal accident—like science or white—is both said of an 
underlying and in an underlying. 
Accident in this sense is a kind of predicament.209 It is an accident that is 
considered absolutely. That is, this accident does not express the relation of a predicate 
to its subject, but rather it is a form of being. Thus, habit is an accident in the sense of a 
predicament even if it is predicated of virtue—in which case it would not be an accident 
in the sense of a predicable. Accident in this sense then can be considered as opposed to 
substance.  
 Once again, this sense of accident cannot be the meaning of accident used in the 
fallacy of the accident. For many valid syllogisms are constructed using predicamental 
accidents as both subjects and predicates. Consider the following argument: 
1) Every habit which leads to happiness is a habit of acting according to right reason. 
Virtue is a habit which leads to happiness. 
Virtue is a habit of acting according to right reason. 
None of the terms in the argument are primary or secondary substances, and yet the 
syllogism is valid and true. Requiring all arguments to be constructed with at least 
                                                     
209 Predicament is the traditional Latin name for the categories or σχήματα τῆς κατηγορίας.  
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some substance terms would render invalid much of Aristotle’s philosophical 
reasoning. Moreover, many of Aristotle’s examples of the fallacy of the accident involve 
terms in the category of substance such as, 
2) Coriscus is different from Socrates. 
Socrates is a man. 
Therefore, Coriscus is different from a man.210 
 
Aristotle, in explaining this example, says that Socrates “is a man accidentally” or 
translating in a more literal way “just happens to be a man.”211 Clearly, the meaning of 
accident as opposed to substance cannot serve as our basis of understanding the fallacy 
of the accident because many good syllogisms use only accidental terms, while 
examples of the fallacy can use substance terms.  
3. Accident as opposed to subject. Aristotle sometimes uses συμβεβηκὸς to mean 
simply predicate regardless of which kind of predicate it is, accidental or essential (cf. 
for instance, APo 73b8-10; Top 152a33-37; Top 152b25-29). Michael of Ephesus claims 
that this is the meaning of accident in the fallacy of the accident.212 In other words, 
according to his position, Aristotle could have just as well call the sophism the fallacy of 
the predicate. There are two reasons this interpretation cannot be so. First, it seems clear 
that all of the examples of the fallacy turn on something accidental in a more common 
sense. Take for instance example 4): Socrates’ being different from Coriscus is accidental 
                                                     
210 εἰ ὁ Κορίσκος ἕτερον ἀνθρώπου, αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ ἕτερος· ἔστι γὰρ ἄνθρωπος (SE 166b32-33). 
211 διὰ τὸ συμβεβηκέναι οὗ ἔφησεν ἕτερον εἶναι, τοῦτον εἶναι ἄνθρωπον (SE 166b33-35).  
212 Cf. Michael of Ephesus, 1898, p. 37.23-26. Cf. also Leone Gazziero, 2015, pp. 334-341. 
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to that fact that he is a man. Second, as we will see below, this interpretation does not 
consider that Aristotle characterizes the sophists as being concerned with accidental 
being or being per accidens (Meta 1026b14-21).  
4. Accident as opposed to through itself (καθ’ αὑτό). In the Metaphysics, Aristotle 
distinguishes between being καθ’ αὑτό—being through itself as such—and being per 
accidens, or more literally through just happening (κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς).  
‘Being’ is said, on the one hand, according to accident, and on the other hand 
through itself. According to accident, for instance, we say that the just one is 
musical, and man is musical and the musical one is a man—resembling those 
saying that the musical one builds because it has just happened to the builder to 
be musical or [it has just happened] to the musical one to build (for that this is 
this signifies that this has happened to that)—and so too in the examples 
mentioned: for when we say a man is musical and the musical one is a man or 
the white is musical or this is white, in the first cases we say that both are 
accidental to the same thing, and in the latter that it has happened to a being, 
while with ‘the musical is a man’ [we are saying] that the musical has happened 
to this. (So too it is said that the not-white is because that to which it is accidental 
is.) Consequently, those are said according to accident in this way either for the 
reason that both belong to the same being, or that it belongs to that being, or that 
that of which it is predicated, to which it belongs, is.213 
 
                                                     
213 Τὸ ὂν λέγεται τὸ μὲν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τὸ δὲ καθ’ αὑτό, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μέν, οἷον τὸν δίκαιον 
μουσικὸν εἶναί φαμεν καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον μουσικὸν καὶ τὸν μουσικὸν ἄνθρωπον, παραπλησίως 
λέγοντες ὡσπερεὶ τὸν μουσικὸν οἰκοδομεῖν ὅτι συμβέβηκε τῷ οἰκοδόμῳ μουσικῷ εἶναι ἢ τῷ μουσικῷ 
οἰκοδόμῳ (τὸ γὰρ τόδε εἶναι τόδε σημαίνει τὸ συμβεβηκέναι τῷδε τόδε),  – οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν 
εἰρημένων· τὸν γὰρ ἄνθρωπον ὅταν μουσικὸν λέγωμεν καὶ τὸν μουσικὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἢ τὸν λευκὸν 
μουσικὸν ἢ τοῦτον λευκόν, τὸ μὲν ὅτι ἄμφω τῷ αὐτῷ συμβεβήκασι, τὸ δ’ ὅτι τῷ ὄντι συμβέβηκε, τὸ δὲ 
μουσικὸν ἄνθρωπον ὅτι τούτῳ τὸ μουσικὸν συμβέβηκεν (οὕτω δὲ λέγεται καὶ τὸ μὴ λευκὸν εἶναι, ὅτι 
ᾧ συμβέβηκεν, ἐκεῖνο ἔστιν)·  – τὰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς εἶναι λεγόμενα οὕτω λέγεται ἢ διότι τῷ 
αὐτῷ ὄντι ἄμφω ὑπάρχει, ἢ ὅτι ὄντι ἐκείνῳ ὑπάρχει, ἢ ὅτι αὐτὸ ἔστιν ᾧ ὑπάρχει οὗ αὐτὸ 
κατηγορεῖται (Meta 1017a7-22). 
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Thomas Aquinas points out that this distinction should not be confused with the 
distinction between substance and accident.214 Here Aristotle is recognizing different 
sorts of being according to accident, but all involve a link between two kinds of beings 
that are only accidentally one. Being is said according to accident A) when an accident 
is linked with substance, like the musical is man or B) when a substance is linked to an 
accident, like the man is musical or C) when one accident is linked to another accident 
like the just is musical.  
Notice the link between the two accidents that happen together is not a link 
through predication, but a link through the two beings that accidentally exist together. 
Aristotle is not describing an accidental relation of subject and predicate, but an 
accidental union in reality. This is not to say that a predication cannot result from the 
accidental unity as when Aristotle mentions that some say the musical one builds the 
house, but this predication is a result of the more fundamental accidental unity in 
reality of the builder and the musician.  
More importantly, from this passage we can conclude an important implication 
of καθ’ αὑτό: it is an attribute that belongs to the thing as such. It is not the musician as 
such who builds the house, but the builder who happens to be a musician. If one says 
that the builder built the house, that is καθ’ αὑτό because it is the builder insofar as he is 
                                                     
214 Cf. Aquinas, 1961, bk. 5, l. 9, n. 885.  
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a builder that builds the house. It is this sense of καθ’ αὑτό that is opposed to the 
meaning of accident used in the fallacy of the accident. 
Aristotle holds that the meaning of accident in the fallacy of the accident is opposed 
to being καθ’ αὑτό.215 Considering Plato’s position, Aristotle comments, 
Whence, in some way, Plato did not speak badly when he said that sophistry is 
concerned with non-being. For the sophists’ arguments, I say, are especially about 
with what is accidental; [The question, for instance,] if the musical and the 
grammatical are the same or different; and if musical Coriscus and Coriscus are the 
same; and if everything that is but has not always been has come to be, so that if the 
musical one has become grammatical, then the grammatical one has become 
musical; and so on with other such arguments. For what is accidental seems to be 
near to non-being.216  
 
Aristotle is clearly saying that the fallacy of the accident is based on accidental being 
insofar as it may be expressed in a statement. For a statement such as the musical 
becomes grammatical expresses what is close to non-being. It is not the musical as such 
that becomes grammatical. For musical and the man who is able to be grammatical are 
only one per accidens, and so it is the man who is able to be grammatical who becomes 
grammatical καθ’ αὑτό. 
                                                     
215 Cf. SE 170a4: καὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ καθ’ αὑτό ὁ παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός.  
216 διὸ Πλάτων τρόπον τινὰ οὐ κακῶς τὴν σοφιστικὴν περὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν ἔταξεν. εἰσὶ γὰρ οἱ τῶν σοφιστῶν 
λόγοι περὶ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ὡς εἰπεῖν μάλιστα πάντων, πότερον ἕτερον ἢ ταὐτὸν μουσικὸν καὶ 
γραμματικόν, καὶ μουσικὸς Κορίσκος καὶ Κορίσκος, καὶ εἰ πᾶν ὃ ἂν ᾖ, μὴ ἀεὶ δέ, γέγονεν, ὥστ᾽ εἰ 
μουσικὸς ὢν γραμματικὸς γέγονε, καὶ γραμματικὸς ὢν μουσικός, καὶ ὅσοι δὴ ἄλλοι τοιοῦτοι τῶν 
λόγων εἰσίν: φαίνεται γὰρ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ἐγγύς τι τοῦ μὴ ὄντος (Meta 1026b14-21).  
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II.IV Species of the Fallacy 
To further clarify this interpretation of the fallacy, let us consider the three modes or 
species of the fallacy according to (ps) Thomas Aquinas. The modes are three places or 
topics (τόποι) from which the sophist can derive numerous fallacies of the accident. 
Aquinas describes the first mode as follows: 
The first mode results from this: namely, it proceeds from the accident to the subject. 
or vice versa. For example, I know Coriscus, Coriscus is coming, and therefore I 
know the one coming. But this does not follow since coming and Coriscus are one 
per accidens, and not per se.”217 
 
The first species of the fallacy of the accident comes from assuming that what is true of 
an accident—as opposed to property—is also true of the substance or vice versa.  In this 
case, “Coriscus” acts as a middle term and insofar as “I” know Coriscus, it is accidental 
to his coming. Insofar as Coriscus is known by me, he just happens to be coming. 
 The second mode of the fallacy of the accident according to Aquinas occurs when 
what belongs to the higher in universality is attributed to something lower on the 
Porphyrian Tree.  
The second mode is when something that belongs to the superior is concluded of 
the inferior, or vice versa. For example, man is an animal; animal is a genus; 
therefore man is a genus. But this does not follow because the higher and the 
lower are in some way one per accidens, although in another way they may be one 
per se. 218 
                                                     
217 Primus modus provenit ex eo quod proceditur ab accidente ad subiectum, vel e converso sicut hic: cognosco 
Coriscum. Coriscus est veniens. Igitur cognosco venientem. Non sequitur: quia veniens et Coriscus sunt unum per 
accidens, et non per se ((ps) Aquinas, 1976, c. 12). This example is given by Aristotle at SE 179a30-b5. 
218 Secundus modus est quando illud quod convenit superiori concluditur in inferiori, vel e converso, sicut hic: homo 
est animal, et animal est genus: igitur homo est genus. Non sequitur: superius enim et inferius aliquo modo sunt 
unum per accidens, licet alio modo sint unum per se ((ps) Aquinas, 1976, c. 12).  
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Since a subject and a predicate are on two different levels of universality—even if the 
predicate is in the definition of the subject or vice versa—they cannot be in every way 
identical. The sophist can manipulate this difference in order to make it appear as 
though the two terms are necessarily connected when they are not. Man is an animal, 
but animal is a genus. Therefore, man is a genus. In this fallacy, it is accidental to animal 
insofar as it is said of man, that it is a genus. 
 The third mode of the fallacy of the accident comes about when what is 
predicated of a predicable property is assumed to belong to the subject of that property.  
The third mode comes when you proceed from the species to the property or vice 
versa. For example, man is risible, but risible is a property, and therefore man is a 
property. Or in this way: man is a species, but the risible is a man. Thus the 
risible is a species. But this does not follow because risible and man are not in 
every way the same according to definition, and therefore risible is not the same, 
and in some way, one is related to the other per accidens and is extraneous, and 
on account of this it is not necessary that whatever is true of one is true of the 
other.219 
 
In the third mode of the fallacy of the accident, a property, in the predicable sense, is 
predicated of a subject and from this predication, the fallacy may result. Although the 
property is convertible with the subject, it is not part of the essence of the subject. For 
instance, man and risible are convertible but the definition of risible is not identical to 
                                                     
219 Tertius modus provenit quando proceditur a specie ad proprium, vel e converso, sicut hic: homo est risibilis. Sed 
risibile est proprium: igitur homo est proprium. Vel sic: homo est species: risibile est homo; ergo risibile est species. 
Non sequitur: quia risibile et homo non sunt omnino idem secundum definitionem, et ideo aliquo modo unum se 
habet ad alterum per accidens et extraneum, et propter hoc non est necesse quod quidquid verificatur de uno, 
verificetur de altero ((ps) Aquinas, 1976, c. 12). 
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the definition of man, and so there will be different attributes that can be said of 
risible—such as it is a property—that cannot be said of man. It is accidental to risible 
that it is a property insofar as it is said of man. 
II.V “Said of All” Principle 
This interpretation is not without its difficulties. It seems that syllogism 8) may be taken 
to violate Aristotle’s so-called “said of all” principle for the predicamental order given 
in the Categories.  
 If something is predicated of another as of an underlying, the predicates that are said 
of what is being predicated will also be said of what is underlying, as “man” is 
predicated of this man, but “animal” of man. Thus, “animal” will be predicated of this 
man also because this man is both a man and an animal.220 
 
Whatever predicate is said of another predicate as of an underlying will be said of 
whatever that predicate is said of as an underlying.221 So, if man is an animal, and 
Socrates is a man, then Socrates is an animal. However, relation is said of half of four 
and half of four is said of two. It appears that either two must be a relation or Aristotle’s 
“said of all” principle is incorrect or imprecise. Aristotle’s hands appear to be tied. 
Either he keeps the “said of all” principle in which case many false conclusions follow 
                                                     
220 Ὅταν ἕτερον καθ’ ἑτέρου κατηγορῆται ὡς καθ’ ὑποκειμένου, ὅσα κατὰ τοῦ κατηγορουμένου 
λέγεται, πάντα καὶ κατὰ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ῥηθήσεται· οἷον ἄνθρωπος κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου 
κατηγορεῖται, τὸ δὲ ζῷον κατὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου· οὐκοῦν καὶ κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου τὸ ζῷον 
κατηγορηθήσεται· ὁ γὰρ τὶς ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἄνθρωπός ἐστι καὶ ζῷον (Cat 1b10-15).  
221 Some commentators claim that Aristotle also implies this principle in the Prior Analytics (24b26-30). Cf. 
for instance, Bäck, 2015, p. 150. However, the interpretations of the passage are varied (cf. Smith ,1989, p. 
111). While I do not find such an interpretation out of the question, it does not seem to be the most likely 
reading of the passage. Whether or not the Posterior Analytics’ passage should be read in imply the “said 
of all” principle, it is clearly stated in the Categories.  
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from true premises as in syllogism 8), or he abandons the “said of all” principle and 
many valid syllogisms like syllogism 7) no longer follow. Taking the latter course 
would seriously undermine his form of reasoning in other works.  
 Nevertheless, Aristotle’s “said of all” principle must be read in light of what else 
is said in the Categories. Aristotle clearly had some restrictions to his “said of all” 
principle. He claims that sometimes a predicamental accident is predicated of a 
substance, but the account of that accident cannot be predicated of the substance (Cat 
2a27-34).222 Moreover, the Categories treats only of strictly univocal terms while 
equivocal terms are excluded from the treatment. Aristotle’s definition of univocal may 
help us to understand that the fallacy of the accident is not a violation of his “said of 
all” principle.  
Things are called univocal whose name is common and the account of the substance 
according to the name is the same, as for instance, both man and ox [are called] 
animal. For man and ox are called by the common name animal, and the account of 
the substance is the same. For if someone gives an account of the ‘what it is’ for each 
of them to be animal, he will give the same account.223 
 
Univocal is used here in a strict sense. Not only does the meaning of the term need to 
remain the same, but “the account of the substance according to the name” must be 
common. As long as the middle term in the argument is said in this strict sense of 
                                                     
222 A number of commentators have noted that the rule does not hold in this case (cf. for instance, 
Philoponus, 1898, p. 38). 
223 συνώνυμα δὲ λέγεται ὧν τό τε ὄνομα κοινὸν καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ὁ αὐτός, οἷον 
ζῷον ὅ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ βοῦς· τούτων γὰρ ἑκάτερον κοινῷ ὀνόματι προσαγορεύεται ζῷον, καὶ ὁ 
λόγος δὲ τῆς οὐσίας ὁ αὐτός· ἐὰν γὰρ ἀποδιδῷ τις τὸν ἑκατέρου λόγον τί ἐστιν αὐτῶν ἑκατέρῳ τὸ 
ζῴῳ εἶναι, τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ἀποδώσει (Cat 1a6-12). 
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univocal—said according to the account of the substance (λόγος τῆς οὐσίας) or 
according the account of what it is (λόγον τί ἐστιν)—and as long as the major term is 
predicated of the middle term by the same strict univocity, then whatever is predicated 
of the middle term will be predicated of the minor term.  
 Consequently, the “said of all” principle stands as long as the terms in the 
premises are predicated according to their strict univocity. In my interpretation, this 
will ensure that the middle term is not accidentally related to the major term insofar as 
it is related to the minor term because the account of the substance of the middle term 
will be the same in both cases. When discussing how to untie the fallacy of the accident, 
Aristotle claims that all the same predicates belong only to “whatever is one and 
undifferentiated according to substance.”224 Whenever the middle term is used in this 
strictly univocal sense, then the fallacy of the accident can be avoided, and the “said of 
all” principle stands. 
Nevertheless, this understanding of the “said of all” principle appears to pose 
another difficulty to my understanding of the fallacy of the accident. For it reduces the 
fallacy to a violation of the univocal use of the term. In other words, this reading of the 
fallacy of the accident makes it a form of the fallacy of equivocation where the use of the 
middle term is not used in the strict sense of univocal. Aristotle, however, prohibits the 
                                                     
224 τοῖς κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀδιαφόροις καὶ ἓν οὖσιν ἅπαντα (SE 179a35). 
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fallacy of accident or any fallacy outside of speech from being equated with the fallacy 
of equivocation (SE 179b38-180a30 and notes ad loc). 
This reading, however, does keep the two distinct fallacies separate insofar as the 
fallacy of equivocation is based on a meaning of ‘equivocation’ (ὁμωνυμία) that is not 
identical to the word’s meaning in the Categories. As was noted in the appendix on 
equivocation, Aristotle’s third and fourth examples reveal that the fallacy includes 
terms which signify the same thing in both cases but under different con-significations 
(cf. SE 165b39-166a7 and notes ad loc). These terms would not be equivocal in the sense 
of the Categories (1a1-5) because this sense of equivocal term must signify different 
things—not the same thing with different con-significations. Again, Aristotle appears to 
say that the second species of the fallacy involves mistaking a customarily used 
metaphor for a proper name (SE 166a16-17 and note ad loc).  Metaphors, however, are 
not equivocal in the sense of the Categories since they are not proper names and do not 
actually have two different meanings. In general, Aristotle uses the word equivocal in 
the Sophistical Refutations to describe the mistake of mixing up the different senses of 
one word, but in the Categories, Aristotle uses the word equivocal to exclude universal 
words that cannot be genera said equally of different species in a Porphyrian Tree. The 
ultimate distinction upon which the fallacy of the accident is based is not a distinction 
between the different senses of a word, but a distinction between accidental and 
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καθ' αὑτό being.225 In short, although the middle term in the fallacy of the accident 
violates the strict univocity of the Categories, the fallacy of the accident cannot be 
reduced to the fallacy of equivocation. 
Conclusion 
Aristotle holds that the fallacy of the accident deceives even “men of scientific 
knowledge (ἐπιστήμων)” (SE 168b6). He obviously took this fallacy seriously, and his 
treatment of it should not be considered careless. Although he has been criticized for 
lack of clarity and consistency, there is a consistent way to read Aristotle’s treatment of 
the fallacy that distinguishes it from the other fallacies outside of speech while 
accounting for his examples. Follow (ps) Thomas Aquinas, the fallacy of the accident 
can be understood as an argument with a defect in the use of the middle term where 
insofar as the middle term is connected with the minor term, it is accidentally connected 
with the major or vice versa. Only this sense of accidental can account both for the 
fallacy and explain how Socrates “just happens to be a man.” Detecting the fallacy 
requires that one intuits when the middle term is being used in this illegitimate way. 
My reading is not without difficulties because in order for the resolution of the fallacy 
                                                     
225 This is not to say that a specific example of the fallacy of the accident will not involve equivocal or 
ambiguous speech. In example 5), the premise “Everything in the material world is changing”, can be 
taken in more than one sense. However, the ultimate cause of the example’s deceptive nature is not the 
various senses of “everything,” but the distinction between things in the material world and the things in 
the material world as changing. Cf. Albertus Magnus I, 1890, tr. 2, c. 4, pp. 563-564 and SE 165b25 note ad 
loc. This, of course explains why some commentators wanted to reduce the fallacy of the accident to the 
fallacy of equivocation although Aristotle repeatedly denies that this can be done. Cf. for instance, SE 
179b38ff.  Cf. also Micheal Ephesus, 1898, p. 59, 21-23 and Ebbesen, 1988, I, p. 226.   
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not to violate the “said of all” principle from the Categories, one might equate the defect 
of the fallacy to a form of equivocation—an equation that Aristotle prohibits. 
Nevertheless, this interpretation of the fallacy does leave room for a possible resolution 






ἀγωνιστικός-competitive 165b11, 174a12, 175a1, 1360b22, 1361b21, 1413b9 
(ὁ) ἀγωνιζόμενος- a competitor, 172b35 
ἄδοξος-unendoxic, a disreputable opinion. Opposed to ἔνδοξος; 183a15, 176a31, 174b17 
ἀναιρέω-do away with, 178b14; Aristotle uses this verb to express one reaction of the 
questioner to a sophistical argument. As opposed to distinguishing the senses of a 
statement or showing that an argument does not follow, a questioner may “do away 
with” one of the premises of the argument. “To do away with” a premise is to argue 
that it is false and thus not accept it in dialectical disputation. Cf. SE 178b12-19. 
ἀντίφασις-contradiction  




ἀποδεικτικός, ή, όν- demonstrable 73a23 
ἀπόδειξις-demonstration 73a25 
ἀπόφανσις-statement “A statement is either side of a contradiction, a contradiction is 
an opposition of which there is no middle according to itself, and a part of a 
contradiction is, the one, the saying of something about something, the other, the 




ἀπορεῖν-to be perplexed 182b34ff 
ἀρχή-beginning, principle 
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ἀσυλλόγιστος-unsyllogistic, 77b40, 91b23 
γνώμη-judgment. 1395a11 (sg., 1394a22) Cf. also footnote for passage at 176b18. 
διαίρεσις- distinction or division. 171a19 When this word is used to name the fallacy of 
composition and division it is translated as division such as at 177a34. However, when 
the word’s verbal form is used to signify the act by which one makes unties a fallacy 
with a distinction it is translated as distinguish. See the following.    
διαιρέω-distinguish see Pol.1295a8, while the primary meaning of the verb is to divide 
96b15, it seems to mean distinguish in 168b9 and though out chapter 7. Every division is 
a distinction but not every distinction implies a division. Divide implies some whole 
and distinguish does not. For instance, we can distinguish being from non-being, but 
there is not whole to divide into the parts of being and non-being. 175a20 Distinction, 
therefore, is a more universal term that holds division as one of its species.  
διακείμενον-intransitive 166b14 
διαλέγω- to dialogue, discuss, practice dialectic. 154a34, 176a13, 159a7 
διάνοια-thought 170b14ff More specifically, I understand this thought to be the result of 
thinking. See Hippocrates G. Apostle’s translation of Posterior Analytics pg. 317 
δίδωμι-grant, concede 
διορισμός-definition (I would prefer to translate this as definition but I have yet to find 
any evidence for this meaning in Aristotle outside of the text at hand 168a23.) However, 
Aristotle generally uses ορισμός for definition 6a18, 8a29 and διαιρεσις division 16a12. 
διορίζω-define 73a27 
δύνᾰμαι-is able 169a32 
δύναμις-ability, power 
ἔλεγχος-refutation 
ἐναντίος-contrary, opposite 24a25, b10: The word may have the technical meaning 
given in to it in dialectic meaning question requiring the answer to commit to one of 
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two contradictory premises. It is the question is A B or not B. The answer of such a 
question would thus form the premise of a dialectical—or sophistical—syllogism. 
ἔνδοξος-endox Top.100b21, 165b8, cf. EN1145b5, Rh.1355a17.  
ἕξις-condition, habit 
ἐπιχείρημα- dialectical syllogism, See Topics 162a16, 174b29 
ἐπιχειρητέον- one must syllogize dialectically, See Topics 120b8, 174b31. Coughlin at 
101a30 translates ἐπιχειρεῖν as to take in hand but the etymology does not apply so 
well in all instances. 
ἐπιχειρέω-attempt 179b21 
ἔργον-proper activity 183a39, 165a26ff. Aristotle does not define ἔργον. Plato’s Socrates 
offers an account of ἔργον that seems consistent with Aristotle’s use of the word: “the 
ἔργον of a horse or any other such thing, is either what someone does with it alone or 
with it best.” Republic 352e.  
ἐριστικός-contentious 165b8, 100b23-101a5, 171b4-172b9 
ἐρώτησις-question  
θέσις-thesis. “I call a “thesis” of an immediate syllogistic principle what one cannot 
show and which it is not necessary for one who is to learn something to have, but what 
is necessary for one who is to learn anything to have.” 72a14 [trans. Coughlin].  
κυρίως-properly, 166a16ff, 176a38 
κατάφασις-affirmation 17a25-36 
λαμβάνω-take, assume 






ὁμώνυ ̆μος-equivocal, 1a1 
ὅρος-definition Top.101b39: ἔστι ὅ. λόγος ὁ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι σημαίνων. 169a21 
ὅπερ ἐστί-what it is. 3b36, 73b8, 120b23 
παράδοξος-paradox, Aristotle uses the word synonymously with ἄδοξος. Cf. 172b10 
and note ad loc.  
παραλογισμός-fallacy 164a21. Note that in the Topics this word is opposed to a 
sophistical refutation and takes on a more specific meaning. In the Topics the word 
signifies fallacies that are determined to one kind of science. In the course of the 
Sophistical Refutations, Aristotle uses the word more generically to include any fallacy.  
παρεξέλεγχος- side refutation, 176a24, 181a21, 112a8 
 
πάσχειν-to undergo 178a13 
πάσχον-undergoing 166b14 
πῃ-in some respect 49a8 
πειραστικός-testing 
ποιεῖν-to make or do. When the word is clearly signifying the category, such as at 
178a13, it is translated as to act upon. 
ποιοῦν-acting upon 166b14ff 
πρᾶγμα-thing or subject. In 165a8 and 175a8 it is opposed to λόγος and ὄνομα and is 
therefore translated as thing. In 171b8ff and 169b23ff, it has the meaning of a subject of a 
discipline.   
πραγματεία-work 165a37, 100a18  
πρότᾰσις-premise, proposition 24a16, 169a8 172b37 




συμβαίνω-happen/happen accidentally, as a participle it is rendered accident “falling 
together” 
συμπέρασμα-conclusion 30a5, 42a5, 155b23, 71b21 170a28 
συνάγω-infer Rhet 1357a8, 1395b25, Meta 1042a3, Pol 1299b12 
συνώνυμος- synonym at 167a24. The word usually means univocal in Aristotle, see 1a5, 
however he does use it to mean synonym, see 1405a1 
στέρησις-privation 
τόδε τι-this something 
τὸ διὰ τί- the “why” 
τόπος-place. The Greek word is τόπος which literally means place. Obviously here the 
meaning is not place in its first sense but in the extended sense using in the Aristotle’s 
logical bearing its name: Topics. That is, a rule for choosing a dialectical proposition 
most appropriate to refute a given opinion. The subject of the Topics are the dialectical 
places and the subject of the Sophistical Refutations are the sophistical places. 
τρόπος-way: Although our word mode is closer to the Latin modus, the translation of 
τροπος by ‘way’ has the advantage of implying order. τρόπος, however, literally means 
turn. In a certain respect, it is closer to our idea of perspective or point of view. Different 
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